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VOLUME 16 NO 2 2000<br />
UNISA CENTRE FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES
BIANNUAL JOURNAL* OF THE UNISA CENTRE FOR LATIN<br />
AMERICAN STUDIES FOR MEMBERS OF THE CENTRE<br />
Editor:<br />
Guest Editor:<br />
Editorial Board:<br />
Editorial Advisory Board:<br />
Editorial Secretary:<br />
Ze lia Roel<strong>of</strong>se-Campbell, Unisa Centre for Latin American Studies<br />
Deon Fourie, Dept. <strong>of</strong> Political Sciences, Unisa<br />
Virgilio R Beltra n, Dept. <strong>of</strong> Sociology, Instituto Torcuato di Tella<br />
Beluce Belluci, Centro de Estudos Afro-Asia ticos, Universidade<br />
Caà ndido Mendes<br />
Horacio Cerutti-Guldberg, Dept. <strong>of</strong> Philosophy, Universidad Auto noma<br />
de Me xico<br />
Phil Eidelberg, Dept. <strong>of</strong> History, Unisa<br />
Deon Fourie, Dept. <strong>of</strong> Political Sciences (Strategic Studies), Unisa<br />
Roger Gravil, Dept. <strong>of</strong> Historical Studies (Economic History),<br />
<strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> Natal<br />
Emilio Meneses, Political Science, Pontificia Universidad Cato lica de<br />
Chile<br />
Burridge Spies, Dept. <strong>of</strong> History, Unisa<br />
Miguel Angel Burelli Rivas, Dept. <strong>of</strong> Sociology, Universidad Simo n<br />
BolõÂvar<br />
Frik de Beer, Dept. <strong>of</strong> Development Administration, Unisa<br />
Deon Geldenhuys, Dept. <strong>of</strong> Political Studies, Rand Afrikaans<br />
<strong>University</strong><br />
Philip Mohr, Dept. <strong>of</strong> Economics, Unisa<br />
Juan M Ossio, Dept. <strong>of</strong> Anthropology, Pontificia Universidad Cato lica<br />
del Peru<br />
George Philip, Latin American Studies, London School <strong>of</strong> Economics<br />
Andre Thomashausen, Institute <strong>of</strong> Foreign and Comparative Law,<br />
Unisa<br />
Moetsie du Plessis<br />
Unisa Latin American Report is an interdisciplinary journal <strong>of</strong> research and commentary relating to Latin America. Its purpose is to<br />
promote scholarly understanding <strong>of</strong> and general information about that continent. It features research articles, commentary,<br />
interviews, news and information, reports and book reviews.<br />
The editorial policy <strong>of</strong> the journal and its publishers is to be non-partisan, and responsibility for opinions and accuracy <strong>of</strong> data<br />
remains that <strong>of</strong> the contributors. Contributions are submitted for the consideration and recommendation <strong>of</strong> editorial advisers, the<br />
final decision being that <strong>of</strong> the editor. Manuscripts should be between 10 and 25 typewritten double-spaced pages. Footnotes<br />
and bibliographic citations should follow the Harvard method. Manuscripts will not be returned to the authors.<br />
Membership <strong>of</strong> the Unisa Centre for Latin American Studies includes subscription to the Unisa Latin American Report.<br />
All correspondence concerning membership, contributions, comments, etc. should be directed to<br />
The Editor<br />
Unisa Latin American Report<br />
PO Box 392<br />
UNISA Tel: +27+12+429±6674<br />
0003 Fax: +27+12+429±3680<br />
Republic <strong>of</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
e-mail: Editorial: roeloz@unisa.ac.za<br />
Subscriptions: dplesch@unisa.ac.za<br />
Printed and published by the <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
# Copyright reserved<br />
ISSN 0256±6060<br />
ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ<br />
* This journal is indexed in the International Bibliography <strong>of</strong> the Social Sciences, the Index to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n<br />
Periodicals and Sabinet
UNISA CENTRE FOR LATIN AMERICAN STUDIES VOL. 16 NO. 2, 2000<br />
Editorial 3<br />
RESEARCH ARTICLES<br />
President Fernando<br />
Henrique Cardoso<br />
p63<br />
. A state failure-violence-resource capture triangle: Comparing the<br />
Angolan and Colombian experiences ± David Broekman 4<br />
. The cultural formation <strong>of</strong> Brazil and the present structure <strong>of</strong> its judiciary ±<br />
Durval de Noronha Goyos Jr. 35<br />
. Contemporary Shamanism ± vegetalismo in the Peruvian Amazon ±<br />
Wynand Koch 42<br />
. Academic freedom in Brazil ± Pedro Paulo A Funari 59<br />
NEWS AND INFORMATION<br />
. The <strong>South</strong> American Summit: A new era for Brazilian foreign policy ±<br />
Ze lia Roel<strong>of</strong>se-Campbell 62<br />
. The current YanomamoÈ scandal: Neel, Chagnon et al. ± Chris van<br />
Vuuren 67<br />
Pr<strong>of</strong> Stuart Hall<br />
p70<br />
UCLAS REPORTS<br />
. Cultural studies highlighted at Comparative Literature Conference in<br />
Brazil ± Ze lia Roel<strong>of</strong>se-Campbell 69<br />
. <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Navy participates in fleet review commemorating 500th<br />
anniversary <strong>of</strong> the discovery <strong>of</strong> Brazil ± Keith Campbell 72<br />
IDB NEWS<br />
. On the right path ± Peter Bate 74<br />
. Soccer meets economics ± Peter Bate 77<br />
Henry Kissinger (right)<br />
with Pele and Enrique<br />
Iglesias<br />
p78<br />
UCLAS NEWS IN BRIEF<br />
. Latin America at SAITEX 2000 79<br />
. Argentina at <strong>Africa</strong> Aerospace and Defence 2000 and SAAF 80 79<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 1
. Piano performance at <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> Pretoria, Musaion 81<br />
. Brazilian historian at Unisa 82<br />
. Uclas fellow reports back 82<br />
. Head <strong>of</strong> the Centre visits Namibia 83<br />
. Colombian gold exhibit at the <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> Pretoria 85<br />
BOOK NEWS<br />
Review Essay<br />
Colombian gold artefact<br />
p85<br />
. The Innkeeper's Underwear, or How Fantastic Latin American Fiction<br />
Can Be ± a review <strong>of</strong> Prospero's Mirror: A Translator's Portfolio <strong>of</strong> Latin<br />
American Short Fiction by Ilan Stavans, ed ± reviewed by Jeroen<br />
Oskam 86<br />
2 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
Editorial<br />
The wide range <strong>of</strong> interests that concern the Unisa Centre for Latin American<br />
Studies is once again emphasized in this issue <strong>of</strong> Unisa Latin American<br />
Report. The four main articles deal with the fields <strong>of</strong> law, anthropology,<br />
comparative politics and human rights.<br />
Each article contributes a valuable insight into some aspect <strong>of</strong> a variety <strong>of</strong> the aspects<br />
<strong>of</strong> work which engages UCLAS in its research, publications and consultations.<br />
For foreigners seeking to do business in Brazil, Noronha's article gives useful<br />
background material on the cultural-legal differences reflected in Brazil's history. It<br />
indicates the need for business to become aware <strong>of</strong> more than simply economic<br />
opportunity when committing itself to foreign countries.<br />
Koch, bringing home the value <strong>of</strong> what one is inclined to regard as `primitive'<br />
medical practices in a society in which modern medicinal practitioners are too few<br />
and medicine too costly, emphasizes that there are lessons to be learned in other<br />
countries in similar situations <strong>of</strong> scarcity, poverty or great distances from urban<br />
centres.<br />
In a well-researched paper comparing the phenomenon <strong>of</strong> state failure in Colombia<br />
and Angola, Broekman <strong>of</strong>fers valuable insights into the inherited perception by<br />
leaders <strong>of</strong> the state as a source for personal gain to be exploited as an explanation <strong>of</strong><br />
why states in <strong>Africa</strong> and <strong>South</strong> America have not easily developed into modern<br />
western states after gaining independence.<br />
The article by Funari explains that the constraints placed upon academic freedom in<br />
Brazil by the traditional hierarchical social structure <strong>of</strong> the country, including the<br />
influence <strong>of</strong> twenty-one years <strong>of</strong> dictatorship, have not been lifted by democratization<br />
since 1985. Read with Broekman's article, this article also <strong>of</strong>fers the potential for<br />
the better understanding <strong>of</strong> the nature <strong>of</strong> the state not only in <strong>South</strong> America, but<br />
also in <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
`To understand is to forgive' ± or perhaps that old adage can be taken too far.<br />
Nevertheless, while the knowledge in the latter articles may be a source <strong>of</strong><br />
despondency for those living though early periods <strong>of</strong> post-colonialism, there is also<br />
room for hope. Read with Crane Brinton's and Charles Tilly's views on the courses <strong>of</strong><br />
revolution, the articles give this editor hope that the knowledge they <strong>of</strong>fer provides a<br />
reason for believing in the future for all countries experiencing the problems<br />
described.<br />
Other important issues addressed in this edition are the historic first <strong>South</strong> American<br />
summit, and the `YanomamoÈ scandal' that is currently convulsing the world <strong>of</strong><br />
anthropology.<br />
Good wishes to all for the Christmas season and also for 2001 and after.<br />
Editor<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 3
A state failure-violence-resource<br />
capture triangle: Comparing the<br />
Angolan and Colombian experiences<br />
by David Broekman<br />
David O Broekman was a diplomat in the <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs, and<br />
served at the <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n High Commission<br />
in Gaborone, Botswana (1992±1995), the <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n Embassy in The Hague (1995±1996), and<br />
in the Directorate for Latin America at the<br />
Union Buildings (1996±1997). He recently obtained<br />
an MA in International Relations from<br />
Webster <strong>University</strong>, Leiden campus, with distinguished<br />
graduate status. He now lives permanently<br />
in The Netherlands. This paper is an<br />
edited version <strong>of</strong> his MA dissertation.<br />
David Broekman<br />
4 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
ABSTRACT<br />
In an attempt to identify and analyse<br />
similarities and differences between the<br />
Angolan and Colombian state failure<br />
experiences, three main components or<br />
variables <strong>of</strong> analysis emerge: violence,<br />
state failure and resource capture. This<br />
article emphasizes their reinforcing relationship<br />
brought together in an equilateral<br />
triangle used as a heuristic<br />
device. In the subsequent comparison,<br />
each component is emphazised separately,<br />
commencing with Angola and<br />
Colombia's history <strong>of</strong> repressive and<br />
exploitative colonial rule and the absence<br />
<strong>of</strong> incentives for nation building.<br />
Rather than nation building, the corrupt<br />
ruling e lite and their main rivals' main<br />
purpose was, and continues to be to<br />
capture, control and exploit the lucrative<br />
resources <strong>of</strong> diamonds and oil in Angola<br />
and cocaine in Colombia. Their dependence<br />
on the global free market forces<br />
<strong>of</strong> demand and supply, creating wealth<br />
for their war effort and weapons procurement,<br />
is also described. By using<br />
empirical data, the author illustrates the<br />
similarities <strong>of</strong> Angola's and Colombia's<br />
post-independence state decline. The<br />
role <strong>of</strong> state and non-state actors reflect<br />
interesting similarities vis-aÁ-vis reinforcing<br />
the link <strong>of</strong> the capture <strong>of</strong> violence<br />
and resources which drive the actors in<br />
both countries. The failure <strong>of</strong> their<br />
primary commodity exports, again reinforces<br />
the actors' commitments to<br />
resource capture. Finally, this author<br />
has examined `constructive' international<br />
engagement and preventive diplomacy,<br />
as well as possible measures<br />
needed for a definite reverse <strong>of</strong> the<br />
current disastrous situations in both<br />
countries.<br />
RESUMEN<br />
En un intento por analizar e identificar<br />
las similitudes y diferencias entre las<br />
experiencias fallidas del gobierno angolenÄ<br />
o y colombiano, aparecen principalmente<br />
tres componentes o variables de<br />
ana lisis: la violencia, el fracaso del<br />
estado y la captura de recursos. Este<br />
artõÂculo enfatiza la fortalecedora relacio n<br />
entablada en un tria ngulo equila tero<br />
usado como un dispositivo heurõÂ stico.<br />
En la siguiente comparacio n, se centra<br />
en cada componente por separado,<br />
comenzando por la historia del gobierno<br />
de represio n y explotacio n colonial de<br />
Angola y Colombia y la ausencia de<br />
incentivos para la construccio n de la<br />
nacio n. En logar de la construccio nde<br />
una nacio n, la intencio n primordial de la<br />
clase dirigente corrupta y sus principales<br />
adversarios era y es la captura, control y<br />
explotacio n provechosa de los recursos<br />
de diamantes y petroleo en Angola y de<br />
cocaõÂ na en Colombia. Asimismo se<br />
describe su dependencia de las fuerzas<br />
de <strong>of</strong>erta y procura del mercado libre<br />
mundial, con el fin de enriquecerse para<br />
financiar la guerra y la obtencio n de<br />
armas. Por medio de datos empõÂ ricos, el<br />
autor ilustra las similitudes en el decline<br />
del gobierno de ambos paõÂses tras su<br />
independencia. El papel de los actores<br />
de dentro y fuera del estado refleja<br />
interesantes semejanzas frente al võÂ nculo<br />
fortalecedor entre la captura de la<br />
violencia y recursos que impulsa a los<br />
actores de ambos paõÂses. El fracaso de<br />
las exportaciones de sus productos<br />
primarios, refuerza el grado de compromiso<br />
de estos actores con respecto a la<br />
captura de recursos. Finalmente, el autor<br />
ha examinado el `constructivo' compromiso<br />
internacional y la diplomacia preventiva,<br />
asõÂ como las posibles medidas<br />
que se precisan para una definitiva<br />
marcha atra s a la desastrosa situacio n<br />
actual que atraviesan estos paõÂ ses.<br />
RESUMO<br />
Numa tentativa de analisar e identificar<br />
semelhancË as e diferencË as entre as experieÃ<br />
ncias de fracasso do estado colombiano<br />
e angolano, treàs fatores principais,<br />
ou varia veis, veà maÁ tona: a violeà ncia, o<br />
fracasso do estado e a tomada de<br />
recursos. Este artigo enfatiza a relacË aÄ o<br />
reforcË ada desses fatores, encapsulada<br />
em um triaà ngulo equÈ ila tero usado como<br />
um dispositivo heurõÂ stico. Na comparacË<br />
aÄ o que segue, cada parte e analizada<br />
separadamente, a comecË ar com a histoÂ<br />
ria repressiva e exploradora do regime<br />
colonial tanto em Angola como na<br />
Coloà mbia, e a falta de incentivos para<br />
a construcËaÄ o de uma nacËaÄ o. Em vez de<br />
construir uma nacË aÄ o, a intencË aÄ o principal<br />
da classe dirigente corrupta e seus<br />
principais adversa rios era e continua a<br />
ser a tomada, o controà le e a exploracËaÄ o<br />
dos lucrativos recursos de diamantes e<br />
petro leo em Angola, e da cocaõ na na<br />
Colombia. A sua dependeà ncia das forcË<br />
as globais do mercado livre ± <strong>of</strong>erta e<br />
procura ±, a criacË aÄ o de riqueza para a<br />
guerra e a compra de armamentos<br />
tambe m saÄ o mencionadas. O autor<br />
ilustra as semelhancË as entre o declõÂ nio<br />
do estado angolano e colombiano apo s<br />
a independeà ncia. O papel de atores<br />
dentro e fora do estado espelha semelhancË<br />
as interessantes quanto ao võÂ nculo<br />
entre a violeà ncia e a tomada de recursos<br />
que propelam os atores em ambos os<br />
paõÂ ses. O fracasso da exportacËaÄ o de<br />
seus produtos principais reforcË a o grau<br />
de compromisso desses atores quanto aÁ<br />
tomada de recursos. Finalmente o autor<br />
examina o envolvimento internacional<br />
`construtivo' e a diplomacia preventiva,<br />
assim como possõÂveis medidas necessaÂ<br />
rias para uma reviravolta definitiva das<br />
desastrosas situacËoÄ es atuais em ambos<br />
os paõÂ ses.<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
The research topic encompasses three main components<br />
<strong>of</strong> analysis which, put together, could be<br />
compared to the three sides <strong>of</strong> an equilateral triangle:<br />
(1) state failure, (2) violence, and (3) resource<br />
capture. Figure 1 illustrates this model, ascribing each<br />
component equal importance. Together they form a<br />
solid triangular unit ± once one component is removed<br />
or separated from the other, the full picture <strong>of</strong> state<br />
failure is no longer reflected. The latter is conceived as<br />
a degenerating process <strong>of</strong> change over time in which<br />
resource capture reinforces state failure and causes<br />
escalation <strong>of</strong> conflict and violence.<br />
Using the model illustrated in Fig. 1 as a directive,<br />
the principal aim <strong>of</strong> this paper is to investigate and<br />
compare the Angolan and Colombian state failure<br />
cases. As a starting point, it is necessary to state the<br />
model's relevance to the aim. Both countries, for<br />
example, had similar historical experiences <strong>of</strong> repressive,<br />
exploitative and violent colonial rule. The<br />
colonial rulers' sole purpose was to capture Angola's<br />
and Colombia's respective mineral wealth. Creating<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 5
conditions for a strong and viable `nation-state' was<br />
not in their minds. Excessive use <strong>of</strong> force against the<br />
indigenous peoples ultimately generated revolutionary<br />
violence and wars <strong>of</strong> national liberation, which, in<br />
turn, reinforced conditions <strong>of</strong> weak and delegitimized<br />
states. The anti-clockwise rotation indicates this<br />
`colonial moment' in time. Similarly, the clockwise<br />
rotation reflects Angola and Colombia's increasing<br />
levels <strong>of</strong> post-independence state failure, caused by<br />
initial weak state conditions, resource capture, repressive<br />
rule and escalating violence. Consequently, a<br />
nation building process in the image <strong>of</strong> European<br />
states has remained elusive. Lucrative resource output<br />
links (oil, diamonds and cocaine) and input links<br />
(weapons procurement) (indicated by Figure 1),<br />
created conditions for a prolonged and violent<br />
transition, acting both as a cause and consequence<br />
<strong>of</strong> their state failure. As such, both countries share an<br />
equally important `third' component ± the availability<br />
<strong>of</strong> large stocks <strong>of</strong> high value/low volume resources<br />
within their national boundaries, enabling those in<br />
control <strong>of</strong> these resources to continue their violent<br />
struggle for political power and wealth. Today,<br />
Colombia has the longest-running and most complex<br />
conflict in Latin America. The same may be said <strong>of</strong><br />
Angola in <strong>South</strong>ern <strong>Africa</strong>. In a mutual, positive and<br />
reinforcing feedback relation, state failure, for example,<br />
to enforce legal controls and secure good<br />
governance through strong, transparent institutions,<br />
creates incentives for powerful and corrupt e lite<br />
groups to capture, control and exploit the wealth <strong>of</strong><br />
resources for personal gain. Their attempts, challenged<br />
by e.g. guerrilla forces with the same objective,<br />
lead to conflict escalation and further disintegration<br />
(Messiant 1998; Pearce 1990).<br />
In one way or another, these and other variables,<br />
such as primary commodity export failure and criminalization<br />
<strong>of</strong> society in Angola and Colombia act<br />
together to fill in the `triangular gap', while the larger<br />
outer bloc indicates the triangle's linkage with the<br />
global economy. The arrows to and from the triangle<br />
(Fig. 1) indicate, on the one hand, the global demand<br />
for Angola's and Colombia's lucrative resources <strong>of</strong> oil<br />
and diamonds and cocaine. On the other hand they<br />
indicate that those who control the resources are able<br />
to earn sufficient foreign revenues to pay for weapons<br />
procurement and so to reinforce violence and state<br />
failure. A general hypothesis incorporating these<br />
components is that: ex-colonial states, which have<br />
in their borders high value/low volume exportable<br />
commodities, are vulnerable to disruption and collapse.<br />
Describing the complexities <strong>of</strong> Angolan and<br />
Colombian state failure, comparable to a tangled knot<br />
with no clear discernible beginning or end, would<br />
require a much more inclusive approach, dealing with<br />
a wide array <strong>of</strong> potential causes and consequences <strong>of</strong><br />
their failure. However, this is beyond the scope <strong>of</strong> this<br />
paper. Instead, a narrow approach and focus are<br />
favoured, partly inspired by increased media emphasis<br />
on the key role <strong>of</strong> lucrative resources `behind the<br />
unsavoury business <strong>of</strong> wars <strong>of</strong> a third kind' (International<br />
Herald Tribune 17 February 2000: 6). The paper<br />
goes on to provide an introductory glimpse <strong>of</strong> the<br />
applicability <strong>of</strong> the state failure-violence-resource<br />
capture components, allowing for a comparison<br />
between the Angolan and Colombian experiences.<br />
Colombia's independence from Spain in 1810 (with<br />
FIGURE 1<br />
DEMAND<br />
3<br />
GLOBAL (CRIMINAL) ECONOMY<br />
SUPPLY<br />
DIAMONDS<br />
OIL<br />
COCAINE<br />
SUPPLY<br />
~<br />
3<br />
~<br />
DEMAND<br />
WEAPONS<br />
!<br />
!<br />
RESOURCE<br />
CAPTURE<br />
VARIABLES<br />
VIOLENCE<br />
3 "<br />
STATE FAILURE<br />
6 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
final military liberation in 1819) did not bring about<br />
conclusive state and nation-building. Rather, Colombia<br />
has experienced an almost constant seesaw<br />
process <strong>of</strong> partial disintegration, followed by brief<br />
periods <strong>of</strong> reconstruction, the result <strong>of</strong> formidable<br />
challenges to internal state legitimacy, as well as<br />
control over territory, and political and economic<br />
space. The elected government's exclusive right to<br />
rule has been violently opposed by powerful nonstate<br />
actors such as guerrilla groups and drug cartels.<br />
Colombian independence also commenced with the<br />
birth <strong>of</strong> a violent order based on political factionalism<br />
(Conservatives versus Liberals), where the ruling<br />
party had no lasting opportunity to consolidate its<br />
power through strong state and civic institutions.<br />
Consequently, central government was unable to<br />
provide adequate collective security and development<br />
opportunities to Colombians (Keen 1996).<br />
Most subsequent governments have suffered the<br />
same fate. Prominent is the co-existence <strong>of</strong> the<br />
`formal' Colombia which, to the outside world, boasts<br />
all the trappings <strong>of</strong> a modern polity, and the `real'<br />
Colombia <strong>of</strong> the people ± a weak, incompetent state<br />
plagued by societal collapse, corruption, crime,<br />
violence, gross human rights violations, and large<br />
income gaps between rich and poor. Central government's<br />
state and nation building capability have been<br />
severely restricted by a conflict between the need for<br />
short-term political survival and the longer-run collective<br />
interests in economic performance and regime<br />
stability. However, Colombia is far from a collapsed<br />
state (representing the extreme form <strong>of</strong> state failure).<br />
It is among Latin America's oldest, most stable<br />
functioning democracies, with regular national elections<br />
the rule, and military coups d' etat the exception.<br />
Contrary to Latin America's largest state, Brazil, it did<br />
not have to reschedule its debt during recent<br />
economic crises. Steady progress has been made<br />
towards a more diversified and industrialized economy,<br />
with textiles leading the way. Notable improvements<br />
in education and health standards have taken<br />
place. However, income inequality remains a decisive<br />
constraint. State and government legitimacy, while<br />
being contested, does exist. Other states do recognize<br />
Colombia's national sovereignty and territorial integrity.<br />
However, as one <strong>of</strong> the world's most violent<br />
nations, the result <strong>of</strong> a wide array <strong>of</strong> historical, political<br />
and socio-economic problems, the state has failed in<br />
its most important responsibility: to protect and secure<br />
the well-being <strong>of</strong> its citizens. Generations <strong>of</strong> ordinary<br />
Colombians have experienced the harsh realities <strong>of</strong><br />
rebellion, civil war, corruption, and violent crime<br />
(Pearce 1990; Osterling 1989; Keen 1996:502).<br />
The Angolan `triangle' reflects very similar features.<br />
The violence represents a domestic situation <strong>of</strong> almost<br />
permanent war ± first a war <strong>of</strong> liberation against its<br />
colonial ruler, Portugal (1961±1975), and then civil<br />
war between the two main liberation movements, the<br />
MPLA, governing independent Angola, and its main<br />
guerrilla force rival, UNITA (1975 to the present)<br />
(Somerville 1997). Over half <strong>of</strong> Angola's 11 million<br />
citizens were born after independence 25 years ago,<br />
which ushered in the civil war (Mail and Guardian<br />
1 July 1999:2). While the ingredients <strong>of</strong> potential<br />
state failure (e.g. traditional clientelism), were already<br />
ingrained during Portuguese rule, a protracted civil<br />
war set into motion state failure in numerous fields,<br />
such as government institutional capacity; the legal<br />
controls; nation building; socio-economic development;<br />
human rights, and citizens' well-being and<br />
security. Contrary to the Colombian experience,<br />
Angola has never really managed to become a modern<br />
state. For example, based on 1996 figures, only 27 TV<br />
sets are in use per 1 000 <strong>of</strong> the population, compared<br />
to 117 per 1 000 <strong>of</strong> the population in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Colombia (Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe 1999:6).<br />
Angola's current telephone network has only 56 000<br />
lines, compared to Zimbabwe's 212 000 and Colombia's<br />
1,89 million (1994) (Lexis-Nexis Academic<br />
Universe 1999:7; Sowetan, 2 March 2000:23) At the<br />
most, only small, heavily guarded islands <strong>of</strong> strategic<br />
political and economic centres exist (e.g. oil refinery<br />
works in Cabinda) ± strategic, due to their importance<br />
as generators <strong>of</strong> foreign capital investment and<br />
revenue for the ruling e lite.<br />
Angola exists by default rather than on merit ± it is<br />
not a socio-political reality where Angolans can<br />
peacefully develop to their full potential. Similarly to<br />
Colombia, the Angolan state is clearly recognizable on<br />
a world map; it enjoys equal national sovereignty and<br />
territorial integrity among other nation-states; it has<br />
embassies worldwide and participates in international<br />
organizations such as the UN. However, domestically,<br />
their respective governments have never been willing<br />
or able to fully extend the power and range <strong>of</strong> a more<br />
or less autonomous national political unit, either by<br />
legal force, national identity, alliances, bargaining,<br />
chicanery, and/or administrative encroachment. Both<br />
tend to act and negotiate from a point <strong>of</strong> weakness.<br />
Notable examples are the Pastrana government's<br />
willingness to recognize the largest guerrilla force<br />
FARC's freedom <strong>of</strong> movement and control over large<br />
parts <strong>of</strong> Colombian territory for the sake <strong>of</strong> peace<br />
negotiations (the so-called Plan Colombia). In Angola<br />
the MPLA government has been willing to<br />
recognize UNITA's control over certain diamond<br />
producing areas (Fituni 1995; Sweeney 1999).<br />
Differently from Colombia, where deep-rooted<br />
political factionalism and social class discrimination<br />
has fuelled violence, Angolan state formation has<br />
been plagued by a mixture <strong>of</strong> Cold War ideological<br />
divisions, nationalist politics and ethnic polarization<br />
(Messiant 1998:150). Colombians are largely a nation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Creoles (people <strong>of</strong> mixed blood: 58 per cent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 7
total population) with different political group rather<br />
than ethnic allegiances. In Angola, ethnic polarization,<br />
exacerbated by an acute rural-urban development<br />
gap, remains a barrier to unified socio-political<br />
formation. UNITA, for example, has its support base<br />
among Angola's largest ethnic tribe, the Ovimbundu<br />
(37 per cent <strong>of</strong> total population), while anti-tribal<br />
urban Creole e lite groups support the MPLA. Colombia's<br />
independence occurred at a time <strong>of</strong> hegemonic<br />
change, with Great Britain defeating Spain. Angola<br />
became independent in a very different world dominated<br />
by the Cold War. It was soon turned into a<br />
superpower proxy conflict, involving foreign intervention<br />
by a Soviet-Cuban force supporting the MPLA,<br />
and a US-backed <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n force in support <strong>of</strong><br />
UNITA. This period also saw mass proliferation <strong>of</strong><br />
small arms in Angola and the region, exacerbating<br />
violence and destruction. Colombia did not experience<br />
this kind <strong>of</strong> foreign intervention as a cause <strong>of</strong><br />
state failure. Rather, from a US-international security<br />
perspective, the threat <strong>of</strong> Colombian-based illicit<br />
cocaine trafficking became the prime incentive for<br />
US intervention in Colombian sovereignty. No doubt,<br />
economic backwardness and poverty, worsened by<br />
unevenly distributed domestic income growth and the<br />
crisis <strong>of</strong> the decline <strong>of</strong> primary (agricultural) commodity<br />
export revenue, have also been ingredients <strong>of</strong><br />
Angolan, and to a lesser extent, Colombian state<br />
failure. In both countries, desperate smallholders and<br />
peasant farmers have been forced to consider generating<br />
income from more pr<strong>of</strong>itable commodities as<br />
the market price <strong>of</strong> staple products such as c<strong>of</strong>fee,<br />
saw a sharp decline. For many <strong>of</strong> them, absence <strong>of</strong><br />
legal controls and <strong>of</strong> effective government has<br />
encouraged an illegal way out <strong>of</strong> misery ± diamond<br />
mining and coca production, which brings us to the<br />
final side <strong>of</strong> the triangle: resource capture by state and<br />
sub-national actors (Central Intelligence Agency<br />
1999; Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe 1999:3).<br />
Again, parallels can be drawn between the Angolan<br />
and Colombian experiences. Angola has enormous<br />
natural resources wealth ± potentially some <strong>of</strong> the<br />
largest untapped crude oil reserves in the world, while<br />
diamonds are extremely plentiful. It is one <strong>of</strong> the few<br />
countries where gem quality stones consistently<br />
predominate, comprising 70 per cent <strong>of</strong> total production<br />
(Global Witness 1998). Yet, as a least developed<br />
country (LDC), Angola is one <strong>of</strong> the weakest partners<br />
in the international community <strong>of</strong> states with formidable<br />
structural handicaps. The state failure-civil wars<br />
since independence have created favourable conditions<br />
for resource capture, control and exploitation by<br />
the rival e lite groups. The corrupt MPLA government<br />
has `captured' oil production and export income<br />
(responsible for 95 per cent <strong>of</strong> foreign export earnings),<br />
in order to finance its war effort and the<br />
luxurious lifestyles <strong>of</strong> the political and military e lite.<br />
UNITA has done the same with diamonds. The<br />
Angolan experience fits recent ICRC observations,<br />
that prolonged internal violence in countries with<br />
significant natural resources wealth but with corrupt<br />
or weak governments may best be understood as<br />
battles for high value/low volume resources which are<br />
in high demand by other states and the open<br />
international market (The Economist 4 March<br />
2000:51). Crude oil is <strong>of</strong> strategic importance to<br />
industrialized states, while MNCs and nonstate actors<br />
in the global (criminal) economy (e.g. crime syndicates),<br />
can make large pr<strong>of</strong>its from diamond earnings.<br />
By disregarding ethical morality for pr<strong>of</strong>it-making in<br />
global markets for oil and diamonds, MNCs, until<br />
recently, have willingly conducted unconditional<br />
trade with both the MPLA government and UNITA,<br />
enabling them to continue their deadly war for power<br />
and wealth. With adequate oil income, the MPLA<br />
government has seen little need for commitment to the<br />
painstakingly slow and far less lucrative process <strong>of</strong><br />
efficient empirical capacity building. Instead, it is<br />
shelving its main responsibility ± the security and<br />
well-being <strong>of</strong> all Angolans (Time 27 March 2000:41).<br />
Similarly, Colombia's contemporary history also<br />
reflects a link between state failure on the one hand,<br />
and violence and resource capture on the other. This<br />
has been constantly reinforced by the co-existence <strong>of</strong><br />
a legal `formal' economy, and a so-called informal<br />
underground economy, where the majority <strong>of</strong> Colombians<br />
work and live. Population movements shifted to<br />
where sources <strong>of</strong> wealth (e.g. emeralds, gold, oil, coal,<br />
and natural gas) opened up. However, rarely did the<br />
poor gain access to more than a small part <strong>of</strong> this<br />
wealth. The emerald war <strong>of</strong> the mid 1960s is but one<br />
example <strong>of</strong> acute resource capture by emerging Mafia<br />
empires, leftist guerrilla movements, and right-wing<br />
paramilitaries, made possible by state incompetence,<br />
neglect and corruption (Pearce 1990:106). However,<br />
<strong>of</strong> far greater importance to these groups currently, is<br />
the control and exploitation <strong>of</strong> coca plantations,<br />
providing the raw material for cocaine. Colombia is<br />
the world's largest producer <strong>of</strong> coca leaf and cocaine.<br />
Given the illegal nature there<strong>of</strong>, any direct state<br />
control and exploitation <strong>of</strong> this resource would be<br />
inconceivable due to the international illegality <strong>of</strong><br />
cocaine trade. Rather, the emphasis is on non-state<br />
actors. FARC, the largest and most powerful guerrilla<br />
force in Colombia, for example, receives about 60 per<br />
cent <strong>of</strong> its income (about US$ 500 million annually),<br />
from taxing coca farmers in areas under its control<br />
(The Economist 26 February 2000:68). Through the<br />
capture, control and exploitation <strong>of</strong> cocaine, one <strong>of</strong><br />
the most lucrative illegal trade commodities in the<br />
world, these nonstate actors have been able to gain a<br />
level <strong>of</strong> military power which by far outweighs their<br />
political support. Similarly to the Angolan experience,<br />
for them war itself has become the prime means <strong>of</strong><br />
8 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
enrichment. Solving the resource capture variable<br />
remains one <strong>of</strong> the most challenging tasks faced by<br />
those who favour strong democratic rule, peace and<br />
prosperity for all in Angola and Colombia.<br />
Given the limited scope <strong>of</strong> this paper, no further<br />
reference is made to equally important factors such as<br />
the decisive role <strong>of</strong> geography and climate, where<br />
both countries' territorial vastness, large rivers, and<br />
high mountains have posed tremendous transport and<br />
communications problems, weakening government's<br />
ability to effectively control territorial, political and<br />
economic space. The geographical features have<br />
encouraged the establishment and functioning <strong>of</strong><br />
local bosses, controlling regimes and rivalries, challenging<br />
central government control. In both Colombia<br />
and Angola, religion and churches (e.g. the Roman<br />
Catholic Church) have played an important role as a<br />
mechanism <strong>of</strong> social control ± an aspect that is also<br />
not discussed (Oquist 1980:12). The briefly discussed<br />
three triangular sides ± state failure, violence, and<br />
resource capture ± and their relevance to the general<br />
hypothesis mentioned, constitute the sole focus.<br />
While some reference is made to the legacy <strong>of</strong> colonial<br />
rule, the emphasis is largely on developments since<br />
independence, representing the period when one<br />
expects to see state and nation building consolidation,<br />
and not continuing decline. At best, only some<br />
prominent events or issues would be discussed,<br />
pertaining to each case, given the significant length<br />
<strong>of</strong> time involved, particularly in the case <strong>of</strong> Colombia<br />
(1810 to the present).<br />
Using the triangular model as a basis, this study is<br />
organized as follows: The state failure component is<br />
discussed in part 1. First, reference is made to the<br />
underlying theoretical notion in which the nature <strong>of</strong><br />
the state and its role as the prime object <strong>of</strong> security are<br />
essential ingredients, followed by the inclusion <strong>of</strong><br />
relevant (similar and diverse) detail on the Angolan<br />
and Colombian experiences. The aim is to create a<br />
basis from which real cases <strong>of</strong> state failure (Angola<br />
and Colombia) could be further investigated, not to<br />
discuss in detail the complex and multi-faceted notion<br />
<strong>of</strong> state failure. Reference is also made as to why<br />
certain states are failing while others are not, as well<br />
as why the phenomenon <strong>of</strong> state failure is important to<br />
the international community at large. Part 2 describes<br />
the prominence <strong>of</strong> violence as a key common variable<br />
in both cases. It commences with a brief discussion <strong>of</strong><br />
the colonial state legacy, followed by reference to<br />
post-independent violence, where `La Violencia' and<br />
its present-day `extended' version in Colombia, and<br />
protracted civil war in Angola, share many similarities<br />
in terms <strong>of</strong> e.g. the actors involved and consequences<br />
for both state and nation. Attention is also given to the<br />
proliferation <strong>of</strong> small arms destruction as a contributing<br />
factor to state and national security failure. Part 3<br />
is a consideration <strong>of</strong> similarities and differences<br />
pertaining to the current scale and scope <strong>of</strong> Angolan<br />
and Colombian state failure. Extensive use is made <strong>of</strong><br />
basic indicators <strong>of</strong> states at risk, listed in Daniel Esty's<br />
State Failure Task Force Report <strong>of</strong> 30 November<br />
1995, such as lack <strong>of</strong> democratic practices, sharp and<br />
severe economic distress, complex humanitarian<br />
emergencies, and a situation where the ethnic<br />
composition <strong>of</strong> the ruling e lite differs from a large<br />
percentage <strong>of</strong> the population (Carnegie Commission<br />
1997:44). Subsequently, Part 4 discusses the protracted<br />
civil war-resource capture link. The emphasis<br />
is on the constructive/destructive role <strong>of</strong> the various<br />
actors or `objects <strong>of</strong> security' involved in state decline<br />
and collapse, particularly in terms <strong>of</strong> the resource<br />
capture variable. Reference is made to the role <strong>of</strong><br />
central government, its main rivals (FARC in the case<br />
<strong>of</strong> Colombia, and UNITA in Angola), the global<br />
(criminal) economy, acting as `outlets' for the trade<br />
in oil, diamonds and cocaine, MNC involvement for<br />
the purpose <strong>of</strong> pr<strong>of</strong>it-making, and last, but not least,<br />
international engagement towards preventive diplomacy,<br />
reconstruction and sustained development<br />
(notably the US and UN). Attention is given to, for<br />
example, the US financial and military support to the<br />
Pastrana government. The question arises to what<br />
extent this support is constructive, given its dual<br />
purpose: to militarily engage in the re-establishment<br />
<strong>of</strong> state control over illegal FARC and ELN political<br />
and economic activity, and by doing so, to combat the<br />
illicit trade in cocaine finding its way to the US. The<br />
aspect <strong>of</strong> solutions and future reconstruction is not<br />
elaborated specifically. However, the conclusion gives<br />
some attention to this (Sweeney 1999).<br />
THE NOTION OF STATE FAILURE<br />
Posing the problem <strong>of</strong> state failure<br />
Fituni (1995:143), puts it in rather simple terms: `no<br />
matter what the scientific definitions <strong>of</strong> a failed or<br />
(near) collapsed state-nation are, a person immediately<br />
knows he is in a collapsed state the moment he<br />
arrives in one'. Yet, it has been difficult to define the<br />
phenomenon and problem <strong>of</strong> state failure. To begin<br />
with, it is both historic and contemporary. Poland, for<br />
example, has a history <strong>of</strong> state collapse, yet it has<br />
survived. Cure and remission is therefore possible. In<br />
other acute cases <strong>of</strong> anarchy, the state has ceased to<br />
exist, while its people have been forced to resort to<br />
clan or ethnic pre-state social structures <strong>of</strong> allegiance<br />
(e.g. Somalia) (Buzan 1991:52). It is evident that<br />
state failure comes first, then individual resort to<br />
ethnic nationalism, and not the other way round.<br />
Furthermore, it is not merely a life cycle in the rise and<br />
fall <strong>of</strong> nation-states. Society carries on, amidst a<br />
situation in which state power is up for grabs. While<br />
most contemporary cases <strong>of</strong> state failure appear<br />
among ex-colonial Third World states, some indus-<br />
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trialized states have also become victims <strong>of</strong> (near)<br />
collapse, notably in the former Soviet Union and<br />
Yugoslavia (Zartman 1995). A state's existence may<br />
have commenced in a situation <strong>of</strong> partial collapse,<br />
with Angola and Colombia as examples, or it may<br />
have suffered gradual decay to the point where even a<br />
strong government, in terms <strong>of</strong> its monopoly over the<br />
means <strong>of</strong> power, could no longer avoid collapse (e.g.<br />
the Soviet Union). The magnitude <strong>of</strong> fall differs from<br />
case to case, where Colombia, for example, has failed<br />
more in terms <strong>of</strong> domestic security for its people than<br />
in terms <strong>of</strong> their quality <strong>of</strong> life. Political assassinations<br />
are more common in Colombia than in Angola, yet the<br />
latter's failure is <strong>of</strong> a greater magnitude when it comes<br />
to political, economic, social, and physical (human)<br />
security. Variables such as government legitimacy,<br />
institutional capacity (comprising the entire machinery<br />
<strong>of</strong> government), and effectiveness are therefore far<br />
more decisive than mere sporadic coups d'eÂtat and<br />
political assassinations. Against this background, it is<br />
evident that the problem <strong>of</strong> state failure is both<br />
complex and a multivariate phenomenon. Zartman<br />
(1995:8) sees it as a `long-term degenerative disease'.<br />
However, any meaningful attempt to pose and define<br />
this phenomenon will first have to consider the nature<br />
and key functions <strong>of</strong> a state. After all, when a state<br />
fails, it would have to do so within the terrain's<br />
representing its basic nature and responsibilities. This<br />
would also allow for the possibility to delineate more<br />
specific, narrow and identifiable state failure contours<br />
(variables; actors; causes; consequences) for the<br />
subsequent studying <strong>of</strong> individual real cases (Zartman<br />
1995:1±3; 8).<br />
Zartman (1995:5) defines a state as `the authoritative<br />
political institution that is sovereign over a<br />
recognized territory'. For a state to function as an<br />
international legal personality or unit under international<br />
law, it should possess the following qualifications:<br />
(a) a permanent sizeable population; (b) a<br />
sizeable, defined territory; (c) an internationally recognized<br />
government, and (d) the capacity to enter<br />
into relations with other states (Shaw 1997:140).<br />
Then sovereignty and territorial integrity is recognized<br />
by the international community and protected by<br />
international law. These definitions focus on four<br />
identifiable functions and responsibilities: the state as<br />
sovereign authority, acting as the legitimate source <strong>of</strong><br />
political, social, economic and cultural identity in the<br />
minds <strong>of</strong> its population; the state as an institution,<br />
functioning as a strong, rule-based organization <strong>of</strong><br />
decision-making and implementation which, through<br />
its undisputed control over the legal means <strong>of</strong> power,<br />
is both able and willing to protect its defined territory<br />
and the population <strong>of</strong> this territory. Buzan (1991:65),<br />
in his descriptive model <strong>of</strong> the nature <strong>of</strong> the state and<br />
national security, identifies three components which<br />
largely correspond with the above: the idea <strong>of</strong> the<br />
state (its legitimacy in the minds <strong>of</strong> its people); its<br />
physical base (territory and population); and institutional<br />
expression (which governs the physical base<br />
and provides symbols <strong>of</strong> national identity). While<br />
identifiable, these functions and components are<br />
interlinked in myriad ways. For example, without<br />
tangible territorial control, state recognition becomes<br />
problematic, while such a state will be unable to<br />
protect all <strong>of</strong> its population by the legal controls. With<br />
statehood comes a specific responsibility in terms <strong>of</strong><br />
security, protecting and promoting both domestic and<br />
international security. The notions <strong>of</strong> a state and<br />
(national) security are therefore inextricably linked.<br />
Traditionally a state's right to sovereignty and territorial<br />
integrity, as well as its ability to function and<br />
survive, amidst external threats to national security,<br />
such as foreign intervention, has been measured in<br />
terms <strong>of</strong> military power (Buzan 1991:2). Traditionalists<br />
see a military balance <strong>of</strong> power between different<br />
states as essential to national security ± the relative<br />
freedom from harmful external military threats (Buzan<br />
1991:17). Today, this view is no longer representative<br />
<strong>of</strong> the full array <strong>of</strong> contemporary state vulnerabilities<br />
and threats to national security, which are <strong>of</strong> both a<br />
domestic and external nature. Newly independent<br />
statehood has to build upon the shaky foundations<br />
created by colonial rule and Cold War legacies and<br />
threats and vulnerabilities resulting from growing<br />
political, economic, social and cultural interdependence<br />
between nation-states (Van Benthem van den<br />
Bergh 1998:1). Apart from raison d'eÂtat (national<br />
interests), the security <strong>of</strong> human collectivities (e.g.<br />
democratic values; legal controls; good governance,<br />
and human rights protection), increasingly underpin<br />
the notion <strong>of</strong> security (Zacarias 1999). Buzan<br />
(1991:19) identifies five major sectors that may reflect<br />
threats to the security <strong>of</strong> human collectivities: military,<br />
political, economic, societal and environmental.<br />
Based on the stated aim <strong>of</strong> this paper, the Angolan<br />
and Colombian experiences <strong>of</strong> state failure will be<br />
measured and compared within these sectors, excluding<br />
the environmental one.<br />
State failure is not merely an `organic characteristic<br />
<strong>of</strong> growth and decay, a life cycle in the rise and fall <strong>of</strong><br />
nations' (Zartman 1995:1). This brings us to the<br />
question why some states do fail while others don't?<br />
Part <strong>of</strong> the answer lies in a distinction between two<br />
types <strong>of</strong> states: the strong state and/or strong power,<br />
and the weak state and/or weak power (Buzan,<br />
1991:97). The US and France are examples <strong>of</strong> the<br />
first kind (strong both as a state and a power), where<br />
their respective domestic political structures and<br />
institutions have sufficient mass, decision-making<br />
momentum, legitimacy and stability to be able to<br />
withstand anything but a threat <strong>of</strong> large-scale external<br />
military intervention (Bugan 1991:113). Their strong<br />
institutional strength is reflected in their control over<br />
10 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
ample resources in many sectors, enabling them to<br />
effectively adapt to, absorb or deter many threats, also<br />
in terms <strong>of</strong> human collectivities. Industrialization,<br />
democratization, interstate competition for wider<br />
markets and mutual identification between rulers and<br />
ruled, all made this possible (Van Benthem van den<br />
Bergh 1998:6±9). Botswana is one <strong>of</strong> the few strong<br />
Third World states in terms <strong>of</strong> ideological and<br />
structural (domestic) legitimacy, as well as physical<br />
base, but remains a weak power with limited<br />
capabilities to deter extensive military, economic or<br />
ecological threats to its national security. Even more<br />
so than Colombia, which has stronger economic<br />
structures, Angola's weakness is almost absolute: its<br />
weak state institutions do not have control over the<br />
natural resources wealth available within its borders,<br />
thus making it vulnerable to most such threats. Both<br />
Angola and Colombia possess some attribute <strong>of</strong><br />
importance to other states and nonstate actors,<br />
namely oil and diamonds, and cocaine, which even<br />
result in constant domestic and external pressures on<br />
their state weakness and vulnerabilities. This does not<br />
mean that strong states do not experience vulnerability<br />
to significant threats. For example, the US state<br />
and society have been unable to escape the subversive<br />
penetration <strong>of</strong> its political and social fabric by<br />
the threat <strong>of</strong> illicit cocaine trafficking from Colombia.<br />
This also explains US determination to intervene in<br />
Colombia's internal affairs to protect its own national<br />
security (discussed in Part 4). Strong socio-political<br />
cohesion (the consolidation <strong>of</strong> domestic political and<br />
societal consensus), however, has placed the US in a<br />
much stronger position to deal with this international<br />
criminal economy-related threat. On the whole, weak<br />
and insecure states find it almost impossible to<br />
adequately perform their basic functions. Their central<br />
government authority and institutional decision-making<br />
capacity is paralyzed. Summarizing, a failed state<br />
is the sum <strong>of</strong> a disputed state legitimacy, an underdeveloped<br />
national identity, and absence <strong>of</strong> strong<br />
empirical statehood to secure sustained protection <strong>of</strong><br />
the nation and territory by the legal controls, socioeconomic<br />
organization and regulation (Zartman<br />
1995:5±9).<br />
The foregoing explanation is far from complete.<br />
However, in combination with brief reference to some<br />
academic definitions <strong>of</strong> state failure, it serves to<br />
establish an adequate basis for the subsequent<br />
elaboration and comparison <strong>of</strong> the Angolan and<br />
Colombian state collapse experiences. Furthermore,<br />
reference to conventional definitions <strong>of</strong> state failure is<br />
also useful in so far as it serves to identify a number <strong>of</strong><br />
(additional) key variables, as well as forces or actors<br />
actively involved in the dynamics <strong>of</strong> such failure. For,<br />
certainly in the case <strong>of</strong> Angola and Colombia, the<br />
state's (partial) loss <strong>of</strong> the exclusive right to rule<br />
(related to the people's unwillingness or inability to<br />
support the state), has been constantly abused by<br />
nonstate actors, also becoming objects <strong>of</strong> security<br />
(e.g. guerrilla movements; secessionist groups; paramilitaries;<br />
crime syndicates; mercenary (security)<br />
organizations, and oil and diamond MNCs).<br />
Defining state failure<br />
Fituni (1995:143), describes a collapsed state as one<br />
whose `economic, political, cultural, and civilization<br />
links have been disrupted to such an extent as to have<br />
brought about drastic deterioration <strong>of</strong> its condition <strong>of</strong><br />
existence'. This definition correlates with Buzan's<br />
different sectors <strong>of</strong> security mentioned above. Woodward<br />
(1998:1) adds the `collapse <strong>of</strong> sovereign<br />
capacity', where the sovereign territorial state as the<br />
standard unit <strong>of</strong> security has failed to secure harmony<br />
between the interests <strong>of</strong> the state, on the one hand,<br />
and the interests <strong>of</strong> the nation (people), on the other.<br />
Its functional balance <strong>of</strong> inputs and outputs is<br />
destroyed. People remove or divert their support to<br />
