1 - The Black Vault

declared as an operational squadron. This happened during evening of 8 September 1970.
fS'axa \lord was one of a chain of UK radar stations who's task was to keep an eye on the slGes
around the northern approaches, identifying aircraft that approached or entered the North
Sea or the sensitive 'Icelandic Gap'. 1970 was at the height of the Cold War with Russian aircraft
making regular flights into the North Atlantic to test NATO's reaction.
;\I 2017 hours on the 8 September, a radar operator at Saxu Vord picked up a contact of an
unidentified aircraft over the North Sea between the Shetland Islands and Norwav. The contact
was monitored at a steady speed of 630 mph at 3i000 feet travelling on a so~th-weste·
ly heading. The contact was then seen to turn 30 degrees to head due south with its spee.
increasing to 900 mph and it altitude climbing to 44000 feet.
The _normal procedure for Saxa Vord was to now order a flash message to the nearest QRA
flight. This urgent message was duly sent to the QRA flight at RAF Leuchars on the east coast
of Scotland. Within. minutes two Lightning's were airborne and heading their way out acros:,
the North Sea. For all concerned, the radar operators, pilots and ground crew, this was just
. another routine scrarnble, but then the radar plotters noticed something on their screens that
left them a little concerned. Up to this point the unidentified aircraft had been travelling at
speeds c1nd altitudes consistent with knov.m Russian warplanes, however in a splil seconc!
the blip on the radar had turned through 180 degrees and disappeared from the screens.
During the next hour the contact reappeared several times, and each time the Lightning~
were vectored to investigate, but then as quickly as it appeared it disappeared again. By this
time two F4 Phantoms of the USAF from Keflavik in Iceland had been scrambled to assist the
Lightnings in trying to intercept thE' intmder. The F4's with their sophisticated radar were
able to track the intruder themselves v ..'ithout the assistance of the ground radar controllers,
however as they attempted to close on the contact they found that they had no more success
than the Lightnings. The incident was now beginning to cause alarm to those in high place~
vvith the contact being monitored by various organisations within the NATO chain of con•-
~~. .
As more and more organisations became involved the Lightnings and Phantoms continued
with their cat and mouse game. They made repeated attempts to close on the contact, but as
they approached it disappeared. Eventually the Lightnings recovered back to Leuchars leaving
the Keflavik Phantoms to continue with the patrol.
At 2139 hours, the controllers picked up the contact again. This time the intruder was decelerating
to 1300 mph which was almost the limit of the Lightnings and Phantoms. It was nmY
tracked off the northern tip of Denmark at an altitude of 18000 feet. By this time it was decid·
ed to 'scramble' two Lightnings from Coltishall to form a Combat Air Patrol(CAP) some 17
miles east of Great Yarmouth. To enable the thirsty Lightnings to maintain their CAP a Vic to;
tanker was scrambled to suppur! the two fighters. With a further two Lightnings from
Leuchars maintaining a CAP on a 50 mile east-west front, 200 miles north east of Aberdeen
the contact was now between the two Jines of fighters. At 2145 hours it was decided to
'scramble' a further Lightning from RAF Bin brook to join in the search for the intruder. This
aircraft. Lightning F6, XS894, was flown by an American pilot on exchange with 3 Squadron,
Captain William Schaffner. By the time he arrived on patrol, in addition to his machine, four
further Lightnings, two Phanton1s and three tankers were airborne on the alert and they were
86
tz.flF" CoL-"''iSHALL 1
F"1 G ~12. sTY\-n Cf\1
joined shortly after by a Shackleton from Kinloss.
The outcome of this interception, which involved the Lightnings trom Coltishall, is subject"!:o
much conjecture and differences of opinion. However, one thing is fact; the 5 Squadrc~n
Lightning F6, XS894 crashed on the night oi 8 September 1970 with the loss of Captmn
Willi.:~m Schaffner. Despite an intensive search by helicopters and Lifeboats from Bndhngton,
Filey and Flamborough, Captain Schaffners body was never found..:.J
Flight Lieutenant Briar. Carroll was an lnstructor and Central Flying School Agent on the
OCU from 1970-73. His recollections of his time at Coltishall graphically illustrate the impact
that operating a Lightning, in realistic operational conditions, had on one particular trainee
pilot who \Vas about to start his conversion flying on the OCU.
At this time, late 1971, No 65 Fighter Squadron operated the Lightning T4 trainer along with
on assortment of F1 and Fl As. As the Squadron had ben declared to SACEUR. tl1ey were also
tasked as u front line Squadron, and as such were subject to alerts and Tactical b·aluation
Exercises(TACEVAL) in just the same way as the full time front line Squadrons .
Brian recalls that the OCU had recentlv received a new intake of pilots ;ust out of Hunter flying
at RAF Chivenor. They had compl~eted their initial ground school programme of lecture~
and were rc