Knowing Endangerment - Hanford Challenge

discovered in December 2001. Tank U-108 also sits at a slightly higher elevation than the
surrounding tanks, meaning any chemicals coming out of the tank could drift downward in the
workers‟ direction in inverted weather conditions. The morning of January 16 th was cold, damp, and
foggy (< 32 degrees F) with little to no wind.
The electricians began the day with a pre-job meeting, where they discussed what they would be
doing that day and what they might encounter on the U-111 job. While someone mentioned that
there had been odors in the area, no one mentioned (nor were the electricians aware) that there was a
hole in the foam at U-108 from which vapors were leaking. After the pre-job meeting, the
electricians spanned out to dig at various points of the trench. Electrician Steve Lewis was working
adjacent to U-108. He had a head cold and could not smell the noxious odors that began to waft out
of U-108 and down toward his co-workers. He was wearing whites, gloves, a hat, and safety glasses.
As the other electricians began to notice and complain about the smell, they backed away from the
immediate area and started yelling and waving for Lewis also to leave the area. Due to the odor
complaints, the person in charge (PIC) decided to shut down the job and, after getting Lewis‟
attention, the entire crew left the area until it could be monitored by an Industrial Hygiene Technician
(IHT).
Meanwhile, en route back to the electricians‟ building, Lewis‟ skin was bright red and burning, he
tasted a metallic taste in his mouth, and developed a headache. Lewis was transported to first aid
(HEHF) at 12:14 pm, and on the way the PIC contacted the Industrial Hygiene department to convey
that there were odors at the U-111 trench jobsite. 120 The IH supervisor then dispatched an IH
technician (IHT) to perform monitoring at that location. At 12:37 pm, a second electrician who had
smelled strong odors was transported to HEHF. 121
At around 1pm, the IH supervisor received a call back from the IHT who had been dispatched to
monitor at the job site. The IHT reported that although there were no detectible odors, 0 ppm
ammonia, and 0 % LEL at U-111. The supervisor called the IHT‟s monitoring results into the
Command Control Center, which recorded the “U-Farm” readings in the CCC log. 122
Later in the day, when Lewis had returned to work from HEHF, he and other co-workers spoke with
a different IHT (aka: IHT #2), who had been working in the A-Farm all day. IHT # 2 stated that it
was no wonder that that day‟s job at U-108 was closed down, because there was a crack in the foam
of the tank‟s pump pit lid, and they had measured at least 600 ppm down in the pump pit. The crack
hadn‟t been repaired yet because of the wet, rainy weather. Though that was the first time Lewis and
his co-workers heard about the high readings and crack in the foam, IHT #2 was referring to a
measurement taken at least a month earlier. On January 22, 2002, a work package was generated to
fix the crack in the foam at Tank U-108. 123
Several months after the January 16 th event, when Lewis‟ symptoms had not subsided and he felt as
if his “lungs were weeping” – he tried and was unable to obtain the monitoring results from his
exposure event. The closest he could obtain was monitoring that occurred at 3:30 pm (when the wind
120 CHG, Command Control Center Log, Jan. 16, 2002, 1214 entry.
121 CHG, Command Control Center Log, Jan. 16, 2002, 1237 entry.
122 CHG, Command Control Center Log, Jan. 16, 2002, 13:00. (“[IH] reports O2 levels normal, NH3-0%, TOC –
0% in U Farm. IH also reports no noticeable odors.”)
123 Rapid Maintenance request, #6432, Jan. 22, 2002 (“Apply Armaflex and Duct Seal at U-108”).
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