Knowing Endangerment - Hanford Challenge

The “Investigation of Events” chapter of the 2001 CH2M Hill Hanford Group (CHG) Conduct of Operations
Manual states that a systematic investigation should occur when workplace conditions are abnormal or
unexplained, or hazardous material limits are exceeded. According to CHG procedure, the investigation should
involve collecting data on the initial conditions, taking statements from involved personnel, and obtaining computer
printouts, copies of log books, work permits, and procedures. The actual responses to the event or abnormality
should be documented and then compared to the expected responses, and detrimental effects of safety issues should
be determined. Once the investigation and reconstruction of the event has occurred, the root cause(s) of the event
should be determined, in order to preclude recurrence of the event. Ultimately, a final Investigation Report should
be prepared, and distributed as a Lessons Learned to those who may benefit from the information.
It is apparent that neither the U.S. Department of Energy nor CHG are willing to truly investigate the recent
abnormal events occurring at the Hanford Nuclear Reservation in Eastern Washington, involving dozens of tank
farm workers being exposed to toxic chemical vapors and requiring medical attention. The Hanford Joint Council, a
mediation board responsible for investigating and resolving conflicts between workers and DOE contractors, was
recently eliminated by the Department of Energy. Thus, the Government Accountability Project (GAP), at the
request of several tank farm workers, has endeavored to conduct its own investigation, using CHG’s Investigation
Criteria. GAP has compiled the following information through Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests,
through interviews with tank farm workers, health care providers, toxicologists, and others, and through review of
incident reports, deposition testimony, Problem Evaluation Requests, Occurrence Reports, Lessons Learned,
newsletters, newspaper stories, and other reports and background information provided to us and publicly available.
Though the information presented below may not be exhaustive, for example, if information has been withheld
through FOIA exemptions, it does form a minimum baseline of information from which it is possible to draw
conclusions.
It is GAP’s hope that this Investigation Report will trigger the DOE, CHG, and government policy makers to take
swift and decisive steps to protect the health and safety of Hanford’s Tank Farm workers.
This report was prepared by Clare Gilbert and Tom Carpenter of GAP’s Nuclear Oversight Campaign with
assistance provided by interns Billie Morelli, Jessica Barkas, Susannah Dougherty, Archana Dayalu, GAP’s
Jennifer Slagle, and Atis Muehlenbachs. GAP also thanks everyone who reviewed and commented upon drafts of
the report.
The Government Accountability Project (GAP) is a private, non-profit organization that advocates on behalf of
employees who witness and disclose fraud, waste and abuse, mismanagement, threats to public and worker health
and safety, and environmental violations. GAP has represented dozens of Hanford employees in various
whistleblower lawsuits since 1998.
Government Accountability Project
Nuclear Oversight Campaign
www.whistleblower.org
The photograph on the cover page was taken by Alan Berner of The Seattle Times
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