other objects <strong>of</strong> security because they realize that the<br />
state is incapable or unwilling to provide essential<br />
supplies. Zacarias (1999:124) refers to failed states in<br />
<strong>South</strong>ern <strong>Africa</strong> as `states in gestation whose governments<br />
find it hard to consolidate and acquire internal<br />
legitimacy'. Helman and Ratner describe the failed<br />
nation-state as `utterly incapable <strong>of</strong> sustaining itself as<br />
a member <strong>of</strong> the international community' (Dorff<br />
1996:3). Other sources mention, inter alia, loss <strong>of</strong><br />
state control over political and economic space;<br />
ungovernability <strong>of</strong> the state; civil war and ethnic<br />
strife; warlordism, and a pervasive sense <strong>of</strong> chaos and<br />
anarchy, as features or variables <strong>of</strong> state collapse<br />
(Zartman 1995). Most, if not all <strong>of</strong> these variables<br />
reflect one common feature ± institutional weakness,<br />
reflecting the inability to maintain its independent<br />
identity and functional integrity (Zartman 1995:5;<br />
Zacarias, 1999:124±125).<br />
No doubt, both the Colombian and Angolan<br />
experiences reflect a significant amount <strong>of</strong> the variables<br />
listed in the definitions. Many Angolans and<br />
Colombians do not regard the state as the sole<br />
legitimate symbol <strong>of</strong> national identity and guarantor<br />
<strong>of</strong> sustained socio-economic and territorial protection.<br />
The state has come to share its `legitimate' right to rule<br />
with nonstate actors eager to grab the political,<br />
economic, social and legal power <strong>of</strong> state planning,<br />
decision-making and execution. Following parts will<br />
indicate how some <strong>of</strong> these groups have violently<br />
exploited the government's weakness to serve their<br />
own interests <strong>of</strong> power and greed. However, the<br />
saying is that it takes two to tango. State failure,<br />
particularly in the case <strong>of</strong> Angola, has not been a<br />
totally undesirable outcome for the influential political<br />
and military ruling e lite. The latter realize too well that<br />
a strong state with strong empirical statehood (good<br />
governance, democratic values, and legal controls)<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 11
would diminish their ability to capture, control and<br />
exploit the lucrative oil and diamond resources for<br />
power and financial gain. The definitions do not<br />
address this crucially important issue and its contribution<br />
towards the persistence <strong>of</strong> state failure in<br />
both Angola and Colombia. For the thesis that excolonial<br />
Third World states, contrary to most industrialized<br />
states, have not been allowed sufficient time<br />
to consolidate from a stage <strong>of</strong> primitive accumulation<br />
<strong>of</strong> power and legitimacy into strong states with<br />
undisputed sovereign capacity, may be true in the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> Angola, but perhaps less so for Colombia,<br />
which gained independence as early as 1819 (Zacarias<br />
1999:124).<br />
Why do states fail?<br />
In simplified terms, states fail because they can no<br />
longer perform the functions required for them to pass<br />
as states. These functions are so intertwined that a<br />
weakening <strong>of</strong> one function drags down performance<br />
in others. In general, weak states (and powers) are<br />
much more susceptible to state and government<br />
faltering and collapse for reasons already stated.<br />
However, there must be some root causes, which<br />
became active at one point or another in the state<br />
formation process, causing the first degenerative<br />
metastasis <strong>of</strong> eventual failure. Authoritarianism and<br />
tyrannic rule, for example, acted as a root cause in the<br />
failure <strong>of</strong> a number <strong>of</strong> states, such as Uganda (under<br />
Idi Amin); Romania (under Ceaucescu); <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
(under the NP), and the Soviet Union (under the<br />
CPSU) (Buzan 1991:43). Successful state and nation<br />
building is as much a top-down process as it is a<br />
bottom-up one, where a strong legitimate government<br />
needs a willing and loyal civil society with regulative<br />
and regenerative capacities (Buzan 1991:73). Authoritarian<br />
tyranny rule tends to neglect and destroy these<br />
capacities. This root cause is absent in the Colombian<br />
and Angolan experiences. Rather, the thesis emphasizing<br />
collapse <strong>of</strong> the colonial order as one root cause<br />
seems more appropriate.<br />
Angola was a Portuguese colony since 1575 (with<br />
the first Portuguese settlement at Luanda), until<br />
independence in 1975 (Somerville 1997:14). Spain's<br />
colonial rule commenced with the founding <strong>of</strong> San<br />
Sebastia n de Uraba along the coast <strong>of</strong> contemporary<br />
Colombia in 1509, followed by establishing the<br />
colonial state <strong>of</strong> Nuevo Reino de Granada (Oquist<br />
1980:21). When Angola and Colombia commenced<br />
their respective territorial nation-state formation, the<br />
only immediate means (institutions and resources)<br />
available to facilitate this, were those created and<br />
developed by their colonizers in the image <strong>of</strong> their<br />
own European states. Portuguese and Spanish rule<br />
took little account <strong>of</strong> existing cultural and ethnic<br />
boundaries nor did they create any new, unified<br />
nations to live and prosper within them. They had<br />
no real policy or rationale for advancing the development<br />
<strong>of</strong> indigenous groups save when such development<br />
served the long-term productivity and wealthgenerating<br />
potential <strong>of</strong> the colony (Oquist 1980:24).<br />
For example, at Angolan independence the illiteracy<br />
rate was over 90 per cent. Instead, they inherited a<br />
divisive clientelist rule, favouring certain class and/or<br />
ethnic groups above others, such as the Luanda-<br />
Mbundu mestizos in Angola (from which the MPLA<br />
e lite originated). The unfortunates were doomed to<br />
slavery (4 million young Angolans were `exported' as<br />
slaves to the Americas) (Hare 1998:4).<br />
In Colombia, a land-owning `hacienda' or `criollos'<br />
e lite (prosperous Spanish-Americans), supported by<br />
the Spanish Viceroyalty, dominated local society,<br />
characterized by a strongly developed hierarchical<br />
class divide, land-grabbing from the rural poor<br />
(Indians), and brutal slavery ± all generating social<br />
tension, grievance, and violence (Pearce 1990:15).<br />
Ownership <strong>of</strong> gold and emerald mines was mainly<br />
restricted to the local oligarchy <strong>of</strong> merchants and<br />
landowners. While taxing the latter, the Spanish<br />
Crown was determined not to hand over any<br />
significant political control to the local e lite. They<br />
were largely excluded from important government<br />
positions. The Comunero movement and its uprising<br />
in 1781 against Spanish bureaucratic oppression and<br />
new exploitative taxation policies, is a notable<br />
example where poor and wealthy `Colombians' joined<br />
forces to challenge Spanish rule. However, at most,<br />
the Comunero movement and other similar developments<br />
represented an uneasy, negative alliance<br />
between the Colombian wealthy and poor, fostered<br />
by a common opposition to Spanish rule, but<br />
inherently weakened by an irreconcilable division <strong>of</strong><br />
political, economic and social circumstances, priorities<br />
and challenges: power and greed, in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
the local e lite; physical survival in the case <strong>of</strong> the rural<br />
poor (Indians; <strong>Africa</strong>n slaves; poor whites, and<br />
classless mestizos) (Keen 1996:482; Oquist 1980:13).<br />
Similarly, deep-rooted regionalism and competing<br />
interests between the west, slave-owning and mining<br />
region, and the eastern region, experiencing vigorous<br />
agricultural and manufacturing production activities,<br />
were to make state and nation building efforts almost<br />
obsolete at the time <strong>of</strong> independence. Not only were<br />
the Creole e lite divided among themselves, but their<br />
leadership, based on different perceptions <strong>of</strong> the<br />
political and economic future <strong>of</strong> an independent<br />
Colombia, also created tensions between their followers.<br />
This deplorable situation-in-the-making is<br />
highlighted by victory over the Spanish, but `defeat'<br />
in terms <strong>of</strong> state and nation building. Simo n BolJ1var's<br />
final military victory over Spanish forces in 1819,<br />
made possible by Spain's declining fortunes in<br />
European power politics and economics, especially<br />
vis-aÁ-vis England, and its inability to re-impose<br />
12 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
Spanish rule in Nuevo Reino de Granada (Colombia),<br />
brought independence without the existence <strong>of</strong> one<br />
nation and one strong emerging government-inwaiting.<br />
At the time <strong>of</strong> Colombia's independence<br />
wars (1810±1819), the principle <strong>of</strong> self-determination<br />
was largely absent from the state formation debate.<br />
However, as the following paragraph indicates, a<br />
certain level <strong>of</strong> similarity with the case <strong>of</strong> Angola is<br />
evident (Pearce 1990:14±15; Keen 1996:503).<br />
As Buzan (1991:98) notes, the apparent surge <strong>of</strong><br />
violent nationalism, justified by growing international<br />
recognition <strong>of</strong> the (Angolan) people's right to selfdetermination,<br />
was not the positive unity <strong>of</strong> a<br />
coherent group with one national identity, but a<br />
negative one <strong>of</strong> common opposition to repressive and<br />
exploitative colonial rule. In the case <strong>of</strong> Angola, the<br />
Portuguese had to leave in a hurry, following a coup<br />
d'eÂtat in Lisbon in 1974 (against the Caetano regime)<br />
(Somerville 1997:14). Apart from plundering what<br />
was left <strong>of</strong> the state apparatus, there was no<br />
opportunity to gradually transfer, inter alia, state<br />
institutional capacity (bureaucracy) and resources<br />
(economic infrastructure) to the new Angolan government.<br />
France managed to facilitate this in a number<br />
<strong>of</strong> its own Third World colonies (e.g. Coà te D' Ivoire),<br />
but Portugal was too poor and too weak a state and<br />
power itself to accomplish transfer <strong>of</strong> power and<br />
resources stability. Then again, apart from a reasonably<br />
developed agriculturally based economy and<br />
infrastructure, serving the needs <strong>of</strong> the colonial state,<br />
there wasn't much to inherit in terms <strong>of</strong> industrial<br />
development. The Portuguese deliberately held back<br />
industrialization to protect national industries in<br />
Portugal. The MPLA, winning the race for Luanda<br />
(1974±75), established political control over a state<br />
lacking strong empirical statehood in the sense <strong>of</strong><br />
European states, whereby the latter, over a long and<br />
violent period <strong>of</strong> time, first secured domestic trade<br />
resources, territorial control, strong institutional capacity,<br />
nation building and undisputed (sole) legitimacy<br />
over the use <strong>of</strong> power and resources, before establishing<br />
the nation-state (Zacarias 1999:124). Furthermore,<br />
in the absence <strong>of</strong> one nation, but merely a<br />
constellation <strong>of</strong> urban-based Creole mestizos and<br />
rural-based sub-ethnic tribes, the national liberation<br />
movements (MPLA, UNITA and FNLA) were unable<br />
to act in an integrating state and nation building<br />
capacity. None <strong>of</strong> them represented the whole <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Angolan territory as one nation, inclusive <strong>of</strong> all the<br />
different sub-ethnic nationalities living within Angola.<br />
Similarly to Colombia, Angola had no single government-in-waiting,<br />
but three armed movements all<br />
claiming sole legitimacy. Today, the MPLA and<br />
UNITA are still fighting each other over this matter ±<br />
an aspect that is elaborated in the next part (Messiant<br />
1998:148; Van Benthem van den Bergh; 1998:12).<br />
The Angolan experience differs from Colombia<br />
when it comes to the role <strong>of</strong> Cold War rivalry and<br />
superpower competition in shaping the domestic<br />
order <strong>of</strong> newly independent ex-colonial states. While,<br />
in Colombia, Marxist ideology, Soviet and Cuban<br />
communism strongly influenced small opposition<br />
parties (e.g. the PCC) and guerrilla movements, with<br />
a closed bipartisan system limiting its influence on<br />
central government, the MPLA government introduced<br />
Marxist-based one party rule (Fituni 1995:143±<br />
144). Central government's political and military<br />
survival, and escape from total state collapse, depended<br />
on sustained Soviet and Cuban aid, amidst a<br />
significant diplomatic and military challenge posed by<br />
UNITA aided by the United States and <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
The Cold War superpowers set the rules for engagement.<br />
Both the MPLA and UNITA could do little to<br />
change them. When Angola lost its strategic significance<br />
as an apparent proxy in a war, following the<br />
Soviet Union's collapse in 1989, limited successes in<br />
state formation, such as institutional and infrastructural<br />
capacity building and control over territory, were<br />
now endangered by the superpowers' withdrawal <strong>of</strong><br />
interest and resources. This process acted as a catalyst<br />
for near state collapse. The Angolan people remained<br />
deeply divided along political, cultural, ideological<br />
and ethnic lines. Soviet and Cuban withdrawal left<br />
behind a weak state and government, acting from a<br />
severely restricted territorial base. In the absence <strong>of</strong><br />
legal controls, uncontrolled predatory activities by<br />
e lite groups (once protected by Cold War patrons),<br />
also increased, resulting in the capture, control and<br />
exploitation <strong>of</strong> Angola's mineral wealth. Realizing that<br />
the prolonged protracted civil war and failure <strong>of</strong> peace<br />
initiatives (e.g. the Bicesse Accords <strong>of</strong> May 1991), left<br />
little time to work out new favourable political and<br />
economic accommodation terms, powerful and corrupt<br />
MPLA e lite, army generals, UNITA leadership,<br />
and local warlords opted for lucrative resourcegrabbing<br />
to secure their privileged positions (Part 4<br />
refers) (Messiant 1998:156±157). Uncontrolled proliferation<br />
<strong>of</strong> small conventional arms in and around<br />
Angola also continued, fuelling further destruction<br />
and human suffering (Woodward 1998:2; 4).<br />
Cases <strong>of</strong> contemporary Third World state failure can<br />
also be attributed to a sustained decline and deterioration<br />
in the state's relative position in trade,<br />
investment, production and consumption vis-aÁ-vis<br />
other states or regions <strong>of</strong> the world. A dependency on<br />
primary commodity exports, particularly agricultural<br />
exports, is a key variable in this. The world prices <strong>of</strong><br />
these commodities have been depressed since the<br />
mid-1970s. Suffering a sharp decline in foreign export<br />
earnings, these states have been largely unable to<br />
generate sufficient economic growth and investment<br />
to diversify their economies towards higher value<br />
added goods. Under these conditions, their marginalization<br />
from the terms <strong>of</strong> global trade, favouring<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 13
value-added goods and services above primary<br />
commodities, has become a fait accompli. A direct<br />
link appears to exist between primary commodity<br />
export failure and crises on the one hand, and the<br />
emergence <strong>of</strong> illicit cocaine and diamond exploitation<br />
in areas worst affected by agricultural sector decline<br />
(Castells 1998:198). In part 3 this cause is discussed<br />
with regard to the Angolan and Colombian experiences.<br />
Olson (1993:572) has an interesting `theory' on<br />
why states tend to fail, which seems appropriate,<br />
particularly to the case <strong>of</strong> Angola. His reference to a<br />
dictator's `short time horizon', aiming at accumulating<br />
wealth and power as quickly as possible, because<br />
tomorrow may bring an abrupt end to his rule, has<br />
relevance, despite the fact that Angola is not ruled by<br />
a dictator. The MPLA e lite has developed a similar<br />
`short time horizon' policy comparable to a mixture <strong>of</strong><br />
`roving banditry' and `monopolized and rationalized<br />
theft in the form <strong>of</strong> taxes' (Olson 1993:567). The<br />
prolonged civil war has severely restricted the state's<br />
ability and opportunity to accumulate wealth through<br />
taxes, while simultaneously securing this source by<br />
creating incentives for Angolan citizens to produce,<br />
earn and invest under conditions <strong>of</strong> adequate national<br />
security. Realizing this, the ruling party has deliberately<br />
embarked on violent and corrupt resource<br />
capture (oil and diamonds) and enrichment, caring<br />
little about the dire long-term consequences for<br />
country and people. This greedy `short term horizon'<br />
ignores the political and socio-economic consequences<br />
<strong>of</strong> instability, disinvestment, societal collapse,<br />
discontent and even anarchy. UNITA has done<br />
the same, regarding diamonds. The Colombian state<br />
has done more to develop `rational monopolization <strong>of</strong><br />
theft' by taxing only part <strong>of</strong> citizens' income, while<br />
also striving to protect the interests <strong>of</strong> its taxgenerating<br />
subjects (Olson 1993:568). However, as<br />
this study indicates, Colombia also has a tendency to<br />
fail in these respects when considering the acute<br />
levels <strong>of</strong> violence, corruption, elitism, deprivation, lack<br />
<strong>of</strong> investment confidence and gross human (and<br />
property) rights violations. Both Angola and Colombia<br />
still have to reach `long-term horizons' <strong>of</strong> peace,<br />
stability and sustained development. State failure has<br />
made it possible for nonstate challengers to conduct<br />
monopolized theft through introducing taxes in sizeable<br />
areas <strong>of</strong> the country under their control. As `defacto<br />
governments' they even provide protection to<br />
their `subordinates', allowing the latter to continue<br />
producing coca leaves and mining diamonds from<br />
which both benefit ± the ruler the most <strong>of</strong> course.<br />
State failure and its global importance<br />
Why is the failed state phenomenon important to the<br />
international community? Globalization requires<br />
strong states that function, with governments capable<br />
<strong>of</strong> providing sovereign guarantees, exercising sovereign<br />
power and responsibility, and controlling their<br />
sovereign borders (Woodward 1998:1±2). Failed<br />
states, which can also be regarded as weak states,<br />
endanger the system <strong>of</strong> `order in anarchy' among<br />
nation-states (Buzan 1991). They cannot convincingly<br />
fulfil the functions <strong>of</strong> statehood and security.<br />
Given its inherent weakness, a failing state is itself a<br />
potential target for internal or external disruption and<br />
insurgencies. Reference has been made to the disruption<br />
caused by rival Cold War factions inside and<br />
outside Angola, trying to consolidate alliances to<br />
secure political, military, territorial and economic<br />
control <strong>of</strong> the country, dividing innocent and peaceseeking<br />
citizens into opposite camps (Somerville<br />
1997:11±38). Compared with the strong state, a<br />
weak, failing state's nation building process is<br />
incomplete; the ruling e lite's view <strong>of</strong> the state's<br />
political, institutional, cultural, religious, economic<br />
and territorial identity may be disputed and challenged<br />
by a significant proportion <strong>of</strong> its people, organized<br />
along ethnic lines (Buzan 1991:70). Again, Angola is<br />
a case in point, where UNITA, with its support base<br />
among the Ovimbundu tribe (37 per cent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
population), has continuously exploited the ruling<br />
MPLA's lack <strong>of</strong> internal legitimacy and control over<br />
territory, in order to promote its own agenda ±<br />
securing its power base, as well as capturing and<br />
selling Angola's diamond wealth to finance its war<br />
effort. The different tribes <strong>of</strong> Angola had little in<br />
common, apart from their experience <strong>of</strong> colonial occupation.<br />
Even this was hardly uniform and rigid, due to<br />
elitist favouritism, forced labour, corruption, nepotism,<br />
and mismanagement. Angolan nation building started<br />
as an MPLA e lite enterprise with a foreign (Western)<br />
ideology (Marxism), in contrast to the popular appeal<br />
<strong>of</strong> ethnic sub-nationalism ± a state <strong>of</strong> affairs constantly<br />
exploited among the Ovimbundu by Jonas<br />
Savimbi, leader <strong>of</strong> UNITA (Somerville 1997:12±13).<br />
This is partly the reason why fragile peace efforts<br />
(accords in 1975, 1992, and 1994), until now, have<br />
proved futile (Somerville 1997; Fituni 1995).<br />
While cases <strong>of</strong> state failure differ in scope, scale and<br />
features, a combination <strong>of</strong> all the variables mentioned<br />
so far, creates a dangerously unstable situation that<br />
could easily embroil neighbouring states. It could lead<br />
to the destabilization <strong>of</strong> an entire region. Recent<br />
violent incidents <strong>of</strong> Namibian border violations by<br />
UNITA forces and the latter's collaboration with rebel<br />
groups in the neighbouring DRC, indicate this<br />
potential for regional destabilization. The same could<br />
be true <strong>of</strong> transnational criminal activities such as drug<br />
trafficking and weapons smuggling, where crime<br />
14 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
syndicates exploit to the maximum the vacuum <strong>of</strong><br />
legal authority in a failed state. Using it as a safe<br />
haven, terrorists and crime syndicates can consolidate<br />
and expand their operations, creating a threat to<br />
international security. It is feared, for example, that<br />
powerful narco-traffickers and guerrilla forces operating<br />
from Colombia may extend their criminal activities<br />
into Panama now that the US has withdrawn most <strong>of</strong><br />
its forces from the latter. Last, but not the least, failed<br />
states also pose a challenge to the international<br />
community because they frequently generate gross<br />
human rights violations (Part 3, dealing with the key<br />
indicators <strong>of</strong> states at risk <strong>of</strong> failing, elaborates this<br />
issue). As Woodward (1998:5) remarks: `the problems<br />
<strong>of</strong> a non-functioning state, for both citizens and<br />
interveners, are first and foremost the absence <strong>of</strong><br />
physical security and the collapse <strong>of</strong> law and order'.<br />
Universally recognized non-derogable erga omnes<br />
obligations under international law are thus being<br />
violated (Shaw 1997:204). Furthermore, the political,<br />
economic and social development strategies pursued<br />
by international agencies and bilateral donors have<br />
been rendered virtually irrelevant under conditions <strong>of</strong><br />
acute state failure. For example, UN-sponsored<br />
emergency relief and peacekeeping operations in<br />
Angola have been among the organization's most<br />
costly and frustrating disappointments: `the bill: US$<br />
1.5 billion; the result: failure' (Time 27 March<br />
2000:41). It needs to be seen whether current US<br />
financial assistance to the Pastrana government,<br />
totalling US$ 1.6 billion, will succeed in combating<br />
the threat <strong>of</strong> cocaine trafficking as a cause and<br />
consequence <strong>of</strong> state failure (The Economist 26<br />
February 2000:68). Against this background, it is<br />
clear that the growing post-Cold War phenomenon <strong>of</strong><br />
failed states is <strong>of</strong> great concern to the international<br />
community, requiring costly and risky humanitarian<br />
intervention (UNCTAD 1997:127; UNDP 1999).<br />
ANGOLAN AND COLOMBIAN STATE FAILURE:<br />
THE VIOLENCE VARIABLE<br />
Born in violence<br />
Domestic violence has been an important and <strong>of</strong>ten<br />
decisive social process in the structuring <strong>of</strong> Angolan<br />
and Colombian state and society. This is not unique.<br />
In general, domestic violence is endemic in the early<br />
stages <strong>of</strong> any state and nation building (Zartman<br />
1995). Such violence, then, signals the vital process<br />
<strong>of</strong> central state power accumulation. However, as<br />
soon as the state-in-the-making has mustered the<br />
economic and political sources necessary to secure<br />
strong statehood, while simultaneously enhancing a<br />
social contract between state and society, rule by<br />
force is replaced by legitimate consensus rule. Most<br />
industrialized nation-states secured their existence in<br />
this way (Zacarias 1999). In the absence <strong>of</strong> this<br />
scenario, large-scale use <strong>of</strong> force tends to prevail ± its<br />
violent expression being a component <strong>of</strong> state faltering,<br />
amidst equally threatening use <strong>of</strong> (military)<br />
violence by its challengers. This represents the current<br />
scenario in which Angola and Colombia tend to find<br />
themselves. Learning from a colonial history <strong>of</strong><br />
`rebellions, cimarronism, slave palenques, and national<br />
liberation wars' (Oquist 1980:27), both `nationstates'<br />
have developed a tendency to fight, initially<br />
based on violent political factionalism in the case <strong>of</strong><br />
Colombia, and ethno-ideological conflict in Angola's<br />
case. In both cases, the delegitimized state and certain<br />
nonstate actors emerged as prime conditioning agents<br />
in post-independent violent conflicts. While political<br />
violence has not led to total anarchy and absence <strong>of</strong><br />
central government rule, it has been decisive enough<br />
to derail the vital process <strong>of</strong> power accumulation ± a<br />
precondition for strong legal controls and the state's<br />
legitimate monopoly over the means <strong>of</strong> violence.<br />
Violence in its many distinct forms is, <strong>of</strong> course, not<br />
unique to Angola and Colombia. It is, however,<br />
endemic to both at a national level, making violence<br />
a key variable in their state failure experiences.<br />
Colombia, for example, has 90 intentional homicides<br />
per 100 000 inhabitants, annually compared to<br />
neighbouring Venezuela's 12, and 10 in the USA.<br />
Similar data for Angola is not available (United<br />
Nations 1998).<br />
It is impossible here to provide a detailed account <strong>of</strong><br />
all the notably distinctive events <strong>of</strong> violence since their<br />
independence, or to discuss all major categories <strong>of</strong><br />
violence, particularly in Colombia's case. For example,<br />
at least 13 important periods <strong>of</strong> violent political<br />
conflict occurred in the first century <strong>of</strong> the latter's<br />
independence; not to mention `La Violencia' <strong>of</strong> the<br />
1950s, and subsequent protracted civil war (Oquist<br />
1980:42). Rather, the emphasis is on the commonality<br />
<strong>of</strong> political violence and guerrilla activities, with a brief<br />
acknowledgement <strong>of</strong> other categories, such as narcoterrorism<br />
by powerful drug cartels. The latter category<br />
is absent in the case <strong>of</strong> Angola. Instead, foreign<br />
private (mercenary) armies have been hired by the<br />
MPLA ruling e lite to support its military <strong>of</strong>fensive<br />
against UNITA and provide `political' services such as<br />
procuring weapons. Reno (1997:172±177) refers to<br />
this development as the `privatization' <strong>of</strong> violence,<br />
involving clandestine companies such as Executive<br />
Outcomes and Saracen International. Subsequent<br />
paragraphs are concerned with the origins, causes<br />
and occurrence <strong>of</strong> political violence at independence<br />
and thereafter, providing some clarity on the violencestate<br />
failure link, the latter component being elaborated<br />
in the next Part.<br />
While more than 150 years apart, certain parallels<br />
can be drawn between the Colombian and Angolan<br />
experiences <strong>of</strong> political violence. In Colombia, BolõÂ -<br />
var's military success resulted in the criollos' assump-<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 15
tion <strong>of</strong> political power and the expulsion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Spanish Viceregal administration. The new government<br />
favoured England's replacing <strong>of</strong> Spain as the<br />
main trading `partner'. Little else changed. By 1825 all<br />
<strong>of</strong> Gran Colombia's territories (including the regions<br />
<strong>of</strong> present-day Panama, Venezuela, and Ecuador), had<br />
been liberated. This was the time for the new<br />
Republics to consolidate, inter alia, through constitution<br />
making, civil institution-building and public<br />
education. However, similarly to Angola, the ruling<br />
criollos' e lite did not inherit a relatively intact Spanish<br />
colonial state. They had to create new power and<br />
authority relationships, amidst the appearance <strong>of</strong><br />
serious constraints: the military demanded a greater<br />
role, favouring a centralized, highly hierarchical,<br />
authoritarian state. The criollo oligarchy itself was<br />
deeply divided between those in favour <strong>of</strong> such a<br />
unitary regime, and others supporting a federal<br />
alliance. They could not agree on one political project<br />
for the new state and whether the colonial socioeconomic<br />
structure should be retained or reformed, or<br />
a new system should be developed, to serve the<br />
interests <strong>of</strong> the wealthy e lite. Furthermore, the classbased<br />
hierarchical social structure continued; political<br />
power remained in the hands <strong>of</strong> a small `white'<br />
criollos' e lite; Indians, mestizos, and the descendants<br />
<strong>of</strong> the <strong>Africa</strong>n slaves were to remain at the bottom <strong>of</strong><br />
this structure. And the Roman Catholic Church and<br />
State were not separated (Keen 1996; Oquist 1980).<br />
State and nation building was further constrained<br />
by regionally based oligarchies demanding that the<br />
central government respect and recognize their power.<br />
This explains to some extent the difficult context<br />
within which contemporary Colombia's two main<br />
political groups and parties, the (pro-clerical) Conservatives<br />
and (anti-clerical) Liberals originated. For<br />
most <strong>of</strong> their existence, no group has been powerful<br />
enough to rule alone. Internal ideological disagreements,<br />
both locally and regionally, the civilian-military<br />
political confrontation, and unresolved Church-State<br />
disputes, fuelled Colombia's first nation-wide civil war<br />
from 1839±1841 (Keen 1996:50±51). Since then,<br />
bipartisan politics have remained a serious obstacle to<br />
the establishment <strong>of</strong> a strong state with undisputed<br />
legitimacy. Political violence erupted sporadically<br />
throughout the 19th century, the depths there<strong>of</strong> were<br />
reached in the `war <strong>of</strong> 1000 days' between 1899 and<br />
1903, killing some 100 000 people (Keen 1996:506±<br />
507). Brutal times occurred again in 1948 after the<br />
Conservative and Liberal parties became more extreme,<br />
the first veering towards fascism and the latter<br />
towards left-wing populism. Colombia's domestic<br />
politics (similarly to Angola) were unable to escape<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>ound developments at international level, notably<br />
the Second World War and the rise <strong>of</strong> communism,<br />
with the Cuban revolution acting as an important<br />
regional catalyst. Violent inter-party rivalries and<br />
increased rural banditry, in which deprived poor<br />
peasants were fighting to reclaim land captured by<br />
the politically powerful e lite, occurred simultaneously<br />
at a nation-wide scale. This period, known as La<br />
Violencia, lasted in distant, geographically isolated<br />
areas at least until the 1960s and took some 200 000±<br />
300 000 lives. Angola's `Guerra das Cidades' (War <strong>of</strong><br />
Cities) (1992±1994), while years away and much<br />
shorter in duration, is comparable in terms <strong>of</strong> the<br />
horrendous levels <strong>of</strong> starvation and destruction<br />
(500 000 died). This `phase' in the Angolan civil<br />
war saw the use <strong>of</strong> heavy artillery, aircraft and<br />
sophisticated weaponry on a scale not hitherto<br />
witnessed in <strong>Africa</strong> (Hare 1998:10; Global Witness<br />
1998).<br />
La Violencia was rooted in a chronic lawlessness<br />
exacerbated by the fact that the state's own agents <strong>of</strong><br />
legal controls and security, the police and defence<br />
force, were also deeply divided by political factionalism,<br />
openly supporting either the Conservative government<br />
or Liberal opposition, instead <strong>of</strong> being<br />
politically neutral. Politically motivated murders became<br />
common. People took the law into their own<br />
hands, while central government implemented a<br />
policy <strong>of</strong> armed repression to neutralize the peasant<br />
and leftist labour union movements. Inequitable land<br />
distribution has been an important cause <strong>of</strong> violence<br />
since colonial times, fuelled by rural poverty amidst<br />
the wealth <strong>of</strong> large landowners. The same accounts<br />
for revenge and hatreds passed down from one<br />
generation to the next. A mixture <strong>of</strong> political fanaticism,<br />
personal vendetta, unresolved land allocation,<br />
and lack <strong>of</strong> strong, reliable state agents and institutions<br />
created favourable conditions for near anarchy<br />
and collapse, epitomizing the state failure-violence<br />
link visualized by the triangular model. In 1957 the<br />
Conservatives and Liberals reached a power-sharing<br />
pact (Frente National) that ended much <strong>of</strong> the<br />
violence, but did not remove the causes there<strong>of</strong>.<br />
General disillusionment prevailed. By agreeing to<br />
allocate the presidency alternately to a Liberal and a<br />
Conservative and equally split seats in cabinet and<br />
Congress (Parliament), ordinary Colombians were<br />
again marginalized by an undemocratic deal from<br />
which the powerful landed gentry, political and<br />
business e lite pr<strong>of</strong>ited. In addition, it also tended to<br />
immobilize central government, leading to the avoidance<br />
<strong>of</strong> difficult but necessary reforms (Keen<br />
1996:513). The National Front lasted until 1974.<br />
Subsequently, attention is given to two new directions<br />
<strong>of</strong> violence in Colombia: leftist guerrilla activity<br />
and drug trafficking. (Osterling 1989:85±87, 97, 270;<br />
UNHCR 1997:109).<br />
Similarly, in Angola the main national liberation<br />
movements could also not agree on one unifying<br />
political and socio-economic project for the new<br />
state. Ironically, it was only the weaker UNITA which,<br />
16 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
then, seriously considered compromise and legitimacy<br />
through elections. However, covert US actions deliberately<br />
are alleged to have derailed this possibility. The<br />
MPLA and UNITA developed competing ideas on<br />
how the state should be managed. The coalition<br />
government <strong>of</strong> 1975 soon broke down, following<br />
failed FNLA attempts to take military control <strong>of</strong><br />
Luanda, while the MPLA and UNITA also engaged<br />
in military confrontation. While the issue <strong>of</strong> unitary<br />
versus federalist government rule was absent in<br />
Angola's experience, ideological divide exacerbated<br />
the deep-rooted colonial era mistrust between the<br />
`privileged' urban Mbundu-creole e lite, on the one<br />
hand, and the marginalized rural Ovimbundu and<br />
Bakongo tribes (supporters <strong>of</strong> UNITA and the FNLA<br />
respectively). Instead <strong>of</strong> seeking unity and reconciliation<br />
at a time when the weak remnants <strong>of</strong> the colonial<br />
state desperately needed new structures (similarly to<br />
Colombia), the liberators opted for civil war, fuelled<br />
by foreign intervention. No one movement was able to<br />
muster sufficient national popularity to obtain legitimacy.<br />
With the FNLA's dwindling support and<br />
eventual decline (for reasons beyond the focus <strong>of</strong><br />
this article), UNITA emerged as the only other<br />
decisive actor in determining and fomenting political<br />
violence and military bipartisan politics. Similar to<br />
Colombia, no one <strong>of</strong> the two remaining movements<br />
were strong enough to obtain outright victory,<br />
resulting in a prolonged violent conflict. However,<br />
very different from Colombia, the nature <strong>of</strong> Angola's<br />
bipartisan politics has experienced almost no `lasting<br />
legacy <strong>of</strong> anti-militarism' among the e lite (Pearce<br />
1990:16). On the contrary, UNITA has never been<br />
willing to fully denounce the military option in favour<br />
<strong>of</strong> democratic elections. The weak MPLA government<br />
could not afford relying solely on regular general<br />
elections as a means to obtain popular legitimacy and<br />
control. UN-sponsored peace initiatives have repeatedly<br />
failed, while no political solution to the war is<br />
immediately foreseeable. The Bicesse Accords, cosponsored<br />
by the US and the Soviet Union and signed<br />
in Portugal, failed to bring about demilitarization,<br />
democratization and free elections. Neither the MPLA<br />
nor UNITA were ready to answer the people's security<br />
needs. On the eve <strong>of</strong> the October 1992 elections,<br />
UNITA resembled less <strong>of</strong> a political party and more <strong>of</strong><br />
a rival army waiting to grab power. The MPLA was<br />
not prepared to renounce its criminalization through<br />
abuse for political ends ± its control <strong>of</strong> state resources.<br />
Similarly to Colombia, subsequent phases <strong>of</strong> the civil<br />
war have seen the returning logic <strong>of</strong> war and violence,<br />
with international mediation marginalized in attempts<br />
to turn the tide (Global Witness 1998; Hare 1998;<br />
Maier 1996).<br />
Different from Colombia's experience <strong>of</strong> intra-class<br />
and inter-party conflict and violence, inter-movement<br />
and inter- politico-ethnic violence have characterized<br />
the Angolan post-independence situation <strong>of</strong> almost<br />
constant civil war. While the 19th century Colombian<br />
civil wars reinforced political party identification and<br />
allegiance, also among ordinary citizens, the immediate<br />
years <strong>of</strong> the Angolan civil war reinforced class and<br />
ethnic-based movement identification (Oquist<br />
1980:13; Messiant 1998). However, such identification<br />
was <strong>of</strong> a far lesser magnitude among ordinary<br />
Angolans than in the case <strong>of</strong> Colombia. The Colombian<br />
civil wars <strong>of</strong> the 19th century were not between<br />
small armed groups, but armies <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong><br />
ordinary men, seeking both rewards from the e lite<br />
and revenge for loved ones killed (Pearce 1990:20).<br />
The majority <strong>of</strong> Angolans simply welcomed liberatorsat-large<br />
and initially had no idea that their future<br />
would be determined by a violent and destructive civil<br />
war, putting them on opposing sides <strong>of</strong> a bloody<br />
barrier (Pearce 1990:149).<br />
New directions <strong>of</strong> violence<br />
The emergence <strong>of</strong> perhaps a dozen different leftist<br />
guerrilla forces in Colombia coincided in time with<br />
increased guerrilla violence <strong>of</strong> national liberation in<br />
Angola (1961±74). The FARC was established in<br />
1966 as the military wing <strong>of</strong> PCC. The smaller ELN<br />
originated in the 1960s and was inspired by Fidel<br />
Castro's revolution in Cuba (Sweeney 1999:4). Both<br />
sought to establish a Marxist Colombian state by<br />
force. Similarly to Angola, externally charged domestic<br />
resistance subverted the goal <strong>of</strong> nationhood. As<br />
`successors' to the communist agrarian groups <strong>of</strong> the<br />
1950s, operating from semi-autonomous isolated<br />
areas characterized by the virtual absence <strong>of</strong> a strong<br />
central state authority and legitimacy, the leftist<br />
guerrilla movements in Colombia strengthened the<br />
proposition that `he who rules determines the meaning<br />
<strong>of</strong> [domestic] security' (Buzan 1991:11). Whereas<br />
the state has failed to conclude a mutually beneficial<br />
social contract with the people to foster strong and<br />
sustainable state and nation building in exchange for<br />
shared security, well-being and protection, FARC and<br />
other guerrilla movements did succeed in creating a<br />
support base by organizing the economically deprived<br />
communities politically and militarily, while providing<br />
social services and facilities (Osterling 1989:99).<br />
Realizing the danger <strong>of</strong> Colombia's fragmentation<br />
into countervailing regions with own power centres<br />
(balkanization), the ruling Conservative Valencia<br />
administration launched military-sponsored antiguerrilla<br />
operations (Keen 1996).<br />
Despite the fact that until the 1980s the FARC had<br />
fewer than 1 000 guerrillas, the central government<br />
was unable to destroy it. Now there are more than<br />
15 000. Again, acute state de-legitimization and<br />
criminalization through, inter alia, fraudulent election<br />
practices, internal divisions and a weak and ineffective<br />
government-opposition equation, brought about its<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 17
failure to effectively `tame the contiguous periphery'<br />
(Zartman 1995:35). The urban based MPLA government<br />
has failed in the same respect. For example, in<br />
recent years, the poorly trained and corrupt national<br />
army has lost more than 80 engagements involving<br />
300 or more guerrillas (Sweeney 1999:8). In contrast,<br />
the MPLA army has booked substantial success<br />
against UNITA forces since 1998 (Global Witness<br />
1998).<br />
The sustained withering <strong>of</strong> central government's<br />
power, reflecting its avoidance <strong>of</strong> necessary but<br />
difficult choices and the lost <strong>of</strong> control over its own<br />
agents, became `signposts' in the failure <strong>of</strong> intermittent<br />
peace initiatives aiming at the successful cooption<br />
<strong>of</strong> FARC and ELN (the latest peace talks began<br />
on 7 January 1999). Instead <strong>of</strong> reforming institutionalized<br />
abusive and discriminatory policies, thus<br />
removing the incentive for violent guerrilla activity,<br />
the state embarked on severe persecution. Similarly to<br />
the Angolan experience, a `drift to non-compliance'<br />
has occurred. (Basic Papers 1997:6). Factionalism<br />
and disagreement among and within guerrilla groups<br />
have also led to violence, while the mushrooming <strong>of</strong><br />
right-wing paramilitary groups to counter guerrilla<br />
activity, opened yet another front <strong>of</strong> sometimes<br />
irrational, horrendous violence. These groups, sponsored<br />
by big business, major land-owners and powerful<br />
elements within the state army and police, have<br />
tended to supersede the weak Colombian army in<br />
recent years as the front-line force against the<br />
guerrillas (AUC, for example, claims to be active in<br />
over 550 municipalities). In waging a low-intensity<br />
war to reclaim guerrilla-held territory for their (e lite)<br />
sponsors, they have continuously terrorized rural<br />
communities, `leftist' local authorities, and human<br />
rights activists, accused <strong>of</strong> sympathizing with FARC<br />
and the ELN. Well over half <strong>of</strong> Colombia's political<br />
murders are committed by the paramilitaries and selfdefence<br />
units (AUC, for example, killed 902 people in<br />
1999 alone) (The Economist 8 April 2000:63±64).<br />
The rise <strong>of</strong> the MedellõÂ n and Cali drug cartels in the<br />
1980s again plunged Colombia into a period <strong>of</strong><br />
widespread violence, corruption and ungovernability.<br />
Developing the cocaine (and heroin) trade into a<br />
powerful, highly pr<strong>of</strong>itable industry, these cartels were<br />
able to gain a significant share in the `monopoly over<br />
violence'. Challenging a weak central state, they<br />
fought a violent all-out war against state security<br />
agents between 1983 and 1993. For the first time in<br />
Colombia, nonstate actors resorted to urban narcoterrorism,<br />
principally car bombs to liquidate its (state)<br />
adversaries. As many as 5 000 police <strong>of</strong>ficers were<br />
murdered by the drugs gangs between 1986 and<br />
1992. Abusing state weakness, they have further<br />
corrupted the system by forging alliances with<br />
legitimate business, the legal system, state agents,<br />
and by controlling politics and the media in cities such<br />
as MedellõÂn and Cali. Apart from becoming highly<br />
politicized, the MedellõÂn cartel boosted its popularity<br />
among the poor through social support and low-cost<br />
housing programmes. The Cali cartel, on the other<br />
hand, practised `social cleaning' by killing <strong>of</strong>f prostitutes,<br />
beggars, street children and homosexuals. While<br />
narco-terrorism was dealt a temporary blow, following<br />
the decimation (killing, detention or extradition) <strong>of</strong> the<br />
MedellõÂn and Cali cartels' top leadership in the mid-<br />
1990s, it did not disappear altogether. The cocaine<br />
trade continues to flourish, while the drug cartels have<br />
become increasingly rooted in Colombian society<br />
through their attempts to infiltrate legitimate sectors<br />
(sport; culture; media; health, and social services).<br />
Bogota , for example, with its 12 million inhabitants,<br />
experiences acute levels <strong>of</strong> violent crime linked to the<br />
illicit cocaine trade. Many urban youths facing a bleak<br />
future have resorted to the lucrative and dangerous<br />
world <strong>of</strong> cocaine trafficking as one <strong>of</strong> the few means <strong>of</strong><br />
escaping poverty. This situation is exacerbated by a<br />
continued flight to cities from rural areas devastated by<br />
the guerrilla war (Castells 1998:198±199).<br />
Another important variable in the state failureviolence-resource<br />
capture triangle is small arms<br />
proliferation. While Colombia has developed a limited<br />
across-the-board capability to produce indigenously<br />
designed small and heavy weapons, Angola has no<br />
such capability at all. Nearly all weapons need to be<br />
imported. Their domestic situation <strong>of</strong> prolonged civil<br />
war (fought mainly with small arms) creates a demand<br />
for such weapons, both by the state and nonstate<br />
actors. During the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union<br />
were both eager to supply large quantities <strong>of</strong> munitions<br />
(e.g. AK47's, personnel mines) to the domestic<br />
`defenders' <strong>of</strong> their ideological stance and national<br />
interests. Both developed a global network <strong>of</strong> black<br />
market supply channels to funnel arms to insurgent<br />
organizations. The demise <strong>of</strong> Cold War proxy conflict,<br />
particularly in the case <strong>of</strong> Angola, did not bring an end<br />
to small arms proliferation and their indiscriminate use<br />
in the ongoing civil war (estimated at 2 million light<br />
weapons. Apart from the fact that these weapons tend<br />
to have a long life, leading to dangerous accumulation<br />
when new weapons are also imported, the `former'<br />
suppliers have merely replaced their ideological<br />
motive with a pr<strong>of</strong>it motive. Particularly the `cashstrapped'<br />
former Eastern European countries such as<br />
Russia, Bulgaria and Ukraine have been hard pressed<br />
to strengthen and increase their market share in the<br />
global supply <strong>of</strong> (small) arms. Ironically, many <strong>of</strong> the<br />
state failure variables active in Angola and Colombia<br />
have also acted as incentives towards e.g. Bulgaria's<br />
failure (unwillingness and/or inability) to impose<br />
barriers to prevent the free flow <strong>of</strong> small arms fuelling<br />
the formers' destructive civil wars. State failure and<br />
the availability <strong>of</strong> an abundance <strong>of</strong> firepower provide<br />
both the guerrillas and government forces <strong>of</strong> Angola<br />
18 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
and Colombia with a reason to bypass the democratic<br />
process <strong>of</strong> power accumulation. This explains the<br />
state failure-arms proliferation-violence link. These<br />
components' link to resource capture is also straightforward,<br />
enabling the conflicting parties to pay in hard<br />
cash or diamonds in a global arms traffic market where<br />
increased supply has made the client-buyer `the king<br />
<strong>of</strong> the market'. Heavier and more sophisticated<br />
weapons (e.g. SAMs) have also been obtained this<br />
way. The large black market for small arms that can be<br />
purchased for as little as the price <strong>of</strong> a second-hand<br />
shirt, is also exacerbating non-political criminality<br />
(Basic Papers December 1997:1±7; Pierre 1997).<br />
Today, Angola and Colombia share the unfortunate<br />
status <strong>of</strong> being major conflicts <strong>of</strong> the 1990s, with at<br />
least 1 000 deaths in any one year during the past<br />
decade alone (Carnegie Commission 1997:12). It is<br />
estimated that at least 35 000 Colombians died <strong>of</strong><br />
political violence during this period. Protracted civil<br />
war in Angola has caused around 1 million deaths<br />
between 1975 and 1991, while an estimated further<br />
300 000 Angolans died since the resumption <strong>of</strong> civil<br />
war in 1992. Around 700 000 people were injured by<br />
landmines (Angola has an estimated 9 million landmines<br />
placed) (The Economist 25 September 1999:1;<br />
The Economist 18 March 2000:57). For ordinary<br />
Angolans and Colombians, violence has become a<br />
`de-personalized phenomenon <strong>of</strong> daily life' as they<br />
have become almost numb to thousands <strong>of</strong> unsolved<br />
murders and irrational killing (Osterling 1989:264).<br />
On the whole, any understanding <strong>of</strong> violence in both<br />
countries must be placed in the context <strong>of</strong> their<br />
political, social and economic structures <strong>of</strong> elitism and<br />
deprivation on the one hand, and politico-economic<br />
pressures from the outside. Much has already been<br />
said about this; much remains to be said. Subsequent<br />
parts elaborate current state failure as a consequence<br />
<strong>of</strong> earlier partial disintegration, violence and last, but<br />
not the least, the role <strong>of</strong> lucrative resources determining<br />
domestic, as well as international activity <strong>of</strong><br />
national interests.<br />
SCALE AND SCOPE OF STATE FAILURE<br />
Reference has already been made to the key indicators<br />
<strong>of</strong> states at risk <strong>of</strong> failing or collapse, such as<br />
demographic pressures; lack <strong>of</strong> democratic practices;<br />
deterioration <strong>of</strong> public services, and sharp and severe<br />
economic distress (Carnegie Commission 1997:44).<br />
These and other indicators are applied to establish and<br />
compare the scale and scope <strong>of</strong> Angolan and<br />
Colombian state failure. In addition, the warning<br />
signals or `ultimate signposts', mentioned by Zartman<br />
(1995:9±10), are also relevant, such as the devolving<br />
<strong>of</strong> state power to the peripheries; withering <strong>of</strong> central<br />
government's power by default; its avoidance <strong>of</strong><br />
necessary but difficult choices, and the state's loss<br />
<strong>of</strong> control over its own agents.<br />
Political failure<br />
Lack <strong>of</strong> democratic practices is common to Angolan<br />
and Colombian political failure, giving rise to the<br />
criminalization and de-legitimization <strong>of</strong> state and<br />
government. It is also closely linked to political<br />
violence in both countries, discussed in the previous<br />
Part. Contrary to Angola, Colombia has a long history<br />
<strong>of</strong> democratic rule, characterized by a civilian, participatory<br />
political system. Its Constitution <strong>of</strong> August<br />
1886 was Latin America's oldest. In Colombia, almost<br />
painstakingly regular elections have been the rule and<br />
coups d'etat the rare exception. Only twice did the<br />
latter replace democratic rule, and then for a very<br />
limited duration. In general, the leadership and<br />
nation's commitment to a democratic framework has<br />
strongly facilitated compromise and return to democracy<br />
at times <strong>of</strong> political violence. So, why then talk<br />
about its political failure? The answer to this aspect is<br />
complex and requires substantial research. Considering<br />
the limitations <strong>of</strong> this paper, only brief reference is<br />
made to certain prominent `signposts' <strong>of</strong> Colombia's<br />
political failure. The first one is a tradition <strong>of</strong> deeply<br />
rooted conservative politics generally unfavourable to<br />
