International Joint Commission

Of course, the Commission and the Parties are public institutions. Their priorities may
or may not be consistent with those of the governments of the day, although, as has been
implied, there may be gaps and inconsistencies in public policy. During the coming decade,
the public is likely to become more insistent that the Board and Commission underscore for
the Parties the urgency for positive action to anticipate possible disasters and to take firm
measures to prevent catastrophic accidents and recurring violations of ecosystem integrity,
such as the introduction of non-indigenous species (e.g. sea lampreys, alewives and zebra
mussels) from the discharge of ballast water from ships entering the Great Lakes from abroad.
Thus,theCommission mayfind itselfobligedtoact in theabsenceofguidancefromtheParties.
In such circumstances, the Commission may benefit from the recommendations of the Science
Advisory Board. If the function of the Board is "to speak truth to power," it is important that
the Board have the capability and independence to effectively and fairly address the issues of
concern, especially those larger issues which cut across agency and disciplinary boundaries.
Comprehensive formulations of issues are likely to become better articulated during the
1990s. Advancements in the environmental sciences and improved understanding of complex
systems will, in all likelihood, increase this probability. Efforts to resolve specific environmental
problems (e.g. atmosphericdeposition of pollutants, lake levels or zebra mussels) encounter
linkages with other problems. Thus, it happens that the specific frequently cannot be resolved
without dealing with the general. For this reason the Science Advisory Board has deemphasized
its disciplinary committee structure in favor of issue-defined, multi-disciplinary
task forces.
The multi-disciplinary team approach to issues may lead to a redefinition of prioritiesand
even to their reordering as more is learned regarding causes, effects, and predictable impacts.
The respective sciences, unaided, cannot easily reveal these interrelationships or assess their
policy significance. "Pure" science is seldom directly translatable into decisionable propositions.
A multi-disciplinary Science Advisory Board, composed solely of scientists eminent in
their own disciplines, but without the interest or inclination to merge their capabilities into
more inclusive, interdisciplinary problem analysis, could not safely be relied upon to serve the
needs of the Commission.
The Science Advisory Board, formerly the Research Advisory Board, is constituted to
bring coherent and evaluated findings of science into the policy process. It is not a Scientist's
Advisory Board. In its role of translating scientific findings into policy alternatives, the Board,
in addition to its strength in the natural sciences, needs the involvement of social scientists,
economists, legalists, engineers, and opinion analysts. Unless the Board comprehends the
policy process that it is expected to inform, its services to the Commission are likely to be
imbalanced or, at worst, misleading. If the challenges of the 1990s to Great Lakes policy are
as compelling as they appear, neither the Commission nor the Parties can afford to settle for
anything lessthan the bestscience-based policy adviceobtainable. Thisadvice is best provided
by a Board conversant with the art of giving advice and appreciative of the significance that its
advice may have on the decision-makers who receive it. Thus, scientific expertise alone will
be insufficient to enable the Board to help the Commission effectively.
If the challenges of
the 1990s to Great
Lakes policy are as
compelling as they
appear, neither the
Commission nor the
Parties can afford to
settle for anything
less than the best
science-based policy
advice obtainable.
Issues of implementation present the Commission and, hence, the Board with dilemmas
to which each must adapt, but which neither can unilaterally resolve. These grow out of an
incongruity among the Boundary Waters Treaty of 1909 and the Water Quality Agreements of
1972,1978 and the Protocol of 1987 (International Joint Commission 1909; 1972; 1985; 1987b).
The Treaty of 1909 and the recent intentions of the Parties to play a more active role in the
implementation ofthe Agreementsassumetheseparate responsibilityof each respective Party
5
1.3 Adaptations
for Implementation