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different and similar objectives. It is a situation where international open market forces provide a demand for lucrative and essential goods for which Angola has the supply. For certain players, whether this demand and supply route is legally or illegally determined is of less importance. MNCs are already a dominant part of the global economy ± yet many of their actions go unrecorded and unaccounted. It is in the national interests of industrialized countries and their multinationals to trade in crucial energy resources such as oil ± Angola can meet the demand, while it desperately needs foreign revenues (Central Intelligence Agency 1999). From a Marxist perspective, it could be argued that imperialist states are interested in the exploitation of the rich diamond and oil wealth of Angola. It is a matter of choice backing the `winning horse' and the one which serves (US) national interests best (Stevens 1999:3). While simplistic a view, ignoring the interaction of several variables in the Angolan state failure case (mentioned in previous Parts), the absence of decisive `good guys' involvement to bring an end to the war is obvious. State institutional failure is also a key variable in the illegal coca cultivation and processing of cocaine in Colombia. Without repeating what has already been discussed in previous Parts, it suffices to observe that the cocaine industry has been able to flourish due to, inter alia, a similar lack of transparency, control and work ethics in the Colombian state apparatus. Systematic corruption is encouraged by the state's failure to pay its civil servants in law enforcement agencies decent salaries. The weak state has been unable to eliminate drug syndicate networks extended to also include other criminal activities such as money laundering, arms traffic, international prostitution and kidnapping. Despite violent state repression, the underground cocaine network continues to subtly penetrate and corrupt all crucial points of the state's institutional environment. Being unable to adequately protect state employees, the latter are constantly confronted by the alternative of much needed bribes or seeing their families terrorized (Castells 1998:194). Colombia is increasingly turning into a safe haven for a complex criminal world stretching its tentacles to neighbouring states and the industrialized world. Even more than illicit diamond smuggling, the Colombian cocaine industry is fully internationalized, with very strict division of labour between different locations. This makes effective combating very difficult and costly (Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe 1999). Colombia's state failure-cocaine-internationalized crime link and the dangers thereof, remains the prime incentive for US `constructive engagement' there. Through its controversial drug de-certification process (which rates the anti-narcotic efforts of other states), as well as substantial financial and military aid, the US has become increasingly involved in Colombia's `Balkan-type' domestic conflict. The central objective is to combat cocaine trafficking at the point of production ± FARC and ELN territory. It is therefore obvious that such engagement contributes to political violence, while turning a blind eye to demand (and with it societal ills) in the US as a root cause. Furthermore, the Colombian central government often openly employed US military support for violent counter-insurgency campaigns that kill more innocent peasants than insurgents. On the whole, US engagement has been `costly, messy and unsuccessful' (Sweeney 1999:2). Economic sanctions against Colombia during 1995±1998 for not meeting the decertification criteria, have further weakened the state's ability to provide for the security and well-being needs of the population. The drug certification policy has been an equally ineffective tool in combating the violence and illicit drug trade. Cocaine is as easily available in the US as it was 15 years ago and at cheaper prices. Rather, increased emphasis on supporting viable crop-substitution and job-creation programmes in Colombia seems to be a small step in the right direction (Keen 1996:555). There is not much to say about the MPLA government's role in resource capture, control and exploitation. After all, it is the legitimate, internationally recognized government, waving the flag of perceived Angolan statehood at its embassies. The British human rights pressure group, Global Witness, reported recently in no uncertain terms, that the bulk of Angola's US$3,5 billion a year oil revenues bypasses the budget, disappearing straight into the hands of the presidency to buy new arms, or to finance the lifestyles of the super-rich eÂ lite (The Economist 15 January 2000:1). As such, the MPLA eÂ lite nomenklatura (consisting of about 30 families) has a vested interest in the protection of oil production facilities as their principal source of wealth (International Herald Tribune 11 April 2000:13). Given its own inability to do this effectively, private mercenary `security' companies (e.g. Executive Outcomes, with which government, until recently, had a US$ 40 million contract, and Ango Segu), have been hired to protect oil installations and help train MPLA soldiers (Maier 1996:157±158). As Reno (1997:172) remarks, `from a weak ruler's perspective, it is better to have reliable foreigners control state assets (than domestic enemies)'. Ironically, Executive Outcomes (consisting of certain demobilized South African military units) used to be a staunch supporter of UNITA, but for them, sharing in the enormous oil and diamond profits have proved too tempting. While ordinary Angolans have been excluded from their rightful share in the country's oil wealth, mercenaries have been able to negotiate salaries ranging from between US$ 2000 and US$ 8000 a month (Maier 1996:158). Again, human rights protection is certainly not their strong point. While the Colombian state and government's hands are reasonably clean when it comes to the actual 28 ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000