change over time. With the ruling e lite failing to<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>oundly change the colonial legacy <strong>of</strong> class-based<br />
socio-political and cultural exclusionism (referred to<br />
in previous Parts), Colombian democracy has remained<br />
a closed system. The formal political structure<br />
in theory allows broad participation, but in practice<br />
the bipartisan system, dominated by the Conservative<br />
and Liberal parties, has led to factionalism, clientelist<br />
politics, elitism and centralized politics. Under these<br />
conditions, it has proved extremely difficult for any<br />
new party to develop and consolidate adequate<br />
political power and support to pose any serious<br />
challenge to either major party (Keen 1996; Osterling<br />
1989).<br />
A new Constitution, promulgated on 5 July 1991,<br />
for the first time ever introduced provisions to increase<br />
other parties' chances <strong>of</strong> election, but given the fact<br />
that clientelismo is one <strong>of</strong> the most pr<strong>of</strong>ound political<br />
phenomena in Colombia, it needs to be seen whether<br />
these measures will prove effective (Kline 1999).<br />
Political power is still largely centred in the hands <strong>of</strong> a<br />
privileged e lite minority, the `la clase polõ tica', who<br />
pull the strings when it comes to senior appointments<br />
at national government level. Qualified citizens who<br />
are not members <strong>of</strong> either the Conservative or Liberal<br />
party have seldom been <strong>of</strong>fered positions <strong>of</strong> power<br />
and influence. Even appointments at lower levels are<br />
strongly determined by family connections and personal<br />
relationships and loyalties. The extent <strong>of</strong> these<br />
discriminatory practices are country-wide. They<br />
spread either through political manipulation by the<br />
two main parties or by the leftist guerrilla forces in<br />
areas under their control. The media, while allowed<br />
substantial freedom to criticize the state and govern-<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 19
ment, have been unable to escape the control <strong>of</strong> the<br />
powerful and wealthy e lite. For example, the country's<br />
major newspaper, El Tiempo, is owned by the family<br />
<strong>of</strong> former Liberal president Eduardo Santos, while<br />
Bogota 's La RepuÂblica belongs to the powerful<br />
Ospina family whose members include three former<br />
Conservative Party presidents. Due to the rigidity <strong>of</strong><br />
Colombia's imperfect political system, it should come<br />
as no surprise that grassroots discontent and frustrations<br />
have turned violent time and again, either within<br />
own party ranks, or through `outsider' guerrilla groups<br />
such as FARC (Osterling 1989:158±172).<br />
In the absence <strong>of</strong> any third party strong opposition<br />
with a `clean' past and accessible to ordinary Colombians,<br />
the state has become criminalized and delegitimized<br />
by undemocratic practices. Corrupt and<br />
unwilling to utilize the available `democratic resources',<br />
it failed to produce lasting positive results<br />
for most <strong>of</strong> its people. This unhealthy state <strong>of</strong> affairs<br />
has encouraged violent opposition, weakening the<br />
state's central authority in contemporary Colombia,<br />
particularly in regions where guerrilla groups and drug<br />
syndicates control the enormous pr<strong>of</strong>its from illicit<br />
cocaine production. Accordingly, they are able to<br />
continuously finance their war against government<br />
forces. Cocaine pr<strong>of</strong>its have also had a pr<strong>of</strong>ound<br />
corrupting effect on influential elements <strong>of</strong> the state,<br />
further weakening the latter's commitment to good<br />
governance, democratic principles and legal controls ±<br />
an issue further discussed in Part 4. One notable<br />
example is the web <strong>of</strong> corruption exposed during the<br />
presidential election campaign <strong>of</strong> 1994. Elected President<br />
Samper's main opponent, (the current President)<br />
Andre s Pastrana, caused a severe state<br />
legitimacy crisis by releasing tapes confirming Cali<br />
cartel donations to Samper's presidential campaign,<br />
also implicating former senior government <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />
(The Economist 26 February 2000:22). Sharp economic<br />
decline, intensified guerrilla activity and state<br />
criminalization thus provide the variables (material) for<br />
the state failure-violence-resource capture triangular<br />
model. Today, many Colombians are experiencing a<br />
`democracy shock', disillusioned by the fact that<br />
democratic rule and practices have not been able to<br />
produce any solutions to the rampant violence, crime<br />
and prolonged semi-civil war. A voter turnout <strong>of</strong> only<br />
45 per cent <strong>of</strong> eligible voters at the latest elections<br />
(March 1998) is evident <strong>of</strong> this (UNDP 1999:218).<br />
When compared to the Colombian democratic<br />
experience, it is evident that Angola has very little to<br />
show in this regard, apart from a `multi-party democracy'<br />
constitution in theory. The weak MPLA government,<br />
unable to complete the vital process <strong>of</strong> central<br />
power accumulation, could only secure its position by<br />
the use <strong>of</strong> force. So far, all attempts to gain political<br />
legitimacy through democratic elections have failed,<br />
despite the fact that the latest elections (September<br />
1992) recorded a desperate voter turnout <strong>of</strong> 91 per<br />
cent <strong>of</strong> eligible voters (UNDP 1999:220). UNITA, in<br />
defiance <strong>of</strong> the MPLA's victory in the 1992 parliamentary<br />
elections, and Savimbi's narrow defeat in the<br />
presidential elections, returned to the bush to continue<br />
its guerrilla war, financed by unrestricted access to<br />
diamonds. While winning the elections, the MPLA's<br />
support was still largely confined to urban centres<br />
under its control. UNITA was still in control <strong>of</strong> large<br />
areas <strong>of</strong> the interior with strong popular support<br />
among rural dwellers (Basic papers, December<br />
1997:6).<br />
At the time <strong>of</strong> independence, the MPLA inherited a<br />
completely disorganized colonial state apparatus when<br />
nine-tenths <strong>of</strong> all Portuguese colonizers suddenly left<br />
the country. However, it could be blamed for not<br />
taking decisive action to avert political failure. First, the<br />
MPLA failed to see that its revolutionary liberator<br />
status was an insufficient condition for legitimacy. It<br />
failed to recognize its inability to command support<br />
from the majority <strong>of</strong> the population. Second, in its<br />
Marxist-based one party rule (<strong>of</strong>ficially abandoned in<br />
1990 in favour <strong>of</strong> democratic socialism) there has been<br />
no place for reconciliation with the FNLA and UNITA<br />
leadership and supporters. Instead, political exclusion<br />
has largely prevailed. The only notable exception is the<br />
October 1992 elections, when `half-hearted' attempts<br />
to incorporate elected UNITA candidates into government<br />
and national parliament were torpedoed by<br />
UNITA itself. While a constitution is in place, MPLA<br />
rule has seen very little <strong>of</strong> its fundamental democratic<br />
principles and values being implemented in real life. In<br />
violation <strong>of</strong> the 1975 Constitution declaring `a free and<br />
democratic society with sovereignty vested in the<br />
people', a policy <strong>of</strong> severe repression was followed<br />
against those suspected <strong>of</strong> sympathy and support <strong>of</strong><br />
the FNLA and UNITA. Similarly to the Colombia<br />
experience, political control, for the greater part <strong>of</strong><br />
Angolan statehood, remained in the hands <strong>of</strong> a small<br />
Creole mestic,o and assimilado MPLA e lite. Political<br />
loyalty became the prime qualification for top and<br />
middle-rank government positions. Political failure was<br />
enhanced by a new post-colonial ethno-political and<br />
class-based hierarchical social structure, excluding<br />
most <strong>of</strong> the Bakongo and Ovimbundu e lite. Ordinary<br />
people in the cities and rural interior controlled by the<br />
MPLA, continue to experience political marginalization.<br />
A notable example in this regard is the government's<br />
severe repression <strong>of</strong> growing populist<br />
opposition by young MPLA cadres in 1977, reducing<br />
the country to silence. By effectively controlling the oil<br />
wealth and creating a unifying nomenklatura e lite<br />
sharing in the wealth, the MPLA defined a mode <strong>of</strong><br />
exercising political power. It did not take much trouble<br />
to establish stable political legitimacy by consensus<br />
rule, or by enhancing a social contract between state<br />
and society. Instead, widespread corruption and<br />
clientship networks have widened the gap between<br />
state and people, while the prolonged protracted civil<br />
20 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
war has made state and nation building almost<br />
impossible. Post-independent Angola continues to<br />
experience the absence <strong>of</strong> robust democratic means<br />
<strong>of</strong> venting disenchantment with government policies<br />
and measures. In such a situation <strong>of</strong> political failure,<br />
the MPLA state depends on power, war and resource<br />
capture to secure its undemocratic grip over society ±<br />
all variables incorporated into the triangular model. As<br />
mentioned before, the state did not hesitate to recruit<br />
aid in the form <strong>of</strong> private mercenary armies to marginalize<br />
the opposition. The problem is that military<br />
solutions are generally short-term, invariably abusive<br />
<strong>of</strong> human rights and inevitably fail to heal the underlying<br />
causes <strong>of</strong> state failure (Messiant 1998:151±153;<br />
New <strong>Africa</strong>n Yearbook 1999:26; Global Witness 1998;<br />
Mail and Guardian 12 May 1999:1).<br />
It suffices to say that the sustained ability <strong>of</strong> FARC,<br />
ELN and UNITA to act as `de facto' rival government<br />
in sizeable areas under their control also contributes to<br />
the state's security failure. In the case <strong>of</strong> Colombia,<br />
FARC and the ELN control and administer nearly half<br />
<strong>of</strong> the territory; organize their own local elections;<br />
patrol roads and waterways; collect taxes, and hold<br />
trials <strong>of</strong> suspected criminals. Their counterpart, UNI-<br />
TA, cannot boast <strong>of</strong> the same magnitude <strong>of</strong> power and<br />
control (Sweeney 1999:3).<br />
Socio-economic failure<br />
Angola and Colombia's socio-economic failure experiences<br />
have different origins. In Angola, the MPLA<br />
government initially favoured the classical Soviet<br />
model <strong>of</strong> development, imposing radical collectivization<br />
and state-controlled industrialization with little<br />
room for gradualism. About 65 per cent <strong>of</strong> GDP were<br />
controlled by the state between 1976 and 1985. In the<br />
country, Angolans were cut <strong>of</strong>f arbitrarily from their<br />
traditional tribal structures and beliefs. Instead <strong>of</strong><br />
uniting all segments <strong>of</strong> socio-economic society, the<br />
state alienated large sub-ethnic tribes and the farming<br />
community through its centralized development policy.<br />
The latter began to adjudge the MPLA in the same<br />
light as their Portuguese predecessors, while many<br />
considered UNITA as the new `liberator'. The prolonged<br />
civil war that followed made socio-economic<br />
failure and collapse inevitable, disrupting state structures<br />
responsible for food and other aid disbursement,<br />
and forcing thousands <strong>of</strong> people from their agricultural<br />
land. Production suffered in every sector, with<br />
agriculture, the livelihood <strong>of</strong> most Angolans, the<br />
hardest hit. Agricultural sector collapse did also have<br />
dire consequences for the nutrition and health status<br />
<strong>of</strong> the population, worsened by severe rural income<br />
decline. Instead <strong>of</strong> producing food surpluses, people<br />
have been forced into subsistence farming with little<br />
or no export capacity. Central government could no<br />
longer adequately facilitate and secure the availability<br />
<strong>of</strong> consumer goods. A dynamic private sector was<br />
almost non-existent.<br />
With increased poverty and infrastructural destruction,<br />
the state was no longer able to secure domestic<br />
taxation income, thus creating greater dependency on<br />
the Soviet bloc for its economic survival. The `minivortex'<br />
created by state failure during the Cold War era<br />
developed into a full blown war, due to increased<br />
Soviet and Cuban political, economic and military<br />
influence in Angola. Fear <strong>of</strong> communism in the US and<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> was followed by increasingly destructive<br />
overt and covert military support and backing <strong>of</strong><br />
UNITA. However, superpower withdrawal following<br />
the end <strong>of</strong> the Cold War, did not bring an end to the<br />
long-term degenerating process <strong>of</strong> socio-economic<br />
failure in Angola. Instead, the protracted civil war and<br />
its socio-economic destruction continuing, new `nonideological'<br />
state (and nonstate actor) survival strategies<br />
merely saw an increased shift towards resource<br />
capture, control and exploitation, allowing them to<br />
`hang on'. For most Angolans, the weak MPLA state<br />
and government has been no better at generating<br />
resources and stabilizing allocation for sustained<br />
socio-economic development than was its predecessor<br />
± so it relies even more on control and coercion. In<br />
the absence <strong>of</strong> strong and dynamic government<br />
institutions and the physical infrastructure in a state<br />
<strong>of</strong> disarray, recent trade liberalization policies have<br />
been unable to generate socio-economic reconstruction<br />
beyond the oil production sector. Furthermore,<br />
foreign revenues from this sector have been selectively<br />
mis-allocated to exclusively benefit e lite groups.<br />
Socio-economic failure has also given rise to a<br />
situation where the informal economy tends to take<br />
over, overshadowing the formal economy in its<br />
transactions and escaping the control <strong>of</strong> the state<br />
(Messiant 1998:151; Zartman 1995:8±9; Fituni 1995).<br />
Angola, and to a lesser extent Colombia's economic<br />
failure can be attributed to their inability to benefit<br />
from enhanced market opportunities created by global<br />
trade liberalization, stimulating a demand for exports.<br />
On the one hand, as primary commodity exporters<br />
both countries have experienced mixed fortunes.<br />
While the recovery <strong>of</strong> crude oil prices resulted in a<br />
large surge in the value <strong>of</strong> exports (crude oil and<br />
petroleum products are among Angola and Colombia's<br />
main export commodities), the same could not<br />
be said <strong>of</strong> the agricultural commodity sector (e.g.<br />
cassava, bananas, c<strong>of</strong>fee, cotton, sugarcane). Colombia,<br />
for example, is the world's second-largest c<strong>of</strong>fee<br />
producer, after Brazil. Growth in world market<br />
demand for agricultural commodities has lagged<br />
behind that <strong>of</strong> value-added industrial goods, while<br />
industrialized countries have continuously boosted<br />
their own supply capacity through the application <strong>of</strong><br />
new technology. To protect their domestic markets,<br />
industrialized countries have also resorted to restrictive<br />
trade measures such as quotas and tariffs. The<br />
result: downward pressure on, for example, c<strong>of</strong>fee and<br />
cotton prices, as well as limited market accessibility.<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 21
Global competition among growers has rendered most<br />
legal cash crop cultivation unpr<strong>of</strong>itable, causing in<br />
Angola and Colombia a sharp decline in the production<br />
<strong>of</strong> these commodities. This has led to rural<br />
poverty and unemployment, as well as a loss <strong>of</strong><br />
dynamism in legal rural business activity. Urban<br />
entrepreneurial centres have also suffered as a result<br />
<strong>of</strong> this. In Colombia, for example, increased international<br />
competition and quota restrictions have damaged<br />
the textile and sugar industries in MedellJ1n and<br />
Cali to such an extent that they now serve as centres<br />
<strong>of</strong> cocaine trafficking (Castells 1998:198). Furthermore,<br />
agricultural sector decline and collapse has led<br />
to food shortages, necessitating increased grain<br />
imports at high prices (given the USD-local currency<br />
exchange rate crisis). In both Angola and Colombia<br />
the price <strong>of</strong> staple foods has risen more rapidly than<br />
the already low wage (Keen 1996:557).<br />
Theoretically, Angola and Colombia should have<br />
the advantage <strong>of</strong> lower labour costs, but, apart from<br />
the acute civil strife and serious deficiencies in the<br />
institutional and physical infrastructure (in Angola's<br />
case), shortages <strong>of</strong> capital, entrepreneurial, technological<br />
and educational workforce, as well as a small<br />
domestic market for industrial output, have scared<br />
non-energy sector foreign investors away. In turn,<br />
inadequate investment has reduced capacity utilization<br />
in industry. As a late industrializer, Colombia has<br />
been less able to compete with the technologically<br />
advanced industrialized states, which dominate global<br />
trade with their ability to produce high quality<br />
products at much lower cost. A notable example is<br />
the negative impact that synthetic fibres have had on<br />
Colombia's traditional textile industry. Its industrial<br />
sector has a limited supply capacity that can meet<br />
exacting standards <strong>of</strong> cost, quality, reliability and<br />
delivery schedules. Angola's failure in this regard is<br />
almost complete. Both countries' economic failure is<br />
not a consequence <strong>of</strong> failure to take trade liberalization<br />
measures, but rather a failure to expand<br />
industrial commodity production for which there is a<br />
global demand. Worsening the domestic situation,<br />
Angola's population continues to grow faster than per<br />
capita income (Table 2 refers). In 1995, GNP per<br />
capita was a mere US$ 410, compared to Colombia's<br />
US$ 1910 for the same year (Castells 1998:91±92).<br />
Both are highly indebted states, with external debt<br />
<strong>of</strong> US$ 11 billion (Angola), and US$ 18 billion<br />
(Colombia) (1998 figures). A poor repayment record,<br />
particularly in the case <strong>of</strong> Angola, has largely cut <strong>of</strong>f<br />
access to favourable, low-interest loans. A persistent<br />
inflationary environment (16,7% for Colombia, and<br />
90% for Angola (1998), has caused local currency-<br />
US$ exchange rates to collapse. The exchange rates<br />
now run into the thousands: Angolan kwanza (NKz)<br />
350 000 per US$ 1, and Colombian peso (Col$) 1562<br />
per US$ 1 (February 1999). It is therefore clear that<br />
Angola, and to a lesser extent, Colombia, are locked<br />
into a cycle <strong>of</strong> poverty and underdevelopment from<br />
which there is no obvious escape. Unemployment is at<br />
an all-time apex <strong>of</strong> 19,8 per cent <strong>of</strong> the Colombian<br />
workforce, while the construction sector, the major<br />
employer <strong>of</strong> unskilled labour, is at a standstill. More<br />
than half <strong>of</strong> the workforce in Angola is unemployed.<br />
Subsequent application <strong>of</strong> socio-economic data and<br />
figures aims to `visualize' both states' level <strong>of</strong> current<br />
socio-economic failure (Mail and Guardian 1 July<br />
1999:1±3; National Security 15 January 2000:1±2;<br />
Central Intelligence Agency 1999; Lexis-Nexis Academic<br />
Universe 1999).<br />
The World Bank's `Development diamond' (Figure<br />
2), portrays four selected socio-economic indicators:<br />
(1) gross primary enrolment, (2) access to safe water,<br />
(3) GNP per capita, and (4) life expectancy. Comparing<br />
the corresponding averages for the income group<br />
to which Angola and Colombia belong (low and<br />
middle income developing states respectively), clearly<br />
indicates that, in the case <strong>of</strong> Angola, its position is<br />
remarkably below the group average. Colombia, on the<br />
other hand, fares much better in this regard.<br />
Table 1 indicates UNDP Human Development<br />
Index (HDI) figures for certain Third World developing<br />
countries, including Colombia and Angola. The<br />
same indicators are used, excluding access to safe<br />
water, calculated for each country on a range between<br />
0 (lowest) and 1 (highest) value. The figures are for<br />
1997.<br />
TABLE 1<br />
Comparing Third World countries' HDI figures<br />
Country<br />
Human Development<br />
Index<br />
Sierra Leone 0,254<br />
Angola 0,398<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> 0,695<br />
Brazil 0,739<br />
Colombia 0,768<br />
Source: UNDP Human Development Report 1999:135±<br />
137.<br />
From the above table it is evident that Colombia's<br />
performance is much better than that <strong>of</strong> Angola, even<br />
surpassing relatively strong and stable developing<br />
countries such as <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> and Brazil.<br />
Table 2 reflects a compilation <strong>of</strong> certain key<br />
demographic pressure (population, health and education)<br />
indicators <strong>of</strong> Angola and Colombia compared to<br />
the corresponding averages for (low-income) developing<br />
states (where available). These indicators<br />
clearly reflect the magnitude <strong>of</strong> state failure in terms<br />
<strong>of</strong> physical well-being and socio-economic develop-<br />
22 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
FIGURE 2<br />
Development diamond<br />
Source: World Bank: Angola and Colombia at a glance 1998.<br />
TABLE 2<br />
Demographic pressures<br />
Indicator Angola Colombia Low-Income<br />
Average<br />
Population growth rate (2000 est.) 3,0% 1,3% 1,7% (1998 est.)<br />
Population distribution urban (1995) 32,2% 72,7% 38,4 (1997)<br />
Age distribution: age 15±64 (1998) 52% 62% 0<br />
Life expectancy in years (2000 est.) 52,8 71,8 63 (1999 est.)<br />
Infant mortality (per 1 000 live births) 129,19 (1999 est.) 95 (2000 est.) 69 (1998 est.)<br />
Access to safe water (% <strong>of</strong> population)<br />
(1998 est.)<br />
32 75 74<br />
Access to health care (% <strong>of</strong> population) 24 (1996) 87 est. 0<br />
Doctors per 10 000 people 1 (1997) 9 (1993)<br />
Adult literacy rate (% <strong>of</strong> population) (1997) 45 90,9 50,7<br />
State expenditure by function as % <strong>of</strong> total<br />
expenditure: health education social security<br />
1994<br />
3,4%; 2,6% ; 1,4%<br />
1993<br />
5,4%; 19,0%; 7,8%<br />
*14,8<br />
(1993±96 average)<br />
* data not available<br />
Source: World Bank: Angola and Colombia at a glance, 1998; Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe Country Pr<strong>of</strong>ile Angola and<br />
Colombia, 1999, http://web.lexis-nexis.com; UNDP Development Report 1999:173±175, 179.<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 23
ment. It is evident that particularly Angola, more than<br />
Colombia, has failed to adequately protect and<br />
promote the basic well-being <strong>of</strong> its citizens through<br />
access to tapped water, education and health services.<br />
The high population growth rate further axacerbates<br />
the domestic situation. Colombia experiences less<br />
population growth pressure, but it is clear that<br />
increased urbanization puts significant stress on state<br />
Angola's relatively better performance in trade (and<br />
investment) could be attributed to accelerating oil<br />
production and export. Large oil MNCs Chevron, BP<br />
Amoco and Exxon Mobil are planning to invest as<br />
much as US$ 19 billion developing Angola's <strong>of</strong>f-shore<br />
oil fields in the next decade. Angola already supplies 7<br />
per cent <strong>of</strong> the US annual petroleum consumption,<br />
expected to increase to 10 per cent by 2005 (The<br />
FIGURE 3<br />
Economic ratios diamond<br />
Source: World Bank: Angola and Colombia at a glance 1998.<br />
resources while also aggravating urban problems <strong>of</strong><br />
adequate food, housing, transportation, schools,<br />
sanitation etc. In both Angola and Colombia, increased<br />
urbanization has lead to the state's urban bias,<br />
the consequence <strong>of</strong> which is poor or inadequate rural<br />
infrastructure and lack <strong>of</strong> basic facilities, exacerbated<br />
by the civil war and criminal activities. For example,<br />
Luanda has 4 million residents but only 20 000 <strong>of</strong><br />
them have running water or modern toilets (International<br />
Herald Tribune, 11 April 2000:13). Furthermore,<br />
a large percentage <strong>of</strong> the population is <strong>of</strong> productive<br />
employment age (15±64) seeking job opportunities<br />
which do not exist or lack, thus creating incentives for<br />
large-scale discontent, tension, insecurity, violent<br />
opposition, and a growing flight to crime.<br />
Figure 3 reflects Angola's and Colombia's economic<br />
ratios diamond, comparing their respective figures for<br />
gross domestic savings, trade and gross domestic<br />
investment (all measured as a share <strong>of</strong> the GDP), as<br />
well as indebtedness (the ratio <strong>of</strong> present value <strong>of</strong><br />
debt to export income), to the corresponding averages<br />
<strong>of</strong> low and middle income developing countries.<br />
International Herald Tribune 11 April 2000:13). However,<br />
domestic savings are extremely low, indicating<br />
that ordinary Angolans do not share in the financial<br />
benefits <strong>of</strong> increased oil exports. Where does the<br />
money then go? Certainly not to external debt<br />
repayment (up from US$ 5.4 billion [1987] to US$<br />
13 billion [1998]. Rather, it goes to financing the<br />
MPLA government's war effort ± 25 per cent <strong>of</strong> GDP<br />
on military expenditures [1998], at the expense <strong>of</strong><br />
Angola's already desperately ravaged social infrastructure.<br />
For example, in 1997, President Dos Santos<br />
stated that two-thirds <strong>of</strong> the Angolan population live<br />
on less than a dollar a day. In the case <strong>of</strong> Angola, more<br />
oil exports, resulting in larger capital inflows, mostly to<br />
MNCs and the government e lite, have meant more<br />
human deprivation (Central Intelligence Agency<br />
1999:6±8). Contrary to this, Colombians are able to<br />
benefit from a more stable indebtedness economic<br />
environment with room for improvement in trade<br />
expansion.<br />
Socio-economic failure is also evident from an everincreasing<br />
exodus <strong>of</strong> young educated pr<strong>of</strong>essionals,<br />
24 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
particularly in the case <strong>of</strong> Colombia. From October<br />
1998 to August 1999, the US Embassy in BogotaÂ<br />
handled almost 215 000 visa applications. Some<br />
300 000 Colombians may have left in 1999. Severe<br />
economic recession and endemic violence is to blame<br />
for this. GDP output, for example, shrank as much as<br />
three per cent in 1999. In Angola, for most <strong>of</strong> the<br />
unemployed, emigrating to seek a decent, safe living<br />
remains a distant fantasy. Those who manage to leave<br />
are usually the few educated e lite. Ordinary Angolans<br />
and Colombians share the commonality <strong>of</strong> `cruel<br />
choices between liberty, country and safety' (The<br />
Economist 18 March 2000:57; Freedom Magazine<br />
International December 1999:1±2).<br />
Human security failure<br />
Both Angola and Colombia are clear cases where the<br />
security apparatus <strong>of</strong> the state, threatened militarily by<br />
non-state actors, have appealed to national (domestic)<br />
security, in order to justify harsh actions and<br />
policies with little regard for fundamental human<br />
rights. In the absence <strong>of</strong> citizen loyalty to the state,<br />
civilians turned soldiers not because <strong>of</strong> patriotism, but<br />
due to fear, corruption, and escape from dire living<br />
conditions. Badly paid, they may even turn ordinary<br />
criminals. Instead <strong>of</strong> meeting their prime responsibility<br />
to protect the nation, security has become a political<br />
tool <strong>of</strong> convenience to the ruling e lite to secure their<br />
own survival and interests. Where state agents (police<br />
and defence force) have been too weak to effectively<br />
protect `national security', they have been constantly<br />
`assisted' by either paramilitary and self-defence<br />
groups (in the case <strong>of</strong> Colombia), or private security<br />
(mercenary) organizations in Angola (Reno<br />
1997:165). The indiscriminate use <strong>of</strong> freely available<br />
small arms by these and other groups (guerrillas) have<br />
produced hundreds <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> refugees and<br />
internally displaced people. Struggle for economic<br />
and political power increasingly places unarmed<br />
civilians in the line <strong>of</strong> fire ± in violation <strong>of</strong> international<br />
humanitarian law. The methods <strong>of</strong> fighting underscore<br />
the extent <strong>of</strong> human security failure: physical intimidation,<br />
terrorism, torture, rape, siege, famine, kidnapping,<br />
and robbery (Amnesty International 1999 and<br />
Carnegie Commission 1997).<br />
Angolan and Colombian state failure are comparable<br />
through the extent <strong>of</strong> complex humanitarian<br />
emergencies taking place there. Roughly 17 million<br />
Angolans and one million Colombians are refugees in<br />
their own countries. Both governments have been<br />
criticized for failure to comply with commitments<br />
guaranteeing the safety <strong>of</strong> returnees and emergency<br />
assistance to displaced families. UNICEF calculates<br />
that 3,7 million people have been affected directly by<br />
the Angolan war (out <strong>of</strong> a total population <strong>of</strong> 11,1<br />
million) [1999 est.] (New <strong>Africa</strong>n Yearbook 1999:26±<br />
27). Malnutrition and famine have also become part<br />
<strong>of</strong> daily life. In Angola, the share <strong>of</strong> agriculture had<br />
fallen from 50 per cent <strong>of</strong> GDP in 1960 to 17 per cent<br />
in 1995 ± the seriousness there<strong>of</strong> evident when<br />
considering that subsistence agriculture provides for<br />
the main livelihood <strong>of</strong> 85 per cent <strong>of</strong> the population<br />
(Central Intelligence Agency 1999). Unemployment<br />
is estimated at more than 50 per cent, with the<br />
industrial sector production almost at a standstill, and<br />
government-employed people earning on average<br />
US$15 a month (The Economist 19 February<br />
2000:42).<br />
Both states and governments have failed in protecting<br />
and promoting at least three fundamental freedoms:<br />
freedom from fear and want, as well as freedom<br />
<strong>of</strong> speech. Millions <strong>of</strong> people, particularly children,<br />
face the threats <strong>of</strong> hunger, neglect, malnutrition, and<br />
disease. In Angola, the media is largely statecontrolled,<br />
political demonstrations are unheard <strong>of</strong>,<br />
and the police do not use rubber bullets to disperse<br />
attempted demonstrations (The Economist 19 February<br />
2000:42). The fac,ade <strong>of</strong> multi-party democracy<br />
represents little more than front parties <strong>of</strong> the MPLA.<br />
There are no distinct differences between the state<br />
(MPLA) and non-state actors (UNITA and criminal<br />
groups), when it comes to systemic human rights and<br />
humanitarian law violations. According to the Amnesty<br />
International Report <strong>of</strong> 1999, both conduct<br />
scores <strong>of</strong> extra-judicial executions, while hundreds <strong>of</strong><br />
people are reportedly arrested and tortured for political<br />
reasons. In what has been declared an all-out war, the<br />
government is forcibly conscripting young males<br />
(born in 1978). The human security failure situation<br />
in Colombia reflects similar features. In the past six<br />
months alone, five journalists have been killed and 14<br />
kidnapped for ransom money or intimidation purposes<br />
(The Economist 18 March 2000:57). The judiciary has<br />
made little progress in, for example, enforcing arrest<br />
warrants against paramilitary leaders implicated in the<br />
murder <strong>of</strong> judicial <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> the Human Rights Unit<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Colombian Attorney General's Office. Several<br />
senior army commanders, closely collaborating with<br />
rightwing paramilitary groups, have been implicated in<br />
intimidation and attacks on human rights defenders.<br />
For example, four (former) Presidents <strong>of</strong> the Permanent<br />
Committee for the Defence <strong>of</strong> Human Rights<br />
have been killed during the past ten years. Legal<br />
controls failure has enabled many <strong>of</strong> these perpetrators<br />
to continue evading accountability. Approxymately<br />
one in a hundred politically motivated murder<br />
cases reach the courts, despite recent reforms <strong>of</strong> the<br />
legal system (Amnesty International 1999:132±133).<br />
The problem <strong>of</strong> internal displacement remains largely<br />
inadequately addressed. Again, state and international<br />
organization institutional failure is a key factor in this<br />
(UNHCR 1997:111).<br />
Angola and Colombia share the commonality <strong>of</strong><br />
certain counter-insurgency strategies <strong>of</strong> `dirty' war. In<br />
Colombia, the army, supported by paramilitaries, has<br />
developed a `Vietnam' variation by, instead <strong>of</strong> exclu-<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 25
sively concentrating its war effort on FARC and the<br />
ELN, targeting people considered to be sympathisers<br />
<strong>of</strong> these groups. Armed groups are intentionally<br />
driving people from their homes and land in an<br />
attempt to remove potential bases <strong>of</strong> support for the<br />
other parties in the conflict. Similarly, UNITA is<br />
employing a brutal new tactic: forcing rural people<br />
into towns, surrounding them and cutting <strong>of</strong>f food<br />
supplies, in order to delay and derail the MPLA's<br />
concentration and use <strong>of</strong> resources to gain victory and<br />
stability in the interior (The Economist 25 September<br />
1999:2). The Angolan civil war has also seen<br />
indiscriminate shelling <strong>of</strong> besieged towns by both<br />
UNITA and the MPLA, resulting in massive destruction<br />
and untold human suffering. While it is not<br />
known whether UNITA has been involved in any high<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>ile kidnapping cases, their counterparts in Colombia<br />
(FARC; ELN) have obviously realized that<br />
kidnapping demanding ransom money, serves their<br />
immediate financial needs. It is also an important<br />
means <strong>of</strong> political intimidation, challenging the state's<br />
power and coercing local political leadership into<br />
adopting pro-guerrilla policies. At least 800 people<br />
have been victimized in this way, including majors,<br />
local and national politicians, journalists, and top<br />
MNC <strong>of</strong>ficials (Global Witness 1998; Amnesty International<br />
1999).<br />
From the above it is evident that the Angolan and<br />
Colombian cases satisfy two <strong>of</strong> the characteristics<br />
depicted in the triangular model on page 1: state<br />
failure and violent conflict escalation. Their `strong<br />
empirical statehood' failure is evident by the little<br />
progress being made to, for example, equip the<br />
judiciary and train the police to protect and enforce<br />
human rights, or to curb the culture <strong>of</strong> impunity and<br />
lawlessness (Amnesty International 1999). Corruption<br />
and the absence <strong>of</strong> ethical values are also a key<br />
variable ± for example, in Angola, certain government<br />
ministers and the generals sell weapons and fuel to<br />
UNITA, while the latter pays with diamonds (The<br />
Economist 25 September 1999:2). Pr<strong>of</strong>iting from<br />
large commissions on weapons purchases has also<br />
become lucrative business (Mail and Guardian 1 July<br />
1999:3). In the next Part, both variables will be linked<br />
with the third one ± resource capture.<br />
THE RESOURCE CAPTURE, CONTROL AND<br />
EXPLOITATION VARIABLE<br />
In terms <strong>of</strong> the central hypothesis, Angola and<br />
Colombia's first and second `vulnerabilities' have<br />
already been stated and discussed: their inception as<br />
partially disintegrating ex-colonial states, and their<br />
inability to overcome political, socio-economic and<br />
cultural constraints to state and nation building in a<br />
domestic situation <strong>of</strong> civil war. What remains, is to<br />
indicate how the capture, control and exploitation <strong>of</strong><br />
high value/low volume (and strategic) resources<br />
(diamond, cocaine and oil) continue to keep state<br />
failure and the `perpetrators' there<strong>of</strong>, afloat. This key<br />
component in the triangular model is not necessarily a<br />
new phenomenon in the Angolan and Colombian<br />
experiences. Neither is it only linked to mineral<br />
resources, but it involves also land capture. Historically,<br />
the capture, control and exploitation <strong>of</strong> gold and<br />
emeralds (in Colombia) and oil and diamonds (in<br />
Angola) had been a primary objective for colonial<br />
rulers. With Angola becoming a new proxy `flash point'<br />
during the Cold War, the US, Soviet Union and Cuba<br />
were also motivated by the need to secure future<br />
access to the country's oil and diamond wealth. While<br />
cocaine, as a lucrative economic good <strong>of</strong> supply and<br />
demand, gained significance only during the 1980s,<br />
there can be no doubt that it has since taken a central<br />
place in transforming the economy and reshaping<br />
political and social relations. For most <strong>of</strong> Angola and<br />
Colombia's contemporary history, non-state actors<br />
have played a key role in the above regard, whether<br />
it be guerrillas, powerful e lite groups, drug cartels, or<br />
MNCs. Similarly to the MPLA and UNITA's experience<br />
at the demise <strong>of</strong> the Cold War, having lost support<br />
from Moscow and Havana, FARC and the ELN began<br />
to increasingly rely on cocaine capture, control and/or<br />
exploitation to finance their struggle. In areas prized<br />
for their commercial and/or strategic value, rural<br />
communities are particularly vulnerable as armed<br />
groups vie for control. Examples in this regard are<br />
the diamond-rich Luanda Norte province and strategic<br />
city <strong>of</strong> Huambo in Angola (its total destruction<br />
resembling Berlin at the end <strong>of</strong> World War Two), and<br />
the coca producing southern provinces <strong>of</strong> Colombia.<br />
The applied `dirty war' strategies (mentioned before)<br />
also frees-up large tracts <strong>of</strong> land for (e lite) commercial-scale<br />
ranching and agri-businesses, destroying<br />
the livelihood <strong>of</strong> tens <strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> poor farmers and<br />
their families in Colombia (the wealthy banana<br />
producing district <strong>of</strong> Uraba is one example).<br />
Thanks to oil, diamonds and cocaine, Angola, and<br />
to a lesser extent, Colombia, have not become fully<br />
marginalized from global trade networks and benefits.<br />
Global demand for these lucrative resources has led to<br />
their selective integration ± a process almost solely<br />
controlled by either a small affluent ruling e lite (also<br />
oligarchy), and/or powerful non-state actors responsible<br />
for securing supply, while external (MNC)<br />
involvement has facilitated sustained demand (see<br />
figure 1). Ordinary citizens have been mostly excluded<br />
from the financial benefits incurred, while other<br />
sectors (e.g. agriculture) from which they could have<br />
earned a living have experienced increased marginalization<br />
and collapse (see Part 3). Under conditions<br />
<strong>of</strong> democratic rule, good governance and legal<br />
controls, the availability and global demand for oil<br />
and diamonds would make state reconstruction<br />
possible. However, with these preconditions almost<br />
absent or weakly developed, those with the military<br />
and financial power moved in to secure their own<br />
26 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
survival by capturing, controlling and exploiting these<br />
valuable resources. While the overwhelming majority<br />
<strong>of</strong> the population are left to their own fate `between<br />
bare subsistence and violent pillage', the e lite have<br />
been able to link up to the global networks <strong>of</strong> wealth,<br />
power, information, communication and trade. Angola<br />
and Colombia share this commonality though, ironically,<br />
illicit cocaine pr<strong>of</strong>its during the mid-1980s,<br />
brought about a significant boom which construction,<br />
real estate, infrastructural development and investment<br />
in Colombian cities. Cocaine (with foreign<br />
revenues <strong>of</strong> between US$ 3±5 billion annually), have<br />
resulted in Colombia gaining a `hegemonic position'<br />
in a major sector <strong>of</strong> the global criminal economy<br />
(Castells 1998:196±197). Oil and diamonds have<br />
failed to do the same for Angola.<br />
The emphasis should therefore not be on availability,<br />
but on exploitation. For, in the words <strong>of</strong> De<br />
Beers diamond conglomerate chairman, Nicky Oppenheimer:<br />
`natural resources are morally neutral ± the<br />
key element is not the resource itself, but how it is<br />
exploited, which makes the difference between<br />
becoming a curse rather than a blessing' to Angola<br />
(The Mining Journal 19 November 1999:1). Coca<br />
plant cultivation, however, is not morally neutral, but<br />
intended outrightly to serve a highly pr<strong>of</strong>itable illegal<br />
and destructive purpose. It is also a matter <strong>of</strong> demanddriven<br />
and exports oriented economics. Cocaine is<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>itable ± every step along the way ± from coca<br />
cultivation to processing to street selling. A coca<br />
grower earns between US$ 1000 and 10 000 for<br />
enough coca leaves to produce a kilo <strong>of</strong> cocaine<br />
which has a street value <strong>of</strong> US$ 800 000. A hectare <strong>of</strong><br />
coca may yield up to three times the income <strong>of</strong> a<br />
hectare <strong>of</strong> bananas (The Economist 26 February<br />
2000:23). While it is difficult to indicate any specific<br />
price value for uncut diamonds as it depends on the<br />
carat measurement, it is common knowledge that<br />
uncut diamonds are substantially more pr<strong>of</strong>itable than,<br />
for example, c<strong>of</strong>fee or cotton ± primary commodities<br />
being exported by Angola and Colombia. Both coca<br />
(cocaine) and diamonds continue to enjoy a considerable<br />
price advantage over most legal cash crops.<br />
This becomes evident when comparing potential<br />
coca/cocaine earnings with the world market prices<br />
for c<strong>of</strong>fee, cotton and maize (see table 3).<br />
The illegal smuggling <strong>of</strong> diamonds, and coca<br />
cultivation <strong>of</strong>ten provide rural dwellers and subsistence<br />
farmers the best hope <strong>of</strong> escaping a life <strong>of</strong><br />
extreme poverty. They have long abandoned hope <strong>of</strong><br />
making a decent living from legal crops alone. Worse<br />
in the case <strong>of</strong> Angola, the state has largely abandoned<br />
them to care for themselves. Ironically, their shift to<br />
producing (or mining) these lucrative resources in<br />
itself, has become an incentive for guerrillas, paramilitaries,<br />
private `security' firms and narco-traffickers<br />
to violently seek control <strong>of</strong> the areas in which rural<br />
farmers and dwellers engaged in coca cultivation<br />
(Colombia) and diamond mining (Angola). For<br />
example, both the largest concentrations <strong>of</strong> FARC<br />
guerrillas and the biggest expanse <strong>of</strong> coca fields are<br />
located in <strong>South</strong>ern Colombia. Securing `outlets' for<br />
cocaine smuggling, and `inlets' for weapons procurement,<br />
FARC controls about 50 small ports in the Gulf<br />
<strong>of</strong> Uraba (North Pacific Ocean) (Sweeney 1999:4;<br />
Messiant 1998:162±164).<br />
Linking institutional failure to resource exploitation,<br />
it suffices to observe that, in the case <strong>of</strong> Angola, there<br />
is no orderly mining regime, operating within a<br />
transparent and predictable legislative and fiscal<br />
framework ± in fact, there is an almost total absence<br />
<strong>of</strong> `strong imperial statehood' (Sweeney 1999:1;<br />
Buzan 1991; Zacarias 1999). This state <strong>of</strong> affairs has<br />
proved conducive to the capture, control and exploitation<br />
<strong>of</strong> these high value commodities by corrupt,<br />
greedy and power hungry e lite groups. One example is<br />
the rich Catoca diamond mine in North-eastern<br />
Angola, seized from UNITA in 1996, and now<br />
protected by a private security force controlled by a<br />
national army general (International Herald Tribune 7<br />
April 2000:2). Ironically, the MPLA leadership's<br />
comment that `the country's revenues are meant for<br />
resolving the country's problems' has been devoid <strong>of</strong><br />
real meaning to the extent that deprived Angolans<br />
have much reason to view oil and diamond revenues<br />
as a threat to their survival (Global Witness). However,<br />
the resource capture variable is determined by a<br />
complex situation, involving different actors with<br />
TABLE 3<br />
World Market Prices for Selected Commodities<br />
Commodity Unit Price 1996 1997 1998 1999*<br />
C<strong>of</strong>fee (arabica) US$/kg 2,65 4,10 2,90 2,35<br />
Cotton US$/kg 1,77 1,74 1,44 1,29<br />
Maize<br />
US$/metric<br />
ton<br />
165,00 117,00 102,00 93,60<br />
* provisional<br />
Source: IMF's The Primary Commodities Prices<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 27
different and similar objectives. It is a situation where<br />
international open market forces provide a demand for<br />
lucrative and essential goods for which Angola has<br />
the supply. For certain players, whether this demand<br />
and supply route is legally or illegally determined is <strong>of</strong><br />
less importance. MNCs are already a dominant part <strong>of</strong><br />
the global economy ± yet many <strong>of</strong> their actions go<br />
unrecorded and unaccounted. It is in the national<br />
interests <strong>of</strong> industrialized countries and their multinationals<br />
to trade in crucial energy resources such as<br />
oil ± Angola can meet the demand, while it desperately<br />
needs foreign revenues (Central Intelligence<br />
Agency 1999). From a Marxist perspective, it could be<br />
argued that imperialist states are interested in the<br />
exploitation <strong>of</strong> the rich diamond and oil wealth <strong>of</strong><br />
Angola. It is a matter <strong>of</strong> choice backing the `winning<br />
horse' and the one which serves (US) national<br />
interests best (Stevens 1999:3). While simplistic a<br />
view, ignoring the interaction <strong>of</strong> several variables in<br />
the Angolan state failure case (mentioned in previous<br />
Parts), the absence <strong>of</strong> decisive `good guys' involvement<br />
to bring an end to the war is obvious.<br />
State institutional failure is also a key variable in the<br />
illegal coca cultivation and processing <strong>of</strong> cocaine in<br />
Colombia. Without repeating what has already been<br />
discussed in previous Parts, it suffices to observe that<br />
the cocaine industry has been able to flourish due to,<br />
inter alia, a similar lack <strong>of</strong> transparency, control and<br />
work ethics in the Colombian state apparatus.<br />
Systematic corruption is encouraged by the state's<br />
failure to pay its civil servants in law enforcement<br />
agencies decent salaries. The weak state has been<br />
unable to eliminate drug syndicate networks extended<br />
to also include other criminal activities such as money<br />
laundering, arms traffic, international prostitution and<br />
kidnapping. Despite violent state repression, the<br />
underground cocaine network continues to subtly<br />
penetrate and corrupt all crucial points <strong>of</strong> the state's<br />
institutional environment. Being unable to adequately<br />
protect state employees, the latter are constantly<br />
confronted by the alternative <strong>of</strong> much needed bribes<br />
or seeing their families terrorized (Castells 1998:194).<br />
Colombia is increasingly turning into a safe haven for<br />
a complex criminal world stretching its tentacles to<br />
neighbouring states and the industrialized world. Even<br />
more than illicit diamond smuggling, the Colombian<br />
cocaine industry is fully internationalized, with very<br />
strict division <strong>of</strong> labour between different locations.<br />
This makes effective combating very difficult and<br />
costly (Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe 1999).<br />
Colombia's state failure-cocaine-internationalized<br />
crime link and the dangers there<strong>of</strong>, remains the prime<br />
incentive for US `constructive engagement' there.<br />
Through its controversial drug de-certification process<br />
(which rates the anti-narcotic efforts <strong>of</strong> other states),<br />
as well as substantial financial and military aid, the US<br />
has become increasingly involved in Colombia's<br />
`Balkan-type' domestic conflict. The central objective<br />
is to combat cocaine trafficking at the point <strong>of</strong><br />
production ± FARC and ELN territory. It is therefore<br />
obvious that such engagement contributes to political<br />
violence, while turning a blind eye to demand (and<br />
with it societal ills) in the US as a root cause.<br />
Furthermore, the Colombian central government <strong>of</strong>ten<br />
openly employed US military support for violent<br />
counter-insurgency campaigns that kill more innocent<br />
peasants than insurgents. On the whole, US engagement<br />
has been `costly, messy and unsuccessful'<br />
(Sweeney 1999:2). Economic sanctions against Colombia<br />
during 1995±1998 for not meeting the decertification<br />
criteria, have further weakened the state's<br />
ability to provide for the security and well-being<br />
needs <strong>of</strong> the population. The drug certification policy<br />
has been an equally ineffective tool in combating the<br />
violence and illicit drug trade. Cocaine is as easily<br />
available in the US as it was 15 years ago and at<br />
cheaper prices. Rather, increased emphasis on supporting<br />
viable crop-substitution and job-creation<br />
programmes in Colombia seems to be a small step in<br />
the right direction (Keen 1996:555).<br />
There is not much to say about the MPLA government's<br />
role in resource capture, control and exploitation.<br />
After all, it is the legitimate, internationally<br />
recognized government, waving the flag <strong>of</strong> perceived<br />
Angolan statehood at its embassies. The British human<br />
rights pressure group, Global Witness, reported recently<br />
in no uncertain terms, that the bulk <strong>of</strong> Angola's<br />
US$3,5 billion a year oil revenues bypasses the<br />
budget, disappearing straight into the hands <strong>of</strong> the<br />
presidency to buy new arms, or to finance the lifestyles<br />
<strong>of</strong> the super-rich e lite (The Economist 15 January<br />
2000:1). As such, the MPLA e lite nomenklatura<br />
(consisting <strong>of</strong> about 30 families) has a vested interest<br />
in the protection <strong>of</strong> oil production facilities as their<br />
principal source <strong>of</strong> wealth (International Herald<br />
Tribune 11 April 2000:13). Given its own inability to<br />
do this effectively, private mercenary `security' companies<br />
(e.g. Executive Outcomes, with which government,<br />
until recently, had a US$ 40 million contract,<br />
and Ango Segu), have been hired to protect oil<br />
installations and help train MPLA soldiers (Maier<br />
1996:157±158). As Reno (1997:172) remarks, `from a<br />
weak ruler's perspective, it is better to have reliable<br />
foreigners control state assets (than domestic enemies)'.<br />
Ironically, Executive Outcomes (consisting <strong>of</strong><br />
certain demobilized <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n military units) used<br />
to be a staunch supporter <strong>of</strong> UNITA, but for them,<br />
sharing in the enormous oil and diamond pr<strong>of</strong>its have<br />
proved too tempting. While ordinary Angolans have<br />
been excluded from their rightful share in the country's<br />
oil wealth, mercenaries have been able to negotiate<br />
salaries ranging from between US$ 2000 and US$<br />
8000 a month (Maier 1996:158). Again, human rights<br />
protection is certainly not their strong point.<br />
While the Colombian state and government's hands<br />
are reasonably clean when it comes to the actual<br />
28 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
`capture', control and financial exploitation <strong>of</strong> cocaine<br />
(non-state actors are the main perpetrators), legal<br />
cases against corrupt senior <strong>of</strong>ficials abusing their<br />
position <strong>of</strong> power and influence to share in cocaine<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>its are quite common. Even the country's highest<br />
<strong>of</strong>fice, the presidency, has been implicated in the past.<br />
Oil multinationals are also not without blame ± for<br />
example, by allowing the Angolan government to<br />
