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value-added goods and services above primary commodities, has become a fait accompli. A direct link appears to exist between primary commodity export failure and crises on the one hand, and the emergence of illicit cocaine and diamond exploitation in areas worst affected by agricultural sector decline (Castells 1998:198). In part 3 this cause is discussed with regard to the Angolan and Colombian experiences. Olson (1993:572) has an interesting `theory' on why states tend to fail, which seems appropriate, particularly to the case of Angola. His reference to a dictator's `short time horizon', aiming at accumulating wealth and power as quickly as possible, because tomorrow may bring an abrupt end to his rule, has relevance, despite the fact that Angola is not ruled by a dictator. The MPLA eÂ lite has developed a similar `short time horizon' policy comparable to a mixture of `roving banditry' and `monopolized and rationalized theft in the form of taxes' (Olson 1993:567). The prolonged civil war has severely restricted the state's ability and opportunity to accumulate wealth through taxes, while simultaneously securing this source by creating incentives for Angolan citizens to produce, earn and invest under conditions of adequate national security. Realizing this, the ruling party has deliberately embarked on violent and corrupt resource capture (oil and diamonds) and enrichment, caring little about the dire long-term consequences for country and people. This greedy `short term horizon' ignores the political and socio-economic consequences of instability, disinvestment, societal collapse, discontent and even anarchy. UNITA has done the same, regarding diamonds. The Colombian state has done more to develop `rational monopolization of theft' by taxing only part of citizens' income, while also striving to protect the interests of its taxgenerating subjects (Olson 1993:568). However, as this study indicates, Colombia also has a tendency to fail in these respects when considering the acute levels of violence, corruption, elitism, deprivation, lack of investment confidence and gross human (and property) rights violations. Both Angola and Colombia still have to reach `long-term horizons' of peace, stability and sustained development. State failure has made it possible for nonstate challengers to conduct monopolized theft through introducing taxes in sizeable areas of the country under their control. As `defacto governments' they even provide protection to their `subordinates', allowing the latter to continue producing coca leaves and mining diamonds from which both benefit ± the ruler the most of course. State failure and its global importance Why is the failed state phenomenon important to the international community? Globalization requires strong states that function, with governments capable of providing sovereign guarantees, exercising sovereign power and responsibility, and controlling their sovereign borders (Woodward 1998:1±2). Failed states, which can also be regarded as weak states, endanger the system of `order in anarchy' among nation-states (Buzan 1991). They cannot convincingly fulfil the functions of statehood and security. Given its inherent weakness, a failing state is itself a potential target for internal or external disruption and insurgencies. Reference has been made to the disruption caused by rival Cold War factions inside and outside Angola, trying to consolidate alliances to secure political, military, territorial and economic control of the country, dividing innocent and peaceseeking citizens into opposite camps (Somerville 1997:11±38). Compared with the strong state, a weak, failing state's nation building process is incomplete; the ruling eÂ lite's view of the state's political, institutional, cultural, religious, economic and territorial identity may be disputed and challenged by a significant proportion of its people, organized along ethnic lines (Buzan 1991:70). Again, Angola is a case in point, where UNITA, with its support base among the Ovimbundu tribe (37 per cent of the population), has continuously exploited the ruling MPLA's lack of internal legitimacy and control over territory, in order to promote its own agenda ± securing its power base, as well as capturing and selling Angola's diamond wealth to finance its war effort. The different tribes of Angola had little in common, apart from their experience of colonial occupation. Even this was hardly uniform and rigid, due to elitist favouritism, forced labour, corruption, nepotism, and mismanagement. Angolan nation building started as an MPLA eÂ lite enterprise with a foreign (Western) ideology (Marxism), in contrast to the popular appeal of ethnic sub-nationalism ± a state of affairs constantly exploited among the Ovimbundu by Jonas Savimbi, leader of UNITA (Somerville 1997:12±13). This is partly the reason why fragile peace efforts (accords in 1975, 1992, and 1994), until now, have proved futile (Somerville 1997; Fituni 1995). While cases of state failure differ in scope, scale and features, a combination of all the variables mentioned so far, creates a dangerously unstable situation that could easily embroil neighbouring states. It could lead to the destabilization of an entire region. Recent violent incidents of Namibian border violations by UNITA forces and the latter's collaboration with rebel groups in the neighbouring DRC, indicate this potential for regional destabilization. The same could be true of transnational criminal activities such as drug trafficking and weapons smuggling, where crime 14 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
