Handbook of Surveillance Technologies (3rd Ed) - The Real Faces of ...

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Handbook of Surveillance Technologies the framework of other or general intelligence activities” and, conversely, other intelligence directives (e.g., electronic intelligence) were not considered directly applicable to COMINT. This point of view was later revised. In 1952, a study was carried out under the chairmanship of Herbert Brownell to survey U.S. communications intelligence (COMINT), with a focus on the functions of AFSA. This became known as the “Brownell Committee Report”. The Report suggested that better national coordination and direction were needed, provoking action on the part of President Harry S. Truman. In an October 1952 Memorandum, President Truman designated the Secretaries of State and Defense as a Special Committee of the National Security Council for COMINT to establish COMINT policies and to provide policy advisement, with help from the Director of the CIA, through the National Security Council. This document further established the Department of Defense (DoD) as the executive agent for the production of COMINT information. The 1948 Intelligence Directive No. 9 by the National Security Council was revised in December 1952 in response to this Memorandum. As a result of these studies and memoranda, security responsibilities were shifted from AFSA to the National Security Agency (NSA), with a broader mandate of national responsibility for communications intelligence. The responsibilities of the U.S. Communications Intelligence Board were revised as well. Electronic intelligence remained within the mandate of the armed services. Two decades later, the NSA again was granted broader powers. The National Security Act of 1947 was amended in 1953 to empower the President, with the support of the Senate, to appoint the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (DDCI) who would stand in for the Director if he could not perform his duties or in the event of a vacancy in the position. In 1958, further reorganization clarified the hierarchy of command and increased the authority and control of the Secretary of Defense. In 1986, the organizational structure would be changed again. Post-War Prosperity and Baby-Boom Years At this point in history, surveillance technologies were used almost exclusively by government and law enforcement agencies and were rarely seen in civilian applications. It was an era of trust and focus on personal responsibility. In the 1950s, in small and mid-sized towns in the U.S. and Canada, it was rare for people to lock their homes or their cars. Burglar alarms in businesses were uncommon and in homes, extraordinarily rare. Post office buildings stayed open 24 hours so people with rented boxes could retrieve their mail when it was convenient, and small children played in parks unattended. In sharp contrast, at the national level, policies on national security were being revised to increase security and surveillance, in the face of growing Cold War fears of Communist expansion. In the past, the FBI and other national investigative organizations had the reputation of being shadowy entities, but with the proliferation of television and long-distance communications in general, government agencies came under greater public scrutiny. Then, in the mid-1950s, the FBI’s name became more prominently associated with solving terrorist crimes when a highprofile case came to public attention. In 1955, a plane exploded in midair in Colorado, and it was the FBI that pieced together evidence to assist local law enforcement agents in winning a case against the person who planted the bomb. U.S. Congress enacted laws to provide the FBI with greater powers to investigate racketeering, gambling, and civil rights violations. The powers of the NSA were also expanded. In September 1958, electronic intelligence (ELINT) was added by Directive (NSCID 6) to the responsibilities of the National Security Agency. This Directive was revised in January 1961. 38
Chapter 1 - Introduction & Overview At the same time, the perspective on intelligence functions was broadening and the motives and responsibilities of government were scrutinized [underlined for emphasis]: Information on the military strength and plans of a potential enemy is highly important, but intelligence agencies cannot concentrate solely on the military because armed forces are only an instrument of policy. They must, at the same time, gather information on the aims and objectives of those who decide on the use of this instrument. Military power is only one of many assets of the policy makers. Therefore, it is obvious that the collection of political intelligence is a matter of the first order, more so now than ever before, since the “hot war” has become a highly dangerous instrument of politics. The relative uselessness of the military instrument in the direct solution of political conflicts has extraordinarily enhanced the importance of the nonmilitary spheres of the international power struggle–diplomacy, economic and cultural policies, propaganda, psychological warfare, and subversive activity.... [Dr. Georg Walter, “Intelligence Services”, Military Review, August 1964.] Public Announcements, Cuba, and Cold War Fears Cars and TVs profoundly changed society in the 1950s and 1960s. As the population increased, it also became more mobile. During the baby-boom years, automobiles made it possible for people to commute to work while living in less expensive houses in outlying areas now called suburbs. With increased mobility, neighbors and neighborhoods were in constant flux and suspicions increased. Public service announcers and insurance companies began using television to entreat people to lock their doors and their vehicles. This change of habits on a personal level would eventually fuel public demand for consumer surveillance devices. The sixties was a period of rapid change and turbulent times. The birth control pill became available, recreational drug use increased, civil rights issues were frequently on the news, and Cuba was invaded by Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs with support from the CIA, in April 1961. Then, in October 1962, the Cuban Missile Crisis erupted when intelligence services discovered Soviet-manufactured nuclear missiles in Cuba that were capable of reaching the U.S. This touched a nerve in a generation sensitized to the devastation of WWII. It also illustrated an aspect of American politics that is often questioned—there is a general assumption by Americans that a democratic superpower knows what’s best for the rest of the world and has a right to bear nuclear arms while keeping them out of the hands of other nations. Most people would acknowledge this as a double standard and those opposed to the incongruity might even argue that the U.S., in global terms, is hanging onto its might and right in the same way the Confederates held onto their might and right to preserve their superiority and status quo in pre-Civil War days. Regardless of the interpretation, however, the fear of nuclear proliferation in the sixties resulted in an increase in foreign surveillance in general, and technologies designed to find or defeat nuclear weapons flourished because the nuclear arms race was no longer confined to the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. New facilities were built and procedures implemented to improve international intelligencegathering. The modeling of foreign terrain, buildings, and weapons systems is one way to build a composite picture of a foreign nation’s priorities and capabilities. In the mid-1960s, the CIA established a workshop for creating hand-crafted 3D models based on surveillance photos and intelligence reports. This facility operated for the next three decades. Computer modeling now serves much the same purpose. 39
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American Intelligence Journal 94 Am
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lack hole 669 black light 619, 640,
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chemical weapons 57 Chemical Weapon
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CODIS 849 DNA 815, 817 entomology 7
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energy 626 spectrum 295, 356, 419 e
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Franklin, Rosalind E. 832 fraud 54,
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hypothermia 70 HySub 262 I IANA 993
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keylogger 983 key pad 154 keystroke
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Middle East 21 MiG 384 migration 63
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India 209 underground 208 nuclear w
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Privacy for Consumers and Workers A
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eplication 114, 120 Repository of S
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sniffer 74, 692, 726, 779, 788 soap
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Surveillance Towed Array Sensor 253
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U.S. Office of Naval Research 218,
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wire gauge 113 wireless 107, 113, 1
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