mortgage its future oil production for short-term highinterest<br />
loans for the above purposes, the former<br />
continue to turn a blind eye to corruption, resource<br />
capture, and a crime against the people <strong>of</strong> Angola.<br />
Chevron's complicity in this regard is evident, as it<br />
accounts for about two-thirds <strong>of</strong> Angola's daily<br />
production <strong>of</strong> 500 000 barrels (Maier 1996:62).<br />
Interestingly, Amnesty International has made a<br />
similar observation with regard to the alleged role <strong>of</strong><br />
oil (MNC, BP) in Colombia. In the absence <strong>of</strong><br />
adequate state protection <strong>of</strong> its recent investment in<br />
a 880 km long oil pipeline to the Caribbean coast, BP<br />
has hired a UK-based mercenary firm, Defence<br />
Systems Limited, to train an e lite mobile army group<br />
in counter-guerrilla tactics to protect this pipeline<br />
against FARC and ELN sabotage. Given the Colombian<br />
army's bad human rights record and its grave<br />
atrocities against civilians, in collaboration with<br />
rightwing paramilitaries, such BP involvement is<br />
unfortunate (Global Witness 1998).<br />
Reference has already been made to UNITA's main<br />
objective in the above regard ± to sell diamonds to<br />
finance its costly war effort. Without diamond sales<br />
(estimated at US$ 3,5 billion (1992±1999), its war<br />
effort would be crippled; it would loose its monopoly<br />
over power and legitimacy in large parts <strong>of</strong> Angola,<br />
and would no longer be able to finance its leadership's<br />
greed (Global Witness 1998). And the civil war<br />
would end. It is therefore evident that UNITA has a<br />
vested interest in seeing that their principal source <strong>of</strong><br />
income (diamonds) is not interfered with. If and when<br />
this happens, the consequence there<strong>of</strong> is escalating<br />
violence. As such, political and economic motives are<br />
increasingly intertwined. Currently, UNITA utilizes a<br />
supply route running through both Uganda and the<br />
DRC (also a failed state case), or Zambia and<br />
Rwanda, with or without the <strong>of</strong>ficial consent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
respective governments, en route to the international<br />
diamond markets <strong>of</strong> Antwerp, London and Tel Aviv.<br />
Weapons are smuggled more or less along the same<br />
routes, with Kigali (Rwanda) allegedly acting as a<br />
rendezvous for the conclusion <strong>of</strong> deals in the above<br />
regard. It could be argued that globalization (easy<br />
access to markets and advanced technological communication),<br />
has also become a friend <strong>of</strong> the<br />
guerrillas. Against this background, it is evident that<br />
constraining the illicit diamond trade curse, thus<br />
increasing opportunities for a political solution to<br />
the war, would be extremely difficult (Mail and<br />
Guardian 1 April 1999; Business Report 16 March<br />
2000:1; Global Witness 1998).<br />
The UN, a key player in recent peace initiatives and<br />
preventive diplomacy in Angola, has taken responsibility<br />
for achieving the above objective by extending<br />
the Security Council embargo on the sale <strong>of</strong> weapons<br />
and oil to UNITA (introduced in 1993) to also include<br />
an embargo against diamond smuggling, effective<br />
from June 1998. Whilst resulting in a significant<br />
decrease in UNITA's diamond sales, the implementation<br />
<strong>of</strong> UNSC Res. 1176 appears token at best. This is<br />
confirmed by the UN-sponsored Fowler Report on<br />
UNITA sanctions busting (<strong>of</strong> 15 March 2000), listing<br />
at least 10 <strong>Africa</strong>n countries assisting UNITA in one<br />
way or another (Time 27 March 2000:41) Today,<br />
UNITA, through its control <strong>of</strong> diamond producing<br />
areas, as well as the lack <strong>of</strong> adequate law enforcing<br />
capacity in neighbouring states, is still able to secure<br />
outlet routes for diamond smuggling, as well as inlet<br />
supply routes for weapons procurement. Particularly<br />
Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Ukraine<br />
and Russia are eager to do business with UNITA<br />
leader, Jonas Savimbi. Interestingly, FARC also obtain<br />
weapons from these countries (Pierre 1997). The<br />
Fowler Report implicates these and other countries,<br />
such as Burkina Faso, Togo and Gabon in allegedly<br />
aiding UNITA. Reference is also made to <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n diamond and arms dealers' alleged involvement<br />
in the diamond-for-arms network <strong>of</strong> illicit UNITA<br />
suppliers. With the world's premier market for uncut<br />
diamonds situated in Antwerp, Belgium is obviously a<br />
key player with significant responsibility to enforce UN<br />
sanctions to curb UNITA's illicit diamond trade. The<br />
Fowler Report strongly criticizes the Antwerp High<br />
Council for Diamond trading for lax and inadequate<br />
control measures, such as verification <strong>of</strong> certificates <strong>of</strong><br />
origin. However, this seems almost an impossible task,<br />
as diamonds imported from neighbouring Zambia,<br />
Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC do not require any<br />
verification <strong>of</strong> source. After all, how do you distinguish<br />
between a `politically correct' and `politically flawed'<br />
uncut diamond? Furthermore, corrupt <strong>of</strong>ficials in these<br />
countries are more than eager to share in UNITA's<br />
lucrative trade, selling false certificates <strong>of</strong> origin<br />
(priced at about US$100). There is also little in terms<br />
<strong>of</strong> effective border policing. Another key factor has<br />
been the large number <strong>of</strong> middlemen involved in the<br />
diamond trade and smuggling ± cases have been<br />
reported where Angolan army generals and UNITA use<br />
the same middlemen to secure this lucrative trade on<br />
the open market. It is extremely difficult to accurately<br />
trace the movements and origins <strong>of</strong> uncut diamonds.<br />
Above all, Belgium and, for example, Israel have a<br />
strong demand for Angolan type uncut diamonds,<br />
encouraging trade through a generous system <strong>of</strong> tax<br />
breaks. There is thus an underlying incentive to evade<br />
the terms and spirit <strong>of</strong> Res. 1176 (Global Witness<br />
1998; Time 27 March 2000:41).<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 29
By controlling between 70±80 per cent <strong>of</strong> the global<br />
trade in diamonds, De Beers diamond cartel is an<br />
equally important actor in the Angolan case. In fact,<br />
De Beers' annual reports during the 1990s clearly<br />
reflect its heavy involvement in buying uncut diamonds<br />
at a time when about 70 per cent <strong>of</strong> the latter's<br />
production was controlled by UNITA. This suggests<br />
that, at least during this time, pr<strong>of</strong>its counted more to<br />
De Beers than any corporate ethic-based accountability.<br />
During this time, UNITA was the main<br />
beneficiary <strong>of</strong> De Beer's involvement, enabling the<br />
former to pay for weapons in the hardest currency on<br />
the market ± diamonds (Global Witness 1998:3). It is<br />
therefore obvious that no progress can be made<br />
towards removing the diamond `curse' as a state<br />
failure variable without the full co-operation <strong>of</strong> De<br />
Beers and its subsidiaries in Antwerp, London, and Tel<br />
Aviv. Against this background it is evident that Angola<br />
and Colombia share the commonality <strong>of</strong> war and/or<br />
criminal-based (sub) economies in which oil, diamonds<br />
and cocaine continue to reinforce predatory<br />
practizes by the state as well as challenging non-state<br />
actors (Messiant 1998).<br />
CONCLUSION<br />
The principal objective <strong>of</strong> this study was to investigate<br />
and compare the state failure cases <strong>of</strong> Angola and<br />
Colombia. While being continents apart, with a<br />
different history and culture shaped by vastly different<br />
international circumstances, justification for a comparison<br />
between the two countries has been found<br />
first and foremost in their shared status as Third World<br />
developing states with a pr<strong>of</strong>ound history <strong>of</strong> domestic<br />
violence and civil war. As Third World states they<br />
share the same state and nation building, as well as<br />
developmental constraints and challenges. As excolonial<br />
countries, they were both established as<br />
weak and partly disintegrating states born in blood<br />
and whose `democracy' would continue this condition.<br />
The roots <strong>of</strong> their civil wars are the same: poverty,<br />
neglect and exclusion. Angola and Colombia are<br />
certainly not the exception. Numerous former colonies<br />
in <strong>Africa</strong> have suffered the same fate, with the DRC,<br />
Liberia, Sierra Leone and Rwanda as notable examples.<br />
Then again, others have managed to overcome<br />
colonial legacies <strong>of</strong> rule by force, deprivation and<br />
exploitation through democratic transition, enhancing<br />
state and nation building. Chile and <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> are<br />
good examples, while states such as Vietnam,<br />
Mozambique and Guatemala are progressing in this<br />
regard. Why have potentially prosperous Angola and<br />
Colombia failed in this respect? The answer to this is<br />
complex, involving a wide array <strong>of</strong> contributing<br />
historical and contemporary variables in terms <strong>of</strong><br />
causes, consequences and actors.<br />
Inspired by the hypothesis that states which were<br />
former colonies which have in their borders high<br />
value/low volume exportable commodities are vulnerable<br />
to disruption and collapse, it was decided to<br />
narrow down research and elaboration to three<br />
components represented by an equilateral triangle<br />
model: state failure, violence and resource capture.<br />
Reference to the equilateral nature <strong>of</strong> the triangle<br />
representing the full picture <strong>of</strong> Angola and Colombia's<br />
state failure suggests that the three components be<br />
allocated equal importance. Subsequent Parts have<br />
aimed to meet this requirement, commencing with a<br />
discussion <strong>of</strong> the theoretical notion <strong>of</strong> state failure,<br />
including academic definitions there<strong>of</strong> and reflecting<br />
upon its various variables. One pertinent conclusion is<br />
that state failure does not occur overnight. Rather, it is<br />
a long-term degenerative process where the inherent<br />
causes and consequences <strong>of</strong> failure to become a<br />
strong state with strong empirical statehood and a<br />
united and prosperous nation are <strong>of</strong> such magnitude<br />
that escape seems extremely difficult. By tracing these<br />
theoretical variables and causes to the state failure<br />
cases <strong>of</strong> Angola and Colombia, this study has<br />
confirmed the long-term degenerative nature there<strong>of</strong>.<br />
Contemporary Angolan and Colombian state failure<br />
cannot be separated from their shared colonial legacy<br />
<strong>of</strong> brutal violence, deprivation, discrimination and<br />
exploitation <strong>of</strong> the indigenous people and mineral<br />
wealth, to mention a few. When Angola and Colombia<br />
gained independence there was no strong central<br />
government in place to act as a catalyst for state and<br />
nation building, concluding a mutually beneficial<br />
social contract with society in exchange for its<br />
submission to state authority and rule. The ruling<br />
party's exclusive legitimacy, monopoly over the means<br />
<strong>of</strong> violence, and control over political, territorial,<br />
cultural and economic space was challenged right<br />
from the beginning. In the absence <strong>of</strong> one unified<br />
nation with a clear view <strong>of</strong> its ultimate destination, the<br />
state and emerging non-state actors resorted to those<br />
means familiar to them during colonial rule: violence,<br />
intimidation and elitist-clientelist exclusivity, culminating<br />
into a prolonged protracted civil war. While<br />
Angola and Colombia's state failure differs in terms <strong>of</strong><br />
magnitude, with Colombia far more a modern state<br />
reality than Angola, their comparison is adequately<br />
justified by shared characteristics <strong>of</strong> deeply-rooted<br />
undemocratic state rule, violent political factionalism<br />
and ethno-ideological divide, deprivation <strong>of</strong> the poor<br />
majority by a powerful and wealthy e lite minority and<br />
the sustained ability <strong>of</strong> challenging groups longing for<br />
state power and wealth to continue their violent<br />
struggle against the central government.<br />
From Part 1 onwards, this paper has aimed to<br />
gradually fill in the gaps <strong>of</strong> the full comparable picture<br />
<strong>of</strong> contemporary Angolan and Colombian state failure.<br />
Discussion centred on the weak nature <strong>of</strong> the state as<br />
the principal object <strong>of</strong> security and how this has<br />
allowed non-state objects <strong>of</strong> security, particularly the<br />
guerrilla movements, FARC and UNITA, as well as<br />
paramilitaries and narco-traffickers (in Colombia),<br />
30 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
mercenary `security' companies and MNCs to play a<br />
determining role, transforming the unstable domestic<br />
political and socio-economic situation to serve their<br />
own narrow interests. They have become so deeply<br />
embedded in society that it is doubtful whether peace<br />
and reconstruction efforts would last without either<br />
their total destruction or total commitment. Both<br />
options seem not to be viable given the state's crises<br />
<strong>of</strong> persistent weakness, delegitimacy and criminalization.<br />
Reference was also made to Angola and<br />
Colombia's experiences with regard to the constructive<br />
and destructive nature <strong>of</strong> other states and an<br />
international organization's involvement. Such elaboration<br />
has been complicated by two additional<br />
facts. Instead <strong>of</strong> acting as the prime object <strong>of</strong> security,<br />
the state and central government in both countries<br />
have been inclined to deliberately act as an agent <strong>of</strong><br />
insecurity to overcome its inherent legitimacy and<br />
power weakness. Part 3 reflected upon this matter,<br />
elaborating the state's political, socio-economic and<br />
human security failure, exacerbated by violent repression,<br />
gross human rights violations, corruption and<br />
resort to military force. In essence, comparing the<br />
Angolan and Colombian experiences has brought to<br />
the fore the existence <strong>of</strong> `grey areas' where it has not<br />
always been possible to distinguish the `good guys'<br />
from the `bad guys'. This observation is inextricably<br />
linked to all three components <strong>of</strong> the triangular model.<br />
Which groups or actors are exclusively responsible for<br />
state failure, violence and resource capture and who<br />
are not to blame? Again, no simple `yes' or `no' answer<br />
exists. Angolan and Colombian state failure does not<br />
take place in a vacuum with little or no external<br />
(global-level) interference. The European scramble for<br />
colonies and its consequences set into motion their<br />
failure. Cold War ideological divisions and superpower<br />
proxy conflict exacerbated their state failure<br />
through, inter alia, small arms proliferation in a<br />
domestic situation <strong>of</strong> civil war and acute citizen<br />
insecurity. Today, the global free trade conditions <strong>of</strong><br />
supply and demand act in an equally important way,<br />
providing strong incentives for external actors to<br />
secure access to Angola and Colombia's lucrative<br />
resources. Powerful, corrupt and criminal domestic<br />
actors do everything possible to meet this demand<br />
through adequate supply. The real victims <strong>of</strong> protracted<br />
social conflict are ordinary citizens suffering<br />
domestic and externally fuelled deprivation, insecurity<br />
and marginalization. Given the failure <strong>of</strong> exclusive<br />
state control through strong empirical statehood and<br />
legal controls, it is not surprising that both the state<br />
and its non-state challengers have increasingly resorted<br />
to violence and disruption to secure their<br />
capture, control and exploitation <strong>of</strong> oil, diamonds<br />
and cocaine. This third key component, visualized by<br />
the triangular model and incorporated into the central<br />
hypothesis, was elaborated in detail (in Part 4). As<br />
such, the `objects <strong>of</strong> security' need state failure and<br />
violence to conceal and continue their illegal activities<br />
<strong>of</strong> resource capture. The wealth incentive also makes<br />
it unlikely that any one <strong>of</strong> them would unilaterally seek<br />
an end to state and societal collapse. Oil, diamond and<br />
cocaine wealth has permitted them to simply abandon<br />
efforts to build unselfish, democratic political and<br />
socio-economic links. Strong concerted external engagement<br />
and pressure through sanctions is necessary<br />
to enforce their crossing <strong>of</strong> the Rubicon. What<br />
should be avoided is single-handed military intervention,<br />
which may tip the two countries over the edge<br />
into full-scale civil war and anarchy.<br />
While this article has delved into the `minefield' <strong>of</strong><br />
Angolan and Colombian state failure complexity <strong>of</strong><br />
diverse and common causes, consequences and<br />
actors, it has averted doing the same with regard to<br />
solutions. In essence, the antidote <strong>of</strong> the discussed<br />
ultimate signs and features <strong>of</strong> the two countries' state<br />
failure is simply to reverse them. In this regard, brief<br />
reference was made to externally driven attempts to<br />
achieve peace and reconstruction. Again, failure has<br />
prevailed. UN-sponsored (UNAVEM) peacekeeping<br />
missions to Angola have been unable to halt the civil<br />
war. Economic sanctions against UNITA have had<br />
little effect on the role <strong>of</strong> diamond capture as the<br />
latter's financial lifeline and an incentive for war.<br />
However, renewed international efforts are now being<br />
enhanced to cut this lifeline: Belgium has agreed to<br />
tighten controls, the UN Security Council is considering<br />
`secondary' sanctions against countries which<br />
assist UNITA, and De Beers no longer buys any uncut<br />
diamonds from UNITA sources. Similarly, international<br />
efforts have largely failed to remove the curse <strong>of</strong><br />
the cocaine-violence-state failure link in Colombia.<br />
Sustained demand in the US (the largest market for<br />
Colombia's cocaine) continues to encourage increased<br />
coca cultivation and cocaine processing.<br />
Time and again, peace efforts between the Pastrana<br />
government and FARC have been derailed by selfish<br />
e lite interests, the rule <strong>of</strong> the gun, impunity, as well as<br />
the parties' unwillingness to compromise. Cocaine<br />
supply can only be restricted if FARC and other nonstate<br />
actors co-sponsored central government's policy<br />
<strong>of</strong> crop substitution in the areas under their control.<br />
However, for them to willingly cut their cocainetaxing<br />
financial lifeline, the political rewards <strong>of</strong>fered<br />
need to surpass the huge cocaine pr<strong>of</strong>its. If this<br />
implies the balkanization <strong>of</strong> Colombia with little<br />
guarantee that peace would prevail, the price would<br />
be too high, both for the Pastrana government and the<br />
US, fearing increased instability in the region.<br />
Against this background, Angola and Colombia will<br />
find it extremely difficult to overcome their `minivortex'<br />
<strong>of</strong> societal collapse, development failure and<br />
prolonged violence. For both, the pendulum <strong>of</strong> state<br />
failure-violence-resource capture continues to move<br />
between the `no maÂs' (no more killings) public outcry<br />
on the one hand, and vague hopes for peace and<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 31
security. Unfortunately, this pendulum is not controlled<br />
by the people, but dictated by powerful,<br />
undemocratic, corrupt, greedy and brutal state and<br />
non-state actors with little or no incentive to negotiate<br />
an `unpr<strong>of</strong>itable' peace. Both countries are on the<br />
verge <strong>of</strong> becoming a no-win situation. To reverse this<br />
dire state <strong>of</strong> affairs, peace would have a cost, requiring<br />
certain distinct steps involving an all-out effort by all<br />
sides. First, the civil war needs to be concluded,<br />
preferably by the successful co-option <strong>of</strong> the main<br />
challengers to state legitimacy. This is to be followed<br />
by serious efforts <strong>of</strong> demilitarization and pacification<br />
<strong>of</strong> the countryside, thus removing the threat <strong>of</strong><br />
sustainable guerrilla war. Co-option implies a choice<br />
in favour <strong>of</strong> competition for legitimate popular support<br />
in a general election. Next, the nature <strong>of</strong> the regime<br />
needs to be changed fundamentally, involving the<br />
establishment <strong>of</strong> effective, accountable, transparent<br />
and democratic state control over territory, people and<br />
the natural resources wealth <strong>of</strong> the country. Peace,<br />
reconciliation and good governance should act as<br />
passwords for state legitimacy, fostering a mutually<br />
beneficial `long-term horizon' for both state and<br />
nation. In the case <strong>of</strong> Angola, this would ensure that<br />
diamonds and oil no longer function exclusively as a<br />
lifeline to corrupt, power-hungry and greedy e lite, but,<br />
instead, provide the much-needed impetus for peaceful<br />
and prosperous societal development. In essence,<br />
three crucial factors would determine whether Angola<br />
and Colombia would move from state failure towards<br />
state reconstruction: enlightened, honest leadership,<br />
social cohesion (removing the incentives for conflict),<br />
and strong international engagement (Carnegie Commission<br />
1997; Zartman 1995:120; Olson 1993).<br />
For each vicious circle <strong>of</strong> destruction (state failure;<br />
violence, resource capture, arms proliferation, poverty),<br />
Angola and Colombia need the `antidote' <strong>of</strong><br />
constructive international engagement by (trans)national<br />
civil society (NGOs; the Church), MNCs, other<br />
states and international organizations. The role <strong>of</strong><br />
Global Witness in securing De Beers and other MNCs<br />
commitment towards business practices that not only<br />
permit pr<strong>of</strong>itability, but also contribute to political,<br />
economic and social justice in Angola (and Colombia),<br />
is evident <strong>of</strong> what sort <strong>of</strong> engagement is needed<br />
to remove the resource capture curse. Similarly, UN<br />
member states' commitment towards the International<br />
Code <strong>of</strong> Conduct on Arms Transfers would go a long<br />
way in combating deadly arms proliferation in Angola<br />
and Colombia's violent civil wars. Failure to do so<br />
would merely foster the state-failure-violence-resource<br />
capture curse in both countries and would<br />
render renewed UN-sponsored humanitarian intervention<br />
and preventive diplomacy meaningless (Oxfam<br />
1999; Carnegie Commission 1997:30, 78).<br />
ABBREVIATIONS<br />
AUC United Self-Defence Forces <strong>of</strong> Colombia<br />
CIA Central Intelligence Agency<br />
DRC Democratic Republic <strong>of</strong> the Congo<br />
ELN Eje rcito de Liberacio n Nacional (National Liberation Army)<br />
FARC Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Colombian Revolutionary Armed Forces)<br />
FNLA Frente Nacional para a Libertac,a5o de Angola (Angolan National Liberation Front)<br />
ICRC International Committee <strong>of</strong> the Red Cross<br />
MNC's Multinational Corporations<br />
MPLA Movimento Popular de Libertac,a5o de Angola (Angolan Popular Liberation Movement)<br />
PCC Partido Comunista Colombiano (Colombian Communist Party)<br />
UNAVEM United Nations Angola Verification Mission<br />
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees<br />
UNITA Unia5o Nacional para a Independeà ncia Total de Angola (National Union for the Total<br />
Independence <strong>of</strong> Angola)<br />
US United States <strong>of</strong> America<br />
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<strong>of</strong> Alabama Press.<br />
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34 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
The cultural formation <strong>of</strong> Brazil and<br />
the present structure <strong>of</strong> its judiciary *<br />
by Durval de Noronha Goyos Jr.<br />
Durval de Noronha Goyos Jr.<br />
Dr Durval de Noronha Goyos Jr. is the founder<br />
and senior partner <strong>of</strong> Noronha Advogados, the<br />
second largest law firm in <strong>South</strong> America, with<br />
<strong>of</strong>fices in various cities in Brazil, as well as in<br />
Miami, London, ZuÈ rich and Lisbon. He is a<br />
member <strong>of</strong> the Brazilian and the Portuguese<br />
Bars, was chairman <strong>of</strong> the Brazilian Bar's<br />
Committee on GATT and is currently a WTO<br />
arbitrator.<br />
He is regarded as an authority on international<br />
law and economics, and on economic<br />
groups such as MERCOSUL, NAFTA and the<br />
FTAA. He has also represented the Brazilian<br />
government in international negotiations involving<br />
MERCOSUL and GATT. Dr Noronha<br />
Goyos Jr. is the author <strong>of</strong> GATT, MERCOSUL &<br />
NAFTA and The WTO and the Treaties <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Uruguay Round, among many other books.<br />
Dr Noronha is the author <strong>of</strong> the authoritative<br />
Legal Dictionary (English/Portuguese; Portuguese/English)<br />
already in its fourth edition.<br />
ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ<br />
* Edited text <strong>of</strong> a presentation made in SaÄ o Paulo, Brazil, at the Getu lio Vargas Foundation, on 25 January 2000, for the Vivendi delegation <strong>of</strong><br />
Duke <strong>University</strong>.<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 35
ABSTRACT<br />
The author describes the legal environment<br />
in Brazil. He outlines the evolution<br />
<strong>of</strong> Brazilian culture from the melting pot<br />
<strong>of</strong> native Brazilians, <strong>Africa</strong>ns and Europeans.<br />
This serves as a background to<br />
the legal system's evolution from Rome,<br />
modern Europe and America. He goes<br />
on to describe the judiciary and the way<br />
it operates in a federation. He refers<br />
briefly to typical difficulties foreign<br />
companies would encounter, especially<br />
as a result <strong>of</strong> misperceptions about the<br />
legal system, the litigious nature <strong>of</strong><br />
Brazilian society since redemocratization<br />
in 1988 and the political influences<br />
on litigation. At the same time the<br />
author hastens to assert that Brazilian<br />
courts are not inefficient, even accepting<br />
pleadings by computer.<br />
RESUMEN<br />
El autor describe el entorno legal de<br />
Brasil y traza la evolucio n de la cultura<br />
brasilenÄ a desde la formacio n del paõÂs en<br />
un crisol de brasilenÄ os, africanos y<br />
europeos. Esto sirve como trasfondo a<br />
la evolucio n del sistema legal desde<br />
Roma, la Europa moderna y Ame rica.<br />
Procede a describir el sistema judicial y<br />
la forma en la que opera en una<br />
federacio n y comenta brevemente las<br />
dificultades ma s comunes que las companÄ<br />
õÂ as extranjeras pueden encontrar,<br />
especialmente como resultado de las<br />
incomprensiones del sistema legal, la<br />
naturaleza litigiosa de la sociedad brasilenÄ<br />
a desde la democratizacio n en 1988<br />
y las influencias polõÂticas en el litigio. Al<br />
mismo tiempo el autor declara que las<br />
cortes en Brasil no son ineficientes, au n<br />
cuando aceptan alegatos por ordenador.<br />
RESUMO<br />
O autor descreve o sistema legal no<br />
Brasil e esbocË a a evolucËaÄ o da cultura<br />
brasileira, derivada da fusaÄ o de indõÂgenas,<br />
africanos europeus. Isto serve<br />
como fundo aÁ evolucËaÄ o do sistema legal<br />
a partir de Roma, da Europa moderna e<br />
da Ame rica. Procede com a descricËaÄ odo<br />
sistema judicia rio e a maneira como<br />
opera em uma federacË aÄ o. Menciona<br />
brevemente as dificuldades tõÂpicas encontradas<br />
pelas companhias estrangeiras<br />
principalmente como consequÈ eà ncia<br />
de percepcËoÄ es erroà neas sobre o sistema<br />
legal, a natureza litigiosa da sociedade<br />
brasileira a partir da redemocratizacË aÄ o<br />
em 1988 e as influeà ncias polõ ticas sobre<br />
o litõÂ gio. Ao mesmo tempo o autor<br />
afirma que as cortes brasileiras naÄ osaÄ o<br />
ineficientes, aceitando mesmo acË oÄ es<br />
judiciais por meio do computador.<br />
INTRODUCTION<br />
This article arises out <strong>of</strong> a request by Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Peter<br />
Brews, <strong>of</strong> Duke <strong>University</strong>, for a paper on the Brazilian<br />
legal environment for business, focusing on the<br />
workings <strong>of</strong> Brazil's Judiciary and the difficulties<br />
encountered by foreign companies. He also asked for<br />
a list <strong>of</strong> common errors/misperceptions made by<br />
international capital whilst doing business in and<br />
with Brazil.<br />
In my view, most problems encountered by international<br />
companies doing business in our country<br />
derive from the very dangerous combination <strong>of</strong><br />
ignorance with ethnocentrism. Accordingly, I chose<br />
first to address Brazil's historical and cultural background,<br />
believing that, without this fundamental, it is<br />
impossible to understand the country's legal structure<br />
and the business environment. This will be followed<br />
by an analysis <strong>of</strong> the Brazilian judiciary, its structure<br />
and operation.<br />
THE CULTURAL FORMATION OF BRAZIL<br />
Failure to appreciate a country's cultural specificities<br />
can be quite costly in terms <strong>of</strong> an investment decision,<br />
in general, and in doing business, in particular. Of<br />
course, the legal framework <strong>of</strong> a country is intimately<br />
linked to its historical and cultural heritage. Neglect to<br />
absorb these elements comes with a high price tag.<br />
Recently, a major international company bought a<br />
privatized public utility based only on representations<br />
and warranties <strong>of</strong> the government. A utility company<br />
<strong>of</strong> that kind had a high tax contingent liability which<br />
materialized only after the acquisition. The buyers had<br />
availed themselves neither <strong>of</strong> a thorough due diligence<br />
report nor <strong>of</strong> the usual appropriate mechanisms<br />
<strong>of</strong> price retention. Surprised by the liability, the buyers<br />
made the second error in replying that they would not<br />
bother with the tax assessment. In this case, the<br />
buyers failed to appreciate that as a democratic<br />
society, the government <strong>of</strong> Brazil is subject to the<br />
law in very much the same way as any other member<br />
<strong>of</strong> society. They believed that a representation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
government would be above the law. They probably<br />
would not have made this mistake in their own<br />
country. Their ignorance and patronizing attitude<br />
had a very high cost.<br />
On another occasion, a major European company<br />
merged their respective subsidiaries in Brazil with a<br />
large American organization. Counsel for the United<br />
States company prepared all documents in accordance<br />
with American law. European counsel agreed.<br />
They asked their subsidiaries to file the documents in<br />
Brazil at the Board <strong>of</strong> Trade. They were returned. The<br />
documents had to be adapted to Brazilian law and<br />
that affected the terms <strong>of</strong> the merger, which had to be<br />
almost entirely renegotiated. That took a long time,<br />
after which American and European counsel sanctimoniously<br />
agreed that Brazilian law was to blame.<br />
Another case involves the senior Latin American<br />
counsel <strong>of</strong> a major US company. The lawyer had<br />
occupied the position for more than ten years. His<br />
company had operated in Brazil for decades. The<br />
lawyer obtained translations into Spanish <strong>of</strong> contract<br />
documentation and was surprised that the Brazilian<br />
party demanded Portuguese versions. He had perhaps<br />
forgotten that Portuguese is the <strong>of</strong>ficial language <strong>of</strong><br />
Brazil. I could go on with many similar examples, but I<br />
think the point has already been made.<br />
36 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
The following is an effort to provide some cultural<br />
background which may be helpful in understanding<br />
the business environment <strong>of</strong> Brazil and, consequently,<br />
in minimizing risks. It is my firm belief that MBA<br />
programmes today not only fail disgracefully in this<br />
regard, but rather make matters much worse in<br />
promoting the `cowboy' business ethics, according<br />
to which pr<strong>of</strong>it at all costs is the basic cannon as well<br />
as the ultimate truth and exclusive end <strong>of</strong> society.<br />
Brazil was discovered by the Portuguese 500 years<br />
ago, on 22 April 1500, when a fleet <strong>of</strong> thirteen ships<br />
commanded by navigator Pedro AÂ lvares Cabral arrived<br />
in the shores <strong>of</strong> what is now the state <strong>of</strong> Bahia. His<br />
expedition represented the <strong>of</strong>ficial claim by Portugal<br />
<strong>of</strong> the lands apportioned to it by the Treaty <strong>of</strong><br />
Tordesillas <strong>of</strong> 7 June 1494, mediated by Pope<br />
Alexander VI, that allocated rights <strong>of</strong> the discoveries<br />
between Spain and Portugal. Spain was to receive the<br />
territories west <strong>of</strong> the Tordesillas line, as long as<br />
Portugal would acquire the lands to its east. In 1500,<br />
the population <strong>of</strong> Portugal was only approximately<br />
1 100 000 people or 280 000 households. The<br />
country's human resources were already over-extended<br />
by the impact <strong>of</strong> the discovery by Admiral<br />
Vasco da Gama <strong>of</strong> the naval route to India in 1498 and<br />
the need to man trading stations in <strong>Africa</strong>, in India, in<br />
Malaga and subsequently in China and Japan. It has<br />
been estimated that in the first half <strong>of</strong> the sixteenth<br />
century, 80 per cent <strong>of</strong> Portugal's male population<br />
was in colonial or trade service abroad.<br />
Portugal had become a nation state and a separate<br />
kingdom since 1139, with the Frenchman Henry <strong>of</strong><br />
Bourgogne as its first king, had already expelled the<br />
moors from its territories in 1239, and successfully<br />
fought <strong>of</strong>f Spain's attempts <strong>of</strong> domination. Conversely,<br />
Spain only began to be a nation state at the end<br />
<strong>of</strong> the fifteenth century and expelled the Moors only<br />
in 1492, the year Columbus discovered America. This<br />
situation determined the attitude <strong>of</strong> the two countries<br />
towards their new colonies: whereas the Spaniards<br />
continued the ruthless military campaign against the<br />
infidels, supported by a very militant Catholic Church,<br />
the Portuguese adopted an <strong>of</strong>ficial policy <strong>of</strong> racial<br />
miscegenation.<br />
When the Portuguese arrived, in 1500, Brazil was<br />
inhabited by approximately five million native Brazilians,<br />
<strong>of</strong> numerous different indigenous peoples, who<br />
spoke languages now classified into four main groups.<br />
Upon disembarkation, the Portuguese were promptly<br />
met by waiting friendly Tupinikins. The predominant<br />
language group, also spoken by the Tupinikins, used<br />
in most <strong>of</strong> the coast areas and deep into the interior up<br />
to the Amazon and what is now Paraguay, Uruguay<br />
and parts <strong>of</strong> Argentina was the Tupi-Guarani, known<br />
in some areas in this language as `nhenhen-gatu', or<br />
general language. The indigenous tribes called their<br />
land pindorama or land <strong>of</strong> the palm trees. They were<br />
basically hunter-gatherers, but also cultivated some<br />
basic crops, such as manioc, peanuts and cotton. They<br />
had a pr<strong>of</strong>ound knowledge <strong>of</strong> and respect for the land,<br />
knew cartography, navigation by the sun and by the<br />
stars and had numerous musical instruments. The<br />
basic artistic manifestations were plumery art and<br />
body painting. Their botanical knowledge was pr<strong>of</strong>ound.<br />
The native Brazilians were in constant warfare. It<br />
was speculated by contemporary European travellers<br />
that this was necessary as a means <strong>of</strong> population<br />
control. When the Portuguese arrived in Pindorama,<br />
the Tupi-Guarani Indians were asserting control <strong>of</strong> the<br />
coastal regions <strong>of</strong> the country. They had their own<br />
legal system, evidenced by extant terms in the Tupi-<br />
Guarani vocabulary for lawyer, court, court-house,<br />
defence, sentence and other terms indispensable for<br />
the functioning <strong>of</strong> a legal society. Violence within the<br />
tribes was practically non-existent. When it occurred,<br />
the aggrieved, or their families, would be authorized to<br />
redress the damage in the same manner as it was<br />
inflicted. Property was communal. The tribes were<br />
nomads, so as not to exhaust the land, and thus there<br />
was no accumulation <strong>of</strong> riches. The ultimate sanction<br />
was a social penalty: exclusion from the tribe.<br />
Prisoners <strong>of</strong> war would be normally integrated into<br />
the tribes as labourers, but not warriors. In many<br />
tribes, the bravest prisoners would be subject to ritual<br />
cannibalism.<br />
The Portuguese settled along the coastline <strong>of</strong> the<br />
country, which they initially called the Land <strong>of</strong> True<br />
Cross. After approximately 20 years, the country<br />
began to be called Brazil, after its main produce, the<br />
Brazil wood, used as a red dye. The origin <strong>of</strong> the name<br />
comes from the Italian Verzino through the French<br />
Bre sil. Early on the Portuguese tried to impose their<br />
culture, including religion and laws, on the native<br />
population, as well as attempting to enslave it to be<br />
put to economic use. The natives almost immediately<br />
started a movement <strong>of</strong> civil resistance against the new<br />
order, by moving further inland. They resisted slavery<br />
to such extent that they did not hesitate to commit<br />
suicide in great numbers immediately after capture.<br />
There are many extraordinary written accounts <strong>of</strong> how<br />
native Brazilians would die in such circumstances,<br />
including various after pronouncing the formula `I die'<br />
three times. By this movement <strong>of</strong> civil resistance, the<br />
Brazilian indigenous people not only refused the<br />
unjust law or practice <strong>of</strong> slavery, but also declined to<br />
accept the artificial frontiers imposed by alien powers.<br />
On both accounts they ultimately prevailed. 1<br />
Simultaneously, the Portuguese proceeded with<br />
understandable delight with their policy <strong>of</strong> miscegenation.<br />
There are accounts <strong>of</strong> some who had as<br />
many as 60 wives, which gave them enormous<br />
political power. This is so because Brazilian indigenous<br />
peoples also had a policy <strong>of</strong> social co-optation. 2<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 37
They wanted to bring the European elements into their<br />
families. Thus, some <strong>of</strong> those Portuguese, such as the<br />
case <strong>of</strong> JoaÄ o Ramalho in SaÄ o Paulo, could come up<br />
with Indian armies <strong>of</strong> up to 5 000 people, when the<br />
king <strong>of</strong> Portugal could only produce 2 000. In the<br />
native culture, the children <strong>of</strong> such parents were<br />
considered to be the same as their fathers, but they all<br />
spoke Tupi-Guarani. When SaÄ o Paulo 3 was founded<br />
by the Jesuits 466 years ago, only a minute part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
population spoke Portuguese, which was taught by<br />
the priests in the college they started in 1554. Until<br />
1640, the city <strong>of</strong> SaÄ o Paulo had neither a system <strong>of</strong> the<br />
laws in force at the time, (the Spanish Philipine<br />
Ordinations) nor any judges. An attempt to introduce<br />
a judge in 1611 failed miserably, as the hapless<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial, Manuel Bravo, was received with arrows and<br />
compelled to return to Europe. 4 In 1640, the Jesuits<br />
were expelled from the land by the Paulista population,<br />
as they were perceived to interfere beyond<br />
reason with the local culture by opposing the<br />
enslavement <strong>of</strong> native Brazilians. Within this same<br />
period, the cleric Padre Vieira, one <strong>of</strong> greatest<br />
intellectuals <strong>of</strong> his time, cited Aristotle in one <strong>of</strong> his<br />
memorable sermons to remind the congregation that<br />
`good laws are those which are obeyed', 5 in view <strong>of</strong><br />
the generalized failure to comply with the statutes that<br />
prohibited the enslavement <strong>of</strong> Brazilian Indians.<br />
As the attempts to enslave the native population<br />
failed, the Portuguese introduced <strong>Africa</strong>n slaves in<br />
Brazil in such great numbers that they soon overtook<br />
the population <strong>of</strong> native Brazilians. They were brought<br />
from the regions that today make up the territories <strong>of</strong><br />
Nigeria and Angola. The first group, who spoke<br />
Yoruba, was introduced into what is today Brazil's<br />
state <strong>of</strong> Bahia. The second group was introduced in<br />
what is presently the states <strong>of</strong> Rio de Janeiro and<br />
Pernambuco, the first in the centre-east part <strong>of</strong> the<br />
country and the second in the north-east. As a result <strong>of</strong><br />
this geographical distribution and the resulting pocket<br />
<strong>of</strong> Yoruba in Bahia, there was a lack <strong>of</strong> continuity <strong>of</strong><br />
the areas where Kimbundo was spoken. As a result,<br />
Brazil had in the early 1800s four general languages:<br />
one native, Tupi-Guarani; two <strong>Africa</strong>n, Kimbundo and<br />
Yoruba; and one European, Portuguese.<br />
In 1807, General Junot, acting on the orders <strong>of</strong><br />
Napoleon, invaded Portugal. The whole Portuguese<br />
court fled to Brazil. It was the first time a reigning<br />
European monarch had crossed the line <strong>of</strong> the<br />
equator. The Portuguese court settled in Rio and<br />
brought about renewed prosperity to the country, in<br />
spite <strong>of</strong> a badly negotiated trade agreement with Great<br />
Britain, signed in 1810. After the French were<br />
defeated at Waterloo, in 1815, the Portuguese court<br />
chose to remain in Brazil, which was elevated to the<br />
status <strong>of</strong> a kingdom. In practice there was for the first<br />
and only time in history a reversal <strong>of</strong> the role <strong>of</strong> colony<br />
and colonial power. In 1821, there was a liberal<br />
revolution in Portugal and the king chose to return to<br />
the country as a hostage. His heir remained in Brazil.<br />
He refused to subordinate himself to the Portuguese<br />
parliament, and as emperor declared the country<br />
independent from Portugal. Brazil had then the only<br />
monarchy <strong>of</strong> the Americas. This lasted until 1889,<br />
when the Republic was proclaimed.<br />
During the second half <strong>of</strong> the nineteenth century,<br />
under Pedro II, European immigration was encouraged,<br />
particularly from Italy, the country <strong>of</strong> his wife,<br />
and from Germany, the country <strong>of</strong> his mother.<br />
European immigration was directed mostly to southern<br />
Brazil. Italians came in such great numbers that<br />
the only reason why Italian did not become the main<br />
national language is due to the fact that it did not exist<br />
as a single tongue. The Italians came from different<br />
areas <strong>of</strong> the peninsula and spoke diverse dialects.<br />
When they arrived in SaÄ o Paulo, for instance, only one<br />
<strong>of</strong> three Paulistas spoke Portuguese; the others spoke<br />
Tupi-Guarani. The Italians found it easier to learn<br />
Portuguese and thus boosted its usage as a general<br />
language. As there were few good reference factors<br />
for Portuguese, the language spoken in SaÄ o Paulo<br />
became very idiosyncratic.<br />
Slavery was only effectively abolished in Brazil in<br />
1888. This was accomplished in a peaceful manner,<br />
no minor achievement for the country with the largest<br />
<strong>Africa</strong>n population outside <strong>Africa</strong>. In 1831 slavery had<br />
already been abolished by law, but never in practice<br />
for lack <strong>of</strong> social acceptance, in spite <strong>of</strong> the very harsh<br />
penalties imposed, which involved the loss <strong>of</strong> liberty.<br />
This was yet another example <strong>of</strong> a law that `did not<br />
catch'. In this case, the law failed to be obeyed and<br />
enforced because it went against the prevailing<br />
economic interest <strong>of</strong> the agricultural society that<br />
characterized Brazil. 6 In this category, there were<br />
other laws enacted in response to external pressure,<br />
notably by the British. These were known as laws `for<br />
the English to see', that is, not to be enforced.<br />
As a result <strong>of</strong> so many diverse ethnic influences, the<br />
Portuguese language spoken in Brazil today is very<br />
rich. It has approximately ten thousand words <strong>of</strong> Tupi-<br />
Guarani in current use, together with about three<br />
thousand words <strong>of</strong> Kimbundo and two and a half<br />
thousand terms <strong>of</strong> Yoruba. The language also has<br />
about twice as many sounds as Spanish, for instance,<br />
which facilitates the understanding <strong>of</strong> that language<br />
by Brazilians, whilst Spanish speaking people cannot<br />
understand Portuguese. 7 Very <strong>of</strong>ten, there are in Brazil<br />
choices <strong>of</strong> words from different origins such as for<br />
`bald', which can be expressed as calvo, from Latin;<br />
careca, from Kimbundo; or abayama, from Tupi-<br />
Guarani. The same goes for witchcraft: bruxaria and<br />
feiticËo, from Portuguese; mandinga, from Kimbundo;<br />
and pagelancËa from Tupi-Guarani. Other examples<br />
abound.<br />
After the proclamation <strong>of</strong> the Republic, Brazil had in<br />
38 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
the twentieth century many ruptures <strong>of</strong> the rule <strong>of</strong> law.<br />
In the 1930s Brazil had a fascist regime led by an<br />
odious dictator who was inclined toward the Axis<br />
powers. In 1941 and in early 1942, the Brazilian<br />
people massively demonstrated for entry into the war<br />
with the allied powers. 8 Eventually, Brazil entered the<br />
war in August, 1942, in response to this enormous<br />
demand. In the process, one expeditionary force <strong>of</strong><br />
thirty-five thousand soldiers and aviators was sent to<br />
Italy, and a ferocious naval war raged in the <strong>South</strong>-<br />
Atlantic, which cost Brazil the loss <strong>of</strong> 98 per cent <strong>of</strong> its<br />
merchant navy. 9 Following the war, democracy was<br />
reinstated in 1945 only to be suppressed by a military<br />
coup in 1964, which started a regime that lasted until<br />
1986, when the rule <strong>of</strong> law was again reinstated in the<br />
wake <strong>of</strong> a great popular movement. Brazil had become<br />
a very complex society with the largest Italian<br />
population outside <strong>of</strong> Italy, estimated at 37 million<br />
people (the city <strong>of</strong> SaÄ o Paulo alone has more Italians<br />
than the combined populations <strong>of</strong> Rome and Milan)<br />
and the largest <strong>Africa</strong>n population outside <strong>of</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
Millions <strong>of</strong> ethnic native Brazilians, the majority <strong>of</strong><br />
which integrated, live mostly but not exclusively in the<br />
centre and north <strong>of</strong> the country. In addition, there are<br />
numerous other nationalities, such as Arabs, Germans,<br />
Japanese, Koreans, Poles, in great numbers. Lastly,<br />
there is the phenomenon <strong>of</strong> widespread racial miscegenation,<br />
which has greatly contributed to the<br />
benign nature <strong>of</strong> our people and for its renowned<br />
tolerance.<br />
THE JUDICIARY IN BRAZIL<br />
Brazil's legal system has its roots in Roman law, with<br />
strong influence from various European sources, such<br />
as Portuguese (constitutional law), French (civil,<br />
commercial, company law), German (civil and criminal<br />
procedure) and Italian (criminal and labour)<br />
legislation. Some elements <strong>of</strong> US inspiration can also<br />
be found in the areas <strong>of</strong> competition; securities;<br />
environmental law; as well as in taxation. Unjust<br />
and/or impractical law is fiercely resisted by the civil<br />
society, in the best Tupi-Guarani tradition. Following<br />
the re-democratization <strong>of</strong> Brazil in 1986, a constituent<br />
assembly was formed with the mission <strong>of</strong> enacting a<br />
new constitution, which task was accomplished in<br />
1988. The Constitution <strong>of</strong> 1988 was, at very best,<br />
highly inadequate in time and space, and accordingly<br />
has already suffered 29 separate amendments. In the<br />
present federal administration only, the constitution<br />
has been amended by 19 different bills. 10 However,<br />
what is most striking about Brazil's constitution is not<br />
the number <strong>of</strong> amendments it has suffered, but the<br />
reforms it will still have to undergo, before it becomes<br />
a rational platform for the rule <strong>of</strong> law, federative pact,<br />
political balance and economic activities.<br />
The 1988 Constitution divided the Judiciary in<br />
ordinary and specialized courts. As Brazil is a<br />
federation, the ordinary court system is established<br />
at the state and federal levels. The ordinary courts<br />
comprise civil and criminal benches and the specialized<br />
courts attend to labour, military and electoral<br />
cases. Appeals may be filed to second and third<br />
instances. At the top <strong>of</strong> the pyramid, there is the<br />
constitutional court, the Federal Supreme Tribunal.<br />
The Superior Tribunal <strong>of</strong> Justice (STJ), with 33<br />
ministers, is the court <strong>of</strong> last resort for non-constitutional<br />
matters. All last resort tribunals are based in<br />
Brazil's capital, BrasõÂlia. With the re-democratization<br />
<strong>of</strong> the country and the adoption <strong>of</strong> the new constitution,<br />
Brazil became an increasingly litigious country,<br />
second only to the USA in terms <strong>of</strong> litigation. In 1997,<br />
four million suits were filed in the Brazilian courts.<br />
This number jumped to five million in 1999. The<br />
specialized labour courts alone tried 2,3 million cases<br />
in 1998. In the same year, the STJ decided 101 000<br />
cases with published opinions, whereas the STF, with<br />
11 justices, decided 52 000 cases.<br />
The 1988 Constitution allowed the Executive<br />
branch to legislate by means <strong>of</strong> decrees, Provisional<br />
Measures (MPs). In theory, those MPs should be<br />
enacted only in those cases <strong>of</strong> relevance and urgency<br />
and to be valid for only 30 days. However, in case<br />
Congress does not approve the law within 30 days,<br />
the administration is allowed to re-enact the measure.<br />
The current administration enacted 199 measures,<br />
which were re-enacted 3 336 times. For each MP,<br />
there are approximately 30 000 suits. Thus, the<br />
legislative effort <strong>of</strong> the FH Cardoso administration<br />
brought about, only in connection with MPs,<br />
5 970 000 suits. Federal, State and Municipal governments<br />
have a policy <strong>of</strong> litigating in bad faith and<br />
never settling cases, as the interest <strong>of</strong> the respective<br />
administrations is put above that <strong>of</strong> the public's. What<br />
counts is to procrastinate the obligation to pay to the<br />
extent possible, so that another administration will<br />
have to foot the bill. The State <strong>of</strong> SaÄ o Paulo alone, in<br />
spite <strong>of</strong> having the reputation <strong>of</strong> one <strong>of</strong> the best<br />
managed in the Brazilian federation, has approximately<br />
<strong>of</strong> US$ 6 billion dollars <strong>of</strong> judicial indemnification<br />
in arrears, and the municipality <strong>of</strong> SaÄ o Paulo,<br />
which does not enjoy the same reputation, US$ 1<br />
billion. As the State <strong>of</strong> SaÄ o Paulo refuses to pay those<br />
judicial awards, there were, in 1999, 1 103 requests<br />
for judicial intervention in the State's executive<br />
branch, whose governor has resorted to evading<br />
summons! 11<br />
In spite <strong>of</strong> such numbers, the Brazilian judiciary has<br />
only approximately 10 000 first-instance judges and<br />
200 000 active lawyers for a population <strong>of</strong> 150 million<br />
people. As in France, those judges are all civil servants<br />
subject to a public examination for qualification.<br />
Brazilian judges have benefited from continuing legal<br />
education programmes for more than ten years. In the<br />
higher courts, twenty per cent <strong>of</strong> members come from<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 39
the legal pr<strong>of</strong>ession as well as from the public<br />
prosecution service, another category <strong>of</strong> civil servants.<br />
