Knowing Endangerment - Hanford Challenge

Not only does the science of the Hewitt report appear fundamentally flawed, but Hewitt‟s assertions
that “employee exposure incidents had virtually ceased” and that the vapor problem had been
“resolved” were rendered invalid within a matter of months. In August of 1997, GAP released a
White Paper examining negligent exposures to workers at one particular Hanford tank – Tank C-103.
The tank has a history of emitting toxic, cancer-causing vapors into the atmosphere. GAP revealed
that, by the time of GAP‟s report, vapor emissions had resulted in over a dozen known worker
exposure incidents from this tank alone. 30
Finally, a consultant to CHG regarding the 2002-2003 vapor exposure incidents pointed out the flaw
of relying upon the Hewitt report now that the conditions in the tanks have changed due to ongoing
pump and treat activities:
The [Tank Vapor] Industrial Hygiene Personal Monitoring Program Plan . . . appears
to be based, to a large part, on conclusions reached in the 1996 [Hewitt report]. As
noted above, data recently collected . . . indicates that the concentration of selected
organic compounds has increased relative to data collected in 1995. Current pumping
activities were not underway during the period that this data was collected and recent
TDU sampling results suggest a need to evaluate what, if any, these activities might
be having on tank vapor constituents and concentrations. 31
III.
CURRENT CONDITIONS
In the last two years, many circumstances of Hanford‟s operations have changed considerably when
compared with those when the Hewitt Report was released in 1996. First and foremost, the Hanford
tank farms are subjected to an “accelerated cleanup” schedule imposed by the Bush Administration.
The DOE‟s current plan is to transfer most of the solid and liquid radioactive wastes from at least 26
single-shell tanks into double-shell tanks by 2006, and then seal or “close” those tanks. The current
pumping and other waste intrusive activities cause higher rates of vapor release events as the waste is
stirred and transferred at high pressure from tank to tank.
These current activities affect tank farm operations in two main ways. First, as the waste is disturbed
more opportunities are created for vapor releases, potentially exposing workers to the chemical
vapors. Second, as the waste is transferred from tank to tank, the chemical makeup of the vapors
changes, rendering previous tank vapor characterization invalid. CHG has not taken seriously
enough the risks that both of these factors pose to the health and safety of tank farm workers.
In addition to increases in chemical vapor exposures, the rush toward accelerated cleanup also has
resulted in 6 contamination events involving 17 individuals since January 2002. Several of these
incidents involve workers who came in direct contact with tank waste, while others involve
contamination by radioactive dust and cesium.
In an April 22, 2002 letter to CHG threatening to withdraw support for the Voluntary Protection
Program, the Hanford Atomic Metal Trades Council (HAMTC), the collective bargaining agent for
Hanford‟s unionized workers, maintained that CHG‟s acceptance of an “accelerated cleanup
30 Government Accountability Project, BLOWING OFF SAFETY AT THE HANFORD TANK FARMS: TOXIC NEGLIGENCE
AT TANK 103-C, August 1997, at http://www.whistleblower.org; John Stang, Hanford Waste Tank Blasted By
Group, TRI-CITY HERALD, Aug. 12, 1997.
31 Kathie Lavaty, supra note 8, at 7.
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