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particularly in the case of Colombia. From October
1998 to August 1999, the US Embassy in BogotaÂ
handled almost 215 000 visa applications. Some
300 000 Colombians may have left in 1999. Severe
economic recession and endemic violence is to blame
for this. GDP output, for example, shrank as much as
three per cent in 1999. In Angola, for most of the
unemployed, emigrating to seek a decent, safe living
remains a distant fantasy. Those who manage to leave
are usually the few educated e lite. Ordinary Angolans
and Colombians share the commonality of `cruel
choices between liberty, country and safety' (The
Economist 18 March 2000:57; Freedom Magazine
International December 1999:1±2).
Human security failure
Both Angola and Colombia are clear cases where the
security apparatus of the state, threatened militarily by
non-state actors, have appealed to national (domestic)
security, in order to justify harsh actions and
policies with little regard for fundamental human
rights. In the absence of citizen loyalty to the state,
civilians turned soldiers not because of patriotism, but
due to fear, corruption, and escape from dire living
conditions. Badly paid, they may even turn ordinary
criminals. Instead of meeting their prime responsibility
to protect the nation, security has become a political
tool of convenience to the ruling e lite to secure their
own survival and interests. Where state agents (police
and defence force) have been too weak to effectively
protect `national security', they have been constantly
`assisted' by either paramilitary and self-defence
groups (in the case of Colombia), or private security
(mercenary) organizations in Angola (Reno
1997:165). The indiscriminate use of freely available
small arms by these and other groups (guerrillas) have
produced hundreds of thousands of refugees and
internally displaced people. Struggle for economic
and political power increasingly places unarmed
civilians in the line of fire ± in violation of international
humanitarian law. The methods of fighting underscore
the extent of human security failure: physical intimidation,
terrorism, torture, rape, siege, famine, kidnapping,
and robbery (Amnesty International 1999 and
Carnegie Commission 1997).
Angolan and Colombian state failure are comparable
through the extent of complex humanitarian
emergencies taking place there. Roughly 17 million
Angolans and one million Colombians are refugees in
their own countries. Both governments have been
criticized for failure to comply with commitments
guaranteeing the safety of returnees and emergency
assistance to displaced families. UNICEF calculates
that 3,7 million people have been affected directly by
the Angolan war (out of a total population of 11,1
million) [1999 est.] (New African Yearbook 1999:26±
27). Malnutrition and famine have also become part
of daily life. In Angola, the share of agriculture had
fallen from 50 per cent of GDP in 1960 to 17 per cent
in 1995 ± the seriousness thereof evident when
considering that subsistence agriculture provides for
the main livelihood of 85 per cent of the population
(Central Intelligence Agency 1999). Unemployment
is estimated at more than 50 per cent, with the
industrial sector production almost at a standstill, and
government-employed people earning on average
US$15 a month (The Economist 19 February
2000:42).
Both states and governments have failed in protecting
and promoting at least three fundamental freedoms:
freedom from fear and want, as well as freedom
of speech. Millions of people, particularly children,
face the threats of hunger, neglect, malnutrition, and
disease. In Angola, the media is largely statecontrolled,
political demonstrations are unheard of,
and the police do not use rubber bullets to disperse
attempted demonstrations (The Economist 19 February
2000:42). The fac,ade of multi-party democracy
represents little more than front parties of the MPLA.
There are no distinct differences between the state
(MPLA) and non-state actors (UNITA and criminal
groups), when it comes to systemic human rights and
humanitarian law violations. According to the Amnesty
International Report of 1999, both conduct
scores of extra-judicial executions, while hundreds of
people are reportedly arrested and tortured for political
reasons. In what has been declared an all-out war, the
government is forcibly conscripting young males
(born in 1978). The human security failure situation
in Colombia reflects similar features. In the past six
months alone, five journalists have been killed and 14
kidnapped for ransom money or intimidation purposes
(The Economist 18 March 2000:57). The judiciary has
made little progress in, for example, enforcing arrest
warrants against paramilitary leaders implicated in the
murder of judicial officials of the Human Rights Unit
of the Colombian Attorney General's Office. Several
senior army commanders, closely collaborating with
rightwing paramilitary groups, have been implicated in
intimidation and attacks on human rights defenders.
For example, four (former) Presidents of the Permanent
Committee for the Defence of Human Rights
have been killed during the past ten years. Legal
controls failure has enabled many of these perpetrators
to continue evading accountability. Approxymately
one in a hundred politically motivated murder
cases reach the courts, despite recent reforms of the
legal system (Amnesty International 1999:132±133).
The problem of internal displacement remains largely
inadequately addressed. Again, state and international
organization institutional failure is a key factor in this
(UNHCR 1997:111).
Angola and Colombia share the commonality of
certain counter-insurgency strategies of `dirty' war. In
Colombia, the army, supported by paramilitaries, has
developed a `Vietnam' variation by, instead of exclu-
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 25