More sophisticated judges and courts tend to be<br />
found in more economically developed federal states,<br />
where follow-up <strong>of</strong> the cases can be done by<br />
computers. At present, cases normally take from three<br />
to five years before conclusion. Discovery is extensive.<br />
Litigation is expensive and the discomfited party will<br />
pay full court fees and reimburse legal costs <strong>of</strong><br />
between ten and 20 per cent <strong>of</strong> the value <strong>of</strong> the case.<br />
The judiciary system does not adopt the `stare decisis'<br />
doctrine and thus every case has to be tried<br />
individually, even if higher courts have already<br />
decided on the matter <strong>of</strong> law.<br />
The states and the federal governments are the most<br />
frequent litigants, more <strong>of</strong>ten than not in the passive<br />
pole, as a result <strong>of</strong> the numerous attempts against the<br />
legal order, commonly in the economic area. Former<br />
President Collor, for example, attempted to eradicate<br />
inflation in the country by means <strong>of</strong> the outright<br />
sequestration <strong>of</strong> 80 per cent <strong>of</strong> the financial assets <strong>of</strong><br />
physical and juridical persons, rather than by fiscal<br />
policy. The expected result was a tidal wave <strong>of</strong> legal<br />
actions where his hapless government was most<br />
thoroughly and inexorably beaten.<br />
Recently, the prestigious The Economist, published<br />
a feature 12 stating that establishing a firm rule <strong>of</strong> law<br />
remains a challenge throughout Latin America; accusing<br />
the Brazilian judiciary <strong>of</strong> corrupt and inefficient<br />
practices and accusing lawyers as well as judges <strong>of</strong><br />
benefiting from the creeping chaos in the judicial<br />
system. In reply to this article, I sent a letter to the<br />
editor on 20 September last year, which was duly<br />
published. 13 I wrote that the assertion that the<br />
Brazilian judiciary is both corrupt and inefficient not<br />
only fails to portray reality but is flagrantly irresponsible.<br />
I also wrote that the evidence <strong>of</strong> corruption is<br />
insufficient to allow for generalizations and that<br />
efficiency <strong>of</strong> the courts is comparable if not greater<br />
to what is found today in the European Union. I also<br />
commented that the decision <strong>of</strong> the Brazilian Bar to<br />
oppose the `stare decisis' doctrine, equally not<br />
recognized by the ICJ or the WTO, comes out <strong>of</strong><br />
concern for the prevalence <strong>of</strong> the rule <strong>of</strong> law, keeping<br />
into memory the sombre years <strong>of</strong> military dictatorship<br />
in the country. Furthermore, the domestic statistics<br />
speak strongly in favour <strong>of</strong> the Judiciary. Against the<br />
four million suits filed in 1997, there were fewer than<br />
100 arbitration cases.<br />
As to efficiency, court proceedings in Brazil are<br />
faster than in most <strong>of</strong> continental Europe today.<br />
Lawyers can follow-up proceedings in all federal<br />
courts via computer and can file pleadings by the<br />
same means. In the most economically developed<br />
states, follow-up via computer as well as filings are<br />
also possible. Distribution <strong>of</strong> new cases is done by<br />
computers. Jurisprudence is immediately made available<br />
via computer as well as published in hard copies.<br />
The legal prosecution service or public ministry is both<br />
independent and quite effective. The Bar has a superb<br />
continuing legal education programme and conducts<br />
a thorough examination before new lawyers are<br />
admitted. The recent vilification <strong>of</strong> the Brazilian legal<br />
system undoubtedly has its roots in bad politicians<br />
who had their evil designs frustrated by the workings<br />
<strong>of</strong> the legal machinery.<br />
Brazilian courts have jurisdiction over defendants<br />
domiciled in Brazil and on disputes resulting from<br />
obligations to be performed in Brazil, as well as on<br />
matters arising from acts occurring in the Brazilian<br />
territory. Foreign companies having a commercial<br />
presence in Brazil are deemed to be domiciled in the<br />
country. Election <strong>of</strong> foreign law to govern local<br />
obligations is possible whenever there is no violation<br />
<strong>of</strong> Brazil's public policies. This is not a common<br />
occurrence, however, as the pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> foreign law in a<br />
Brazilian court tends to be quite burdensome.<br />
Foreign sentences are ratified in Brazil by the STF<br />
upon the fulfilment <strong>of</strong> five requirements, as follows:<br />
(1) foreign court having personal and subject matter<br />
jurisdiction; (2) proper summons; (3) final judgement;<br />
(4) legalization and sworn translation; and (5)<br />
compliance with basic principles. Ratification will be<br />
denied if Brazilian courts have exclusive jurisdiction <strong>of</strong><br />
a matter, which occurs in case <strong>of</strong> property located in<br />
Brazil and probate <strong>of</strong> assets in the country. Defendants<br />
resident in Brazil must be properly summoned<br />
by means <strong>of</strong> rogatory letters. Affidavits have to be<br />
presented to the effect that no appeals are possible in<br />
the country <strong>of</strong> origin <strong>of</strong> the judgement. Foreign<br />
judgements must not violate Brazil's national sovereignty,<br />
public order or morality.<br />
Until very recently, for foreign arbitration awards to<br />
be enforced in Brazil, ratification by the courts <strong>of</strong> the<br />
country <strong>of</strong> origin <strong>of</strong> the award and ratification by the<br />
STF were necessary. This ensured that arbitration was<br />
eschewed in Brazil. On 27 December 1995, Brazil<br />
ratified the Panama convention on arbitration, which<br />
eliminated the necessity <strong>of</strong> ratification <strong>of</strong> an award by<br />
the local courts in most cases. Furthermore, in<br />
accordance with new domestic legislation on arbitration,<br />
14 international awards are dependent on ratification<br />
by the STF only. Summons are allowed in<br />
accordance with applicable international treaty or<br />
foreign law. The award may be based on submission<br />
clauses, whose validity will survive the relevant<br />
agreement. In spite <strong>of</strong> such positive developments,<br />
arbitration remains only exceptionally used in Brazil.<br />
40 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
NOTES<br />
1 For an excellent history <strong>of</strong> the Brazilian indians, see Red Gold ± The Conquest <strong>of</strong> the Brazilian Indians by John Hemming,<br />
Cambridge, Harvard <strong>University</strong> Press, Massachusetts: 1978.<br />
2 Which they named tuasap or extended family. In Portuguese, this phenomenon became known as cunhadismo or the practice<br />
<strong>of</strong> expanding a family by marriage. Darcy Ribeiro in O Povo Brasileiro, SaÄ o Paulo, Cia das Letras, 2nd edition, superbly<br />
analyses this topic.<br />
3 Originally called SaÄ o Paulo de Piratininga. Piratininga is a tupi-guarani word meaning dry-fish, which is how the local<br />
population, approximately 90 kilometres away from the sea, ate their fish.<br />
4 See A NacËaÄo Mercantilista by Jorge Caldeira, SaÄ o Paulo, Editora 34, 1999, p. 35.<br />
5 See Os SermoÄes, by Pe. Antonio Vieira, SaÄ o Paulo Ed., Cultrix, 1995.<br />
6 In this respect see A EscravidaÄo <strong>Africa</strong>na no Brasil by the great Brazilian abolitionist, Evaristo de Moraes, BrasõÂlia, Editora<br />
UNB, 3rd edition.<br />
7 For a history <strong>of</strong> the development <strong>of</strong> the Portuguese language, see Relembrando o PortugueÃs com DicionaÂrio de Anglicismos,<br />
by Durval de Noronha, SaÄ o Paulo, Observador Legal Ed., 1998.<br />
8 For a history <strong>of</strong> the popular movement for declaration <strong>of</strong> war against the axis powers, see O Brasil e a 2 a Guerra, by JoaÄo<br />
FalcaÄ o, BrasõÂ lia, Editora UNB, 1998.<br />
9 For an excellent and concise work on the subject, see Brazil in the Second World War, by Keith Campbell, Pretoria, UNISA<br />
Centre for Latin American Studies, 1992.<br />
10 See `LicË oÄ es Que NaÄ o Morrem', by Reginaldo de Castro, in OAB Nacional, December <strong>of</strong> 1999.<br />
11 OAB-SP Boletim, December, 1999.<br />
12 `The Price <strong>of</strong> Justice', September 18th 1999.<br />
13 The Economist, October 2, 1999.<br />
14 Law 9307 <strong>of</strong> November 24, 1996.<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 41
Contemporary shamanism Ð<br />
vegetalismo in the Peruvian Amazon *<br />
by Wynand Koch **<br />
Uclas Research Fellow<br />
Wynand Koch was a Research Fellow <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Unisa Centre for Latin American Studies from<br />
August 1996 to July 1997 and is currently<br />
completing his MA dissertation in Anthropology<br />
at Unisa. His focus is on shamanism and its<br />
various manifestations. As Uclas Research<br />
Fellow, he spent several months in the Peruvian<br />
jungle during which time he shared<br />
practical experiences with Peruvian shamans,<br />
including the imbibing <strong>of</strong> the ayahuasca. At<br />
present he is teaching in Taiwan.<br />
Wynand Koch<br />
ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ<br />
* Editor's Note: A second article `Vegetalismo Consciousness and the New Sciences' will appear in the issue <strong>of</strong> ULAR 17(1), 2001. The articles<br />
were written while the author was Research Fellow at the Unisa Centre for Latin American Studies.<br />
** My thanks for being enabled to undertake research in the Peruvian Amazon to the Head <strong>of</strong> UCLAS, Mrs Ze lia Roel<strong>of</strong>se-Campbell, to my<br />
supervisor, Dr Chris van Vuuren, Department <strong>of</strong> Anthropology, Unisa, to Dr Eleanor B. Smithwick, <strong>of</strong> the Peruvian Amazon Conservation, Inc.,<br />
my joint supervisor, and my soror mystica and to the PAC, Inc., and their assistant director Clever Hoyos Rengifo. Many thanks go to my two<br />
main informants and maestros, Don Francisco Montes ShunÄ a and Don Fernando Lachi who introduced me to the world <strong>of</strong> the Vegetalista,<br />
Ayahuasca, Sachamama, Yacumama, Pachamama and Huayramama. I dedicate the work to Sachamama, the spirit <strong>of</strong> the rain forest.<br />
42 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
ABSTRACT<br />
Undertaking a research project into<br />
shamanism in the Peruvian Amazon,<br />
the author was introduced to the vegetalista,<br />
a type <strong>of</strong> shaman with special<br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> a wide variety <strong>of</strong> medicinal<br />
plants and a vocation to help their<br />
fellows Ð without payment. The article<br />
describes the way in which vegetalistas<br />
are co-opted into the calling, their<br />
initiation, long training, the status allocated<br />
to them and the roles they play in<br />
Peruvian Amazonian society. Vegetalistas<br />
undertake an important function in a<br />
society in which clinics and even district<br />
nurses are rarely to be found. For the<br />
poor and the widely dispersed inhabitants<br />
they are particularly necessary.<br />
RESUMEN<br />
El proyecto de investigacio n sobre el<br />
chamanismo en la Amazonia peruana,<br />
ha permitido a su autor conocer al<br />
vegetalista, un tipo de chama n conocedor<br />
de una gran variedad de plantas<br />
medicinales y con una vocacio n a<br />
ayudar a sus conge neres Рa menudo<br />
sin cobrar. El artõÂculo describe como los<br />
vegetalistas escuchan la llamada, como<br />
son invitados a su iniciacio n, al largo<br />
periodo de entrenamiento, el status que<br />
se les confiere y el papel que juegan en<br />
la sociedad de la Amazonia peruana.<br />
Los vegetalistas juegan un papel muy<br />
importante en una sociedad en la que<br />
las clõÂ nicas y las enfermeras de distrito<br />
escasean. Estos son especialmente necesarios<br />
para los pobres y aquellos<br />
habitantes que se hayan diseminados<br />
por la regio n.<br />
RESUMO<br />
O projeto de pesquisa sobre o xamanismo<br />
na Amazoà nia peruana levou o<br />
autor a conhecer o vegetalista, uma<br />
categoria de xamaÄ com conhecimentos<br />
especiais sobre uma grande variedade<br />
de plantas medicinais e com vocacËaÄ ode<br />
ajudar ao pro ximo Рmuitas vezes de<br />
gracË a. O artigo descreve como os<br />
vegetalistas saÄ o chamados a seguir a<br />
vocacË aÄ o, a sua iniciacË aÄ o, o longo<br />
perõÂodo de treinamento, o status a eles<br />
conferido e o papel que desempenham<br />
na sociedade da Amazoà nia peruana. Os<br />
vegetalistas exercem uma funcËaÄ o importante<br />
numa sociedade onde postos<br />
de sau de ou ate enfermeiras saÄ o raridades.<br />
Eles se tornam assim essenciais<br />
para os pobres e os habitantes de uma<br />
regiaÄ o escassamente populada.<br />
SHAMANISM: A BRIEF INTRODUCTION<br />
Nevill Drury (1982:1) describes shamanism as a<br />
visionary tradition, an ancient practice <strong>of</strong> utilizing<br />
altered states <strong>of</strong> consciousness to contact the gods<br />
and spirits <strong>of</strong> the natural world. Browman (1979:6±7)<br />
uses the term `shaman' to refer to those persons who<br />
mediate relationships between humans and the supernatural,<br />
and intervene in specific cases <strong>of</strong> misfortune<br />
and illness to determine a cause and to administer a<br />
cure. When we think <strong>of</strong> the shaman, the image <strong>of</strong> an<br />
enigmatic and mysterious medicine man or sorcerer<br />
comes to mind Ð a figure who through entering a<br />
condition <strong>of</strong> trance is able to undertake a vision-quest<br />
<strong>of</strong> the soul, journey to the sacred places and report<br />
back to humankind on matters <strong>of</strong> cosmic intent. It<br />
might be that the shaman is a healer, able to conquer<br />
the spirits <strong>of</strong> disease, a sorcerer, skilled in harnessing<br />
spirits as allies for magical purposes, or a type <strong>of</strong><br />
psychic detective able to recover lost possessions. At<br />
other times the shaman may seem to be somewhat<br />
priestlike Ð an intermediary between the gods <strong>of</strong><br />
Creation and the more familiar realm <strong>of</strong> everyday<br />
domestic affairs. But whatever the specific role, the<br />
shaman, universally, is one who commands awe and<br />
respect, for the shaman can journey to other worlds<br />
and return with revelations from the gods (Drury<br />
1982:1).<br />
Compared with others in their society, shamans<br />
frequently have more extensive knowledge <strong>of</strong> the<br />
natural world (ranging from plants to stars), a keener<br />
grasp <strong>of</strong> the subtleties <strong>of</strong> interpersonal and psychic<br />
phenomena, and a clearer understanding <strong>of</strong>, and more<br />
intimate involvement with the world <strong>of</strong> the spirits.<br />
Depending on the specific cultural context, shamans<br />
are involved in consulting, propitiating, and manipulating<br />
supernatural beings; divining the causes <strong>of</strong><br />
thefts, fevers, and deaths; curing illnesses ranging<br />
from fractures to psychotic episodes; and guiding<br />
members <strong>of</strong> society in economic pursuits, political<br />
activities, and religious ceremonies. When viewed<br />
collectively, shamans combine, in varying degrees in<br />
different cultures, the roles <strong>of</strong> physician, pharmacologist,<br />
psychotherapist, sociologist, philosopher, lawyer,<br />
astrologer, and priest Ð and aspects <strong>of</strong> other<br />
statuses which in our society have become highly<br />
specialized (Browman 1979:6±7).<br />
In the Peruvian Amazon we have a phenomenon<br />
called the vegetalista, who precisely fits this description.<br />
The vegetalista is a person <strong>of</strong> exceptional<br />
knowledge, ranging from entheogens and medicinal<br />
plants, from which his name is derived, to knowledge<br />
<strong>of</strong> the spiritual domain Ð vegetalistas may be male or<br />
female, but for fluidity in reading I will make use <strong>of</strong> the<br />
male pronoun Ð perceived under the influence <strong>of</strong> the<br />
entheogen, ayahuasca. The vegetalista is the contemporary<br />
healer for poor urban and rural mestizos.<br />
Not only is he the healer par excellence, but also the<br />
only psychologist available to these people. He is the<br />
person who, in an altered state <strong>of</strong> consciousness, can<br />
divine, travel to distant places and find lost objects.<br />
The vegetalista is still a man <strong>of</strong> considerable power<br />
and can be found all over jungle cities in Peru and in<br />
rural settlements. To many <strong>of</strong> these mestizos, the<br />
vegetalista is <strong>of</strong>ten the only help in critical situations.<br />
He is the person with whom these people can relate,<br />
and they feel comfortable with him. Although the<br />
mestizo is acculturated into modern society, they very<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 43
<strong>of</strong>ten still find the Western doctor and ways <strong>of</strong><br />
diagnosis and healing as alien as many modern<br />
people would find the shaman.<br />
In the wake <strong>of</strong> a new group <strong>of</strong> sciences, <strong>of</strong> which<br />
transpersonal anthropology and psychology, ethnobotany<br />
and ethnopharmacology, are but a few, have<br />
led to a general evaluation <strong>of</strong> consciousness, accompanied<br />
by a more positive attitude towards altered<br />
states <strong>of</strong> consciousness. For many <strong>of</strong> these new<br />
scientists, the shaman is becoming their most valuable<br />
informant since he is a world expert on medicinal<br />
plants, entheogens and access to altered states <strong>of</strong><br />
consciousness. Thus, it is not only the local Peruvian<br />
mestizos that are in need <strong>of</strong> the vegetalista, but also<br />
the modern scientist, who has come to recognize the<br />
shaman for whom he is a man <strong>of</strong> knowledge. In the<br />
words <strong>of</strong> Holger Kalweit (1988:13) `the shaman<br />
should therefore not be branded as some sort <strong>of</strong><br />
archaic hero or as a relic <strong>of</strong> the past, who, although<br />
historically redundant, somehow continues to vegetate<br />
on the fringe <strong>of</strong> our technological civilization. In<br />
the light <strong>of</strong> the revolutionary findings <strong>of</strong> recent<br />
researchers into the nature <strong>of</strong> dying and death, the<br />
shaman should be considered as a most up-to-date<br />
and knowledgeable psychologist'. According to the<br />
same author, academics from many different disciplines<br />
have now begun to exhume the shaman from<br />
the tangle <strong>of</strong> rationalist theories and romantic ideas,<br />
so that our modern research into shamanism could, in<br />
fact, be seen as a sort <strong>of</strong> archaeology <strong>of</strong> the Western<br />
mind and spirit.<br />
Although the vegetalista is still very much in<br />
practice today, this archaic cult is slowly disappearing<br />
in the face <strong>of</strong> modern development. To find a<br />
vegetalista is still relatively easy, but to find a disciple<br />
is practically impossible. Not only will the local<br />
mestizos, who in many cases cannot afford modern<br />
medical treatment and medicine, suffer immeasurably<br />
if vegetalismo disappears in the Peruvian Amazon, but<br />
we as modern humans will miss the opportunity to<br />
learn more about medicinal plants, disappearing at an<br />
incredible rate due to deforestation, and learning<br />
about the unconscious, from a person for whom<br />
altered states <strong>of</strong> consciousness is not something<br />
phenomenologically extraordinary, mysterious, or arcane,<br />
but a way <strong>of</strong> life, and something totally real. At<br />
the dawning <strong>of</strong> a new millennium, the world will have<br />
to turn back and acknowledge the most knowledgeable<br />
person <strong>of</strong> all, the shaman. This person, found in<br />
the Peruvian Amazon, is willing to share his medicine<br />
with people in need and is willing to guide people in<br />
an altered state <strong>of</strong> consciousness, to perceive another<br />
reality. This person is the vegetalista.<br />
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY<br />
During my travels in <strong>South</strong> America I arrived in<br />
Iquitos, the capital <strong>of</strong> the Department <strong>of</strong> Loreto, in<br />
the Peruvian Amazon, where I met Dr Eleanor B.<br />
Smithwick, founder and director <strong>of</strong> Peruvian Amazon<br />
Conservation, Inc. She introduced me to the life <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Peruvian shaman or vegetalista and their use <strong>of</strong> the<br />
ayahuasca. In 1996 armed with a fellowship from the<br />
Unisa Centre for Latin American Studies I returned to<br />
Peru and Dr Smithwick to conduct research on<br />
Peruvian shamanism among the vegetalistas.<br />
The theoretical framework for this investigation<br />
comes, in the main, from a new scientific orientation,<br />
one that has lost its specifically Western character,<br />
because it gives full recognition to the psychologies<br />
and philosophies <strong>of</strong> other cultures and strives to bring<br />
these into harmony with our modern knowledge. This<br />
new scientific orientation is known as Transpersonal<br />
Science (Kalweit 1988:xv).<br />
When it comes to studying shamans, our findings<br />
are no more than what we have fed into the research<br />
itself, namely our own concepts and philosophies, our<br />
contemporary projections. Hundreds <strong>of</strong> these studies<br />
on shamanism have been written, but their methodology<br />
has only explored the cultural outer layer <strong>of</strong> the<br />
shaman Ð his external appearance. The essence <strong>of</strong><br />
altered states <strong>of</strong> consciousness and the inner world <strong>of</strong><br />
the shaman are not touched upon (Kalweit 1988:242±<br />
243).<br />
Shamans are said to be reluctant to talk about their<br />
experiences <strong>of</strong> altered states <strong>of</strong> consciousness. It is<br />
not that the shaman considers it sacrilegious to speak<br />
<strong>of</strong> such matters to strangers or the uninitiated, nor that<br />
he cannot remember what he experienced in his<br />
trance; the reason is much more likely that he cannot<br />
find the words to describe what he has seen. At best<br />
he will make use <strong>of</strong> descriptions handed down within<br />
his culture, but these in themselves are once again no<br />
more than categorizations <strong>of</strong> that which cannot be<br />
categorized. Because <strong>of</strong> our ingrained Western faith in<br />
the communicativeness <strong>of</strong> language, we take his<br />
words literally, assuming that they correspond exactly<br />
to processes <strong>of</strong> our external environment (Kalweit<br />
1988:244).<br />
The more directly researchers experience the various<br />
states <strong>of</strong> consciousness themselves, the better they<br />
ought to be able to describe them in rational terms.<br />
The yogin/scientist, the shaman/scientist Ð the man<br />
who embodies two worlds Ð is surely better qualified<br />
than anyone else to explore the whole spectrum <strong>of</strong><br />
consciousness, because he is capable <strong>of</strong> basing his<br />
descriptions on his own inner experience and so will<br />
know what he is talking about (Kalweit 1988:245).<br />
The introduction <strong>of</strong> a scientific researcher to the<br />
universe <strong>of</strong> the shaman could conceivably pass<br />
through the following stages (Kalweit 1988:245±<br />
246):<br />
1. Pure external observation and objective description<br />
<strong>of</strong> behaviour.<br />
2. Empathic resonance with and sympathy for the<br />
44 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
shaman's way <strong>of</strong> life, coupled with an attempt to<br />
give a description based on personal participation.<br />
3. The ethnologist must seriously acknowledge the<br />
mental techniques and experiences <strong>of</strong> the shaman<br />
and should himself experiment with some <strong>of</strong><br />
them. (Some researchers, such as V. Brown,<br />
Boyd, Cushing, David-Neel, Eaton, Katz, Kunze,<br />
J. R. Walker, and others, either have taken<br />
psychoactive drugs, fasted, and prayed or have<br />
gone in search <strong>of</strong> visions. In this way they have,<br />
to a certain extent, acquired an inner understanding<br />
<strong>of</strong> the shaman's way <strong>of</strong> life.)<br />
4. The ethnologist becomes an apprentice <strong>of</strong> the<br />
shaman, thereby transcending his traditional role<br />
as a scientist, raising his scientific curiosity to a<br />
new and higher level, and attempting to combine<br />
learning with active reflection. (By now, a<br />
number <strong>of</strong> Westerners have entered into or<br />
partially completed such an apprenticeship, as<br />
for instance Boshier, Co rdova-Rios, Derlon,<br />
Harner, and Prem Das.)<br />
The most complete description <strong>of</strong> and the deepest<br />
insight into the life <strong>of</strong> the shaman will, <strong>of</strong> course,<br />
come from researchers who themselves enter into<br />
altered states <strong>of</strong> consciousness. The more we manage<br />
to close the gap between the scientist and the<br />
shaman, the closer we come to a truly transpersonal<br />
and transcultural science (Kalweit 1988:246).<br />
Ethnology resists a strictly psychological analysis <strong>of</strong><br />
shamanism Ð and rightly so, because it is undeniable<br />
that our Western psychology has been ethnocentric<br />
from it's very beginnings and has always refused to<br />
accord any kind <strong>of</strong> recognition to tribal psychologies<br />
and philosophies. Transpersonal science, on the other<br />
hand, has come into being from a fusion <strong>of</strong> Asian<br />
philosophy and Western consciousness research, just<br />
as transpersonal anthropology also takes account <strong>of</strong><br />
the wisdom and systems <strong>of</strong> knowledge <strong>of</strong> other<br />
cultures. It is this kind <strong>of</strong> transcultural science that<br />
can bridge the gap between traditional and modern<br />
societies; it may be symbiotic, combining the energies<br />
<strong>of</strong> several ways <strong>of</strong> life, but it is stimulating a new<br />
universal science <strong>of</strong> man. Soon transcultural science<br />
will overtake the kind <strong>of</strong> narrow-minded research into<br />
shamanism, which considers the shaman as no more<br />
than an object and product <strong>of</strong> social circumstances<br />
(Kalweit 1988:247).<br />
In an age characterized by an unshakeable faith in<br />
science it has become the task <strong>of</strong> anthropology to<br />
provide a rational explanation for such wayward and<br />
illogical notions and concepts (Kalweit 1988:xii). The<br />
shaman should therefore not be branded as some sort<br />
<strong>of</strong> archaic hero or as a relic <strong>of</strong> the past, who, although<br />
historically redundant, somehow continues to vegetate<br />
on the fringe <strong>of</strong> our technological civilization. In<br />
the light <strong>of</strong> the revolutionary findings <strong>of</strong> recent<br />
researchers into the nature <strong>of</strong> dying and death, the<br />
shaman should be considered as a most up-to-date<br />
and knowledgeable psychologist (Kalweit 1988:13).<br />
In order to gain more knowledge <strong>of</strong> the world view<br />
and <strong>of</strong> the origin <strong>of</strong> the knowledge which the<br />
vegetalista possesses and which he believes he<br />
obtains, in altered states <strong>of</strong> consciousness, while<br />
under the influence <strong>of</strong> ayahuasca, transpersonal<br />
research will form an important aspect <strong>of</strong> my fieldwork.<br />
THE PERUVIAN AMAZON<br />
Peru, a country <strong>of</strong> 1 285 215 Km, has 54 per cent <strong>of</strong> its<br />
territory in the Amazon area. This area is located<br />
within a larger geographical unity, the Upper Amazon<br />
Basin, which comprises the network <strong>of</strong> rivers that<br />
drain the tropical rainforest east <strong>of</strong> the Andes<br />
mountains and flow into the Amazon River until the<br />
mouth <strong>of</strong> the Rio Madeira (Lathrap 1970:22±23).<br />
There is a geographical and ecological differentiation<br />
between the forest on the steep eastern slopes <strong>of</strong><br />
the Andes, between 400 and 1000 metres above sea<br />
level, with heavy rainfall, and a great contrast in the<br />
temperatures between day and night (between 148<br />
and 328 Centigrade), and the tropical forest on the<br />
floor <strong>of</strong> the Amazon Basin, situated between 80 and<br />
400 metres above sea level, with hot temperatures<br />
(between 248 and 408 Centigrade), high humidity and<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten violent rains (Rumrill 1984:33).<br />
Four departments <strong>of</strong> Peru (Loreto, San MartõÂn,<br />
Ucayali, and Madre de Dios) lie completely within the<br />
Amazon area, while eleven other departments have<br />
part <strong>of</strong> their territories covered by tropical rain forest<br />
(Luna 1986:25).<br />
Numerous Indian communities belonging to various<br />
linguistic families, lived Ð and several still live Ð in<br />
this area (Luna 1986:25). Lowie (1948:1) points out<br />
that their cultural complex contrasts markedly from<br />
that <strong>of</strong> the Andean civilizations by lacking architectural<br />
and metallurgical refinements. Their diagnostic<br />
features are the cultivation <strong>of</strong> tropical root crops, the<br />
construction <strong>of</strong> effective wooden river craft, the use <strong>of</strong><br />
hammocks as beds, and the manufacture <strong>of</strong> simple<br />
pottery.<br />
According to the same author, a second feature,<br />
namely the effective use <strong>of</strong> canoeing, allowed certain<br />
tribes to spread their art and customs over enormous<br />
distances, and this, combined with natural conditions,<br />
produced the remarkable levelling <strong>of</strong> culture in this<br />
area. Other factors, such as the generalized custom <strong>of</strong><br />
taking a bride from another settlement, irrespective <strong>of</strong><br />
linguistic affinity (Lowie 1948:29), and the necessity<br />
<strong>of</strong> trading among distant tribes or villages for the<br />
purpose <strong>of</strong> obtaining essential raw materials (Latharp<br />
1970:32) contributed to this levelling <strong>of</strong> culture. We<br />
may even say that syncretism was thus built into the<br />
system (Luna 1986:26).<br />
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The arrival <strong>of</strong> the Europeans considerably accelerated<br />
the process <strong>of</strong> interchange, by breaking down the<br />
integrity <strong>of</strong> particular tribal or ethnic groups. The<br />
missionaries forced Indian groups <strong>of</strong> different traditions<br />
to settle in large villages (reducciones), where<br />
they could be evangelized and controlled `more<br />
easily'. During the rubber epoch (1880±1914), Indian<br />
communities, simply considered as a labour force,<br />
were enslaved, forced to migrate and compelled to<br />
work together, irrespective <strong>of</strong> their cultural differences.<br />
Later, with the advent <strong>of</strong> urbanization, the<br />
process <strong>of</strong> interchange continued in the urban slums<br />
<strong>of</strong> Iquitos, Pucallpa and other Amazonian towns<br />
(Luna 1986:26).<br />
The economic frontier created by the exploitation <strong>of</strong><br />
rubber had disastrous results for the indigenous<br />
population, as entire ethnic groups disappeared as a<br />
result <strong>of</strong> disease, malnutrition, slave-raids, forced<br />
labour and the unwarranted cruelty <strong>of</strong> the rubber<br />
collectors (Chirif 1980:187). Today ethnic groups<br />
represent only about 20 per cent <strong>of</strong> the jungle<br />
population, and about 2,5 per cent <strong>of</strong> the total<br />
population <strong>of</strong> the country, which amounts to approximately<br />
24 million people (Luna 1986:26). However,<br />
according to Wise (1983), there are still 63 surviving<br />
ethnic groups.<br />
Only a little more than ten per cent <strong>of</strong> the country's<br />
population, known as mestizos, live in Amazonian<br />
territories. Many <strong>of</strong> these people live along the flood<br />
plains <strong>of</strong> the Amazon and its major tributaries, where<br />
recent alluvial layers <strong>of</strong> soil are rich in nutrients. They<br />
practise subsistence farming, and exploit the rich<br />
fishing resources, or have their chacras (gardens)<br />
along the roads recently opened in various parts <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Amazon (Luna 1986:26).<br />
The Webster Dictionary (1981) gives two definitions<br />
<strong>of</strong> the word `mestizo': 1) a person <strong>of</strong> mixed<br />
European and non-Caucasian stock, and specifically,<br />
one <strong>of</strong> European (as Spanish and Portuguese) and<br />
American Indian ancestry; 2) a completely acculturated<br />
Central or <strong>South</strong> American Indian. Among<br />
vegetalistas there are people who could, probably,<br />
pass as Europeans (Spanish, Portuguese or Italian),<br />
and also those who would be racially indistinguishable<br />
from people belonging to some ethnic groups.<br />
But what they all have in common is that Spanish is<br />
their mother tongue, while they operate, naturally, in<br />
various degrees, within the large and diffuse Upper<br />
Amazon cultural complex (Luna 1986:15; Vitebsky<br />
1995:49).<br />
During the last few decades, the Amazon area has<br />
witnessed a great demographic expansion due to<br />
colonization programmes launched by Lima to integrate<br />
these territories with `the nation' (Luna<br />
1986:26).<br />
RESEARCH AREA: IQUITOS AND THE RIO<br />
NAPO<br />
The city <strong>of</strong> Iquitos (3845'S 79811'W) is located on the<br />
west bank <strong>of</strong> the Amazon, between the mouths <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Nanay and Itaya rivers. It has its origin in the first half<br />
<strong>of</strong> the 18th century, in Jesuit missionary activities in<br />
the territories between the Tigre and Napo rivers,<br />
particularly those that were carried out on the river<br />
Itaya by the Jesuit Maroni in 1729. The original<br />
population belonged to the Yameos. After the<br />
independence <strong>of</strong> Peru in 1821, the settlement was<br />
consolidated with native Christian people <strong>of</strong> several<br />
other tribes, among them Mayoruna, Pebas and<br />
Omaguas (Luna 1986:27).<br />
The introduction <strong>of</strong> steamboats in the Amazon was<br />
to change the destiny <strong>of</strong> many Amazonian settlements.<br />
Iquitos became the principal river harbour in<br />
the Peruvian Amazon area. In 1864 a commercial line<br />
went upstream to Yurimaguas, in the Huallaga, and<br />
downstream to Tabatinga, in Brazilian territory (Barcia<br />
GarcõÂa 1983:9±23). One <strong>of</strong> the consequences <strong>of</strong> the<br />
great demand for rubber in Europe and the United<br />
States after the discovery <strong>of</strong> vulcanization by Goodyear<br />
in 1839 was that the Amazonian territories were<br />
soon the object <strong>of</strong> foreign capitalist interests (Luna<br />
1986:27).<br />
Iquitos became a cosmopolitan centre <strong>of</strong> trade,<br />
where English gold sovereigns circulated along with<br />
the Peruvian national currency. However, communication<br />
with Lima, the capital, was very difficult, due<br />
to the distance, lack <strong>of</strong> roads, and topography. During<br />
the so-called `rubber boom period' from 1880 to 1914<br />
thousands <strong>of</strong> tons <strong>of</strong> rubber left Iquitos, and at the<br />
same time the area was inundated with Western<br />
products, especially from England and the United<br />
States. In 1910 the export <strong>of</strong> rubber exceeded four<br />
thousand tons. However, the development <strong>of</strong> large<br />
rubber plantations in Malaysia, Burma, India, Indochina<br />
and <strong>Africa</strong>, first by Great Britain, and then by<br />
Holland, Belgium, France, Germany and the United<br />
States (Barcia GarcõÂ a 1983:63), and the First World<br />
War (1914±1918), caused the collapse <strong>of</strong> the Amazonian<br />
rubber industry. Thousands <strong>of</strong> workers returned<br />
from the jungle, increasing the population <strong>of</strong><br />
Iquitos, Yurimagus, Requena, Nauta, Contamana and<br />
other urban nuclei (Barcia GarcõÂ a 1983:65).<br />
In the 1920's other Amazonian products, such as<br />
balata (Manilkara bidentata), leche caspi (Couma<br />
macrocarpa Barb. Rodr.), precious wood and resins,<br />
and live animals (especially ornamental fish) became<br />
the objects <strong>of</strong> intense exploitation. Many people were<br />
engaged in these kinds <strong>of</strong> jobs, usually through a<br />
debt-peonage labour system or habilitacioÂn. The<br />
export <strong>of</strong> skins <strong>of</strong> wild animals, such as cayman,<br />
boas, peccari, sajino (Tayassu tajacu), jaguars and<br />
otters was taken almost to the point <strong>of</strong> extinction <strong>of</strong><br />
some animals, such as the white cayman (Caiman<br />
46 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
sclerops) and the otter (Ptenorura brasiliensis) (Villarejo<br />
1979:173±176; Chirif 1980:188). In the thirties<br />
gold and oil were found in the area <strong>of</strong> Pachitea (Luna<br />
1986:27±28).<br />
In September 1932 a group <strong>of</strong> Peruvian civilians<br />
took the Colombian town <strong>of</strong> Leticia by force. A war<br />
with Colombia was the result <strong>of</strong> this action, which<br />
was supported by the government in Lima. A<br />
consequence <strong>of</strong> this was the militarization <strong>of</strong> the<br />
zone, and the forced recruitment <strong>of</strong> soldiers among<br />
the Amazonian population. In the military camps<br />
people from distant areas <strong>of</strong> all the Amazonian<br />
territories and other parts <strong>of</strong> Peru met. Local healers<br />
forced to join the army met each other, and were able<br />
to exchange ideas (Luna 1986:28).<br />
The Second World War was again to bring changes<br />
to the Amazon. In 1941 Japan rapidly advanced<br />
through <strong>South</strong> East Asia, from where most <strong>of</strong> the<br />
rubber used in the Western world came. Old Amazonian<br />
jungle tracks were reopened in search <strong>of</strong> rubber<br />
and jebe fino, attracting immigrants from the rest <strong>of</strong><br />
the Peruvian territory. In November 1971 oil was<br />
discovered in the RõÂo Tigre, and a new period <strong>of</strong><br />
expansion occurred, bringing about a demographic<br />
explosion (Luna 1986:28).<br />
Iquitos plays a central role in the administrative,<br />
economic and cultural life <strong>of</strong> north-eastern Peru. It<br />
continues to attract immigrants, not only from jungle<br />
settlements in Amazonian territories, but also from<br />
other areas <strong>of</strong> the country. With them have come their<br />
traditional beliefs and practices, and this city and its<br />
vicinity are a rich field for gathering ethnological and<br />
folkloristic information (Luna 1986:28).<br />
Despite the modern facË ade <strong>of</strong> the city <strong>of</strong> Iquitos,<br />
traditional jungle life with roots in a not so distant<br />
past, has by no means disappeared or even given<br />
ground before the impact <strong>of</strong> the hitherto coast-basal<br />
industrial society. Although the casual visitor cannot<br />
help but notice just how much twentieth-century<br />
machinery and ways have entered into jungle life (at<br />
least as far as the presence <strong>of</strong> motor-powered<br />
launches, automobiles, aeroplanes, telephones, movies<br />
and pumps, nonetheless he would find many<br />
traditional beliefs flourishing in this relatively modern<br />
urban setting. Magical beliefs flourish in this situation<br />
<strong>of</strong> culture change, as Man attempts to achieve mastery<br />
and control over the unknown by special rituals and<br />
ceremonies. Real problems are presented to the<br />
anthropologist who tries to separate the myriad<br />
strands <strong>of</strong> imported industrial society found among a<br />
small sector <strong>of</strong> the population from the admixtures <strong>of</strong><br />
beliefs held by the destitute poor or middle-income<br />
men and women who attribute illness and misfortune<br />
to witchcraft (Dobkin de Rios 1984:49).<br />
In Iquitos, much <strong>of</strong> the population, many <strong>of</strong> them<br />
landless peasants who have migrated from other areas<br />
<strong>of</strong> the country, live in barriadas or squatter settlements.<br />
Many <strong>of</strong> these peasants have very little<br />
knowledge <strong>of</strong> the Amazonian environment (Chirif<br />
1980:189). The price <strong>of</strong> food and other goods is very<br />
high, compared with those <strong>of</strong> other cities <strong>of</strong> Peru. The<br />
price <strong>of</strong> the transport <strong>of</strong> agricultural products from the<br />
chacras to the city, either by river or by road, is also<br />
high (Luna 1986:29).<br />
Down river from Iquitos, the RõÂ o Napo, a major<br />
tributary <strong>of</strong> the Amazon river, is populated by mestizos<br />
or riberenÄos, struggling in transition between the tribal<br />
situation and modern civilization. They live in casarõÂos<br />
or riverine communities on the banks <strong>of</strong> the river and<br />
make use <strong>of</strong> river transport for contact with the<br />
modern world, travelling between Iquitos and other<br />
casarõÂos. The distinction between mestizo and riberenÄo<br />
is very complicated. Luna (1991:9) defined<br />
riberenÄos as the descendants <strong>of</strong> detribalized Amazonian<br />
Indians, the <strong>of</strong>fspring <strong>of</strong> Indian-European and<br />
Indian-<strong>Africa</strong>n unions, and the descendants <strong>of</strong> early<br />
immigrants from different areas <strong>of</strong> Brazil, Peru, and<br />
other Andean countries, thus comparing well with the<br />
previously discussed definition <strong>of</strong> mestizo. RiberenÄo<br />
can however also refer to those who dwell along the<br />
riverbanks in riverine communities.<br />
These mestizos or riberenÄos live in huts, mostly with<br />
only a raised floor and ro<strong>of</strong> made out <strong>of</strong> thatched<br />
palm. Most <strong>of</strong> these huts lack any walls and furniture,<br />
except for mosquito netting in which to sleep, and an<br />
occasional hammock. The women mainly farm on<br />
their chacras (swidden gardens), with yuca (a starchy<br />
root) and plantain (cooking bananas) as the main<br />
produce. Some will sometimes run a little bodega<br />
(shop) from their house. The men are mostly fishermen<br />
and spend most <strong>of</strong> their time fishing on the river,<br />
making dugout canoes, or helping in the chacra with<br />
the more strenuous work. Most <strong>of</strong> the casarõÂos have<br />
an elementary school and soccer field. Soccer is in<br />
most cases the main recreation <strong>of</strong> riberenÄos.<br />
Most <strong>of</strong> the work is <strong>of</strong> a subsistence nature only.<br />
Some riberenÄos do send their produce and fish to<br />
Iquitos by river transport, to sell or trade for necessities<br />
like sugar, soap, tobacco, medicine, and aguardiente<br />
Ð a raw sugarcane rum, distilled by the local<br />
mestizos. Some people will also catch and sell<br />
ornamental fish for aquariums to the many tourists in<br />
Iquitos. Another alarming source <strong>of</strong> income is the<br />
making <strong>of</strong> carboÂn (charcoal) for use as fuel by the<br />
many inhabitants <strong>of</strong> Iquitos. This process entails the<br />
cutting down <strong>of</strong> hardwood trees, normally done by<br />
the father with a chainsaw, followed by his wife and<br />
children, stacking the logs up and burning it to<br />
produce the carboÂn. This has become a valuable<br />
source <strong>of</strong> income for many riberenÄos, and is one <strong>of</strong> the<br />
causes <strong>of</strong> deforestation on the riverbanks and<br />
throughout the rainforest, which is easily accessed<br />
by water ways.<br />
Because <strong>of</strong> the struggle between the tribal situation,<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 47
which no longer exists, and modern civilization, which<br />
in some cases is too remote and alien, many social<br />
problems have developed, like poverty, poor sanitation,<br />
poor nutrition, alcoholism, and unwanted pregnancies.<br />
The life <strong>of</strong> many men revolves around the<br />
consumption <strong>of</strong> aguardiente, and they fish only when<br />
no aguardiente is available and they are sober, leaving<br />
most <strong>of</strong> the women and children without fish to eat,<br />
and therefore, with insufficient dietary protein, most <strong>of</strong><br />
the time.<br />
These casarõÂos lack any basic medical facilities, and<br />
the local vegetalista is the healer and medicine man. I<br />
found a vegetalista in basically every second village I<br />
visited on the RõÂ o Napo, but their number is decreasing<br />
rapidly, because <strong>of</strong> the social problems. Most <strong>of</strong><br />
the communities have a promotor en salud (health<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficer), but I found most <strong>of</strong> them undeserving <strong>of</strong> their<br />
title, without medicine, and in some cases the worst<br />
alcoholics in the community.<br />
The riberenÄos have little understanding <strong>of</strong> the<br />
importance <strong>of</strong> their rain forest and natural resources<br />
to their own lives, either now or in the future. The<br />
demographic pressure on the Amazon is causing great<br />
changes. To date 5,7 per cent <strong>of</strong> the forest <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Peruvian Amazon has been destroyed, and the<br />
prognosis is that by the year 2000 15,2 per cent <strong>of</strong><br />
the jungle (c. 12 million ha) will have been cleared<br />
out, with unimaginable climatic, ecological and social<br />
consequences (Luna 1986:29).<br />
RELIGION: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE<br />
RESEARCH AREA<br />
The population <strong>of</strong> the Peruvian Amazon has been<br />
subject to active missionary activity since the arrival <strong>of</strong><br />
the Spaniards. During the 17th and 18th centuries<br />
several religious orders, most notably the Jesuits and<br />
Franciscans, were very active. The reducciones (settlements)<br />
established by religious orders, had dire<br />
consequences for the Indian population in terms <strong>of</strong><br />
epidemics, forced labour, and the disruption <strong>of</strong> their<br />
traditional way <strong>of</strong> life. Even so evangelization was very<br />
effective, and Christian elements penetrated deeply<br />
into the Amazonian population. Various admixtures <strong>of</strong><br />
folk Catholicism, which came primarily from the<br />
missionaries themselves, were transmitted to people<br />
who lived in missions, and who assimilated Catholic<br />
ideas and interpreted them according to their own<br />
traditions (Luna 1986:29).<br />
Regan (1983:II:165±166), in his study <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Religion <strong>of</strong> Amazonian people, recognizes the uniformity<br />
in the religious beliefs <strong>of</strong> the whole population<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Amazon area, and the juxtaposition and<br />
reinterpretation <strong>of</strong> elements due to the mutual<br />
influence <strong>of</strong> popular Catholicism and autochthonous<br />
Amazonian religious ideas. Most <strong>of</strong> the mestizo<br />
population are still nominally Catholic. However,<br />
there is an increasing influence <strong>of</strong> various Protestant<br />
sects, such as Adventists, Pentecostals, Evangelists,<br />
as well as groups such as the Jehovah's Witnesses,<br />
and the Catholic Church is progressively losing<br />
power. Dozens <strong>of</strong> syncretic cults are appearing,<br />
including messianic-millenarian movements which<br />
incorporate Tupi-Guarani, Catholic and Protestant<br />
religious elements (Regan 1983:129).<br />
Popular Catholicism still remains an important<br />
religious element among many <strong>of</strong> the practitioners <strong>of</strong><br />
these new sects, as also among vegetalistas. Catholic<br />
elements are not always syncretically amalgamated,<br />
but coexist hand in hand with Amerindian ideas (Luna<br />
1986:30). As GalvaÄ o (1976:5) observes, Catholic<br />
beliefs and institutions and those <strong>of</strong> Amerindian origin<br />
serve different objectives and complement each other<br />
as parts <strong>of</strong> a religious system.<br />
Ignorance <strong>of</strong> the cultural achievements <strong>of</strong> the native<br />
population <strong>of</strong> the Amazon extends to their religious<br />
insights as well. Convenient labels have reduced the<br />
spiritual dimensions <strong>of</strong> Amerindians to a simplicity<br />
that does not do justice to the sophistication and<br />
richness <strong>of</strong> their conceptualization and imagery.<br />
Intense missionary activity still in effect today aims<br />
depriving the Indians <strong>of</strong> their spiritual heritage.<br />
Incapable <strong>of</strong> understanding or accepting an alternate<br />
world view, Western missionaries prefer to obliterate it<br />
and instead make the Indians dependent on their own<br />
ideas <strong>of</strong> the sacred Ð if indeed there remains anything<br />
truly sacred in the Western civilization (Luna<br />
1991:10).<br />
Many <strong>of</strong> my informants were either Catholic or<br />
belonged to some kind <strong>of</strong> Protestant sect, combining<br />
various Christian elements in their rituals, ceremonies<br />
and mesas sagradas (altars). During a ritual with Don<br />
Herman, a mestizo vegetalista, I noticed the use <strong>of</strong> the<br />
name <strong>of</strong> Jesus very <strong>of</strong>ten. In answering me after<br />
questioning him about this, he replied that he calls on<br />
all good spirits, including Amazonian spirits (Pachamama,<br />
Sacahamama, and such), as well as God and<br />
Jesus.<br />
SHAMANISM IN THE PERUVIAN AMAZON<br />
The shaman appears to play a role <strong>of</strong> considerable<br />
importance among the tribes <strong>of</strong> <strong>South</strong> America. Not<br />
only is he the healer par excellence, and, in some<br />
regions, the guide who leads the souls <strong>of</strong> the recently<br />
dead to their new home, he is also the intermediary<br />
between men and the gods or the spirits (for example,<br />
among the Mojo and the Manasi <strong>of</strong> eastern Bolivia,<br />
and the Taino <strong>of</strong> the Greater Antilles), he sees to it that<br />
ritual prohibitions are observed, defends the tribe from<br />
the evil spirits, indicates the sites for pr<strong>of</strong>itable<br />
hunting and fishing, increases game, controls atmospheric<br />
phenomena, facilitates birth, reveals future<br />
events, and so forth. Thus he enjoys considerable<br />
prestige and authority in <strong>South</strong> American societies.<br />
Furthermore, they are believed to perform miracles<br />
48 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
(which are strictly shamanic in character: magical<br />
flight, swallowing hot coals, and such) (Eliade<br />
1989:323±324).<br />
However, it is rather to his ecstatic capacities than<br />
to his exploits as a magician that the <strong>South</strong> American<br />
shaman owes his magico-religious position and his<br />
social authority. For his ecstatic capacities enable him,<br />
in addition to his usual prerogative <strong>of</strong> healing, to make<br />
mystical journeys to the sky to meet the gods directly<br />
and convey men's prayers to them (Eliade 1989:324).<br />
As in Mexico, shamanism in <strong>South</strong> America tends to<br />
be psychedelic, making frequent use <strong>of</strong> tropical plants<br />
which contain hallucinogenic alkaloids. Banisteriopsis<br />
spp. vine is widely utilized by <strong>South</strong> American<br />
shamans in the forests <strong>of</strong> the Upper Amazon, for the<br />
visions it produces are believed to represent encounters<br />
with supernatural forces (Drury 1982:16±17).<br />
As everywhere else, the essential and strictly<br />
personal function <strong>of</strong> the <strong>South</strong> American shaman<br />
remains healing. It is not always wholly magical in<br />
character. The <strong>South</strong> American shaman knows the<br />
medicinal virtues <strong>of</strong> plants and animals, employs<br />
massage, and so on. But since, in his view, the vast<br />
majority <strong>of</strong> illnesses have a spiritual cause Ð that is,<br />
involve either the flight <strong>of</strong> the soul or a magical object<br />
introduced into the body by spirits or sorcerers Ð he<br />
is obliged to have recourse to shamanic healing<br />
(Eliade 1989:326±327).<br />
The conception <strong>of</strong> disease as a loss <strong>of</strong> the soul,<br />
either strayed away or abducted by a spirit or a ghost,<br />
is extremely widespread in the Amazonian and<br />
Andean regions, but appears to be rather rare in<br />
tropical <strong>South</strong> America. When a soul carried <strong>of</strong>f by<br />
spirits or the dead is sought, the shaman is believed to<br />
leave his body and enter the underworld or the regions<br />
inhabited by the abductor (Eliade 1989:327).<br />
The shaman's ecstatic journey is generally indispensable,<br />
even if the illness is not due to the theft <strong>of</strong><br />
the soul by demons or ghosts. The shamanic trance<br />
forms part <strong>of</strong> the cure; whatever interpretation the<br />
shaman puts on it, it is always by his ecstasy that he<br />
finds the exact cause <strong>of</strong> the illness and learns the best<br />
treatment (Eliade 1989:328).<br />
The morphology <strong>of</strong> shamanic cures is almost the<br />
same throughout <strong>South</strong> America. It includes fumigations<br />
with tobacco, songs, massage <strong>of</strong> the affected<br />
area <strong>of</strong> the body, identification <strong>of</strong> the cause <strong>of</strong> the<br />
illness by the aid <strong>of</strong> the helping spirits (at this point<br />
