Knowing Endangerment - Hanford Challenge

warnings by safety experts, threatening workers with job loss if they reported injuries, and knowingly
submitting false information regarding lost-time injuries. 19
The 16 exposures also triggered a large scale investigation by the DOE and culminated in a highlevel,
comprehensive Type B Investigation of Hanford Tank Farms Vapor Exposures, released in
April of 1992. 20 The Type B Investigation found numerous problems underlying the then primary
tank farms contractor‟s (Westinghouse Hanford Corporation (WHC)) inability to protect its tank
farm workers, and concluded there were 37 “judgments of need” to be translated into corrective
action. 21 The Type B Investigation resulted in the implementation of supplied air for workers at 84
of the 177 tanks, constant air monitoring by Industrial Hygiene Technicians (IHT) at all sites where
supplied air was not being used, requirements to characterize of tank contents and vapors, the
creation and implementation of a tank farms Health and Safety Plan (HASP), and a plan to install
permitted ventilation on single shell tanks. Reports of exposures decreased as a result of the
implementation of these controls. Unfortunately, this did not last long.
The Hewitt Report
In July 1996, Westinghouse released a report, Tank Waste Remediation System Resolution of
Potentially Hazardous Vapors Issue, authored by an employee named Elton Hewitt. 22 The Hewitt
report concluded that due to implementation of controls around potential vapor release points,
characterization of tank contents and vapors, and “as a result of better communications regarding
vapor odors and risks” following the Type B Investigation, “employee exposure incidents have
virtually ceased” and the vapor problem had been “resolved.” 23
In reaching this conclusion, Hewitt noted that while ammonia and nitrous oxide compounds routinely
were present in concentrations greater than 5 times permissible exposure limits (PELs) in the
headspace of tanks, when vented, they did not pose a hazard to workers because barriers had been
installed around release points and effective controls were in place. The report went on to assert that
even if control measures failed, because ammonia has such a distinct odor and can be smelled at
levels below the PEL, employees could leave the area before any overexposures occurred. 24
Additionally, while acknowledging that “potential carcinogens have been identified as being present
in the tank headspace,” Hewitt postulated that
these chemicals are present at sufficiently low concentrations so that employees can
be protected from overexposure by maintaining their ammonia exposure level below
its PEL [25 ppm]. By protecting employees from an excess exposure to ammonia,
the resulting exposure to other materials would also be at acceptable levels. 25
19 Id.
20 DOE-RL, 1992 TYPE B INVESTIGATION, supra note 6.
21 Id. at 5.15 – 5.19.
22 Elton R. Hewitt, et. al., WESTINGHOUSE HANFORD COMPANY [hereinafter WHC] , TANK WASTE
REMEDIATION SYSTEM RESOLUTION OF POTENTIALLY HAZARDOUS VAPORS ISSUE (WHC-SD-TWR-RPT-001) (June
24, 1996) [hereinafter HEWITT REPORT].
23 Id. at 2.
24 Id. at 17.
25 Id. at 7-8.
8