`capture', control and financial exploitation of cocaine (non-state actors are the main perpetrators), legal cases against corrupt senior officials abusing their position of power and influence to share in cocaine profits are quite common. Even the country's highest office, the presidency, has been implicated in the past. Oil multinationals are also not without blame ± for example, by allowing the Angolan government to mortgage its future oil production for short-term highinterest loans for the above purposes, the former continue to turn a blind eye to corruption, resource capture, and a crime against the people of Angola. Chevron's complicity in this regard is evident, as it accounts for about two-thirds of Angola's daily production of 500 000 barrels (Maier 1996:62). Interestingly, Amnesty International has made a similar observation with regard to the alleged role of oil (MNC, BP) in Colombia. In the absence of adequate state protection of its recent investment in a 880 km long oil pipeline to the Caribbean coast, BP has hired a UK-based mercenary firm, Defence Systems Limited, to train an eÂ lite mobile army group in counter-guerrilla tactics to protect this pipeline against FARC and ELN sabotage. Given the Colombian army's bad human rights record and its grave atrocities against civilians, in collaboration with rightwing paramilitaries, such BP involvement is unfortunate (Global Witness 1998). Reference has already been made to UNITA's main objective in the above regard ± to sell diamonds to finance its costly war effort. Without diamond sales (estimated at US$ 3,5 billion (1992±1999), its war effort would be crippled; it would loose its monopoly over power and legitimacy in large parts of Angola, and would no longer be able to finance its leadership's greed (Global Witness 1998). And the civil war would end. It is therefore evident that UNITA has a vested interest in seeing that their principal source of income (diamonds) is not interfered with. If and when this happens, the consequence thereof is escalating violence. As such, political and economic motives are increasingly intertwined. Currently, UNITA utilizes a supply route running through both Uganda and the DRC (also a failed state case), or Zambia and Rwanda, with or without the official consent of the respective governments, en route to the international diamond markets of Antwerp, London and Tel Aviv. Weapons are smuggled more or less along the same routes, with Kigali (Rwanda) allegedly acting as a rendezvous for the conclusion of deals in the above regard. It could be argued that globalization (easy access to markets and advanced technological communication), has also become a friend of the guerrillas. Against this background, it is evident that constraining the illicit diamond trade curse, thus increasing opportunities for a political solution to the war, would be extremely difficult (Mail and Guardian 1 April 1999; Business Report 16 March 2000:1; Global Witness 1998). The UN, a key player in recent peace initiatives and preventive diplomacy in Angola, has taken responsibility for achieving the above objective by extending the Security Council embargo on the sale of weapons and oil to UNITA (introduced in 1993) to also include an embargo against diamond smuggling, effective from June 1998. Whilst resulting in a significant decrease in UNITA's diamond sales, the implementation of UNSC Res. 1176 appears token at best. This is confirmed by the UN-sponsored Fowler Report on UNITA sanctions busting (of 15 March 2000), listing at least 10 African countries assisting UNITA in one way or another (Time 27 March 2000:41) Today, UNITA, through its control of diamond producing areas, as well as the lack of adequate law enforcing capacity in neighbouring states, is still able to secure outlet routes for diamond smuggling, as well as inlet supply routes for weapons procurement. Particularly Eastern European countries such as Bulgaria, Ukraine and Russia are eager to do business with UNITA leader, Jonas Savimbi. Interestingly, FARC also obtain weapons from these countries (Pierre 1997). The Fowler Report implicates these and other countries, such as Burkina Faso, Togo and Gabon in allegedly aiding UNITA. Reference is also made to South African diamond and arms dealers' alleged involvement in the diamond-for-arms network of illicit UNITA suppliers. With the world's premier market for uncut diamonds situated in Antwerp, Belgium is obviously a key player with significant responsibility to enforce UN sanctions to curb UNITA's illicit diamond trade. The Fowler Report strongly criticizes the Antwerp High Council for Diamond trading for lax and inadequate control measures, such as verification of certificates of origin. However, this seems almost an impossible task, as diamonds imported from neighbouring Zambia, Congo-Brazzaville and the DRC do not require any verification of source. After all, how do you distinguish between a `politically correct' and `politically flawed' uncut diamond? Furthermore, corrupt officials in these countries are more than eager to share in UNITA's lucrative trade, selling false certificates of origin (priced at about US$100). There is also little in terms of effective border policing. Another key factor has been the large number of middlemen involved in the diamond trade and smuggling ± cases have been reported where Angolan army generals and UNITA use the same middlemen to secure this lucrative trade on the open market. It is extremely difficult to accurately trace the movements and origins of uncut diamonds. Above all, Belgium and, for example, Israel have a strong demand for Angolan type uncut diamonds, encouraging trade through a generous system of tax breaks. There is thus an underlying incentive to evade the terms and spirit of Res. 1176 (Global Witness 1998; Time 27 March 2000:41). ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 29
Page 1 and 2: VOLUME 16 NO 2 2000 UNISA CENTRE FO
Page 3 and 4: UNISA CENTRE FOR LATIN AMERICAN STU
Page 5 and 6: Editorial The wide range of interes
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Page 11 and 12: enrichment. Solving the resource ca
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Page 17 and 18: syndicates exploit to the maximum t
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Page 27 and 28: particularly in the case of Colombi
Page 29: survival by capturing, controlling
Page 33 and 34: mercenary `security' companies and
Page 35 and 36: Mail and Guardian, (1999). `Angola'
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Page 39 and 40: The following is an effort to provi
Page 41 and 42: the twentieth century many ruptures
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