comes the shaman's `trance', during which the<br />
audience sometimes ask him questions not directly<br />
connected with illness), and, finally, extractions <strong>of</strong> the<br />
pathogenic object by suction (Eliade 1989:329).<br />
<strong>South</strong> American shamanism still displays a number<br />
<strong>of</strong> extremely archaic characteristics: initiation through<br />
which ritual death and resurrection <strong>of</strong> the candidate is<br />
enacted, insertion <strong>of</strong> magical substances into his<br />
body, celestial ascent to lay the wishes <strong>of</strong> the whole<br />
society before the supreme god, shamanic healing by<br />
suction or search for the patient's soul, the shaman's<br />
ecstatic journey as psychopomp, the `secret songs'<br />
revealed by God or by animals, more especially birds<br />
(Eliade 1989:331±332).<br />
According to Joralemon (1993:4), the curanderos<br />
<strong>of</strong> Peru are now referred to as shamans, because their<br />
vocation fits well with classical definitions <strong>of</strong> shamanic<br />
healers as religious specialists who undergo<br />
controlled trances in a community context. Mestizo<br />
shamanism is a direct continuation <strong>of</strong> shamanism as it<br />
is found among ethnic groups. It is still an integral part<br />
<strong>of</strong> peasant religion (Luna 1986:31).<br />
Mestizo shamans are called vegetalistas. The term<br />
would mean, to any person not familiar with the belief<br />
system <strong>of</strong> these practitioners, an `expert in the use <strong>of</strong><br />
plants' (vegetales). This term indicates, however, not<br />
so much the fact that they frequently use plants in<br />
their practice, but refers to the origin <strong>of</strong> their knowledge:<br />
it comes from the spirit <strong>of</strong> certain plants<br />
(vegetales), which are the shaman's real teachers<br />
(Luna 1986:14±15). As already mentioned, shamanism<br />
in <strong>South</strong> America tends to be psychedelic.<br />
Vitebsky (1995:49), mentions in this regard that<br />
mestizo shamans are called vegetalistas because <strong>of</strong><br />
their skill with hallucinogenic plants.<br />
The term vegetalista should not be confused with<br />
that <strong>of</strong> herbalist, which denotes a person knowledge<br />
in the use <strong>of</strong> medicinal plants. All vegetalistas are<br />
usually also herbalists, in that they know a great deal<br />
about medicinal plants and frequently use them. But<br />
not all herbalists may be called vegetalistas (Luna<br />
1986:15). Wolf (1991:103) points out that vegetalistas<br />
are also versed in the use <strong>of</strong> medicinal herbs and<br />
plants, but herbalists do not use the psychotropic<br />
plants, nor do they learn from the plant by consuming<br />
the plant during rigorous dietary deprivation.<br />
Vegetalismo and Vegetalistas<br />
A vegetalista is a person who has acquired his<br />
knowledge from a plant, usually referred to as his<br />
doctores, and who uses this plant in his diagnosis and<br />
sometimes also in his healing <strong>of</strong> patients. Many <strong>of</strong><br />
these plants are hallucinogenic. Most vegetalistas<br />
have in common the use <strong>of</strong> tobacco (also a<br />
hallucinogenic) and ayahuasca, with the purpose <strong>of</strong><br />
diagnosing and/or curing illnesses, or <strong>of</strong> performing<br />
other shamanic tasks such as communicating with the<br />
spirits <strong>of</strong> plants, animals and human beings (dead or<br />
alive), travelling to distant places, finding lost objects,<br />
divining, and so forth (Luna 1986:16).<br />
When asked why they consume plant-teachers,<br />
vegetalistas say that they do it to `cure' themselves<br />
(curarse). This implies that they consume plantteachers<br />
not only to heal themselves <strong>of</strong> illness or to<br />
recover the energies <strong>of</strong> their youth, but also to<br />
`awaken' their minds (McKenna 1995:354).<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 49
The idea that certain plants are teachers is even<br />
found in highly syncretic, modern rural-urban cults. In<br />
Brazil, in the state <strong>of</strong> Acre, there are groups that use<br />
the beverage prepared from Banisteriopsis caapi and<br />
Psychotria viridis under the name Santo Daime,<br />
because it is believed that these plants heal both the<br />
body and the soul and teach the doctrine <strong>of</strong> Jesus<br />
Christ (McKenna 1995:354).<br />
Among vegetalistas there are several specializations,<br />
according to the main plant used. Luna (1986:32±33)<br />
classifies them as follows:<br />
Ð Ayahuasquero: the person who uses ayahuasca<br />
in his visions and healing. Normally a potion made<br />
from the vine <strong>of</strong> Banisteriopsis caapi, and the<br />
leaves <strong>of</strong> Psychotria viridis. The admixture may<br />
differ, but the main ingredient will always be the<br />
Banisteriopsis vine (Luna 1986:32).<br />
Ð Camalonquero: the person who uses camalonga.<br />
According to Luna (1986; 1991) this plant was<br />
still unidentified, but Duke & Vasquez (1994)<br />
identified it as Thevitia peruviana. I disagree with<br />
this identification, since the Thevitia peruviana are<br />
found all over the jungle. The seeds are also used<br />
as beads by many women in the selva (jungle). I<br />
have learned from my informant camalonqueros,<br />
that the camalonga plant does not grow in the<br />
selva itself, but comes from the sierra (mountainous<br />
area) <strong>of</strong> Peru. See also Luna (1986:32;<br />
1991:13).<br />
Ð Tabaquero: the person who uses tobacco. This<br />
tobacco is not the commercial grades <strong>of</strong> Nicotiana<br />
tabacum, available today, but Nicotiana<br />
The author, Wynand Koch, holding a painting received from<br />
Shaman Don Francisco<br />
rustica, a species much more potent, chemically<br />
complex, and potentially hallucinogenic (McKenna<br />
1992:196).<br />
Ð ToeÂro: the person who uses toeÂ. Luna (1986;<br />
1991) identified this plant as Brugmansia sauveolens,<br />
Duke & Vasquez (1994:64) as the Datura<br />
arborea and Dobkin de Rios (1984:130) as the<br />
Datura sauvoleons. Talking to my toeÂro informants,<br />
I found the toe to be <strong>of</strong> the Datura sp.<br />
Ð Palero: the practitioner who has learned from<br />
palos (sticks). Paleros use the bark <strong>of</strong> various large<br />
trees such as ayahuÂman (Couroupita guianensis),<br />
huacapu (Minguartia guianensis), clavohuasca<br />
(Tynanthas panurensis), chuchuhuasa (Heisteria<br />
pallida), chullachaki-caspi (Brysonima christianeae),<br />
remocaspi (Aspidosperma excelsum) and<br />
many others (Luna 1991:13).<br />
Ð Catahuero: he person who uses catahua Ð Hura<br />
crepitans (Luna 1986:33).<br />
Besides vegetalistas, Luna (1986:33) also classifies<br />
other types <strong>of</strong> practitioners:<br />
Ð Oracionistas: who use mainly prayers and<br />
encantations in their practice.<br />
Ð Perfumeros: who practise a sophisticated sort <strong>of</strong><br />
`aromatherapy'.<br />
Ð Espiritualistas: who deal with spirits.<br />
This is just a basic classification, since I have found<br />
that the same vegetalista <strong>of</strong>ten may master several <strong>of</strong><br />
these plants, and use them regularly. All my informants<br />
used more than one plant. Don Fernando, a<br />
camalonquero, made use <strong>of</strong> the camalonga and<br />
ayahuasca, in the same ceremony, drinking it consecutively.<br />
It is also a problem to distinguish oracionistas,<br />
perfumeros and espiritualistas from<br />
vegetalistas, since most <strong>of</strong> them use one or another<br />
plant. Don Francisco, a perfumero, also made use <strong>of</strong><br />
the ayahuasca in his ceremonies, so did DonÄ a Otilia,<br />
an oracionista.<br />
I have found the terms maestro, banco and brujo<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten used. A vegetalista in training will always refer<br />
to his teacher as maestro, even after he has completed<br />
his training. I have found the term banco to refer to<br />
vegetalistas <strong>of</strong> great knowledge. According to one <strong>of</strong><br />
my informants, Don Francisco, a banco is a practitioner<br />
who lies face down on the floor, then enters<br />
into trance with the spirits descending upon him, as<br />
though he was a bench (banco). Further, Don<br />
Francisco also sees the banco as a vegetalista, able<br />
to travel between the three realms <strong>of</strong> mestizo<br />
cosmology. Bancos are hard to find, since they are<br />
considered to be men <strong>of</strong> exceptional knowledge. The<br />
term brujo negro is used for a vegetalista who<br />
practises black magic, in other words, who uses<br />
medicinal herbs and casts spells to cause harm to<br />
50 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
others (Wolf 1991:58; Sharon 1978:3; Luna 1986:33;<br />
Dobkin de Rios 1984:93).<br />
Luna (1991:32) also distinguishes between murayas<br />
and sumirunas, as well as bancos, according to<br />
their mastering <strong>of</strong> the three basic realms: water, jungle<br />
and sky. A banco according to the same author, is<br />
master <strong>of</strong> the jungle realm, has contact with the spirits<br />
<strong>of</strong> the sky, and understands secrets related to the<br />
earth, but he is unable to enter the underwater realm.<br />
Wynand Koch with another painting by Don Francisco<br />
A muraya is, first <strong>of</strong> all, a master <strong>of</strong> the water and the<br />
jungle realms. He is knowledgeable about plants and<br />
animals, and is able to live for periods <strong>of</strong> time in the<br />
subaquatic realm, finding food there. But he is unable<br />
to ascend to the sky. To become a muraya a<br />
practitioner needs to contact the spirits <strong>of</strong> the water,<br />
such as mermaids, yakurunas, and dolphins.<br />
A sumiruna is the highest degree a vegetalista may<br />
reach, because he or she is able to master all three<br />
realms: jungle, water, and sky. This division is not<br />
generalized in the Peruvian Amazon (Luna 1991:32),<br />
and many people use these three terms as more or less<br />
synonymous. This might be the reason why, in my<br />
conversations with informants, I only encountered the<br />
term banco.<br />
According to Luna (1986:36), vegetalistas are the<br />
only reliable repositories <strong>of</strong> the Amazonian world<br />
view. He believes that they represent a case <strong>of</strong><br />
transitional shamanism, who incorporate more `modern'<br />
elements, and are between two different economic<br />
systems: a subsistence economy (they all have<br />
their chacras) and market economy. Many <strong>of</strong> my own<br />
informants also made use <strong>of</strong> Western medicine, and<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten prescribed pharmaceutical medicines, which in<br />
most <strong>South</strong> American countries require no prescription<br />
and are available to anyone who can pay the<br />
price. The process <strong>of</strong> referring patients to medical<br />
personnel in cases <strong>of</strong> simple organic disease has its<br />
counterpart in the frequent referrals <strong>of</strong> patients to the<br />
drug healers by medical doctors attached to the city<br />
hospital and in private practice (Dobkin de Rios<br />
1984:68).<br />
Vegetalistas, due to their possession <strong>of</strong> an intimate<br />
understanding <strong>of</strong> the social community in which they<br />
are immersed, and their pr<strong>of</strong>iciency in the use <strong>of</strong><br />
medicinal plants and healing metaphors, contribute<br />
significantly to the physical and mental health <strong>of</strong> the<br />
people <strong>of</strong> rural areas and the urban poor, and they are<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten the only help available to them in critical<br />
situations. Illness is generally conceived as the<br />
product <strong>of</strong> an animated source, either human or<br />
spiritual Ð including the spirits <strong>of</strong> plants, animals,<br />
and natural phenomena Ð and is produced by<br />
intrusion <strong>of</strong> pathogenic objects, soul loss, contamination,<br />
or breaching <strong>of</strong> a taboo (Luna 1991:13).<br />
Vegetalismo is still in Peru today, a very active<br />
practice and vegetalistas are found throughout the<br />
cities and jungle communities. As previously mentioned,<br />
I found a practising vegetalista in virtually<br />
every second casarõÂo which I visited along the stretch<br />
<strong>of</strong> the RõÂo Napo, between Llachapa and Atu n Cocha. I<br />
visited a total <strong>of</strong> thirteen villages, over a stretch <strong>of</strong><br />
about 80 km. These vegetalistas accommodated an<br />
average <strong>of</strong> ten patients per week. Only one <strong>of</strong> these<br />
vegetalistas had someone under training, his wife.<br />
In Iquitos the picture was more favourable with<br />
practising vegetalistas all over the city, especially in<br />
the poorer areas. These vegetalistas had many<br />
patients, with curing sessions sometimes as many as<br />
three times a week. One <strong>of</strong> my informants, Don<br />
Umberto, even had his own little hospital in town with<br />
twelve beds, with an average <strong>of</strong> ten patients per day.<br />
Only two <strong>of</strong> my informants in the city had pupils, the<br />
other five had none, and as DonÄ a Otilia put it: No hay<br />
futuro, (There is no future).<br />
Vocation<br />
Shamans are called to their vocation in different ways.<br />
For some it is a matter <strong>of</strong> ancestral lineage or<br />
hereditary bonds establishing the person in that<br />
position or a situation where a would-be shaman<br />
seeks initiation from one already established in this<br />
role. In other cases it seems almost as if the spirits<br />
have chosen the shaman, rather than the other way<br />
around. These are the `greater shamans' Ð those who<br />
have been called spontaneously through dreams or<br />
mystical visions to embody supernatural power. Those<br />
who have simply inherited their role are regarded as<br />
`lesser shamans' and hold a lower status in society<br />
(Drury 1982:6).<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 51
Eliade (1989:13) differentiates between two methods<br />
<strong>of</strong> recruiting shamans: (1) hereditary transmission<br />
<strong>of</strong> the shamanic pr<strong>of</strong>ession; and (2) spontaneous<br />
vocation (`call' or `election'). The same author also<br />
cites individuals who become shamans <strong>of</strong> their own<br />
free will or by the will <strong>of</strong> the clan. He also comes to the<br />
same conclusion as Drury (1982) that `self-made'<br />
shamans are considered less powerful than those who<br />
inherited the pr<strong>of</strong>ession or who obeyed the `call' <strong>of</strong><br />
the gods and spirits'.<br />
In parts <strong>of</strong> the upper Amazon the shaman's power<br />
may also be bought. However, most traditions<br />
emphasize that it is the spirits themselves who choose<br />
who is to become a shaman. In many regions the<br />
future shaman may be approached in dreams and<br />
visions by spirits who suggest that he or she should<br />
take on this role (Vitebsky 1995:56).<br />
All these examples reveal, in one way or another,<br />
the exceptional character <strong>of</strong> the medicine man within<br />
society. Whether he is chosen by gods or spirits to be<br />
their mouthpiece, or is predisposed to this function by<br />
physical defects, or has a heredity that is equivalent to<br />
a magico-religious vocation, the medicine man stands<br />
apart from the world <strong>of</strong> the pr<strong>of</strong>ane precisely because<br />
he has more direct relations with the sacred and<br />
manipulates its manifestations more effectively. Infirmity,<br />
nervous disorders, spontaneous vocation, or<br />
heredity are external signs <strong>of</strong> a `choice', an `election'.<br />
Sometimes these signs are physical (an innate or<br />
acquired infirmity); sometimes an incident, even <strong>of</strong> the<br />
commonest type, is involved (e.g., falling from a tree<br />
or being bitten by a snake); ordinarily, election is<br />
announced by an unusual incident or event Ð lightning,<br />
apparitions, dreams (Eliade 1989:31±32). He<br />
may find out that his selection has been underscored<br />
by some physical or mental anomaly, like an extra digit<br />
on his hand or foot or an extra tooth; he may be prone<br />
to spells <strong>of</strong> possession or fainting (Ripinsky-Naxon<br />
1993:72).<br />
Commonly, the person falls seriously ill and comes<br />
to understand the spirits' intentions during the course<br />
<strong>of</strong> the illness. It may be an illness such as smallpox,<br />
which without modern medicine is normally fatal. For<br />
prospective shamans the disease leads to an acceptance<br />
<strong>of</strong> their new role which allows them to be<br />
healed and so to heal others (Vitebsky 1995:56±57).<br />
Thus, the future shaman is cured in the end, with the<br />
help <strong>of</strong> the same spirits that will later become his<br />
tutelaries and helpers. Sometimes these are ancestors<br />
who wish to pass on to him their own unemployed<br />
helping spirits. In these cases there is a sort <strong>of</strong><br />
hereditary transmission; the illness is only a sign <strong>of</strong><br />
election, and proves to be temporary (Eliade<br />
1989:28).<br />
Usually sicknesses, dreams, and ecstasies in themselves<br />
constitute an initiation, that is, they transform<br />
the pr<strong>of</strong>ane, pre- `choice' individual into a technician<br />
<strong>of</strong> the sacred. Naturally, this ecstatic type <strong>of</strong> experience<br />
is always and everywhere followed by theoretical<br />
and practical instruction at the hands <strong>of</strong> the old<br />
masters; but that does not make it any less determinative,<br />
for it is the ecstatic experience that radically<br />
changes the religious status <strong>of</strong> the `chosen' person<br />
(Eliade 1989:33).<br />
Amongst the mestizo shamans in my research area, I<br />
have found that the vocation is normally initiated by<br />
either one <strong>of</strong> the following: (1) an incurable sickness,<br />
followed by a visit to a local vegetalista and the<br />
ingestion <strong>of</strong> ayahuasca. `One gets a terrible sickness.<br />
The Western doctors are not able to cure it. The<br />
person either goes to an experienced vegetalista, or<br />
takes ayahuasca by himself and is cured. In the<br />
process <strong>of</strong> being cured the person acquires certain<br />
powers and becomes a healer' (Luna 1986:43); (2) by<br />
inheritance, with a close family member becoming his<br />
maestro, giving him his first ayahuasca to drink; or, (3)<br />
in a vision or dream, in most cases the result <strong>of</strong> the<br />
ingestion <strong>of</strong> ayahuasca.<br />
The following is an abbreviated account to illustrate<br />
how Don Francisco, one <strong>of</strong> my informants, received<br />
his vocation:<br />
At the age <strong>of</strong> fifteen, I got an incurable pain in my<br />
heart. I drank ayahuasca for the first time. In my<br />
vision I saw that I was accidently hit by a virote (a<br />
spirit arrow) <strong>of</strong> a brujo (witch). The brujo then cut<br />
me open, took out my heart, healed it and put it<br />
back with the ability to cure. After that I went to the<br />
Campa tribe where I met Don Pasqual Yumpiri,<br />
who became my maestro.<br />
Initiation<br />
As in most shamanic traditions, the apprentice<br />
ayahuasquero must undergo an initiatory period <strong>of</strong><br />
training. During this time, which lasts for a minimum<br />
<strong>of</strong> six months but may extend for several years<br />
(depending on the degree <strong>of</strong> power he wishes to<br />
acquire), the ayahuasquero consumes ayahuasca<br />
frequently while adhering to a strict diet in which no<br />
salt, sugar, fat, pork, alcoholic or cold beverages may<br />
be consumed; sexual abstinence is also a strict<br />
requirement. During this initiatory period the ayahuasquero<br />
acquires the magical songs, objects and<br />
helping spirits which he will later use in curing<br />
ceremonies; he also learns the properties and uses <strong>of</strong><br />
numerous medicinal plants, <strong>of</strong>ten by consuming them<br />
in the form <strong>of</strong> admixtures to ayahuasca. The assertion<br />
is nearly universal among ayahuasqueros that this<br />
shamanic knowledge is transmitted directly by ayahuasca<br />
and other `plant-teachers'; it is not acquired<br />
through instruction by an elder ayahuasquero or other<br />
human teacher (McKennna 1995:351). According to<br />
Luna (1986:51) the function <strong>of</strong> the senior shaman,<br />
when present, is to protect the novice during his<br />
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apprenticeship from evil spirits and sorcerers, and to<br />
instruct him about the diet and prescription to be<br />
observed. However, it is the spirits <strong>of</strong> the plants that<br />
actually teach him the magic melodies and the use <strong>of</strong><br />
medicinal plants to diagnose and to cure.<br />
I have found that even if the vegetalista were to<br />
become a camalonquero, or any other specialist, the<br />
diet during initiation will always involve ayahuasca.<br />
The other plants may be used on their own, in<br />
between days <strong>of</strong> drinking ayahuasca, or as admixtures<br />
to the ayahuasca, during the diet. After his initiation<br />
the vegetalista will decide on a specific plant teacher,<br />
but the initial plant teacher will, in most cases, always<br />
be the ayahuasca. This is why one <strong>of</strong> my informants,<br />
Don AgostõÂ n, says that ayahuasca is the `father <strong>of</strong> all<br />
medicines'.<br />
The necessity <strong>of</strong> the diet Ð which includes also<br />
sexual segregation Ð to learn from the plants, was<br />
stressed by every vegetalista I met (Luna 1986; 1991;<br />
Dobkin de Rios 1984; McKenna 1995). Sexual<br />
activity may be discouraged prior to the ritual<br />
ingestion <strong>of</strong> hallucinogenic plants because <strong>of</strong> a desire<br />
to channel libidinal energy toward interior states <strong>of</strong><br />
contemplation. Any discharge <strong>of</strong> such energy might<br />
be viewed as detracting from the experience itself. The<br />
reason various drug-using societies are so particular<br />
about the food eaten before an individual ingests a<br />
hallucinogen may be due to a desire to heighten the<br />
effects <strong>of</strong> the drug when it is finally taken. An example<br />
may be the common taboo against salt ingestion.<br />
Although the biochemical effects <strong>of</strong> a lack <strong>of</strong> salt in<br />
the diet in tandem with the hallucinogenic experience<br />
are badly understood, this is the kind <strong>of</strong> voluntary<br />
control <strong>of</strong> internal states that healers <strong>of</strong>ten attempt. At<br />
another level, however, the main effect <strong>of</strong> both sexual<br />
restraint and particular diets seems to be the shrouding<br />
<strong>of</strong> the actual experience in an aura <strong>of</strong> the unusual<br />
and the special. Thus when the initiate or the shaman<br />
comes to the experience, his expectation <strong>of</strong> entry into<br />
non-ordinary realms <strong>of</strong> consciousness is heightened<br />
Ð and he is, in effect, psychologically as well<br />
as physically prepared for access to realms <strong>of</strong> the<br />
unconscious (Dobkin de Rios 1984 b:207).<br />
Dietary prescription, according to McKenna<br />
(1995:353), can also reflect accurate observations <strong>of</strong><br />
the incompatibility <strong>of</strong> ingesting specific foods together<br />
with certain plants. It is well known, for<br />
instance, that when ingesting chuchuhuasa, a beverage<br />
made <strong>of</strong> the bark <strong>of</strong> Maytenus ebenifolia and<br />
alcohol, one should avoid eating peccary (a wild pig).<br />
The combination produces an intermittent high fever,<br />
similar to malaria. Compatibility and incompatibility is<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten explained in terms <strong>of</strong> friendship or enmity<br />
between the spirits <strong>of</strong> the plants.<br />
Access to the sacred dimension <strong>of</strong> reality happens<br />
through consumption <strong>of</strong> psychotropic plants and the<br />
dietary prescriptions mentioned above. By ingesting<br />
these plants and keeping the prescribed diet, the<br />
initiate is supposed to be in the appropriate state <strong>of</strong><br />
consciousness for learning the body <strong>of</strong> knowledge<br />
necessary for his future shamanistic practices. These<br />
plants `open the mind' <strong>of</strong> the initiate, so that he can<br />
effectively explore the flora, fauna, and geographical<br />
setting which surrounds him and will be able to<br />
remember it all in the future. Much <strong>of</strong> this learning<br />
process takes place in dreams, which are said to be<br />
especially vivid during the period <strong>of</strong> initiation. The<br />
personal disposition <strong>of</strong> the individual and his ability to<br />
withstand the hard training and the dangers involved<br />
in the shamanic initiation will determine the degree <strong>of</strong><br />
his development. The sexual abstinence and the diet<br />
should not be broken, as the person may be<br />
`punished' by the spirits <strong>of</strong> the plants with sickness<br />
or even death (McKenna 1995:353).<br />
Plant-teachers<br />
Sacred plants are plants which cause visions and<br />
hallucinations and are a central feature <strong>of</strong> shamanism<br />
in many regions <strong>of</strong> the world. To modern urban<br />
Westerners the idea <strong>of</strong> visions induced by psychotropic<br />
means may seem like an aberration, perhaps<br />
even a type <strong>of</strong> decadence. Indeed, during the late<br />
1960s, when the youthful exploration <strong>of</strong> psychedelics<br />
was rampant, one would <strong>of</strong>ten read in the press about<br />
mystical episodes being `artificially' produced by<br />
drugs like LSD and psilocybin. The perception was<br />
that such drugs invariably produced a distortion, a<br />
wavering from `reality'(Drury 1982:43).<br />
In the pre-literate world <strong>of</strong> the shaman, the exact<br />
opposite is true. Here the sacred plants are believed to<br />
open the doors to the heavens, to allow contact with<br />
the gods and the spirits, and to permit access to a<br />
greater reality beyond (Drury 1982:43). For the<br />
American Indian, the presence in a plant <strong>of</strong> any<br />
psychotropic effect whatever was plain evidence <strong>of</strong> its<br />
containing supernatural `medicine' or spirit-shaking<br />
power (Schultes 1992:18).<br />
Our attitude to such matters in modern Western<br />
society is mirrored by our language. The word `drug'<br />
itself is a highly coloured term and is frequently<br />
associated with acts that are disapproved <strong>of</strong> in the<br />
mainstream. As a consequence, the `drug experience',<br />
if one could call it that, is not something valued by<br />
modern Western culture as a whole. Little distinction<br />
exists in the popular mind between sacred and<br />
psychedelic drugs, like those which feature in shamanism,<br />
and the recreational, addictive or analgesic<br />
drugs which are part <strong>of</strong> contemporary urban life<br />
(Drury 1982:4).<br />
Eliade's belief that the use <strong>of</strong> psychotropic plants in<br />
shamanistic techniques represents a more recent,<br />
degenerated innovation, is not supported by evidence<br />
from either the Old or the New World Ð just the<br />
opposite. Current studies point favourably to strong<br />
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Upper Palaeolithic beginnings for the use <strong>of</strong> psychotropic<br />
flora. La Barre, while repeatedly stressing the<br />
shamanistic character <strong>of</strong> native religions in the<br />
Americas, notes that the ecstatic nature <strong>of</strong> shamanism<br />
is `culturally programmed for an interest in hallucinogens<br />
and other psychotropic drugs' (Ripinsky-Naxon<br />
1993:44).<br />
Hallucinogenic plants <strong>of</strong> the type used in shamanism<br />
thus require some sort <strong>of</strong> clarification. While by<br />
definition such plants are toxic Ð if we mean by that<br />
something which has a distinct biodynamic effect on<br />
the body Ð this does not mean that such plants are<br />
invariably poisonous, though some are in certain<br />
dosages (e.g. Datura or Sophora secundiflora). As<br />
far as known, none <strong>of</strong> the hallucinogenic plants<br />
utilized in shamanism is addictive. It is also important<br />
that we make the distinction that these plants do not<br />
simply modify moods but are capable <strong>of</strong> producing a<br />
dramatic and <strong>of</strong>ten pr<strong>of</strong>ound change in perception.<br />
Colours are enhanced, spirits may appear, the sacramental<br />
plant appears godlike to the shaman who has<br />
invoked it ceremonially, and perhaps a cosmic bridge<br />
or smoke tunnel appears in the shaman's vision,<br />
allowing him to ascend to the heavens. In every way<br />
the sacred plant is a doorway to a realm that is<br />
awesome and wondrous, and the undertaking is not<br />
one which is taken lightly. To this extent, then, the<br />
ritual use <strong>of</strong> hallucinogenic plants is not recreational<br />
but transformative Ð one undertakes the vision-quest<br />
to `learn' or to `see', not to `escape' into a world <strong>of</strong><br />
`fantasy' (Drury 1982:45).<br />
Psychologists have produced various terms to<br />
describe the substances which produce such radical<br />
shifts in consciousness. Dr Humphry Osmond, an<br />
English psychiatrist, coined the term psychedelic<br />
meaning `mind-revealing' or `mind-manifesting' but<br />
a term preferred by many is psychotomimetic: substances<br />
within this category are capable <strong>of</strong> inducing<br />
temporary psychotic states <strong>of</strong> such intensity that the<br />
`visionary' or `dream' world appears pr<strong>of</strong>oundly real. In<br />
shamanic societies experiences like this are highly<br />
valued. Sacred plants remove the barriers between<br />
humankind and the realm <strong>of</strong> gods and spirits, and<br />
from them one receives wisdom and learning. The<br />
gods know; the sacred plants speak (Drury 1982:45).<br />
Michael Harner (1973:24) has pointed out that for<br />
example, common themes emerge in a cross-cultural<br />
examination <strong>of</strong> <strong>South</strong> American yage experiences. The<br />
drug is capable <strong>of</strong> causing the sensation <strong>of</strong> aerial flight<br />
and dizziness, and visions <strong>of</strong> exquisite cities, parks,<br />
forests, and fantastic animals. It is common for the<br />
drug to suggest the flight <strong>of</strong> the soul <strong>of</strong> the<br />
participant. According to Harner the Jivaro tribe<br />
actually refer to the soul flight as a `trip' while among<br />
the Conibo-Shipibo Indians <strong>of</strong> eastern Peru the<br />
ayahuasca experience allows the shaman to leave<br />
his body in the form <strong>of</strong> a bird, capable <strong>of</strong> killing a<br />
distant person at night.<br />
Among those drugs which have a shamanic use are<br />
Banisteriopsis caapi, known variously in the western<br />
Amazon as ayahuasca, caapi or yageÂ; datura, which is<br />
identified with the American south-west and Mexico,<br />
as well as among tribes in Colombia, Ecuador and<br />
Peru; Mescal Beans, used in the Red Bean Dance <strong>of</strong><br />
the Plains Indians, the Morning Glory or Ololiuqui<br />
used by curanderos (healers) in Oaxaca, the Peyote<br />
cactus used by Mexicans and North American<br />
Indians, and the Psilocybe mexicana, an important<br />
narcotic mushroom used, once again, in Oaxaca<br />
(Harner 1973:23).<br />
Generally, the psychotropic components <strong>of</strong> sacred<br />
plants are contained in the alkaloids, resins, glucosides<br />
and essential oils found in the leaves, bark, stem,<br />
flowers, sap, roots or seeds <strong>of</strong> the plants. The regions<br />
richest in naturally occurring hallucinogenic plants are<br />
Mexico and <strong>South</strong> America (Drury 1982:45).<br />
As we have seen, most literature will always refer to<br />
these sacred plants utilized by shamans as hallucinogenic,<br />
psychedelic, even as psychotomimetic, and are<br />
<strong>of</strong>ten talked about as drugs. These terms have become<br />
so invested with distorted connotations, as to make it<br />
incongruous to speak <strong>of</strong> a shaman ingesting these<br />
plants. I would rather like to make use <strong>of</strong> the term<br />
entheogen as defined by Jonathan Ott (1994:91) as a<br />
cultural term to include all the shamanic inebriants Ð<br />
sacraments, plant-teachers, the stock-in-trade <strong>of</strong> shamans<br />
the world over. The term means literally<br />
`realizing the divine within,' and can be seen as the<br />
user realizing that the divine infuses all <strong>of</strong> creation, or<br />
specifically that the entheogenic plant is itself infused<br />
with the divine. This again puts the sacred, which has<br />
been raped by modern society, back into the use <strong>of</strong><br />
these shamanic inebriants.<br />
Ayahuasca<br />
The use <strong>of</strong> ayahuasca has already been mentioned as<br />
common among the vegetalistas <strong>of</strong> Peru. The major<br />
active constituents <strong>of</strong> ayahuasca are the beta-carboline<br />
alkaloids harmine, harmaline, and tetrahydroharmine,<br />
and N,N-dimethyltryptamine (DMT) (McKenna<br />
1995:351). Harner (1973:172±3) summarizes as the<br />
main cultural themes associated with the drug: (a) the<br />
sensation <strong>of</strong> separation <strong>of</strong> the `soul' and the physical<br />
body; (b) visions <strong>of</strong> predatory animals; (c) contact<br />
with the supernatural and heaven and hell states; (d)<br />
visions <strong>of</strong> distant locations and persons; and (e)<br />
explanatory visions <strong>of</strong> events such as thefts and<br />
mysterious homicides. However, several <strong>of</strong> these<br />
may be linked. The so-called out-<strong>of</strong>-the-body experience<br />
is associated with the sensation <strong>of</strong> flight, but can<br />
also produce visionary and symbolic experiences<br />
(Drury 1982:109±110).<br />
Ayahuasca, like other plant teachers, is used to<br />
54 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
explore both this world and other parallel worlds that<br />
are usually beyond our normal perception. By ingesting<br />
it, the ayahuasquero is freed from the normal<br />
space-time boundaries <strong>of</strong> this world and, with training,<br />
freely moves from world to world (Wolf<br />
1991:105).<br />
The main function <strong>of</strong> ayahuasca is thus to induce an<br />
altered state <strong>of</strong> consciousness, because as Fred Alan<br />
Wolf (1991:10) remarks, `Shamans perceive reality in<br />
a state <strong>of</strong> altered consciousness.'<br />
Ayahuasca, and probably other entheogens, was<br />
not discovered accidentally. These plants were necessary<br />
for our evolution as a species. They enabled us<br />
to reconnect with our planet. They provided us with<br />
spiritual and mythic insights into our own natures. In<br />
every culture shamans were and still are those people<br />
most sensitive to the vibrations <strong>of</strong> the planet, and they<br />
were connectors taking their tribes outside the realms<br />
<strong>of</strong> physical existence, enabling the tribes to remember<br />
and rekindle their sacred functions (Wolf 1991:106).<br />
Ayahuasca had been discovered in archaeological<br />
findings in Ecuador. Other psychotropic plants were<br />
also used as far back as 3000 BC. Ecuador has been<br />
inhabited by humankind for the past 11 000 years and<br />
there a plethora <strong>of</strong> drawings exists on pottery, from<br />
the Santa Elena peninsula, 4000±2000 BC, showing<br />
people chewing leaves and inhaling ground plants is<br />
to be found. Drawings also show the existence <strong>of</strong><br />
shamans. Some <strong>of</strong> the drawings appear to reveal the<br />
mental effects produced by these sacred plants (Wolf<br />
1991:103).<br />
Ayahuasca ritual<br />
Ritual is the outer enactment <strong>of</strong> an internal event. In<br />
all religions, and also in shamanism and ceremonial<br />
magic, those that perform a ritual believe that what<br />
they are doing is not simply theatrical but accords<br />
with some sort <strong>of</strong> sacred, inner reality Ð that for a<br />
time they are caught up in a mystical drama, perhaps<br />
involving union with a god, identification with a<br />
source <strong>of</strong> spiritual healing or the act <strong>of</strong> embodying<br />
some sort <strong>of</strong> transcendental power. In such a way the<br />
shaman, priest or magician believes he is tapping into<br />
a dimension which is much larger and more awesome<br />
than the world <strong>of</strong> familiar reality. It is very much a case<br />
<strong>of</strong> participating in a mystery Ð <strong>of</strong> leaving the everyday<br />
realm and, for a sacred and special period <strong>of</strong> time,<br />
entering the Cosmos (Drury 1982:32).<br />
Clearly in such rituals there are physical observances<br />
Ð that one can actually see externally Ð and<br />
symbolic, mythic processes that are represented by the<br />
ceremonial sequence <strong>of</strong> events (Drury 1982:35). The<br />
shaman's activities depend closely on the ability to<br />
sweep the audience along with the power <strong>of</strong> his or her<br />
performance, which must have its effect both on the<br />
audience and on the shaman. Shamans use many<br />
props and symbols to represent their psychic experience<br />
and to affect the experience <strong>of</strong> their clients<br />
(Vitebsky 1995:52).<br />
Skeptics have long maintained that shamans rely on<br />
conjuring tricks. Certainly, some shamans use spectacular<br />
effects some <strong>of</strong> the time, but they claim that their<br />
tricks, like their equipment, are not the main point. The<br />
point <strong>of</strong> such tricks is to make others aware, through<br />
an outward expression, <strong>of</strong> the shaman's inner power<br />
(Vitebsky 1995:88). Among the Mehinaku, where the<br />
theatrical side to the shaman's role is unusually<br />
developed, and where the successful shaman is above<br />
all a good performer, the dramaturgical approach to<br />
the art seems particularly appropriate (Ripinsky-<br />
Naxon 1993:73).<br />
But being a shaman is ultimately a public role and<br />
the shaman's inner experience reaches its culmination<br />
and its full significance only as part <strong>of</strong> public<br />
performance. To say that shamanic action is sometimes<br />
highly theatrical is not to imply that the shaman<br />
is `only acting', as though this were something false.<br />
Rather, the performance transforms the inner reality or<br />
consciousness <strong>of</strong> a whole range <strong>of</strong> people who are<br />
involved in a number <strong>of</strong> different ways. It is this which<br />
makes the question <strong>of</strong> trickery irrelevant (Vitebsky<br />
1995:120).<br />
Shamanic performance is a highly skilled activity in<br />
which the delicate collective mood is vulnerable to<br />
collapse, resulting in the failure <strong>of</strong> the purpose <strong>of</strong> the<br />
ritual. In this light, healing power is a form <strong>of</strong> artistry.<br />
Many anthropological approaches imply that ritual<br />
performance acts out some hidden cultural script, but<br />
it is perhaps more appropriate to suggest that the<br />
culture itself is constantly being formed and reformed<br />
through these performances (Vitebsky 1995:121±<br />
123).<br />
One can only conclude that the world <strong>of</strong> the<br />
shaman, bizarre as it must sometimes seem to outsiders,<br />
is nevertheless totally real to the person<br />
experiencing it (Drury 1982:36±37).<br />
For a description <strong>of</strong> an ayahuasca ceremony, I will<br />
refer to one given by Luna (1991:33), which I have<br />
found to be very typical:<br />
The vegetalista sings an icaro [magic incantation]<br />
over the preparation and gives [a portion <strong>of</strong> the<br />
preparation in] a small gourd to the participants. At<br />
the end he will also take the brew. For some time<br />
they will be waiting for the effects to come. Then<br />
the vegetalista gives the order to blow out all<br />
candles, and in the dark, [he] begins to `call the<br />
visions,' by singing the appropriate icaro and<br />
agitating his schacapa, a rattle usually made <strong>of</strong><br />
the leaves <strong>of</strong> Pariana sp. [palm].<br />
It is normally agreed that in the beginning people<br />
see lights and geometrical designs. After some time<br />
appear visions <strong>of</strong> animals, plants, and such. They<br />
come `in waves'. When there are several vegetalistas<br />
present, they each sing their icaros simulta-<br />
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neously, usually letting the owner <strong>of</strong> the house take<br />
the lead by allowing his voice to be heard over the<br />
others. It is not unusual that rivalries will occur at<br />
this point, when somebody tries to show more<br />
power than others through the icaros. When a<br />
vegetalista has disciples, it may happen that they<br />
will follow the icaro <strong>of</strong> the teacher. It is believed<br />
that an icaro sung by several people will have a<br />
stronger effect.<br />
Many people report hearing marvellous music.<br />
The spirits come singing, and in fact the singing <strong>of</strong><br />
the vegetalista is orchestrated by the music and<br />
chorus <strong>of</strong> the spirits. From time to time there are<br />
breaks in the singing, and the vegetalista and other<br />
people are in deep concentration contemplating<br />
their visions. People <strong>of</strong>ten have periods <strong>of</strong> heavy<br />
vomiting and diarrhoea. When the vegetalista is<br />
`bien mareado' [very dizzy] he will call the patients<br />
one by one and cure them, usually by blowing<br />
smoke on their bodies to restore their lost spirits, by<br />
rubbing them with special stones called encantos<br />
[enchanted objects], or by sucking the inflicted<br />
part. If the matter in question is love magic, a<br />
photograph <strong>of</strong> the person is brought so that the<br />
vegetalista will act on it. Sometimes only the name<br />
and address will suffice for the vegetalista to<br />
perform some action over the distant person.<br />
Shamanic fights are not infrequent. The vegetalista<br />
may realize that he is under attack by the witch<br />
or the forces that caused illness. He will then sing<br />
special songs which will bring his arcanas (defences)<br />
and tingunas to his defence. It may happen<br />
that a person is frightened by the visions, and the<br />
vegetalista has to `take out his visions' with an<br />
icaro, or by blowing smoke on the top <strong>of</strong> the<br />
person's head, rubbing his body, and such. When<br />
everything seems to be at peace, and there are<br />
beautiful visions, it may happen that the persons<br />
taking part in the session will dance. Musical<br />
instruments are sometimes used in sessions.<br />
After several hours the vegetalista finally keeps<br />
silent, and people may sleep on the spot or tell<br />
stories in the dark. Patients may stay there until the<br />
morning, or leave the place after they have been<br />
healed.<br />
Vegetalismo and Healing<br />
We have already seen that vegetalismo is still a very<br />
active practice in the Peruvian Amazon. Wils<br />
(1967:131) found that over 25 per cent <strong>of</strong> the people<br />
he questioned in Bele n, Iquitos, preferred empõÂricos<br />
(folk healers) to Western doctors. Dobkin de Rios<br />
(1984:67) sees this as a conservative figure. I went to<br />
several healing sessions with my informants in various<br />
parts <strong>of</strong> Iquitos and the RõÂ o Napo area, and found<br />
many people attending these ceremonies. In one<br />
ceremony with Don Herman, on the outskirts <strong>of</strong><br />
Iquitos, there were twenty-two people in attendance.<br />
Most <strong>of</strong> my informants in the RõÂo Napo area, as<br />
previously stated, had an average <strong>of</strong> ten patients per<br />
week, and in Iquitos, up to ten patients per day.<br />
Dobkin de Rios (1984:82) found that the destitute<br />
who live in Bele n, find the ayahuasca healer far more<br />
effective than the indifferent medical services available<br />
to them. Vegetalistas, due to their possession <strong>of</strong> an<br />
intimate understanding <strong>of</strong> the social community in<br />
which they are immersed, and their pr<strong>of</strong>iciency in the<br />
use <strong>of</strong> medicinal plants and healing metaphors,<br />
contribute significantly to the physical and mental<br />
health <strong>of</strong> the people <strong>of</strong> rural areas and the urban poor<br />
(Luna 1991:13). While the ayahuasquero gears his<br />
prices to the ability <strong>of</strong> his patient to pay, the large city<br />
hospital's public wards provide no medical service<br />
inexpensive enough for the empty pockets <strong>of</strong> the<br />
poor. Formal medical consultations are generally far<br />
too costly for poor people, and the city hospital has<br />
the reputation <strong>of</strong> being a place that the poor go to in<br />
order to die (Dobkin de Rios 1984:78±82).<br />
The medical clinics and <strong>of</strong>fices are totally foreign<br />
and even sometimes terrifyingly alien, especially to the<br />
rural mestizos. The Western doctors usually have very<br />
little time and charge too much. The vegetalista <strong>of</strong>ten<br />
opens his home to the patients, even for long periods<br />
<strong>of</strong> time, provides counselling, shows interest in the<br />
financial and emotional problems <strong>of</strong> his patients,<br />
amuses them with his stories, even <strong>of</strong>fers them what<br />
we would call forms <strong>of</strong> family therapy (Luna<br />
1986:161).<br />
Don Fernando, one <strong>of</strong> my informants, went for a<br />
week to a village close to Iquitos, where he treated<br />
two <strong>of</strong> his patients. He stayed there all the time giving<br />
plant remedies, emotional and spiritual support, only<br />
in exchange for the cost <strong>of</strong> his transport by colectivo<br />
(river boat) and free accommodation and food. In<br />
other healing ceremonies, I have noticed that some<br />
patients will give the vegetalista fish, yucca, mapachos<br />
(native cigarettes) or other kind <strong>of</strong> produce, in<br />
exchange for their consultation. In most cases the<br />
patients were too poor to <strong>of</strong>fer any payment, which<br />
the vegetalista accepted without any complaints. I<br />
have found that vegetalistas very seldom expect any<br />
kind <strong>of</strong> payment, but will always welcome any gifts.<br />
The vegetalistas prepare special tonics, herb baths,<br />
and diets for their patients. As well as employing an<br />
immense number <strong>of</strong> plants and vegetable substances<br />
in their treatments, they will also make use <strong>of</strong><br />
proprietary medicines (Dobkin de Rios 1984:82).<br />
The system <strong>of</strong> ethno medicine practised by the<br />
mestizo healer can in some sense be regarded as an<br />
alternative health care system. The urban mestizo who<br />
is poor, barred by economic factors from all but the<br />
barest access to health care based on Western<br />
medicine, looks to the ayahuasquero and his magical<br />
and botanical remedies for medical, psychiatric, and<br />
56 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
spiritual support. Although the health-care system <strong>of</strong><br />
the ayahuasquero incorporates magical, religious, and<br />
psychotherapeutic elements, it is also largely based on<br />
pharmacology because <strong>of</strong> its reliance on numerous<br />
biodynamic plants. In that respect it is more akin to<br />
Western medicine than to other shamanic, quasimedical<br />
systems <strong>of</strong> traditional healing (McKenna<br />
1995:351).<br />
A vegetalista <strong>of</strong>ten <strong>of</strong>fers to the poor patients Ð<br />
which represent the majority <strong>of</strong> the people <strong>of</strong> this<br />
area Ð more psychological support (Luna 1986:161).<br />
Formal psychiatric facilities in jungle cities are<br />
relatively rare. In fact, in Peru, as SeguõÂ n (1970:175)<br />
points out, there are about 100 psychiatrists in<br />
practice, 90 <strong>of</strong> them in Lima, the capital. Of the total<br />
<strong>of</strong> 2 010 psychiatric beds in the nation, 95 per cent are<br />
in Lima. The rest <strong>of</strong> the country, which has 83,4 per<br />
cent <strong>of</strong> the population, has only 93 psychiatric beds.<br />
<strong>University</strong> training in underdeveloped countries, as<br />
well in the United States, generally prepares the<br />
doctor for a focus on organic rather than psychological<br />
illness. For these latter illnesses, the folk healer is<br />
probably better prepared, as his general expectations<br />
are that a patient will suffer from socially precipitated<br />
illnesses which have resulted from stress, conflicts,<br />
tensions and the like. To the healer, interpersonal<br />
referents are as important, if not more so, than organic<br />
symptoms. To the ayahuasquero, in fact, his patient is<br />
not merely a `bearer <strong>of</strong> organs' in Frans Alexander's<br />
(1950:17) term, but an invisible whole. Peruvian folk<br />
healers recognize the important role <strong>of</strong> emotional<br />
factors in disease, and give this great prominence in<br />
their diagnoses (Dobkin de Rios 1984:68±88).<br />
In rural areas, the vegetalista is <strong>of</strong>ten the only help<br />
available to the mestizos or riberenÄos in critical<br />
situations. Every riverine community has a government<br />
appointed promotor en salud or sanitario, who<br />
diagnoses, uncomplicated ailments and prescribes<br />
medicines he thinks may be effective. Sometimes<br />
these technicians are <strong>of</strong> help, but it is doubtful if they<br />
maintain any standard <strong>of</strong> hygiene or have any real<br />
understanding <strong>of</strong> what they are doing (Dobkin de<br />
Rios 1984:78). I have found these technicians mostly<br />
incapable <strong>of</strong> their title, and always without medicine,<br />
leaving the vegetalista as the only help in many<br />
situations.<br />
I am <strong>of</strong> the opinion that the Peruvian government is<br />
overlooking a potential solution to the medical<br />
problems in rural areas. I have found my informants<br />
to be the most healthy and sober people in the villages<br />
I visited. Rather than spend money on the training <strong>of</strong><br />
just any local person as sanitario, leaving them<br />
without medicines, the government would be better<br />
served training the local vegetalista as a promotor en<br />
salud, who can make use <strong>of</strong> both traditional remedies<br />
and Western medicines when available. Many private<br />
organizations like the Peruvian Amazon Conservation,<br />
Inc., a charitable medical and educational organization,<br />
are taking this into consideration, but they<br />
receive no financial support from the local or national<br />
governments.<br />
REFERENCES<br />
Alexander, Franz. 1950. Psychosomatic Medicine: Its Principles and Applications. New York: Norton.<br />
Barcia GarcõÂ a, Fernando. 1983. Iquitos, Capital de la AmazonõÂa Peruana. Iquitos: Roger Rumrill.<br />
Browman, V & Rovinsky, Y. 1979. Spirits, Shamans, and Stars: Perspectives from <strong>South</strong> America. New York:<br />
Mouton Publishers.<br />
Chirif, Alberto. 1980. Internal Colonization in a Colonized Country: The Case <strong>of</strong> the Peruvian Amazon. In Land,<br />
People and Planning in Contemporary Amazonian, by FrancË oise Barbira-Scazzochio (ed.). Cambridge:<br />
Cambridge <strong>University</strong>.<br />
Dobkin de Rios, Marlene. 1984. Hallucinogens: Cross-Cultural Perspectives. Albuquerque: <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> New<br />
Mexico Press.<br />
Dobkin de Rios, Marlene. 1984. Visionary Vine: Hallucinogenic Healing in the Peruvian Amazon. Illinois: Waveland<br />
Press, Inc.<br />
Drury, N. 1982. The Shaman and the Magician. London: Boston and Henley.<br />
Drury, N. 1982. Shamanism. United States <strong>of</strong> America: Element, Inc.<br />
Duke, James Allen & Va squez, Rodolfo. 1994. Amazonian Ethno botanical Dictionary. Boca Rato n: CRC. Press,<br />
Inc.<br />
Eliade, Mircea. 1989. Shamanism: Archaic techniques <strong>of</strong> ecstasy. Arkana: Penguin.<br />
GalvaÄ o, Eduardo. 1976. Santos e Visagens. Um Estudo da Vida Religiosa de Ita, Baixo Amazonas. SaÄ o Paulo:<br />
Companhia Editoà ra Nacional.<br />
Harner, M.J. 1973. Hallucinogens and Shamanism. New York: Oxford <strong>University</strong> Press.<br />
Joralemon, D. 1993. Sorcery and Shamanism: Curanderos and Clients in Northern Peru. Salt Lake City: <strong>University</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong> Utah Press.<br />
Kalweit, Holger. 1988. Dreamtime and Inner Space: The World <strong>of</strong> the Shaman. London: Shambhala.<br />
Lathrap, Donald W. 1970. The Upper Amazon. <strong>South</strong>ampton: The Camelot Press Ltd.<br />
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Lowie, Robert H. 1948. The Tropical Forests: An Introduction. In Handbook <strong>of</strong> <strong>South</strong> American Indians. Vol 3. 1±<br />
56. Washington: United States Government Printing Office.<br />
Luna, Luis Eduardo. 1986. Vegetalismo: Shamanism among the Mestizo Population <strong>of</strong> the Peruvian Amazon.<br />
Stockholm, Sweden: Almqvist & Wiksell International.<br />
Luna, Luis Eduardo. 1991. Ayahuasca Visions: The Religious Iconography <strong>of</strong> a Peruvian Shaman. Berkeley,<br />
California: North Atlantic Books.<br />
McKenna, T. 1993. True Hallucinations. San Francisco: Harper San Francisco.<br />
McKenna, Terence. 1992. Food <strong>of</strong> the Gods: The Search for the Original Tree <strong>of</strong> Knowledge. London: Rider.<br />
McKenna, Dennis J., Luna, L.E. and Towers, G.N. 1995. Biodynamic Constituents in Ayahuasca Admixture Plants:<br />
An Uninvestigated Folk Pharmacopeia. In Ethnobotany: Evolution <strong>of</strong> a Discipline, by Schultes, R.E. and Von<br />
Reis, S. (eds.) Portland, Oregon: Dioscorides Press.<br />
Montes ShunÄ a, Francisco. 1985. Jardin Etnobota nico `Sacha Mama': Curaciones de enfermedades incurables, con<br />
base en plantas medicinales. In Tres Naciones, Iquitos: Oficina de Informacio n.<br />
