Knowing Endangerment - Hanford Challenge

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On June 14, 2002, headspace organics levels were consistently saturating the monitoring instrument, reading 9,999 ppm. When the IHT called in to report this, no one answered and he had to leave a message. When his call was returned, he was directed to proceed with monitoring, and call back if high levels were received again. A nearby health physics technician complained of a creosote odor. It wasn‟t until an hour later, when a pressurization alarm went off, that all personnel evacuated the farm. 71 On November 19, 2002, workers were wearing HEPA respirators in the presence of high levels of organics. HEPA respirators do not filter organic vapors. 72 In April 2003, the boundary demarcating the Air Monitoring Zone (AMZ) around an exhauster was reconfigured without the permission of the responsible IH person. Additionally, a vapor warning sign posted on the Constant Air Monitor (CAM) cabinet inside the AMZ was removed without the permission of the responsible IH person. 73 3. A Case Study in Monitoring Failure The limitations of CHG‟s monitoring policies and practices are clearly demonstrated by the fact that there are several recorded instances that even while the person conducting the monitoring is smelling odors, the monitoring equipment indicates that contaminant levels are non-detectible. 74 CHG asserts that this is because workers can smell ammonia at levels that are lower than the equipment monitoring equipment can detect. Yet, as explained above, ammonia can not be detected until it reaches concentrations of 5 ppm and cannot be recognized as ammonia until it reaches a concentration of around 50 ppm. There are several potential explanations for the failure in CHG‟s ability to detect the contaminants that workers are experiencing: Workers are smelling something other than ammonia, to which the monitoring equipment is not calibrated or is incapable of detecting. The vapors are coming out of the source in intermittent bursts too inconsistent and quick for the monitoring equipment to register. Monitoring is not being conducted at the right place – too far from the workers, not at the source, or not in the vapor plume. 71 CHG, IH DRI Survey,, ID # 02-0313, June 14, 2002 72 CHG, IH DRI Survey, ID # 02-2284, Nov. 19, 2002 73 PER-2003-1591, Apr. 22, 2003. 74 CHG, IH DRI Survey, ID # 02-0024, Jan. 26, 2002 (“Called out to investigate high odor report by power operator . . . slight odor was apparent . . . readings remained 0 ppm in field.”); CHG, IH DRI Survey, ID #02-0716, Jan. 29, 2002 (“Although no detectable readings were obtained, an odor was detected by the NPO, PO, IH, and IHT.”); CHG, IH DRI Survey, ID # 02-0107, April 1, 2002 (“Operator asked about organics as he said he smelled a stinky egg odor in hole when putting monitoring tube down into pit. I told him no organics were detected.”); CHG, IH DRI Survey, ID # 02-0325, June 19, 2002 (“A mild ammonia odor was detected around breather filter however it was below the detection level of the instrument.”); CHG, IH DRI Survey, ID # 02-0341, July 2, 2002 (“Checked around areas where workers were and nothing detected on ammonia instrument, however there was a mild to moderate ammonia odor detected by me.”); CHG, IH DRI Survey, ID # 02-2139, Aug. 30, 2002 (“All readings were 0 ppm. A very slight brief pungent smell occurred downwind of stack.”); CHG, IH DRI Survey, ID # 02-2198, Nov. 9 2002 (“A slight brief foul odor was smelled approx. 50‟ downwind of stack and no readings were detected.”); CHG, IH DRI Survey ID # 03-0246, Jan. 22, 2003 (“When doing this job you could smell a faint odor but nothing detectable on any of the instruments.”); CHG, IH DRI Survey ID # 03-0187, Feb. 10, 2003 (“Mild ammonia odor detected around AN exhauster area, but instrument showed
The wrong kind of monitoring equipment is being used. C. Personal Protective Equipment – CHG Procedures and Practices CHG safety procedures restrict tank farm employees from working in an area without approved respiratory protection where contaminant levels in the breathing zone may exceed 2 ppm (for three minutes) for volatile organic compounds (VOC) and/or 25 ppm for ammonia. When the Job Hazard Analysis (JHA) indicates that employees may be entering an area in excess of these levels, workers are supposed to be required to use a full face respirator with cartridges, usually the GME-P100. Additionally, CHG asserts that employees may receive a nuisance mask or a full face respirator at any time, upon request. 75 The HASP requires workers to wear supplied air respirators when a potentially hazardous atmosphere exists and any of the following occur: conditions are unknown or uncharacterized 76 contaminants have poor warning properties 77 contaminant concentrations exceed the respirator canister limits 78 contaminant concentrations are at levels that are considered to be immediately dangerous to life and health (IDLH). 79 There are three general categories of respirators used by CHG at <strong>Hanford</strong>‟s tank farms. There are dust or nuisance masks; full face respirators with cartridge filters (CHG primarily uses the Mine Safety Appliance GME-P100 Combination Cartridge); and supplied air (self contained breathing apparatus (SCBA) or air line respirators). Despite the sharp increase in recent vapor exposures, CHG rarely requires workers to wear basic respiratory protection (much less supplied air respirators) when going out on a job. Furthermore, when respirators are required, they are often insufficient or ineffective. A recent Problem Evaluation Request filed by a tank farm worker cogently explains the problem: During the course of my duties as an HPT [Health Physics Technician] . . . I was asked to respond to an “event” at the 241-C tank farm. An operator had complained of headache and nausea after being exposed to unknown tank vapors and was subsequently transported to KADLEC medical center for evaluation. At this time, C- farm was evacuated. My task was to accompany an operator and an IH technician into C Farm. I was to evaluate the radiological conditions while the IHT checked for 75 This allowance complies with CHG Radiological Work Permit (RWP). 76 CHG, HASP, supra note 7, at 39. 77 Id. at 38 78 Id. 79 Id. at 38 – 39. 19
Page 1 and 2: Knowing Endangerment: WORKER EXPOSU
Page 3 and 4: TABLE OF CONTENTS I. EXECUTIVE SUMM
Page 5: SCBA SST TLV TOC TWINS VOC WHC Self
Page 8 and 9: used in the tank farms and reduce t
Page 10 and 11: II. BACKGROUND A. Hanford Tank Farm
Page 12 and 13: not detected on an ammonia monitor.
Page 14 and 15: warnings by safety experts, threate
Page 16 and 17: Not only does the science of the He
Page 18 and 19: symptoms: burning skin, persistent
Page 20 and 21: CHG‟s monitoring equipment has li
Page 22 and 23: glands tied to memory banks in the
Page 26 and 27: vapor sources. Initially, we were t
Page 28 and 29: Even when CHG does determine that r
Page 30 and 31: outdated Hewitt report 105 (discuss
Page 32 and 33: discovered in December 2001. Tank U
Page 34 and 35: With the failure to record this inf
Page 36 and 37: manner because my success here depe
Page 38 and 39: management. The patient receives th
Page 40 and 41: elated work other than some persons
Page 42 and 43: OSHA does not have right-of-entry o
Page 44 and 45: Like NASA, Hanford has fallen victi
Page 46 and 47: covering up monitoring data, or pro
Page 48 and 49: APPENDIX B: Chemical Vapor Exposure
Page 50 and 51: APPENDIX B: January 2002 - August 2
Page 52 and 53: “During the course of my duties a

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