syndicates exploit to the maximum the vacuum of legal authority in a failed state. Using it as a safe haven, terrorists and crime syndicates can consolidate and expand their operations, creating a threat to international security. It is feared, for example, that powerful narco-traffickers and guerrilla forces operating from Colombia may extend their criminal activities into Panama now that the US has withdrawn most of its forces from the latter. Last, but not the least, failed states also pose a challenge to the international community because they frequently generate gross human rights violations (Part 3, dealing with the key indicators of states at risk of failing, elaborates this issue). As Woodward (1998:5) remarks: `the problems of a non-functioning state, for both citizens and interveners, are first and foremost the absence of physical security and the collapse of law and order'. Universally recognized non-derogable erga omnes obligations under international law are thus being violated (Shaw 1997:204). Furthermore, the political, economic and social development strategies pursued by international agencies and bilateral donors have been rendered virtually irrelevant under conditions of acute state failure. For example, UN-sponsored emergency relief and peacekeeping operations in Angola have been among the organization's most costly and frustrating disappointments: `the bill: US$ 1.5 billion; the result: failure' (Time 27 March 2000:41). It needs to be seen whether current US financial assistance to the Pastrana government, totalling US$ 1.6 billion, will succeed in combating the threat of cocaine trafficking as a cause and consequence of state failure (The Economist 26 February 2000:68). Against this background, it is clear that the growing post-Cold War phenomenon of failed states is of great concern to the international community, requiring costly and risky humanitarian intervention (UNCTAD 1997:127; UNDP 1999). ANGOLAN AND COLOMBIAN STATE FAILURE: THE VIOLENCE VARIABLE Born in violence Domestic violence has been an important and often decisive social process in the structuring of Angolan and Colombian state and society. This is not unique. In general, domestic violence is endemic in the early stages of any state and nation building (Zartman 1995). Such violence, then, signals the vital process of central state power accumulation. However, as soon as the state-in-the-making has mustered the economic and political sources necessary to secure strong statehood, while simultaneously enhancing a social contract between state and society, rule by force is replaced by legitimate consensus rule. Most industrialized nation-states secured their existence in this way (Zacarias 1999). In the absence of this scenario, large-scale use of force tends to prevail ± its violent expression being a component of state faltering, amidst equally threatening use of (military) violence by its challengers. This represents the current scenario in which Angola and Colombia tend to find themselves. Learning from a colonial history of `rebellions, cimarronism, slave palenques, and national liberation wars' (Oquist 1980:27), both `nationstates' have developed a tendency to fight, initially based on violent political factionalism in the case of Colombia, and ethno-ideological conflict in Angola's case. In both cases, the delegitimized state and certain nonstate actors emerged as prime conditioning agents in post-independent violent conflicts. While political violence has not led to total anarchy and absence of central government rule, it has been decisive enough to derail the vital process of power accumulation ± a precondition for strong legal controls and the state's legitimate monopoly over the means of violence. Violence in its many distinct forms is, of course, not unique to Angola and Colombia. It is, however, endemic to both at a national level, making violence a key variable in their state failure experiences. Colombia, for example, has 90 intentional homicides per 100 000 inhabitants, annually compared to neighbouring Venezuela's 12, and 10 in the USA. Similar data for Angola is not available (United Nations 1998). It is impossible here to provide a detailed account of all the notably distinctive events of violence since their independence, or to discuss all major categories of violence, particularly in Colombia's case. For example, at least 13 important periods of violent political conflict occurred in the first century of the latter's independence; not to mention `La Violencia' of the 1950s, and subsequent protracted civil war (Oquist 1980:42). Rather, the emphasis is on the commonality of political violence and guerrilla activities, with a brief acknowledgement of other categories, such as narcoterrorism by powerful drug cartels. The latter category is absent in the case of Angola. Instead, foreign private (mercenary) armies have been hired by the MPLA ruling eÂ lite to support its military offensive against UNITA and provide `political' services such as procuring weapons. Reno (1997:172±177) refers to this development as the `privatization' of violence, involving clandestine companies such as Executive Outcomes and Saracen International. Subsequent paragraphs are concerned with the origins, causes and occurrence of political violence at independence and thereafter, providing some clarity on the violencestate failure link, the latter component being elaborated in the next Part. While more than 150 years apart, certain parallels can be drawn between the Colombian and Angolan experiences of political violence. In Colombia, BolõÂ - var's military success resulted in the criollos' assump- ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 15
Page 1 and 2: VOLUME 16 NO 2 2000 UNISA CENTRE FO
Page 3 and 4: UNISA CENTRE FOR LATIN AMERICAN STU
Page 5 and 6: Editorial The wide range of interes
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Page 11 and 12: enrichment. Solving the resource ca
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Page 15: Spanish rule in Nuevo Reino de Gran
Page 19 and 20: then, seriously considered compromi
Page 21 and 22: and Colombia with a reason to bypas
Page 23 and 24: war has made state and nation build
Page 25 and 26: FIGURE 2 Development diamond Source
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Page 31 and 32: `capture', control and financial ex
Page 33 and 34: mercenary `security' companies and
Page 35 and 36: Mail and Guardian, (1999). `Angola'
Page 37 and 38: The cultural formation of Brazil an
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Page 41 and 42: the twentieth century many ruptures
Page 43 and 44: NOTES 1 For an excellent history of
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