Ott, Jonathan. 1994. Ayahuasca Analogues: Pangaean Entheogens. Kennewick, WA: Natural Products Co.<br />
Regan, Jaime. 1983. Hacia la tierra sin mal. Estudio de la religioÂn del pueblo en la Amazonian. Iquitos: Ceta.<br />
Ripinsky-Naxon, M. 1993. The Nature <strong>of</strong> Shamanism. New York: State <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> New York Press.<br />
Rumrill, Roger. 1984. (Ed.) AmazonõÂa Peruana. Loreto, Madre de Dios, San MartõÂn, Ucayali. EconomõÂa, Historia,<br />
Cultura, Turismo. Lima: Roger Rumrill.<br />
Schultes, R.E. and Raffauf, R.F. 1992. Vine <strong>of</strong> the Soul: Medicine Men, their Plants and Rituals in the Colombian<br />
Amazonian. Arizona: Synergetic Press.<br />
Schultes, R.E. and Von Reis, S. 1995. Ethnobotany: Evolution <strong>of</strong> a Discipline. Portland, Oregon: Dioscorides Press.<br />
SeguõÂn, Carlos Alberto. 1970. Folklore Psychiatry. In The World Biennial <strong>of</strong> Psychiatry and Psychotherapy. Vol. I.<br />
by S. Arieti (ed.). New York: Basic Books.<br />
Sharon, D. 1978. Wizard <strong>of</strong> the four Winds: A Shaman's Story. New York: The Free Press.<br />
Smithwick, Eleanor B. 1997. Peruvian Amazon Conservation, Inc., unpublished mission statement, non-pr<strong>of</strong>it<br />
corporation (# 9121457) chartered in Georgia, 1759 Dyson Drive NE, Atlanta, Georgia, USA (Tel: 404±378<br />
9800).<br />
Vitebsky, Piers. 1995. The Shaman. London: Duncan Baird Publishers.<br />
Wils, Frits. 1967. Estudio social sobre BeleÂn Ð Iquitos. Centro de Investigaciones Sociales, Econo micas, Polõ ticas y<br />
Antropolo gicas. Lima.<br />
Wise, Mary Ruth. 1983. Lenguas IndõÂgenas de la Amazonia Peruana: Historia y Estado Presente. AmeÂrica IndõÂgena.<br />
Vol. XLIII: 4: 823±848. Me xico: Instituto Indigenista Interamericano.<br />
Wolf, Fred Allan. 1991. The Eagle's Quest: A Physicist's Search for Truth in the Heart <strong>of</strong> the Shamanic World.<br />
London: Mandala.<br />
58 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
Academic freedom in Brazil<br />
by Pedro Paulo A. Funari<br />
Pedro Paulo A. Funari has a B.A. in history, a<br />
Master's degree in Anthropology, and a PhD in<br />
Archaeology. He is pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> historical<br />
archaeology at the Campinas State <strong>University</strong>,<br />
Brazil, and research associate <strong>of</strong> the Illinois<br />
State <strong>University</strong> (US) and Barcelona (Spain).<br />
Funari is author <strong>of</strong> several books published in<br />
the UK, Spain and Brazil, has published more<br />
than 50 papers in international journals and 150<br />
in Brazilian scholarly journals, is a member <strong>of</strong><br />
the editorial boards <strong>of</strong> the International Journal<br />
<strong>of</strong> Historical Archaeology (New York,<br />
Plenum), Journal <strong>of</strong> Material Culture (London)<br />
and Public Archaeology (London). He is also a<br />
Senior <strong>South</strong> American representative at the<br />
World Archaeological Congress Executive.<br />
Pedro Paulo Funari<br />
ABSTRACT<br />
The paper deals with academic freedom<br />
in Brazil. Brazil is characterized as a<br />
hierarchical society and traditionally<br />
intellectuals spring from the ruling e lites.<br />
Dictatorship (1964±1985) strengthened<br />
this characteristic but the end <strong>of</strong> military<br />
rule did not radically change the picture.<br />
Academic freedom is thus still limited by<br />
patronage inside and outside academia.<br />
Academic freedom is now limited by the<br />
internalization <strong>of</strong> submission.<br />
RESUMEN<br />
El escrito trata de la libertad acade mica<br />
en Brasil. Brasil se caracteriza por ser<br />
una sociedad jera rquica y tradicionalmente<br />
los intelectuales surgen de las<br />
clases dirigentes. La dictadura (1964±<br />
1985) reforzo esta situacio n pero el final<br />
del gobierno militar no cambio el escenario<br />
de forma radical. De este modo la<br />
libertad acade mica es limitada por un<br />
patrocinio dentro y fuera de la academia.<br />
Ahora la libertad acade mica se ve<br />
limitada por la internalizacio n de la<br />
sumisio n.<br />
RESUMO<br />
O artigo trata da liberdade acadeà mica no<br />
Brasil. O Brasil e caracterizado como<br />
uma sociedade hierarquizada e, tradicionalmente,<br />
os intelectuais prove m das<br />
elites dominantes. A ditadura (1964±<br />
1985) reforcË ou isso, mas o fim do<br />
regime militar naÄ o alterou, de forma<br />
radical, a situacËaÄ o. A liberdade acadeà -<br />
mica e , assim, limitada pelo compadrio,<br />
tanto dentro como fora da academia. A<br />
liberdade acadeà mica, agora, encontra-se<br />
limitada pela internalizacËaÄ o da submissaÄ<br />
o.<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 59
Academic freedom in Brazil, as in other countries<br />
which experienced dictatorship, is a matter <strong>of</strong> particular<br />
concern and intellectuals are aware <strong>of</strong> the<br />
political implications <strong>of</strong> what they say and do. Brazil<br />
was ruled by the armed forces for twenty one years<br />
(1964±1985) and the scars caused by authoritarian<br />
rule are very much still with us. Academic freedom<br />
cannot be dissociated from society and Brazilian<br />
society has from the inception been authoritarian<br />
and patriarchal, dominated by patronage, a hierarchizable<br />
society, in the words <strong>of</strong> anthropologist Roberto<br />
DaMatta (1991a:399). Brazil has been described as a<br />
country with no citizens, but with dependents<br />
(Schwartz 1997:2) and vassals (Velho 1996), privileges<br />
(DaMatta 1991b:4) being granted to people in<br />
power. The result is a most uneven society, with the<br />
ten per cent richest people getting 47 per cent <strong>of</strong> the<br />
GDP, while the poorest ten per cent gets only 0,8 per<br />
cent (Natali 1998). Nowadays, Brazil boasts the 10th<br />
largest economy, just behind Spain and Canada, but it<br />
has an appalling maldistribution <strong>of</strong> income and<br />
millions <strong>of</strong> poor people, indigenous peoples, landless<br />
peasants and street children are looked upon as<br />
expendable (Pinheiro 1996).<br />
In this context, intellectuals have traditionally been<br />
people from the ruling e lites and the main hindrance<br />
to their freedom came not from the state but from their<br />
peers. As patronage is pervasive, critical approaches<br />
are not welcome and the best way to survive within<br />
the intelligentsia has always been to eulogize intellectual<br />
authorities. Since the 1930s, with the first<br />
universities in the country, there has been an increasing<br />
widening <strong>of</strong> opportunities, enabling people from<br />
outside the e lite to become academics, even though<br />
the constraints <strong>of</strong> the clientele system have never been<br />
lifted <strong>of</strong>f. Particularly after the Second World War,<br />
although pr<strong>of</strong>essors still held significant power over<br />
ordinary scholars, academic freedom improved considerably<br />
and when the armed forces took over in<br />
1964 there was a strong reaction by some scholars.<br />
Censorship and funding restrictions were the first<br />
moves by the dictatorship, followed by the expulsion<br />
<strong>of</strong> scholars. Finally torture and the killing <strong>of</strong> free<br />
thinkers were used to muzzle protest. As put recently<br />
by a leading scholar who survived this nightmare, `it<br />
was forbidden to think' (Ab'Saber 1999:2). `A lot <strong>of</strong><br />
people suffered, were exiled, tortured, killed', in the<br />
words <strong>of</strong> another academic (Igle sias 1985:221).<br />
The end <strong>of</strong> military rule left the same people in<br />
power and within the academic world the collaborators<br />
also usually continued in power. On the one<br />
hand, the restoration <strong>of</strong> civilian rule meant freedom <strong>of</strong><br />
speech and there has been, in the last fifteen years, a<br />
sprouting <strong>of</strong> free expression. However, the enticements<br />
<strong>of</strong> power were not negligible, and several<br />
intellectuals, in the capacity <strong>of</strong> power-holders, have<br />
the ability to lend credence to their interpretive<br />
frameworks (Velasco e Cruz 1997:21±22). Through<br />
the systematic denial <strong>of</strong> other opinions, they established<br />
a discoursive field constraining other academics<br />
to comply or to be excluded from funding and power.<br />
Academics are led to carry out studies confirming the<br />
constructions <strong>of</strong> common sense and ordinary discourse<br />
by transcribing conventional assumptions into<br />
scientific definitions, what Bourdieu (1988:777) calls<br />
`scholarly common sense'. In a society grounded on<br />
patronage, `common sense' is more important than<br />
elsewhere, and the temptation to repeat the established<br />
ideas and canonic authors is palpable. There are<br />
scholars who are explicit about the way favour should<br />
be considered: `the political culture <strong>of</strong> favour does not<br />
necessarily entail submission and inequality ... it can<br />
also bring rights, equality, justice and, why not?,<br />
fraternity'. Fraternity is a symptomatic word, as it<br />
refers to brothers in a brotherhood, as though<br />
patronage would bring freedom, not constraints.<br />
Nowadays, academic freedom is thus hindered not<br />
by the state, as was the case during the dictatorship,<br />
but by two different but concurring sources. Globalization<br />
is clearly the leading maõÃtre mot used by the<br />
dominant scholars and by research agencies to force<br />
their concepts as the only valid and acceptable ones.<br />
A superficial use <strong>of</strong> foreign authorities and even<br />
fashionable terminology or jargon disenfranchizes<br />
people and discourages critical thought, as aping<br />
foreign trends is seen as the more up-to-date attitude.<br />
Furthermore, globalization affected academic freedom<br />
in Brazil by accentuating the imbalances between<br />
those tiny minority with access to the internet and<br />
ordinary academics with difficult or no access. This<br />
varies by discipline, the humanities, in particular,<br />
lagging behind. A second move though is even more<br />
important, as it is the internal academic system which<br />
enforces compliance. As a leading scholar, exiled<br />
during the dictatorship and one <strong>of</strong> the few black<br />
intellectuals in the country, Milton Santos (1998),<br />
said recently, `to look for new ideas is dangerous'.<br />
Why is it dangerous? What is the threat to academic<br />
freedom, if there is no discretionary rule? Once again,<br />
patronage (compadrio) is the answer. Patronage is<br />
pervasive, from small towns to states, from university<br />
departments to ministerial <strong>of</strong>fices in BrasõÂ lia. Several<br />
examples are indicative <strong>of</strong> the limits to academic<br />
freedom. Young scholars, in particular, are prone to be<br />
affected by persecution. Walter Alves Neves and<br />
Solange Caldarelli were expelled from the <strong>University</strong><br />
<strong>of</strong> SaÄ o Paulo, some years ago, for a Dean decided that<br />
she did not agree with their standpoints. Eduardo<br />
Go es Neves was also submitted to threats from a<br />
senior scholar who tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade<br />
the <strong>University</strong> Chancellor to discharge him.<br />
Nowadays, another way <strong>of</strong> limiting the freedom <strong>of</strong><br />
scholars is simply to stop or to reduce funding for<br />
scientific research. This strategy was widely used<br />
60 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
during military rule against scholars and institutions<br />
alike who did not conform. The Institute for Prehistoric<br />
Studies, in SaÄ o Paulo, was so affected in the<br />
1960s and 1970s, as was the case <strong>of</strong> several<br />
departments <strong>of</strong> the Federal <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> Rio de<br />
Janeiro, to mention some <strong>of</strong> the most notorious cases.<br />
Recently, however, the lack <strong>of</strong> funds is <strong>of</strong>ten disguised<br />
as search for globalization and modernity. Economic<br />
problems have been affecting universities, the public<br />
ones sometimes without funds for paying for toilet<br />
paper! Engineering research centres in Rio de Janeiro<br />
have been subjected to lack <strong>of</strong> funds, whilst being<br />
accused by the authorities as `too nationalist'. Lecturers<br />
are usually underpaid and have to submit<br />
themselves to both public and private pressures. The<br />
argument <strong>of</strong> lack <strong>of</strong> funds has been used to close<br />
down departments and research units, affecting<br />
scholars studying such subjects as eastern and dead<br />
languages, archaeology and even non-applied, socalled<br />
pure sciences, like physics. There are also<br />
scholars affected by sheer prejudices, as was the case<br />
recently <strong>of</strong> Luiz Mott, a historian in Bahia State and a<br />
gay activist, who has been attacked physically, as well<br />
as damage being inflicted on his car and his house.<br />
Academic freedom thus faces new challenges in the<br />
late nineteen nineties and early 2000s, as earlier<br />
external censorship, prevailing in the military period,<br />
has been substituted by much more deleterious inner<br />
censorship. To deviate from dominant discourse is to<br />
risk retaliatory moves from people and institutions in<br />
power. It is perhaps a mixed feature <strong>of</strong> postmodern<br />
times in Brazil that academic freedom is threatened<br />
not by the sheer use <strong>of</strong> force, as it has been the case<br />
for several years, but by a most insidious internalization<br />
<strong>of</strong> docility.<br />
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS<br />
I owe thanks to SebastiaÄ o Velasco e Cruz and Eduardo Go es<br />
Neves. The ideas expressed here are my own and I am<br />
therefore solely responsible.<br />
REFERENCES<br />
Ab'Saber, A.N. 1999. Trajeto ria, Jornal de Resenhas, Folha de SaÄo Paulo, 1/9/99, 1±2.<br />
Bourdieu, P. 1988. Vive la crise! For heterodoxy in social sciences, Theory and Society, 17, 773±787.<br />
DaMatta, R. 1991a. Religions and modernity: three studies <strong>of</strong> Brazilian religiosity, Journal <strong>of</strong> Social History, 25,2,<br />
389±406.<br />
DaMatta, R. 1991b. Nepotismo e jeitinho brasileiro, Jornal da Tarde, Caderno de SaÂbado, 9/7/91, 4±5.<br />
Editorial, 1997. Universidade de SaÄ o Paulo, Teses e Compadrio, Folha de SaÄo Paulo, 10/13/97, 1, p. 2.<br />
Igle sias, F. 1985. Momentos democra ticos na trajeto ria brasileira. In H. Jaguaribe et alii (orgs), Brasil, Sociedade<br />
DemocraÂtica, Rio de Janeiro: Jose Olympio, 125±221.<br />
Natali, J.B. 1998. Brasil e o paõ s mais desigual da Ame rica Latina, diz BID, Folha de SaÄo Paulo, 11/14/98, 1, p. 14.<br />
OESP 1998. Paternalismo ainda domina relacË oÄ es polõÂ ticas na cidade, O Estado de SaÄo Paulo, 10/11/98, E. p. 4.<br />
Pinheiro, P.S. 1996. Brazil's bold effort to curb police violence, Time, June 10th, p. 76.<br />
Santos, M. 1998. Buscar o novo e perigoso, Jornal do Brasil, IdeÂias, 12/26/98, p. 6.<br />
Schwartz, S. 1997. A terra das coisas trocadas. Folha de SaÄo Paulo, Jornal de Resenhas, 10/11/97, p. 2.<br />
Velasco e Cruz, S.C. 1997. Restructuring World Economy. Arguments about `market-oriented reforms' in<br />
developing countries. Campinas: IFCH-UNICAMP.<br />
Velho, G. 1996. Felicidade aÁ brasileira, Folha de SaÄo Paulo, Mais!, 11/3/96, p. 10.<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 61
News and Information<br />
The <strong>South</strong> American Summit:<br />
A new era for Brazilian foreign policy<br />
by Ze lia Roel<strong>of</strong>se-Campbell<br />
Head, Unisa Centre for Latin American Studies<br />
For the first time in history, all the presidents <strong>of</strong> <strong>South</strong><br />
America met at a summit, called by Brazil's President<br />
Fernando Henrique Cardoso. The summit took place<br />
on 31st August and 1st September in BrasõÂ lia.<br />
The 12 countries 1 represent a population <strong>of</strong> 337<br />
million people and total GDP <strong>of</strong> US$ 1,5 trillion and are<br />
currently grouped into two main free trade blocs, namely<br />
Mercosul and the Andean Community <strong>of</strong> Nations<br />
(CAN). Mercosul comprises Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay<br />
and Uruguay, with Bolivia and Chile as associate<br />
members. The countries <strong>of</strong> the Andean Community <strong>of</strong><br />
Nations are: Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru and<br />
Venezuela. English-speaking Guyana and Dutch-speaking<br />
Suriname were also included at the summit, as they<br />
form an integral part <strong>of</strong> <strong>South</strong> America 2 .<br />
The summit was universally regarded as marking a<br />
new phase in Brazilian foreign policy. For example,<br />
The New York Times headlined an article on the<br />
summit `Brazil Begins to Take Role on the World<br />
Stage' (Rohter 2000), while Correio Braziliense<br />
described it as `an historic landmark' (um marco<br />
histoÂrico) (GarcõÂ a 2000).<br />
Writing before the summit, President Cardoso described<br />
it as a `reaffirmation <strong>of</strong> <strong>South</strong> America's<br />
identity as a region where democracy and peace<br />
advance the prospects for an increasingly energetic<br />
process <strong>of</strong> integration among countries that live<br />
together in the same neighbourhood' (Cardoso 2000).<br />
The timing <strong>of</strong> the summit was explained by the<br />
Brazilian Ambassador to the United States in an<br />
address at the National Press Club in Washington DC:<br />
We think that after NAFTA was signed in 1994, a<br />
new economic geography began to take shape in<br />
the hemisphere with very clear cut differentiations:<br />
NAFTA, North America, with three countries; then<br />
Central America with the Central American Common<br />
Market; CARICOM, with the countries <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Caribbean forming this political and economic<br />
entity; and <strong>South</strong> America, the fourth area. In<br />
<strong>South</strong> America we have two regional groupings,<br />
the Mercosur, from 1990, and the Andean Pact<br />
from 1969. This is, in economic terms, financial<br />
terms, from companies' point <strong>of</strong> view, what is really<br />
happening in the hemisphere ... <strong>South</strong> America as a<br />
unit, as a group <strong>of</strong> countries, is sort <strong>of</strong> left over, and<br />
now we decided to do something about that ... Our<br />
shared geography, history, values point out to a<br />
unit, an integrated part <strong>of</strong> the world ... This is<br />
beginning, as Brazil sees it, to create a new identity<br />
<strong>of</strong> the region with a common agenda, and with<br />
geo-economic concerns ± not geopolitical concerns<br />
± ... because the motivation <strong>of</strong> all this is<br />
mainly the economy, trade, finance, but not<br />
exclusively, because there are political considerations<br />
as well ... (Barbosa 2000). (See table 1.)<br />
The main topics <strong>of</strong> the agenda were: strengthening<br />
<strong>of</strong> democracy; expansion <strong>of</strong> trade; development <strong>of</strong><br />
integration infrastructure; combating illicit drugs and<br />
related crimes; information, science and technology.<br />
The particular objectives <strong>of</strong> Brazil were to strengthen<br />
the links among the countries <strong>of</strong> <strong>South</strong> America,<br />
improve the utilization <strong>of</strong> regional energy, communications,<br />
transport and trade resources, and strengthen<br />
regional integration by ensuring support for this at<br />
62 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who hosted the<br />
<strong>South</strong> American Summit<br />
Photo: Fritz van Rensburg<br />
the highest levels. Brazil borders all but two <strong>of</strong> the<br />
countries <strong>of</strong> <strong>South</strong> America (the exceptions are Chile<br />
and Ecuador), and has by far the largest economy and<br />
population in the region. The Brazilian GDP in<br />
purchasing power parity terms is just over US$ 1<br />
trillion (1999 estimate ± CIA World Fact Book 2000)<br />
with a population <strong>of</strong> 168 million.<br />
Decisions reached at the summit 3<br />
Various decisions were reached by the Presidents at<br />
the summit. With regard to peace and security, it was<br />
agreed to establish a <strong>South</strong> American Zone <strong>of</strong> Peace<br />
and that the dialogue on security in the sub-continent<br />
be deepened. Furthermore, the countries <strong>of</strong> Mercosul<br />
and CAN, together with Chile, Guyana and Suriname<br />
agreed to establish a mechanism for political dialogue,<br />
the first meeting <strong>of</strong> which will take place in Bolivia in<br />
the near future.<br />
It was unanimously agreed that the maintenance <strong>of</strong><br />
the rule <strong>of</strong> law and a strict respect for the democratic<br />
system was a precondition for attendance at future<br />
<strong>South</strong> American summits. This point is referred to as<br />
the `democracy clause'. In addition it was agreed that<br />
political consultations will be held in the event <strong>of</strong> a<br />
threat <strong>of</strong> the disruption <strong>of</strong> democracy in the region.<br />
Concerning human rights and social issues, consensus<br />
was reached that programmes <strong>of</strong> co-operation<br />
aimed at strengthening national institutions responsible<br />
for protecting human rights be identified. At the<br />
same time, a public action programme aimed at<br />
addressing income distribution disparities was proposed.<br />
Another agreement was to establish information<br />
exchange and co-operation mechanisms,<br />
enhancing the safety <strong>of</strong> individuals, and allowing<br />
them to fully exercise their citizenship.<br />
With regard to trade and investment, agreement was<br />
reached that Mercosul and the Andean Community <strong>of</strong><br />
Nations would begin negotiations to create a free<br />
trade area as soon as possible, but at any event before<br />
January 2002, and to create a broader economic and<br />
TABLE 1<br />
TRADING BLOCS OF THE AMERICAS<br />
This table illustrates the strength <strong>of</strong> the trade blocs already in existence in the Americas, and what a union <strong>of</strong> all<br />
<strong>South</strong> American countries into one group would mean.<br />
Blocs<br />
GDP in<br />
US$ million<br />
%<strong>of</strong><br />
Continent's<br />
Total<br />
Population<br />
in million<br />
%<strong>of</strong><br />
Continent's<br />
Total<br />
NAFTA 9 202 85 403 50<br />
MERCOSUL 1 141 10 212 26<br />
ANDEAN<br />
COUNTRIES<br />
CENTRAL<br />
AMERICA<br />
SOUTH<br />
AMERICA<br />
289 3 107 13<br />
127 1 69 8<br />
1 516 14 337 42<br />
Source: L'Expansion ± L'Atlas de la Croissance Jan/2000 in Veja 6 September 2000, p. 49<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 63
trade area in <strong>South</strong> America, in accordance with the<br />
principle <strong>of</strong> `open regionalism'. In addition it was<br />
agreed to intensify the co-ordination <strong>of</strong> the <strong>South</strong><br />
American countries' negotiating positions on the<br />
proposed Free Trade Area <strong>of</strong> the Americas (FTAA).<br />
Also, ministers are to co-ordinate proposals for<br />
establishing a <strong>South</strong> American consultative forum<br />
which would identify joint actions in the areas <strong>of</strong> trade<br />
and investment, to deepen integration in the region. In<br />
parallel with the summit there was a meeting <strong>of</strong><br />
entrepreneurs from the various countries.<br />
An `Action Plan for Integrating Regional Infrastructure<br />
in <strong>South</strong> America' was attached to the final<br />
communique and it was agreed that the IDB and other<br />
financial institutions would seek to implement these<br />
proposals. Bilateral and sub-regional infrastructure<br />
projects are to be identified and are to involve the<br />
private sector and multilateral financial institutions. A<br />
ministerial meeting was to be held in Uruguay late in<br />
2000 on the expansion and modernization <strong>of</strong> infrastructure<br />
in <strong>South</strong> America.<br />
The Brazilian government agreed to establish a<br />
<strong>South</strong> American fund to encourage scientific and<br />
technical co-operation in the sub-continent.<br />
Not least <strong>of</strong> the issues under discussion was that <strong>of</strong><br />
drugs and organized crime. Here, closer co-operation<br />
in intelligence, policing, control <strong>of</strong> illegal arms,<br />
precursor chemicals and money laundering was<br />
pledged.<br />
Plan Colombia<br />
However there was one important topic <strong>of</strong> discussion<br />
which was not explicitly on the agenda ± Plan<br />
Colombia.<br />
Nearly half <strong>of</strong> Colombia's territory is dominated by<br />
leftist guerrillas, narcotraffickers and right-wing paramilitaries.<br />
The Colombian government requested<br />
financial and military assistance from the US, which<br />
agreed to aid <strong>of</strong> US$ 1,3 billion, to be used against<br />
drug production and trafficking. Three special antidrugs<br />
battalions are being formed in the Colombian<br />
Army, with US training, equipment and finance,<br />
which will be deployed in the main coca producing<br />
areas <strong>of</strong> the country to assist in the destruction <strong>of</strong> coca<br />
plantations and cocaine producing laboratories. These<br />
regions are also those most dominated by the<br />
guerrillas. This has given rise to fears throughout the<br />
region that `Plan Colombia' will escalate the conflict<br />
in that country and have serious spill-over effects for<br />
its neighbours, namely Ecuador, Peru, Venezuela,<br />
Brazil and, in next door Central America, Panama.<br />
Many in these countries ± and some in their governments,<br />
notably Venezuela, view this American aid as<br />
amounting to a `vietnamization' <strong>of</strong> the region. Clearly<br />
the situation in Colombia became the most explosive<br />
item under discussion. The situation has forced Brazil,<br />
which shares a 1 000 km border with Colombia, to<br />
dramatically increase its border defence and security<br />
measures in the Amazon region (Veja 2000:43).<br />
Although, at the end <strong>of</strong> the summit, the Presidents<br />
signed a `Declaration <strong>of</strong> Support for the Peace Process<br />
in Colombia', affirming that the summit had enhanced<br />
the spirit <strong>of</strong> co-operation, and that a more effective<br />
integration <strong>of</strong> the region would render a positive<br />
contribution to the advancement <strong>of</strong> the peace process<br />
in Colombia, they did not endorse the military aspects<br />
<strong>of</strong> Plan Colombia.<br />
Brazil's role<br />
There is no doubt that Brazil (as represented by its<br />
President and senior <strong>of</strong>ficials <strong>of</strong> the Foreign Ministry)<br />
actively seeks to curb any designs <strong>of</strong> the US to extend<br />
its influence throughout the Americas by means <strong>of</strong> the<br />
FTAA, which is planned to be operational by 2005. At<br />
the same time, Brazil indefatigably argues against<br />
protectionist measures by developed countries which<br />
discriminate against developing nations:<br />
<strong>South</strong> American Presidents in BrasõÂlia: first time in history<br />
Photo: courtesy Veja, 6 September 2000, pp. 42±43<br />
64 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
Guyana<br />
Guyana<br />
dedicated a cover story to the event describing the<br />
summit as `the first step in the construction <strong>of</strong> a <strong>South</strong><br />
American bloc which could confront American hegemony<br />
in the Continent' (Veja 2000:42). The latter<br />
stated that `today an increasingly confident and<br />
assertive Brazil is emerging as both an American<br />
partner and rival in Latin America, steering its own<br />
course on political and economic matters' (Rohter<br />
2000).<br />
Nor was the significance <strong>of</strong> the summit lost on<br />
Washington. The US ambassador to Brazil, Anthony<br />
Harrington, said that:<br />
Brazil has reached a level <strong>of</strong> international and<br />
regional interest unprecedented in its history. The<br />
country is today the spokesman <strong>of</strong> the developing<br />
world, while also having a seat in important First<br />
World forums (Veja 2000:43).<br />
We share a common interest in struggling against<br />
the protectionist barriers that limit the access our<br />
products have to the markets <strong>of</strong> the developed<br />
countries (Cardoso 2000).<br />
The Brazilians do not regard an integrated <strong>South</strong><br />
America as an alternative to the FTAA, but rather as a<br />
political effort to consolidate the <strong>South</strong> American<br />
Continent as a unified partner in the FTAA negotiations.<br />
This would only increase their bargaining<br />
power. Furthermore, the commitment to democratic<br />
values and the rule <strong>of</strong> law should be seen as the<br />
seminal aspect <strong>of</strong> the summit (O Estado de SaÄo Paulo,<br />
29 August 2000).<br />
The Brazilian authorities played down any leadership<br />
aspirations on the part <strong>of</strong> Brazil. When asked,<br />
they would refer to the summit merely as a `meeting'.<br />
The light agenda <strong>of</strong> the summit was designed to give<br />
ample opportunity to the <strong>South</strong> American Presidents<br />
to meet informally with each other and to attend<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficial social functions. It was as if the Heads <strong>of</strong> State<br />
had been invited to `an academic tea party' (Veja<br />
2000:42)<br />
To expect this first <strong>South</strong> American summit to make<br />
dramatic progress towards solving the problems <strong>of</strong> the<br />
sub-continent is clearly unrealistic. Necessarily there<br />
was a large symbolic element in the meeting.<br />
Unfortunately, misperceptions occurred, such as the<br />
article published in the prestigious Latin American<br />
Weekly Report (5 September 2000), in which it is<br />
implied that the summit achieved little.<br />
However, Veja and The New York Times both<br />
understood the importance <strong>of</strong> the event. The former<br />
And Riordan Roett, director <strong>of</strong> the Western Hemisphere<br />
Programme at Johns Hopkins <strong>University</strong>,<br />
wrote that:<br />
It is clearly the judgement that the continent is now<br />
ready for Brazil to assume a broader, more dynamic<br />
leadership role in regional affairs. And it is now<br />
understood in <strong>South</strong> America that the regional card<br />
to play is one that is led from BrasõÂlia (Rohter<br />
2000).<br />
Conclusions<br />
It is clear that the summit brought three new<br />
phenomena to the fore in the international political<br />
arena. Firstly, a new assertiveness in Brazilian Foreign<br />
policy, for the first time showing the world that Brazil<br />
is willing and able to take on a leadership role not only<br />
in the hemisphere, but also in the developing world.<br />
Secondly, the countries <strong>of</strong> <strong>South</strong> America, especially<br />
Spanish-speaking <strong>South</strong> America, where balkanization<br />
has hitherto been the rule, are now coming<br />
together in an initiative which could strengthen the<br />
whole continent.<br />
Thirdly, Portuguese-speaking Brazil and the Spanish-speaking<br />
countries, which before had limited<br />
interaction with each other, are now establishing a<br />
new community. The inclusion <strong>of</strong> the two small<br />
northern tier countries is another positive new step.<br />
In the words <strong>of</strong> President Cardoso:<br />
Thus my vision for the <strong>South</strong> America <strong>of</strong> this<br />
coming century is one <strong>of</strong> a vibrant region, guided<br />
by the common ideals <strong>of</strong> liberty and justice,<br />
increasingly prosperous and integrated, as well as<br />
fully capable <strong>of</strong> confronting the challenges <strong>of</strong> the<br />
knowledge society (Cardoso 2000).<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 65
NOTES<br />
1 The Heads <strong>of</strong> State present at the summit were: the host, President Fernando Henrique Cardoso <strong>of</strong> Brazil and the Heads <strong>of</strong><br />
State <strong>of</strong> Argentina, Fernando de la Ru a; Bolivia, Hugo Ba nzer Sua rez; Chile, Ricardo Lagos Escobar; Colombia, Andre s<br />
Pastrana Arango; Ecuador, Gustavo Noboa; Guyana, Bharrat Jagdeo; Paraguay, Luis Angel Gonza lez Macchi; Peru, Alberto<br />
Fujimori; Suriname, Runaldo Ronald Venetiaan; Uruguay, Jorge Batlle IbanÄ ez; and Venezuela, Hugo Cha vez. In addition<br />
Mexico, a North American country, had observer status at the summit. Various international institutions and organizations<br />
such as the IDB (Inter-American Development Bank), ALADI (Latin American Integration Association), SELA (Latin<br />
American Economic System), CEPAL (Economic Commission for Latin America) and Parlatino (Latin American Parliament)<br />
also attended as observers.<br />
2 French Guyana, albeit geographically in <strong>South</strong> America, did not take part, as it is a province <strong>of</strong> France and not an independent<br />
country.<br />
3 Based on the document `The First <strong>South</strong> American Heads <strong>of</strong> State Summit ended today, September 1st, in BrasõÂ lia' published<br />
on the web by the Brazilian Embassy in Washington DC. See: http://www.brasilemb.org/policy/summit2000/final_1.htm.<br />
REFERENCES<br />
Barbosa, Rubens. 2000. Address on `<strong>South</strong> American Heads <strong>of</strong> State Summit' Washington: National Press Club,<br />
1st September.<br />
Cardoso, Fernando Henrique. 2000. `Brazil and a New <strong>South</strong> America' (published in Portuguese) Valor 30 August.<br />
CIA World Fact Book 2000.<br />
Garcõ a, Enrique. 2000. `Um Marco Histo rico' Correio Braziliense 30 August.<br />
Latin American Weekly Report 2000 `BrasõÂ lia summit under-performs' WR-00-35, 5 September, p. 414.<br />
O Estado de SaÄo Paulo 2000, Editorial, 29 August.<br />
Rohter, Larry. 2000. `Brazil Begins to Take on the World Stage' The New York Times 30 August.<br />
Veja 2000. `O Brasil diz naÄ o' ano 33, n8 36 pp 42±49.<br />
66 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
The current YanomamoÈ scandal:<br />
Neel, Chagnon et al<br />
by Chris van Vuuren<br />
Senior Lecturer<br />
Department <strong>of</strong> Anthropology and Archaeology, Unisa<br />
Chris van Vuuren<br />
American anthropologist Napoleon Chagnon (YanomamoÈ:<br />
The fierce people 1968, `77, `83, `92, `97) has<br />
been the target <strong>of</strong> academic criticism (starting in<br />
1979) which culminated in a number <strong>of</strong> discourses<br />
and debates (see Van Vuuren in Unisa Latin American<br />
Report 10(2) 1994). To summarize these: he was<br />
accused by anthropologists such as Da Cunha and<br />
Ramos <strong>of</strong> portraying the YanomamoÈ <strong>of</strong> Venezuela and<br />
Brazil as `fierce' and `war-like' which, it was argued,<br />
provided governments and garimpeiros with an<br />
excuse to wilfully attack and terminate these tribal<br />
communities. Secondly, he was accused <strong>of</strong> advocating<br />
neo-Darwinist `survival <strong>of</strong> the fittest' theories with<br />
reference to the so-called sexual rewards for revengeand-kill<br />
warriors (so-called unokais)<br />
Now, even worse, he is implicated in a major<br />
scandal which might cause anthropology and the<br />
American Anthropological Association (AAA), in<br />
particular, long term damage. An investigative journalist<br />
named Patrick Tierney is publishing a book<br />
(sometime in October 2000) `Darkness in El Dorado'<br />
in which he claims that Chagnon, Tim Asch (the<br />
visual anthropologist who made Chagnon's YanomamoÈ<br />
films (`The Axe Fight' and others) and geneticist<br />
Dr James Neel have conducted medical experiments<br />
under the YanamamoÈ for close to 35 years.<br />
Among other gross human rights violations Neel is<br />
said to have injected YanamamoÈ with radioactive<br />
iodine isotopes and might also have been the cause <strong>of</strong><br />
the measles epidemic in 1968 which saw hundreds or<br />
even thousands <strong>of</strong> YanomamoÈ perishing. He alleges<br />
that Neel injected the YanomamoÈ with a virulent<br />
vaccine called Edmonson B which caused or worsened<br />
the epidemic. Neel's experiments carried the<br />
support <strong>of</strong> the US Atomic Energy Commission. Neel<br />
worked at the Center for Human Genetics at Ann<br />
Arbor (Michigan <strong>University</strong>) at the time. Intrigued by<br />
the notion <strong>of</strong> `innate leadership' and reproductive<br />
success as Chagnon coined it, Neel believed that the<br />
isolated Amazonian YanamamoÈ population would<br />
serve as the ideal springboard for his experiments<br />
and theory.<br />
Tierney alleges that Chagnon and Neel worked<br />
closely together. He also alleges that Chagnon's<br />
obsession with Hobbesian human savagery spurred<br />
him on to invite Asch to film a YanamamoÈ axe fight<br />
which the former enacted, thus adding to the `fierce'<br />
image portrayal. In fact, it is alleged that Chagnon's<br />
staging <strong>of</strong> aggression aggravated warfare indirectly in<br />
the region. Tierney also refers to Chagnon's sexual<br />
abuse <strong>of</strong> YanomamoÈ women as well as French<br />
anthropologist Jacques Lizot's `harem <strong>of</strong> Yanomami<br />
boys that he keeps, and showers with presents in<br />
exchange for sexual favours'.<br />
Since the initial response to Tierney's manuscript by<br />
Terry Turner and Leslie Sonsel <strong>of</strong> the AAA, and on<br />
which the above summary is based, many other<br />
responses emerged from around the globe, some in<br />
defence <strong>of</strong> Neel, Asch and Chagnon. Chagnon himself<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 67
efuted all claims, once more saying it borders on<br />
media sensation (in a letter to the weekly Time<br />
magazine).<br />
A visual anthropologist named Peter Biella studied<br />
the `Axe fight' and could find nothing wrong which<br />
would harm the integrity <strong>of</strong> the late Tim Asch. He in<br />
fact claims that Asch always remained critical <strong>of</strong><br />
Chagnon's obsession with YanomamoÈ violence.<br />
Gregory Finnegan (Harvard <strong>University</strong>) a close<br />
colleague and former student <strong>of</strong> Tim Asch at Brandeis<br />
<strong>University</strong>, and who knew most <strong>of</strong> Asch's films on the<br />
YanomamoÈ , concludes as follows: `Everyone in the<br />
YanomamoÈ -studies communities is working with<br />
notions <strong>of</strong> human nature and global systems that<br />
affect how they view each other's portrayals <strong>of</strong> the<br />
YanomamoÈ . Since there is no answer without a<br />
question, and theories, even implicit ones, determine<br />
questions, Chagnon and all <strong>of</strong> us necessarily ``cook''<br />
our ``raw'' data in the act <strong>of</strong> acquiring it. But that's not<br />
the same as ``cooking the data'' in the ways that<br />
Tierney is said to allege'.<br />
From his home base university at Ann Arbor,<br />
Michigan <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong>ficially defended the late Dr<br />
Neels's academic scientific integrity and could find<br />
nothing to support the Tierney accusations.<br />
In the same vein historian Susan Lindee, anthropologist<br />
Alan Fix and Jeffrey Long (a student <strong>of</strong> Neel)<br />
have sought to refute most <strong>of</strong> the allegations against<br />
Neel.<br />
Thus, the last word has not been spoken. One can<br />
only assume that once the book is on the market more<br />
responses will magnify and more `cans <strong>of</strong> worms' will<br />
be opened. The problem is that neither Neel nor Asch<br />
is alive to tell their stories.<br />
68 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
UCLAS Reports<br />
Cultural studies highlighted at<br />
Comparative Literature Conference in Brazil<br />
by Ze lia Roel<strong>of</strong>se-Campbell<br />
Head, Unisa Centre for Latin American Studies<br />
Salvador, the capital city <strong>of</strong> the State <strong>of</strong> Bahia in Brazil,<br />
hosted the VII Congress <strong>of</strong> ABRALIC * (Associac,aÄ o<br />
Brasileira de Literatura Comparada ± Brazilian Association<br />
<strong>of</strong> Comparative Literature) from 25 to 28 July<br />
2000.<br />
I participated and delivered a paper at the conference,<br />
thanks to a grant from Unisa's Research and<br />
Bursaries Committee and the Division for Social<br />
Sciences <strong>of</strong> the National Research Foundation.<br />
The scale <strong>of</strong> the conference was shown by the fact<br />
that more than 1 300 papers were presented. The<br />
majority <strong>of</strong> participants came from the host country,<br />
Brazil. As Brazil has 27 States (provinces), there were<br />
representatives from different regions and backgrounds.<br />
The other countries represented were:<br />
Argentina, Belgium, Canada, Chile, France, Germany,<br />
India, Italy, Netherlands, Peru, Portugal, <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong><br />
(represented by myself), Spain, United Kingdom,<br />
United States, Uruguay and Venezuela (18 countries<br />
in all). This is unsurprising, given that the biennial<br />
Congress <strong>of</strong> Abralic is the most important and allembracing<br />
event in the area <strong>of</strong> comparative literature<br />
and criticism organized in Brazil. It serves as a forum<br />
for dialogue between Brazilian, Latin American, North<br />
American, European and other researchers in the field<br />
coming to grips with topical issues and problems. The<br />
aim <strong>of</strong> this particular congress was to debate<br />
important contemporary issues, such as identity; as<br />
a consequence <strong>of</strong> globalization, identities can be said<br />
to be less monolithic, leading to fragmentation.<br />
The main theme <strong>of</strong> the congress ± Terras e Gentes<br />
(Lands and Peoples) ± was set against a background<br />
<strong>of</strong> the end <strong>of</strong> the millennium, namely a time <strong>of</strong> stocktaking,<br />
evaluations and prospects. This was further<br />
emphasized by the commemorations surrounding the<br />
500th anniversary <strong>of</strong> Brazil's `discovery', and discourses<br />
on the nation-state in a context <strong>of</strong> economic<br />
ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ<br />
* ABRALIC is affiliated to ICLA (International Comparative Literature Association). The 13th ICLA Congress took place in <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, at Unisa<br />
from 13 to 19 August 2000.<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 69
Pr<strong>of</strong> Stuart Hall<br />
Photo by Welton ArauÂjo, courtesy <strong>of</strong> Correio da Bahia<br />
and cultural globalization. The setting, in Salvador,<br />
the most `<strong>Africa</strong>n' city outside <strong>Africa</strong>, also led to the<br />
themes <strong>of</strong> colonial memory and <strong>Africa</strong>n descent.<br />
The sub-themes <strong>of</strong> the congress were divided as<br />
follows:<br />
(i) Power, colony, national identity, transnationality;<br />
(ii) Travels, diasporas, migrations;<br />
(iii) Ethnicity, gender, class;<br />
(iv) Memory and rituals<br />
(v) Literature, media and identities<br />
These themes were discussed in a total <strong>of</strong> 224<br />
sessions.<br />
Cultural studies played a central role in the congress.<br />
It became clear that a fusion is taking place between<br />
literature and cultural studies. A sharp dialogue is<br />
taking place between literature and culture. The aim,<br />
according to Abralic's vice-president, Pr<strong>of</strong>. Eneida Leal<br />
Cunha is `to perceive and debate literature in its<br />
political, ethical and aesthetical dimension'.<br />
Academics <strong>of</strong> the calibre <strong>of</strong> Stuart Hall (Open<br />
<strong>University</strong>), Paul Gilroy (Yale <strong>University</strong>) and Gayatri<br />
Spivak (Columbia <strong>University</strong>) were prominent speakers<br />
at the conference.<br />
Jamaican-born Stuart Hall gave one <strong>of</strong> two keynote<br />
addresses at the opening and set the tone. As<br />
doyen <strong>of</strong> cultural studies in the world, he focused on<br />
the question <strong>of</strong> cultural hybridism and its consequences,<br />
positive and negative. In his lecture ±<br />
`Diasporas and the logic <strong>of</strong> cultural translation' , he<br />
argued against closed models in studying such<br />
themes as cultural identity, because those who feel<br />
victimized by the diasporas <strong>of</strong> their ancestors cannot<br />
`return home'. Globalization becomes a strong factor,<br />
side by side with the intervention <strong>of</strong> history in the lives<br />
<strong>of</strong> people.<br />
Themes related to diasporas, race and ethnicity<br />
were further discussed. In this regard, the location <strong>of</strong><br />
the congress was excellent. Bahia epitomizes all these<br />
aspects in a visual and audible manner. Cultural life is<br />
extremely rich in Salvador and one can have crosscultural<br />
experiences by the minute, simply by walking<br />
along the streets <strong>of</strong> the historical centre <strong>of</strong> the city.<br />
The focus <strong>of</strong> the entire congress was interdisciplinary.<br />
In fact, the blurring <strong>of</strong> boundaries which were<br />
previously strict led to lively and fruitful crosspolination.<br />
Spivak even suggested that Comparative<br />
Literature might ally itself with Area Studies and<br />
Ethnic Studies. Literature was juxtaposed with<br />
Anthropology, Philosophy, History, Politics, Religion,<br />
Education, and so on, creating a panorama <strong>of</strong> ideas<br />
which complemented each other.<br />
The study <strong>of</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n literature, Afro-Brazilian<br />
cultural expressions and obviously Brazilian diaspora<br />
was <strong>of</strong>ten expressed in studies <strong>of</strong> `memory construction'.<br />
Travel literature was also tackled, as it highlights the<br />
meeting <strong>of</strong> two worlds, people in transit and migration.<br />
My own lecture formed part <strong>of</strong> the session entitled<br />
SertoÄes, Canudos: releituras atuais (Backlands, Canudos,<br />
contemporary re-readings), under the subtheme<br />
`Power, colony, national identity, transnationality'.<br />
The general consensus among the participants was<br />
that this congress opened new avenues and new paths<br />
for interdisciplinary and transdisciplinary co-operation.<br />
There was no sense <strong>of</strong> rigidness or antagonism as<br />
themes were thrashed out from different perspectives.<br />
A definite sense <strong>of</strong> enrichment emerged, which will no<br />
doubt form a foundation for future co-operation.<br />
The conference proceedings were <strong>of</strong> direct relevance<br />
to academic debate in <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
A typical Bahian Woman dressed<br />
in traditional <strong>Africa</strong>n attire<br />
70 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
The similarities between <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> and Brazil,<br />
especially Bahia, are striking. ** The issues pertaining<br />
to diasporas, ethnicity and especially transnationality<br />
are very important for <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> as are discussions<br />
on racism, gender and class. Globalization, a much<br />
debated theme in <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, was in the background<br />
<strong>of</strong> a great number <strong>of</strong> discussions at the Abralic<br />
conference, raising the issue <strong>of</strong> nationality as a<br />
counterpart to this phenomenon.<br />
It was worthwhile to witness the debate on<br />
disciplinary boundaries, as this is currently a burning<br />
issue in <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, arising out <strong>of</strong> restructuring<br />
processes in tertiary education.<br />
The abolishing <strong>of</strong> boundaries in cultural and<br />
national expressions is a reality which permeates all<br />
spheres <strong>of</strong> endeavour, creating an identity vacuum. A<br />
search for a new identity, merging the old and new are<br />
<strong>of</strong> the utmost importance, especially in the new <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong> in its quest towards a national identity which<br />
has a right to be singular in spite <strong>of</strong> fragmentation.<br />
All in all, the congress was a stimulating and<br />
rewarding experience.<br />
I should like to express my gratitude to Unisa's<br />
Research and Bursaries Committee and the National<br />
Research Foundation for affording me this invaluable<br />
opportunity.<br />
ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ<br />
** The Unisa Centre for Latin American Studies has been consistently working towards creating an awareness <strong>of</strong> these similarities, as well as those<br />
with other Latin American countries, for the past 17 years.<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 71
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Navy participates in fleet<br />
review commemorating 500th anniversary<br />
<strong>of</strong> the discovery <strong>of</strong> Brazil<br />
by Keith Cambell<br />
Political analyst and journalist<br />
The <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Navy's hydrographic ship, SAS<br />
Protea, was one <strong>of</strong> 29 ships from eleven nations<br />
which participated in a fleet review in Guanabara Bay,<br />
Rio de Janeiro, on 30 April 2000, as part <strong>of</strong> festivities<br />
to mark the 500th anniversary <strong>of</strong> the discovery <strong>of</strong><br />
Brazil. The Protea left the <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Navy's main<br />
base at Simonstown, south <strong>of</strong> Cape Town, on 14<br />
April, arriving in Rio on 26 April. The captains <strong>of</strong> all<br />
the ships participating in the review were briefed on<br />
the morning <strong>of</strong> 28 April, on such matters as the route<br />
to be followed, the order <strong>of</strong> ships in the review, and so<br />
on.<br />
The review fleet included modern warships, naval<br />
auxiliaries, sail training ships, and replicas <strong>of</strong> 15th/<br />
SAS Protea participating in the fleet review<br />
16th century Portuguese vessels. Apart from <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong>, the foreign countries participating were the<br />
US, which sent a frigate, the UK, with a destroyer and<br />
tanker, Venezuela, with a frigate and a tank landing<br />
ship, Argentina, Spain and the Netherlands, each <strong>of</strong><br />
which was represented by a frigate, Poland, whose<br />
representative was a training ship, Uruguay, with a sail<br />
training ship, and <strong>of</strong> course Portugal, which sent a<br />
couple <strong>of</strong> replica sailing vessels and its Navy's sail<br />
training ship, the Sagres. Apart from four sailing<br />
vessels ± three civilian and the Navy's new sail training<br />
ship Cisne Branco ± the Brazilian Navy contingent<br />
comprised one destroyer, five frigates, a corvette, a<br />
submarine, a tank landing ship, a survey ship, and a<br />
museum ship. In addition, nine helicopters participated<br />
in a fly-past.<br />
The review took the form <strong>of</strong> a sail past, with the<br />
ships in line-ahead formation and divided into two<br />
divisions. The first division comprised a Brazilian<br />
frigate (which was in the lead) followed by the eight<br />
sailing ships (or tall ships as they are nowadays<br />
called). Then there was the helicopter flypast, and<br />
finally the sail past <strong>of</strong> the modern naval vessels.The<br />
salute was taken by Brazilian President Fernando<br />
Henrique Cardoso, from a review stand at the Escola<br />
Naval in Rio de Janeiro.<br />
Captain L D Reeder, commander <strong>of</strong> the Protea,<br />
reported that his crew had been proud to represent<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong> at the review and enjoyed themselves<br />
thoroughly. The reception received by the ship in<br />
72 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
Brazilian fragata Bosisio participating in the fleet review<br />
Brazilian submarine Tonelero passing the Escola Naval<br />
(Naval Academy)<br />
Brazil had been very good, and the fleet review had<br />
been a well-planned and auspicious occasion. The<br />
Protea's crew were also complemented on the<br />
appearance <strong>of</strong> their ship.<br />
While in Rio, the opportunity was taken by the<br />
ship's survey <strong>of</strong>ficers and ratings (enlisted men) to<br />
visit the Brazilian Navy's Directorate <strong>of</strong> Hydrography<br />
and Navigation. The Brazilians showed great interest<br />
in the SAN hydrographic service and, in return, freely<br />
answered the questions posed by the <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>ns.<br />
The result was a better mutual understanding. The<br />
Protea's crew also interacted with crews from other<br />
participating nations, especially the Argentines, British<br />
and Dutch.<br />
The Protea left Rio on 3 May, arriving in Simonstown<br />
on 15 May. Advantage was taken <strong>of</strong> both transoceanic<br />
voyages to undertake training <strong>of</strong> junior<br />
<strong>of</strong>ficers and survey ratings.<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 73
IDB News<br />
On the right path *<br />
Hondurans make steady progress in reconstruction<br />
after Hurricane Mitch<br />
by Peter Bate<br />
HUNDREDS OF MILES OF ROADS REPAIRED<br />
Bridges, schools, hospitals and water systems rebuilt.<br />
A gradual recovery in farming and manufacturing<br />
output. Inflation under control. Reforms underway in<br />
key areas <strong>of</strong> the state. A revitalized democracy in<br />
which civil society groups are playing an increasingly<br />
active role. All in all, it is quite a showing for a poor<br />
country that had been brought to its knees late in<br />
1998 by Hurricane Mitch.<br />
These are some <strong>of</strong> the achievements the Honduran<br />
government and its people exhibited at a February<br />
meeting with delegates from donor countries and<br />
multilateral institutions chaired by the Inter-American<br />
Development Bank. The gathering, known as the<br />
Consultative Group for the Reconstruction and<br />
Transformation <strong>of</strong> Honduras, assembled in Tegucigalpa<br />
to gauge how Hondurans were recovering from<br />
the worst natural disaster in their history.<br />
The international community's assessment was<br />
largely positive, considering the destruction wrought<br />
by the massive flooding and mudslides triggered by<br />
Mitch and the adverse weather conditions Central<br />
America suffered during 1999.<br />
`Honduras has legitimate reasons to feel proud <strong>of</strong><br />
the promising beginning its national reconstruction<br />
and transformation plan has had,' said the meeting's<br />
chairman, Miguel E. MartõÂ nez, the IDB's manager for<br />
regional operations for a group <strong>of</strong> countries that<br />
include Central America. `We have also seen that the<br />
international community's solidarity is turning into<br />
concrete accomplishments. Certainly, much remains<br />
to be done, but I am sure that I am not mistaken when<br />
I say that Hondurans and their friends from around the<br />
world are building solid foundations for a better<br />
Honduras,' he added.<br />
Nearly 6 000 Hondurans died and 8 000 were<br />
listed as missing due to the hurricane, which caused<br />
more than $3,6 billion in economic losses and<br />
infrastructure damage. In less than one week, hundreds<br />
<strong>of</strong> thousands <strong>of</strong> Hondurans lost their homes,<br />
their land or their means <strong>of</strong> making a living, as the<br />
floods ruined crops and washed away the topsoil.<br />
In May 1999, the international community, at a<br />
meeting held in Stockholm, pledged to provide some<br />
$2,8 billion in humanitarian aid, long-term financing<br />
for reconstruction, and debt relief to support Hondurans'<br />
efforts to rebuild and modernize their nation. In<br />
return, Honduras pledged to observe the principles <strong>of</strong><br />
the Stockholm Declaration, which binds donors and<br />
beneficiaries to work together to fight poverty and<br />
promote growth within a framework <strong>of</strong> democracy<br />
and respect for human rights, transparency and good<br />
governance, decentralization and the reduction <strong>of</strong><br />
social and environmental vulnerabilities.<br />
Progress updates<br />
In Tegucigalpa, the Honduran government <strong>of</strong>fered<br />
detailed reports on the national reconstruction and<br />
transformation plans. The presentations included<br />
abundant information on the steps taken to secure<br />
financing for the projects and the progress achieved<br />
so far in implementing them in such areas as<br />
education, health, housing, agriculture, forestry, manufacturing,<br />
mining, tourism, financial services, roads,<br />
ports, airports, water and sanitation, energy and<br />
telecommunications.<br />
Honduran <strong>of</strong>ficials also briefed the visitors about<br />
the country's efforts to reduce poverty and environmental<br />
vulnerability and modernize its government<br />
institutions. They stressed the urgency <strong>of</strong> negotiating<br />
further relief <strong>of</strong> Honduras' $3,9 billion external debt,<br />
which President Carlos Roberto Flores called `one <strong>of</strong><br />
ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ<br />
*First published in IDB America, March±April 2000 and reprinted with the permission <strong>of</strong> the Inter-American Development Bank.<br />
74 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
International donors meet in Tegucigalpa<br />
the biggest obstacles to redeeming our people<br />
socially.'<br />
Delegates also received a report from a follow-up<br />
group formed by donor nations and multilateral<br />
agencies to monitor the implementation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
Honduran plan. The report praised the fact that social<br />
spending was being targeted to benefit the most<br />
vulnerable sectors, especially in rural areas; nevertheless,<br />
it urged the government to adopt specific<br />
policies to protect indigent women and children and<br />
indigenous groups. In the case <strong>of</strong> environmental<br />
vulnerability, it commended the draft legislation for<br />
land use and forestry management and the improvement<br />
<strong>of</strong> emergency preparedness, but found that<br />
Honduras still lacked the policies needed to prevent<br />
people from settling in high-risk areas.<br />
Another notable aspect <strong>of</strong> the February meeting<br />
was the enthusiastic participation <strong>of</strong> Honduras' civil<br />
society. While representatives <strong>of</strong> the private sector,<br />
organized labor, peasants, indigenous and Afro-Latin<br />
groups that took part in the discussions <strong>of</strong>ten took<br />
issue with the government ± and with each other ±<br />
their interventions were viewed by many as an<br />
indication <strong>of</strong> an invigorated democracy at work. In<br />
fact Honduran authorities acknowledged that civil<br />
society groups have called for sweeping reforms in the<br />
One block at a time:<br />
Honduras is still in the process <strong>of</strong> rebuilding housing and infrastructure in the aftermath <strong>of</strong> Hurricane Mitch<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 75
legislative, judiciary and executive branches <strong>of</strong> government,<br />
as well as the use <strong>of</strong> plebiscites and<br />
referendums.<br />
However, the limited disbursement <strong>of</strong> aid so far,<br />
compared with the sizeable pledges made in Stockholm,<br />
pointed to some bottlenecks. The IDB's<br />
MartõÂnez urged donors to work with Honduras to<br />
strengthen its ability to manage projects to speed up<br />
implementation.<br />
Need for transparency<br />
The Bank is working with the Honduran government<br />
to promote transparency and good governance. A<br />
central concern for Hondurans as well as for donors,<br />
the issue may weigh heavily in the Central American<br />
country's prospects <strong>of</strong> attracting more capital to<br />
modernize its economy. Last year, Honduras ranked<br />
low in the annual survey on perception <strong>of</strong> corruption<br />
conducted by Transparency International, a Berlinbased<br />
nongovernmental organization.<br />
The IDB and several donor nations plan to support<br />
Honduras' efforts to make its state procurement and<br />
contracts system more efficient and transparent. As<br />
initially drafted, the program would have two phases:<br />
a temporary one to monitor projects during the post-<br />
Mitch reconstruction period and a permanent one to<br />
promote the modernization <strong>of</strong> the Honduran system <strong>of</strong><br />
checks and balances.<br />
During the temporary plan, an international consulting<br />
firm would be hired to perfom random audits<br />
<strong>of</strong> reconstruction projects and check their technical,<br />
financial and administration performance. These inspections<br />
would be carried out in parallel to the<br />
existing controls that individual donors have for the<br />
projects they finance. The results <strong>of</strong> the audits would<br />
be released to the Honduran government, donors and<br />
the public. Given that some $2 billion could be spent<br />
on reconstruction efforts, such as auditing exercise<br />
could cost up to $30 million, the chief <strong>of</strong> the IDB's<br />
Procurement Policy and Coordination Office, Jorge<br />
Claro de la Maza, told delegates.<br />
The other phase ± to which the IDB could<br />
eventually commit some $14 million in s<strong>of</strong>t loans ±<br />
is aimed at allowing Honduras to acquire as much<br />
know-how and technology as possible from the<br />
international auditors. Under that part <strong>of</strong> the program,<br />
local <strong>of</strong>ficials involved in procurement and contracts<br />
would receive training, and new purchasing procedures<br />
would be developed and enforced across the<br />
Honduran public sector.<br />
While the potential cost <strong>of</strong> the project gave some<br />
delegates `sticker shock,' Claro de la Maza explained<br />
that the estimate was based on a survey <strong>of</strong> auditing<br />
firm fees. He also conceded that such controls are<br />
expensive ± except when compared with the alternative<br />
<strong>of</strong> not doing them.<br />
76 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
Soccer meets economics *<br />
Pele and Kissinger highlight seminar on<br />
sports and development<br />
by Peter Bate<br />
Soccer and development banking found some common<br />
ground at the Inter-American Development<br />
Bank's first-ever seminar on sports and development,<br />
held in Washington, D.C., in May.<br />
The event featured an impressive lineup, starting<br />
with Edson Arantes do Nascimento, or Pele , as the<br />
world's greatest soccer player is universally known.<br />
Backing up the former captain <strong>of</strong> the Brazilian<br />
national team was one <strong>of</strong> the world's most famous<br />
soccer fans, former U.S. secretary <strong>of</strong> state Henry<br />
Kissinger.<br />
Other speakers included the presidents <strong>of</strong> the<br />
football confederations <strong>of</strong> <strong>South</strong> America. North<br />
America, and the Carribean; U.S. Major League<br />
Soccer Commissioner Don Garber; and top executives<br />
from international sports marketing firms that have<br />
helped turn soccer into a huge business in the<br />
industrialized world.<br />
Brazil's most famous sports ambassador meets enthusiastic soccer fans outside the IDB's Washington, D.C., headquarters<br />
ÐÐÐÐÐÐÐÐ<br />
* First published in IDB America, May±June 2000 and reprinted with the permission <strong>of</strong> the Inter-American Development Bank.<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 77
`Soccer is a sport with multiple dimensions,' IDB<br />
President Enrique V. Iglesias told the participants. `It<br />
<strong>of</strong>fers opportunities because <strong>of</strong> its economic return,<br />
but it also is a sport whose popularity transcends<br />
class, race, religion, gender and educational background<br />
boundaries.<br />
Head table: ardent soccer fan Henry Kissinger with<br />
IDB President Iglesias and PeleÂ<br />
`This is why soccer is an important instrument for<br />
regional development and integration', Iglesias said.<br />
According to participants, soccer in Latin America<br />
has been a victim <strong>of</strong> the region's political instability,<br />
financial crises and social tensions. While <strong>South</strong><br />
Ameri-can countries have won the World Cup as<br />
many times as Europeans have, they have derived only<br />
minimal economic advantage from their excellence in<br />
this field.<br />
According to participants at the IDB seminar, Latin<br />
America can do much to make soccer a more pr<strong>of</strong>itable<br />
business. Pele , for example, sees potential for turning<br />
soccer into a major industry, largely by following the<br />
playbooks written over the past decade by the<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>essional leagues in Europe and the United States.<br />
But Pele , who rose from grinding poverty to become<br />
one <strong>of</strong> the world's best-paid athletes and later Brazil's<br />
sports minister, also highlighted the potential <strong>of</strong> sports<br />
to promote social as well as economic development.<br />
`In the United States, the sports industry generates<br />
about four percent <strong>of</strong> GDP. In Latin America, it barely<br />
represents one percent <strong>of</strong> output. If we could get to<br />
two percent, we could create a lot <strong>of</strong> jobs and<br />
opportunities,' he said.<br />
However, Pele added, while Latin America is quick<br />
to embrace changes in areas such as technology, it<br />
continues to regard soccer as a pastime ruled by raw<br />
passion rather than reasioned planning. Latin American<br />
soccer clubs are usually run as nonpr<strong>of</strong>it<br />
organizations. Major teams may give great performances<br />
on the field, but the clubs are constantly<br />
courting bankruptcy. Traditionally, the sport's <strong>of</strong>ficials<br />
tended to stave <strong>of</strong>f financial ruin by selling <strong>of</strong>f their<br />
best players to richer teams in other countries. In the<br />
worst cases, the teams become involved in shady or<br />
even illegal financial dealings.<br />
One <strong>of</strong> Pele 's main goals while he was sports<br />
minister was to pr<strong>of</strong>essionalize soccer club management<br />
in Brazil. `If you have pr<strong>of</strong>essionals running the<br />
sport as a business, it is much easier to stamp out<br />
corruption. Pr<strong>of</strong>essional managers are held accountable<br />
and they must account for every penny,' he said.<br />
According to Pele , Latin America's soccer federations<br />
are not much better run than the individual<br />
teams. Even seemingly straightforward duties such as<br />
setting a reasonable schedule <strong>of</strong> matches can turn out<br />
to be a daunting task in some countries.<br />
Nevertheless, there are some encouraging signs <strong>of</strong><br />
change. A few Brazilian clubs have started to choose<br />
the business model followed by major European<br />
teams. Flamengo <strong>of</strong> Rio de Janeiro has signed a<br />
management contract with ISL, a Swiss sports<br />
marketing company, and Corinthians <strong>of</strong> SaÄ o Paulo<br />
has brought in two U.S. firms as partners, The Muller<br />
Sports Group and the private investment company<br />
Hicks, Muse, Tate & Furst.<br />
By signing up partners with deep pockets to run the<br />
financial side, clubs can concentrate on what they do<br />
best: training teams to win. Meanwhile, businesssavvy<br />
entrepreneurs can negotiate lucrative contracts<br />
with broadcasters, advertisers, sponsors and companies<br />
interested in merchandising licenses.<br />
However, the sports business model may not<br />
generate phenomenal results in every single country.<br />
Heinz Schurtenberger, CEO <strong>of</strong> Switzerland's ISL,<br />
noted that in his own country top pr<strong>of</strong>essional soccer<br />
players earn but a fraction <strong>of</strong> the princely sums their<br />
colleagues command in the British, Italian, or Spanish<br />
leagues.<br />
How does the IDB fit into this picture? At the close<br />
<strong>of</strong> the conference, Iglesias said the Bank would have<br />
to draft its own game plan before it can start playing a<br />
larger role. However, he noted that soccer seemed like<br />
a natural fit in the myriad <strong>of</strong> social programs the IDB is<br />
promoting throughout the region, especially in the<br />
programs for at-risk children and youth it helps to<br />
finance in more than 30 cities.<br />
In partnership with clubs and other civil society<br />
organizations, these programs could be expanded to<br />
include sports, which, as Pele underscored, can be<br />
one <strong>of</strong> the best strategies to keep kids out <strong>of</strong> trouble.<br />
On the business side, Iglesias noted that the IDB<br />
supports for-pr<strong>of</strong>it ventures through its own private<br />
sector department and the Inter-American Investment<br />
Corporation, as well as in its lending through national<br />
development banks in the region. These could be<br />
potential sources <strong>of</strong> financing for pr<strong>of</strong>essionally<br />
managed clubs.<br />
Soccer authorities were quick to pick up on the<br />
Bank's interest. The first request came from Costa<br />
Rica's Football Federation, which would like the IDB<br />
to support the creation <strong>of</strong> a regional soccer training<br />
center in San Jose .<br />
78 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
UCLAS news in brief<br />
LATIN AMERICA AT SAITEX 2000<br />
The annual <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n International Trade Exhibition,<br />
Saitex, took place from 3 to 7 October 2000. The<br />
Latin American participation was dominated by Brazil,<br />
which had a 600 square metre pavilion at the show,<br />
with some 23 companies and institutions present ± the<br />
biggest ever Brazilian representation at Saitex. As<br />
usual, the main focus <strong>of</strong> the Brazilians was on small<br />
and even micro-businesses, with companies displaying<br />
machines specially developed in Brazil for microindustrialists,<br />
and production lines for small and<br />
medium-sized factories.<br />
The range <strong>of</strong> machines for micro-industries produced<br />
by Kilindas were first introduced into <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong> some three years ago. Initially, marketing<br />
focused on their disposable nappy and sanitary towel<br />
making machine, which has proven highly successful<br />
in the <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n market. Through their enthusiastic<br />
local agents, the Thomas Group <strong>of</strong> Companies,<br />
more and more Kilindas machines are being introduced<br />
to <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>, <strong>Africa</strong> and even Asia and the<br />
Middle East. These include the foil plate-making<br />
machine, the candle-making machine, and the shoe<br />
and sandal-making machine.<br />
Further up the scale, a small company named<br />
ExpansaÄ o generated enormous interest. ExpansaÄ o<br />
assembles and erects small to medium size production<br />
lines to two basic agricultural produce into processed<br />
products, allowing farmers to produce and sell their<br />
own brands <strong>of</strong> everything from animal feed to roasted,<br />
milled and packaged c<strong>of</strong>fee. The company has already<br />
enjoyed success in <strong>South</strong> and Central America and<br />
West <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
Half <strong>of</strong> the Brazilian pavilion was paid for by<br />
Sebrae, the SaÄ o Paulo agency which promotes small<br />
business in that state. Sebrae was also represented at<br />
Saitex 2000.<br />
Other Brazilian companies also displayed machinery<br />
for small businesses and vendors, or food products.<br />
Chile had a small pavilion with four companies<br />
represented ± mostly foodstuffs, but including an<br />
engineering company ± one <strong>of</strong> the specialities <strong>of</strong><br />
which is manufacturing wheelchairs ± and a minor<br />
technology, engineering and consulting company,<br />
CIMM Tecnologia y Servicios.<br />
Argentina was represented by a single company,<br />
specializing in sanitary products.<br />
Keith Campbell<br />
ARGENTINA AT AFRICA AEROSPACE AND<br />
DEFENCE 2000 AND SAAF 80<br />
From 5 to 9 September, Waterklo<strong>of</strong> Air Force Base in<br />
Pretoria was the scene both <strong>of</strong> `<strong>Africa</strong> Aerospace and<br />
Defence 2000', a defence and aerospace industry<br />
exposition, and the `SAAF 80', the <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Air<br />
Force's eightieth anniversary celebrations.<br />
They were attended by companies, air forces and air<br />
force representatives from all over the world, and both<br />
were ajudged highly successful.<br />
The most prominent Latin American participation<br />
was unquestionably that <strong>of</strong> Argentina ± the only Latin<br />
American country to send aircraft to AAD 2000 /<br />
SAAF 80. Two aircraft were sent: a US-built C-130<br />
Hercules transport, which carried the second, and<br />
more important aircraft: an Argentine-designed and<br />
built IA-63 Pampa (PAMPA) jet trainer.<br />
The Pampa was designed by the former Fa brica<br />
Militar de Aviones, which is now Lockhead Martin<br />
Argentina SA.<br />
The Pampa programme began in 1981. Flight tests<br />
were undertaken from 1984 and 1989, with series<br />
production <strong>of</strong> the first batch starting in 1987. By May<br />
1992 the Pampa was fully operational in an Argentine<br />
Air Force squadron. In all, including prototypes, the<br />
first batch numbered 18 aircraft. Recently, a second<br />
batch <strong>of</strong> 12 was ordered. In addition, the Argentine<br />
Navy is known to be interested in a dozen or so, fitted<br />
to fly from an aircraft carrier. Although Argentina does<br />
not possess its own carrier, it is able to train with<br />
Brazil's.<br />
The IA63 Pampa is a tandem two-seat, singleengined,<br />
high-wing basic and advanced training<br />
aircraft, which combines advanced design technology<br />
with structural simplicity. The aircraft's manoeuvreability<br />
was demonstrated daily in an impressive flying<br />
display by test pilot Major Ruben Lianza. The Pampa<br />
can also serve in the light attack role.<br />
Keith Campbell<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 79
1A-63 Pampa at Waterklo<strong>of</strong> Air Force Base, Pretoria<br />
1A-63 Pampa crossing the Andes<br />
80 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
PIANO PERFORMANCE AT UNIVERSITY OF<br />
PRETORIA, MUSAION<br />
Pianists Celia Roca and Susana Gutman were the<br />
performers at a concert at the Pretoria <strong>University</strong><br />
Musaion in August. The concert was held under the<br />
auspices <strong>of</strong> the Uruguayan embassy to commemorate<br />
the 175th anniversary <strong>of</strong> the declaration <strong>of</strong> the<br />
independence <strong>of</strong> Uruguay. The duo-pianists played<br />
with the fluency and communicative warmth this<br />
particular genre needs. They had a wide range <strong>of</strong><br />
dynamics, yet rarely did one feel that any detail was<br />
exaggerated.<br />
In the J. S. Bach adagio they performed with clarity.<br />
Teamwork was impeccable. They successfully revealed<br />
the inner beauties <strong>of</strong> the music. Lyricism<br />
predominated in Brahms' Variations on a theme <strong>of</strong><br />
Haydn. Their intriguing understatement <strong>of</strong> romantic<br />
rhetoric came as a pleasant surprise. It was a case <strong>of</strong><br />
inimitable charm produced with some lovely tone.<br />
The eloquence and subtlety <strong>of</strong> their playing were at<br />
once present in the set <strong>of</strong> variations. They avoided the<br />
rattling vacuity so <strong>of</strong>ten suggested and elicited a vital,<br />
yet sensitive execution. Their marvellous lucidity <strong>of</strong><br />
performance entailed, among other things, the application<br />
<strong>of</strong> a subtle range <strong>of</strong> quiet columns particularly<br />
in the recital statement <strong>of</strong> the theme.<br />
In the <strong>South</strong> American material the pianists played<br />
with predictable idiomatic panache, the Argentinian<br />
piece (Llanura) with uncanny ensemble and crispness,<br />
the two Uruguayan items for four hands, the first<br />
(Triste no 1) with ineffable grace and the second<br />
(Joropo) with rhythmic tautness.<br />
In Milhaud's Scaramouche the composer's sunny<br />
ebullience was projected with striking colour. Here<br />
was due efficiency coupled with the ingredient so<br />
pivotal to make this number work ± charm.<br />
The outer movements were fast, on the verge <strong>of</strong><br />
hectic, but with ensemble reasonably clean. The<br />
central Modere was suitably pensive.<br />
In Lutoslawsky's Variations on a theme <strong>of</strong> Paganini<br />
the two pianists thrilled with an exceptionally<br />
varied palette <strong>of</strong> sounds. Shading was bold, but not<br />
unduly harsh and contrasts grand in the extrovert<br />
passages.<br />
Riek van Rensburg<br />
Pretoria News<br />
Uruguayan pianists (from left to right: The Uruguayan Ambassador, HE Mr Jose Luis Aldabalde, pianist Mrs Susana Gutman, the<br />
<strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>n Deputy Minister <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs Mr Aziz Pahad, pianist Mrs Celia Rocca, and Mrs Anabella de Aldabalde<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 81
At the Uruguayan piano recital (from left to right): the Director <strong>of</strong> the Latin American Section, Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs, Mr<br />
Lenin Shope, the Uruguayan Ambassador and Mrs de Aldabalde, and Mrs Shope<br />
BRAZILIAN HISTORIAN AT UNISA<br />
Pio Penna Filho, a pr<strong>of</strong>essor <strong>of</strong> History at the Federal<br />
<strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> Mato Grosso in Brazil, spent three<br />
months at Unisa this year while engaged in research<br />
towards a PhD on Foreign Relations between <strong>South</strong><br />
<strong>Africa</strong> and Brazil (1947-1996) at the <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong><br />
BrasõÂ lia (Unb).<br />
At Unisa Pio Penna was a guest <strong>of</strong> the Centre and<br />
<strong>of</strong> the Department <strong>of</strong> History. He was able to collect<br />
important material at Unisa, the National Archives and<br />
the Department <strong>of</strong> Foreign Affairs.<br />
His supervisor Pr<strong>of</strong> Jose Fla vio Sombra Saraiva, a<br />
specialist in <strong>Africa</strong>n History, is an associate <strong>of</strong> long<br />
standing <strong>of</strong> the Unisa Centre for Latin American<br />
Studies.<br />
The completed thesis will be <strong>of</strong> great importance for<br />
scholars interested in bilateral relations between Brazil<br />
and <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>.<br />
UCLAS FELLOW REPORTS BACK<br />
At a UCLAS seminar on 13 September Ana Agostino,<br />
the UCLAS Research Fellow for 2000, presented a<br />
paper on the subject <strong>of</strong> her fellowship research<br />
`Global Barter Network ± new social and economic<br />
relationships within a post development era?' This<br />
was one <strong>of</strong> the series intended by UCLAS to draw<br />
Pio Penna Filho<br />
decision makers' attention to experiences in Latin<br />
America relevant to the RDP.<br />
In her presentation she described the way in<br />
which people in several <strong>South</strong> American countries,<br />
82 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
initiative had thus come to <strong>of</strong>fer alternative ways <strong>of</strong><br />
improving the barterers' quality <strong>of</strong> life. A semiformal<br />
system had developed so that the people engaged in<br />
barter had organized themselves to co-ordinate their<br />
efforts, to train themselves and to provide forms <strong>of</strong><br />
marketing services. At the same time barter questioned<br />
essential paradigms <strong>of</strong> traditional development<br />
practices, such as economic growth. The<br />
process had developed extensively in Argentina,<br />
and had proved to be so successful that it was being<br />
adopted, albeit on a smaller scale, in other countries<br />
in the region.<br />
Ms Agostino's paper elicited an interesting discussion<br />
from a large audience, particularly with<br />
regard to her views on the adaptability <strong>of</strong> the system<br />
in <strong>South</strong> <strong>Africa</strong>. Stefan Treurnicht <strong>of</strong> the Department<br />
<strong>of</strong> Development Administration, thanked her on the<br />
behalf <strong>of</strong> UCLAS.<br />
Two UCLAS Research Fellows Ana Agostino (left)<br />
and Elna de Beer<br />
not necessarily unemployed, had found that when<br />
they had goods or services which others needed and<br />
who themselves had something to exchange, they<br />
were able to make passable livings from the process<br />
in a central barter marketing process. The barter<br />
HEAD OF THE CENTRE VISITS NAMIBIA<br />
The head <strong>of</strong> the Centre, Ze lia Campbell, visited<br />
Namibia from 3 to 7 April this year, as the guest <strong>of</strong><br />
the Brazilian Ambassador in Windhoek, His Excellency<br />
Mr Orlando Galveà as Oliveira, and the Rector <strong>of</strong><br />
the <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> Namibia, Pr<strong>of</strong>essor Peter Katjavivi.<br />
While in Namibia Mrs Campbell and Pr<strong>of</strong> Katjavivi<br />
discussed inter-university co-operation between Brazilian<br />
universities and the <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> Namibia. She<br />
Presentation on Global Barter Network: From left to right Ð Mr Treurnicht, Pr<strong>of</strong> Fourie, Ana Agostino (speaker), HE the<br />
Ambassador <strong>of</strong> Uruguay, He Mr Aldabalde and Pr<strong>of</strong> Peter Stewart<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 83
Guests at the seminar on global barter: (left to right), Ms Jansen (Sociology Dept, Unisa), Ms Mnguni (Citi Bank), Mr Kolonji<br />
(Jesuit Refugee Service), the speaker Ana Agostino, Mr Sithole (National Victim Empowerment Development), and Father<br />
Reynolds (Sunnyside Catholic Church)<br />
At the <strong>of</strong>fice <strong>of</strong> the Vice-Chancellor <strong>of</strong> the <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> Namibia (from left to right): ZeÂlia Roel<strong>of</strong>se-Campbell,<br />
the Vice-Chancellor Pr<strong>of</strong> Peter Katjavivi, Mr Keith Campbell, Dr I Kandjii-Murangi, and the<br />
Brazilian Ambassador HE Mr Orlando GalveÃas Oliveira<br />
84 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
also visited the Dean <strong>of</strong> the Faculty <strong>of</strong> Economic and<br />
Management Sciences, Pr<strong>of</strong> Andre du Pisani, and the<br />
Department <strong>of</strong> Political Administration.<br />
On 3 April Mrs Campbell addressed a seminar on<br />
Brazil, the <strong>South</strong> Atlantic and <strong>South</strong>ern <strong>Africa</strong>:<br />
Challenges and Opportunities at the <strong>University</strong>. She<br />
held various discussions with the Brazilian Ambassador,<br />
and members <strong>of</strong> the Brazilian Embassy and with<br />
the Cuban Ambassador to Namibia, H. E. Mr Sergio<br />
Gonzales Gonza lez and the Mexican Charge d'Affaires<br />
Mr Nicolas Escalante Barett.<br />
COLOMBIAN GOLD EXHIBIT AT THE<br />
UNIVERSITY OF PRETORIA<br />
A travelling exhibit from the world-renowned Museo<br />
del Oro (Gold Museum in Bogota , Colombia), was on<br />
public display at the <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> Pretoria from 22 to<br />
31 August. Most <strong>of</strong> the pieces displayed were<br />
produced by lost wax casting, and ranged over the<br />
period from 100 BC to AD 1600. They included flasks,<br />
a trumpet, pectorals, pendants and votive figures. The<br />
exhibit was formally opened by Colombian Ambassador<br />
Fred Erik Jacobsen, with an explanatory address<br />
by Colombian anthropologist Juan Ricardo Aparicio.<br />
Keith Campbell<br />
Tolimo Antrhopomorphic Pectoral. Lost wax molding/<br />
Hollow cast. 23.4 x 25.7 cm 0 ±550 AD.<br />
Quimbaya Lime Flask (Poporo). Lost wax molding/with<br />
nucleus. 200 AD±1000 AD. 11.4 x 8.3 cm<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 85
BOOK NEWS<br />
Review essay<br />
The Innkeeper's Underwear, or How Fantastic Latin American<br />
Fiction Can Be<br />
A review <strong>of</strong> Prospero's Mirror: A Translator's Portfolio <strong>of</strong> Latin American Short<br />
Fiction by Ilan Stavans, ed. Willimantic, Conn: Curbstone Press, 1998. xxvi + 323<br />
pp. Bibliographical references. $17.95 (paper), ISBN 1-880684-49-7<br />
by Jeroen Oskam<br />
Hogeschool Maastricht, The Netherlands<br />
The idea behind this bilingual anthology <strong>of</strong> Latin<br />
American Short Fiction is to manifest the role<br />
translators play in the contact between cultures. Of<br />
course, there is no question about the usefulness <strong>of</strong><br />
their craftsmanship nor about the creativity or interpretative<br />
implications <strong>of</strong> their work. However, literary<br />
translators have a far-reaching cultural influence that<br />
goes beyond the interpretation <strong>of</strong> the originals, since<br />
their initiatives are usually essential in the process <strong>of</strong><br />
discovering, selecting, and getting recognition for<br />
texts that are eventually published in the target<br />
language. Therefore it is not only an excellent idea,<br />
but also a logical one, to support and encourage these<br />
efforts by collecting in one volume the personal<br />
choices <strong>of</strong> a group <strong>of</strong> eminent translators.<br />
Translation has had an even greater importance for<br />
Latin American identity, as Ilan Stavans argues in his<br />
essay `Translation and Identity,' which introduces this<br />
anthology: it was `at the birth <strong>of</strong> the Americas' (p. vii).<br />
During the early stages <strong>of</strong> the Conquista, it became a<br />
powerful weapon in the hands <strong>of</strong> the Spaniards that<br />
led to the replacement or the annihilation <strong>of</strong> aboriginal<br />
languages. As a result, `the continent has been forced<br />
to appropriate a foreign, non-native vehicle <strong>of</strong> communication'<br />
(p. xvii). The implications <strong>of</strong> this statement<br />
are more controversial than they may seem.<br />
Authors like Ferna ndez de Lizardi, Neruda, Asturias,<br />
Machado de Assis or Allende are mentioned as<br />
examples <strong>of</strong> this `appropriation <strong>of</strong> a non-native<br />
language,' which we can even see as a `form <strong>of</strong><br />
linguistic cannibalism': `in order to be members <strong>of</strong><br />
Western civilization, Latin Americans need to be<br />
initiated, and then are forced to perfect the language<br />
<strong>of</strong> the invader' (p. xv). And even though recognizing<br />
that GarcJ1a Ma rquez was born into Spanish, and<br />
raised in Spanish, Stavans still points out that his<br />
birthplace, Aracataca, `was a landscape where pre-<br />
Columbian languages and dialects were used'<br />
(p. xvi). Should the conclusion be that the continent<br />
has a linguistic reality that resides outside those who<br />
live, speak, and write there?<br />
Returning to the initial purpose <strong>of</strong> this anthology,<br />
Stavans concludes his introduction with a brief history<br />
<strong>of</strong> literary translations from Spanish into English. This<br />
history leads to the names <strong>of</strong> Gregory Rabassa and<br />
Helen Lane, who are among the `veterans' contributing<br />
to this collection. Besides these established<br />
names, several up-and-coming translators were invited<br />
to submit a short story. In order to give an<br />
impression <strong>of</strong> the style and method <strong>of</strong> these translators,<br />
they were asked to answer a number <strong>of</strong> questions<br />
about the way they work. Together with a short<br />
curriculum <strong>of</strong> the translator and a few introductory<br />
lines about the translated author, the answers to these<br />
questions are included in the comments that precede<br />
the different contributions.<br />
As an inevitable consequence <strong>of</strong> the chosen<br />
approach, the anthology is quite heterogeneous. It<br />
includes stories by Alfonso Reyes, Luisa Valenzuela,<br />
Marco Denevi, Ana Maria Shua, Jorge Lanata, Silvina<br />
Ocampo, Ruben Loza Aguerreberre, Antonio BenJ1tez-<br />
Rojo, and Augusto Monterroso; the Brazilian Dalton<br />
Trevisan, Alfredo Bryce Echenique and Felisberto<br />
Herna ndez; and several less well-known authors like<br />
the Honduran Jorge Medina GarcJ1a, the Panamanian<br />
Jorge Turner, and the Spaniard Jose Carmona Blanco,<br />
as well as a short story by Ilan Stavans himself. 1 The<br />
list <strong>of</strong> names illustrates the enormous differences in<br />
generation, style and recognition that this collection<br />
covers. This diversity is, <strong>of</strong> course, natural, and can<br />
only be positive for the purpose <strong>of</strong> introducing<br />
undiscovered Latin American writers and texts to<br />
readers <strong>of</strong> English. However, the particular characteristics<br />
<strong>of</strong> this anthology ± an anthology inside an<br />
86 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
anthology, composed with as many different criteria<br />
as there were translators invited to collaborate ±<br />
would have required a more clarifying motivation for<br />
its composition, a more relevant explanation <strong>of</strong> the<br />
choices made by the translators. While only a minority<br />
allude to the literary qualities <strong>of</strong> the selected story,<br />
others simply limit themselves to the fact that the<br />
writer in question is important and deserves more<br />
attention from the public. Helen Lane submits her<br />
translation (<strong>of</strong> Luisa Valenzuela's `El lugar de su<br />
quietud') as an early example <strong>of</strong> her own translation<br />
style (p. 19). Asa Zatz, translator <strong>of</strong> Jorge Lanata's<br />
`Oculten la luna,' confides that the selection <strong>of</strong> this<br />
author `emerges in part from the pleasure <strong>of</strong> reading<br />
him' (p. 109). James Maraniss motivates his selection<br />
<strong>of</strong> `Incidente en la cordillera,' by Antonio BenJ1tez-<br />
Rojo, as follows: `I selected this story because I like it,<br />
had it at hand, was short enough for didactic use, and<br />
is the first piece that BenJ1tez-Rojo has written after<br />
thirteen years <strong>of</strong> non-fictional theorizing' (p. 163).<br />
The irrelevance <strong>of</strong> these comments becomes somewhat<br />
irritating when we examine the second important<br />
aspect <strong>of</strong> this book: the presentation <strong>of</strong> a series <strong>of</strong><br />
translations by eminent or promising experts. When,<br />
for example, an author who is known to be `difficult to<br />
translate,' like Dalton Trevisan, is selected by a<br />
translator as prominent as Gregory Rabassa, it would<br />
indeed be fascinating to learn about his style and<br />
method, about the problems and solutions he encountered.<br />
Instead, what strikes us is the triviality <strong>of</strong><br />
the observations some translators share with us: how<br />
late they work, whether they read the book once or<br />
twice, or which brand <strong>of</strong> ice cream helps them<br />
through moments <strong>of</strong> reduced inspiration. Responding<br />
to Stavans' questionnaire, some <strong>of</strong> them indicate that<br />
they prefer not to consult with the authors, and others<br />
say that they do; this does shed some light on the<br />
matter <strong>of</strong> a translator's style and method, but would it<br />
not have been more interesting to know what they<br />
consult them about?<br />
In spite <strong>of</strong> the hardly satisfactory result <strong>of</strong> the<br />
questionnaire, this book gives an interesting insight<br />
into the styles <strong>of</strong> different translators; after all, it is a<br />
bilingual edition. To give an example <strong>of</strong> a well<br />
motivated choice a translator can make: the character<br />
<strong>of</strong> Marco Denevi's story `Carta a Gianfranco' (translated<br />
by Alberto Manguel) makes a comment about<br />
the colour malva (mauve), and tells that she does not<br />
know what it looks like (p. 42). Obviously, this<br />
requires the English word for malva to be an<br />
uncommon one; therefore, I believe that `cerulean' is<br />
adequate. Further on in this same story, we read:<br />
`Ultramarinos. Que hermosa palabra, Gianfranco.<br />
Almace n de ultramarinos' (p. 52), which also for<br />
stylistic reasons leads to `Ultramarine shops' in<br />
English ± even though it might be less clear what<br />
these are.<br />
There is a similar stylistic problem in Jorge Turner's<br />
`Mangos de enero,' translated by Leland Chambers.<br />
One <strong>of</strong> the characters hears a `strange word: ``yearning''<br />
' (p. 253). Here the result <strong>of</strong> the translation is<br />
rather odd. Yearning is not such a strange word; but<br />
`desalmarse' is. Usually, difficulties <strong>of</strong> this kind also<br />
emerge from obligatory changes between Spanish<br />
and English, which <strong>of</strong>ten demand a creative solution.<br />
This could be the case, for instance, when there is an<br />
explicit reference to a change from the polite to the<br />
informal pronoun, or, as in the following example<br />
taken from `La mu sica de la lluvia' by Silvina Ocampo<br />
(translated by Suzanne Jill Levine): `± Para Octavito ±<br />
... ± No ± susurro la senÄ ora de Griber, detenie ndolo ±.<br />
Puede <strong>of</strong>enderlo. No le gustan los diminutivos'<br />
(p. 144), which becomes: ` ``For little Octavio'' ...<br />
``No,'' whispered Griber's mother, holding him back.<br />
``It may <strong>of</strong>fend him. He doesn't like diminutives.'' ' The<br />
solution sounds a little artificial, since the `diminutive'<br />
has disappeared from the translation.<br />
I agree that cena (`La cena' by Alfonso Reyes,<br />
translated by Rick Francis) could be translated into<br />
either `dinner' or `supper'; but why choose one for the<br />
title and the other for the quote that follows it (`The<br />
Dinner ± 'The supper, that delights and enchants. `±<br />
St. John <strong>of</strong> the Cross,' p. 5)? Why does the character<br />
<strong>of</strong> `La mu sica de la lluvia' put on `his shoes and his<br />
socks' (p. 145), and not, more conventionally, his<br />
socks first like his Spanish counterpart? I am not<br />
suggesting that these translations are wrong or<br />
inadequate; it is simply that the reader who feels<br />
encouraged by this bilingual version to compare both<br />
versions, is likely to be interested as well in the<br />
motivation for these choices. And again, he or she<br />
would have felt less frustrated if the introductions<br />
would have made a more serious reference to those<br />
questions.<br />
This review is not the place for an in-depth analysis<br />
<strong>of</strong> the translations presented in this book. But even a<br />
superficial glance at its pages leads to a disconcerting<br />
conclusion: the ones on the right are shorter than the<br />
ones on the left. The reason is that sometimes part <strong>of</strong> a<br />
sentence that appears in the original is missing from<br />
the translation. It also occurs that complete sentences<br />
or paragraphs have disappeared. I found fragments<br />
that I could not trace in the English versions on pages<br />
26, 28, 30, 32, 34 (`El lugar de su quietud'), 144 (`La<br />
mu sica de la lluvia'), 284, 292 (Felisberto Herna ndez,<br />
`El cocodrilo,' translated by Alfred MacAdam) and<br />
322 (Jose Carmona Blanco, `Los camalotes,' translated<br />
by Toby Talbot). This is probably an editing<br />
problem, since I also came across translations <strong>of</strong><br />
fragments that were missing from the Spanish texts,<br />
on pages 65 (`Carta a Gianfranco') and 311 (`Los<br />
camalotes'). 2<br />
A remarkable translating style attracts the attention<br />
to Donald Yates' version <strong>of</strong> `Cotode caza,' by Ruben<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 87
Loza Aguerreberre. Yates has an inclination to specify<br />
or embellish the original and turns `disecadores de<br />
libros ajenos' (p. 152) into `arid dissectors <strong>of</strong> other<br />
people's books.' In some cases this is acceptable, but<br />
it becomes puzzling when a restaurant is decorated<br />
with `unas redes colgadas a las paredes como<br />
enormes telaranas' (p. 150), which are rendered into<br />
`huge fishing nets that hung from the walls like<br />
enormous spiderwebs.' Fishing nets are larger than<br />
spiderwebs, and `huge' fishing nets can be up to<br />
several miles in length. Also, it occurred to me that<br />
Yates likes Ernest Hemingway more than Loza<br />
Aguerreberre does. The original character says that<br />
`solo me gusta su estilo para contar' (p. 154), and<br />
Yates' character replies, `I have always been impressed<br />
by his original style.' When he takes the female<br />
character to Hemingway's residence in Paris, we read:<br />
`Ella no la conocJ1a' (p. 154). But in the English<br />
version she seems more enthusiastic: `Annie was<br />
pleased since she said she had not known about that<br />
residence.'<br />
Harry Morales has translated Ilan Stavans' `Tres<br />
Pesadillas.' Besides his translator, he is also his former<br />
neighbour and they have collaborated in various<br />
projects. In short, he is not likely to misinterpret the<br />
story. So I am getting more and more confused when I<br />
read ± or misread ± the following passage, where the<br />
main character comes home and his maid tells him<br />
that his wife has left:<br />
`Ms. Betzi called,' she said. `She's had to leave for<br />
Rochester. It's a ternational conference.' I deduced<br />
that ternational meant international. Ternational:<br />
the word sounded nice ... .<br />
`She'll be in Rochester for two days,' said the<br />
lady who owned an inn ... She mechanically<br />
repeated the same phrase. (pp. 223-225)<br />
Now, where does this mysterious lady-innkeeper<br />
come from? In Spanish, the mispronounced word is<br />
`innacional.' My impression was that the sentence<br />
`Dijo la senÄ ora que tenJ1a un inn ...' was a repetition <strong>of</strong><br />
her earlier announcement. The last sentence <strong>of</strong> the<br />
quoted fragment actually says so, and the position <strong>of</strong><br />
the quotation marks in the original confirms my<br />
impression.<br />
`Mangos de enero' is a story about anti-imperialist<br />
manifestations around the Panama Canal-zone in<br />
January 1964. U.S. military actions cause a large<br />
number <strong>of</strong> casualties and a character <strong>of</strong> the story<br />
who has been shot will be attended in the gynaecological<br />
ward. The sudden entrance <strong>of</strong> wounded<br />
young men upsets a pregnant woman, who is<br />
already in labour:<br />
`I'm having the baby!' No one pays any attention to<br />
her. The woman insists that the fetus is settling,<br />
they're all just fooling around with her while her<br />
husband thinks he's so great, he's not there, he's<br />
out getting drunk, leaves her here alone, as if there<br />
isn't much to it, thinks he's hot enough to make a<br />
good dog laugh, going around with his friends like<br />
that, just a little boy celebrating in advance ... She'd<br />
like to see him like these kids, see him with a bullet<br />
inside him, see him going up against the gringos,<br />
see him in this mess, see him having a baby like<br />
her. Then she shit in her underwear.<br />
While the reader feels sympathy for the lady in this<br />
embarrassing moment, she does not seem uncomfortable<br />
at all with the situation, and not even her sticky<br />
underpants can distract her for a moment from raging<br />
against her husband:<br />
What kind <strong>of</strong> husband ... Her mouth is full <strong>of</strong> her<br />
husband, bah! husband!: resist, resisting, resister,<br />
resistance, fingers worn out, lips bitten down.<br />
Calm, why calm? ± To hell with being calm! Smell<br />
<strong>of</strong> ether bustling activity nervous sweating.<br />
(p. 247-49)<br />
Just ether and sweat, no other smell; that should<br />
give us a clue. We look up the original passage and<br />
find:<br />
Lo viera como los muchachos, lo viera con una<br />
bala adentro, lo viera contra los gringos, lo viera en<br />
este esca ndalo, lo viera pariendo como yo. Entonces<br />
se cagarJ1a los pantalones. (p. 248)<br />
The cowardly husband would be shitting himself ...<br />
I do not know if I am splitting hairs here. `Los<br />
camalotes' is about the sinister find <strong>of</strong> human remains<br />
washed ashore in Uruguay. Before eventually being<br />
able to reconstruct two complete amputated hands,<br />
the character <strong>of</strong> the story finds a man's ring finger, a<br />
female middle finger and then a second ring finger,<br />
also part <strong>of</strong> the woman's hand. Therefore, `el segundo<br />
anular' is not equivalent to `the second finger'<br />
(p. 317): I imagine that a reader who has no access<br />
to the Spanish version will feel completely lost here. In<br />
general, I would like to remind that these are<br />
translations which the translators themselves have<br />
selected and submitted to be published along with the<br />
originals in order to show us the secrets <strong>of</strong> their<br />
pr<strong>of</strong>ession. One should expect the details to be taken<br />
care <strong>of</strong>.<br />
I am running out <strong>of</strong> euphemisms. What to say <strong>of</strong> `En<br />
medio del bullicio,' `Along the boulevard' (p. 151)?<br />
`¿Cuando lees?' and `When did you read?' (p. 153)?<br />
`Un muchacho muy erudito' who turns into `a<br />
sensitive young fellow' (p. 159)? Mystic `sabios' <strong>of</strong><br />
inland <strong>South</strong> America who are called `researchers'<br />
(p. 27)? Literal calques <strong>of</strong> idiomatic expressions as<br />
`Me toco hablar' ± `I was scheduled to speak' (p. 149)<br />
± or play the piano with your hands, `como Dios<br />
manda' ± `as God intended' (p. 135)? `Un color claro'<br />
that turns out to be `a dark color' (p. 283)? A man<br />
88 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
who puts his `plata' in his pocket and only has got<br />
`silver coins' (p. 317)?<br />
The overall impression caused by this book is that it<br />
is a far too hasty a product based upon a maybe good<br />
and `novel' idea. But in order to be <strong>of</strong> academic value,<br />
the introductions need to be rewritten, to be made<br />
more informative and less frivolous. And whereas<br />
normally bilingual editions <strong>of</strong> literary texts might be a<br />
useful instrument in undergraduate reading classes, I<br />
am afraid that this one is not ± unless you want to<br />
make people laugh. The really sad thing is that it<br />
contains translations that are acceptable or even<br />
worthwhile. With the contributions <strong>of</strong> Rick Francis,<br />
Alberto Manguel, Dick Gerdes (`Como una buena<br />
madre,' Ana Maria Shua), Asa Zatz, James Maraniss,<br />
Edith Grossman (`Movimiento perpetuo,' Augusto<br />
Monterroso), JoAnne Engelbert (`La noche clara de<br />
los coroneles,' Jorge Medina GarcJ1a), Gregory Rabassa,<br />
Hardie St. Martin (`Con Jimmy en Paracas,'<br />
Alfredo Bryce Echenique) and Alfred MacAdam, these<br />
are, in fact, the majority. But they are overshadowed<br />
by other translations that, simply, are not ready yet for<br />
publication.<br />
Review: Courtesy <strong>of</strong> H-Net@H-Net.MSU.EDU.<br />
[J.A.Oskam@Bigfoot.com]<br />
NOTES<br />
1 The complete list <strong>of</strong> the stories included in this volume is as follows: Alfonso Reyes, `La cena,' originally published in El plano<br />
oblicuo, vol. III <strong>of</strong> Obras Completas. Mexico: Fondo de Cultura Econo mica, 1956. Luisa Valenzuela, `El lugar de su quietud'<br />
The Censors. Willimantic, Conn.: Curbstone Press, 1992. Marco Denevi, `Carta a Gianfranco,' Hierba del cielo. Buenos Aires:<br />
Corregidor, 1973. Ana Maria Shua, `Como una buena madre,' Viajando se conoce gente. Buenos Aires: Editorial<br />
Sudamericana, 1988. Jorge Lanata, `Oculten la luna,' Polaroids, unpublished in Spanish. Silvina Ocampo, `La mu sica de la<br />
lluvia,' Las reglas del secreto: antologK1a, Matilde Sa nchez, ed. Me xico: Fondo de Cultura Econo mica, 1991. Ruben Loza<br />
Aguerreberre, `Coto de caza,' Coto de caza y otros cuentos. Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda Oriental, 1993. Antonio<br />
BenJ1tez-Rojo, `Incidente en la cordillera,' A View from the Mangrove. London: Faber and Faber, 1998. Augusto Monterroso,<br />
`Movimiento perpetuo,' Complete Works and Other Stories. Austin: <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> Texas Press, 1995. Jorge Medina Garcia, `La<br />
noche clara de los coroneles,' Pudimos haber llegado maÂs lejos. Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Editorial Guaymuras, 1989. Ilan<br />
Stavans, `Three Nightmares,' The One-Handed Pianist and Other Stories, Albuquerque, <strong>University</strong> <strong>of</strong> New Mexico Press,<br />
1996. Dalton Trevisan, `Treàs tiros na tarde,' The Vampire <strong>of</strong> Curitiba and Other Stories. New York: Albert A. Knopf, 1972.<br />
Jorge Turner, `Mangos de enero,' Viento de agua. Me xico, 1977. Alfredo Bryce Echenique, `Con Jimmy en Paracas,' Cuentos<br />
completos. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1985. Felisberto Herna ndez, `El cocodrilo,' Las hortensias y otros relatos. Montevideo:<br />
Editorial Arca, 1966. Jose Carmona Blanco, `Los camalotes,' El reencuentro: cuentos. Montevideo: Ediciones de la Banda<br />
Oriental, 1978.<br />
2 This review is based upon an uncorrected copy <strong>of</strong> the book.<br />
Copyright (c) 1998 by H-Net, all rights reserved.<br />
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 89
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Ð Embassy: Avenida das NacË oÄ es Lote 6, 70406-900 BrasõÂ lia D. F. ±<br />
Tel. 0955 (61) 223-4873 ± Fax 0955 (61) 3228491 ± E-mail:<br />
saemb@brnet.com.br<br />
Ð Consulate General: Avenida Paulista, 1754, 128 andar, CEP<br />
01310-920 SaÄ o Paulo ± Tel 0955 (11) 2850433 ± Fax 0955<br />
(11) 2844862 ± Saconsp@uninet.com.br<br />
Ð Hon Consulate: Ave Presidente Antonio Carlos 607, Terceiro<br />
Andar-Centro, CEP 20.020.010 Rio de Janeiro ± Tel (0955) 21<br />
2405684<br />
Ð Hon Consulate: Rua Bororo 496, CEP 91900-540 Porto Alegre, RS<br />
CHILE<br />
РEmbassy: Torre San Ramo n, Avda 11 de Septiembre 2353, Piso<br />
16, Providencia, Santiago 9 ± Tel 0956 (2) 231-2860/2/3 ± Fax<br />
0956 (2) 2313185 ± E-mail: saemb@sicoar.com<br />
COLOMBIA<br />
Ð Hon Consulate: Calle 17, Nr 10-16, Oficina 502, Bogota ±<br />
Tel 0957 (1) 3411291/3346477<br />
COSTA RICA<br />
Ð Consulate: PO Box 2816-100, Pacifico, San Jose , Costa Rica ±<br />
Tel (0950-6) 2221470 ± Fax (0950-6) 2238223<br />
CUBA<br />
Ð Embassy: Calle 22 no. 503, Miramar, Havana, Cuba ± Tel 0953<br />
(7) 249672-6 ± Fax 0953 (7) 802857 ± Cell 0537802239 ±<br />
E-mail: rsacuba@ceniai.inf.cu<br />
GUATEMALA<br />
Ð Consulate: 10 Avenida 30±57, Zona 5, Guatemala City CA<br />
01005 ± Tel (09502-2) 326890/311190 ± Fax (09502-2)<br />
327291<br />
HONDURAS<br />
Ð Hon Consulate: 3 Ave S.E. 21 y 22 Calle Barrio, Las Palmas, San<br />
Pedro Sula ± Tel 09 504 566466/566567 ± Fax 09 504 567084<br />
MEXICO<br />
Ð Embassy: Andres Belloca 10, Forum Building, 9th Floor, Col.<br />
Polanco, CP 11560, Mexico D. F. ± Tel. 0952 (5) 282-9260/65<br />
± Fax 0952 (5) 282-9259 ± E-mail: saemb@supernet.com.mx<br />
PANAMA<br />
Ð Hon Consulate: c/o Durling & Durling, Edificio Vallarino, Calle 52<br />
y Elvira Mendez, Panama City ± Tel. 09 507 2636900 ±<br />
Fax 09 507 2636964<br />
PARAGUAY<br />
Ð Hon Consulate: Casilla de Correo 848, Asuncio n ± Tel. (09595)<br />
21 92093/81931<br />
PERU<br />
Ð Embassy: Torre Real Tres, Centro Empresarial Real, Via Principal<br />
155 ± OF 801, San Isidro, Lima ± 27 ± Tel. (09511) 4409996 ±<br />
Fax (09511) 4223881<br />
Ð Consulate: Camino Real 1252, 2ë Piso ``B'', Lima ± 27 ±<br />
Tel. (095114) 222280 ± Fax (095114) 427154<br />
URUGUAY<br />
Ð Embassy: Dr. Prudencio de Pena 2483, Montevideo ±<br />
Tel. 09598 (2) 790411/16 ± Fax 09598 (2) 790459<br />
VENEZUELA<br />
Ð Embassy: Apartado numero 2613, Carmelitas, 1010 ± Caracas<br />
D. F. ± Tel (09582) 9097151/9098606/5 ± Fax (09582)<br />
9098607 ± E-mail: rsaven@eldish.net