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final military liberation in 1819) did not bring about
conclusive state and nation-building. Rather, Colombia
has experienced an almost constant seesaw
process of partial disintegration, followed by brief
periods of reconstruction, the result of formidable
challenges to internal state legitimacy, as well as
control over territory, and political and economic
space. The elected government's exclusive right to
rule has been violently opposed by powerful nonstate
actors such as guerrilla groups and drug cartels.
Colombian independence also commenced with the
birth of a violent order based on political factionalism
(Conservatives versus Liberals), where the ruling
party had no lasting opportunity to consolidate its
power through strong state and civic institutions.
Consequently, central government was unable to
provide adequate collective security and development
opportunities to Colombians (Keen 1996).
Most subsequent governments have suffered the
same fate. Prominent is the co-existence of the
`formal' Colombia which, to the outside world, boasts
all the trappings of a modern polity, and the `real'
Colombia of the people ± a weak, incompetent state
plagued by societal collapse, corruption, crime,
violence, gross human rights violations, and large
income gaps between rich and poor. Central government's
state and nation building capability have been
severely restricted by a conflict between the need for
short-term political survival and the longer-run collective
interests in economic performance and regime
stability. However, Colombia is far from a collapsed
state (representing the extreme form of state failure).
It is among Latin America's oldest, most stable
functioning democracies, with regular national elections
the rule, and military coups d' etat the exception.
Contrary to Latin America's largest state, Brazil, it did
not have to reschedule its debt during recent
economic crises. Steady progress has been made
towards a more diversified and industrialized economy,
with textiles leading the way. Notable improvements
in education and health standards have taken
place. However, income inequality remains a decisive
constraint. State and government legitimacy, while
being contested, does exist. Other states do recognize
Colombia's national sovereignty and territorial integrity.
However, as one of the world's most violent
nations, the result of a wide array of historical, political
and socio-economic problems, the state has failed in
its most important responsibility: to protect and secure
the well-being of its citizens. Generations of ordinary
Colombians have experienced the harsh realities of
rebellion, civil war, corruption, and violent crime
(Pearce 1990; Osterling 1989; Keen 1996:502).
The Angolan `triangle' reflects very similar features.
The violence represents a domestic situation of almost
permanent war ± first a war of liberation against its
colonial ruler, Portugal (1961±1975), and then civil
war between the two main liberation movements, the
MPLA, governing independent Angola, and its main
guerrilla force rival, UNITA (1975 to the present)
(Somerville 1997). Over half of Angola's 11 million
citizens were born after independence 25 years ago,
which ushered in the civil war (Mail and Guardian
1 July 1999:2). While the ingredients of potential
state failure (e.g. traditional clientelism), were already
ingrained during Portuguese rule, a protracted civil
war set into motion state failure in numerous fields,
such as government institutional capacity; the legal
controls; nation building; socio-economic development;
human rights, and citizens' well-being and
security. Contrary to the Colombian experience,
Angola has never really managed to become a modern
state. For example, based on 1996 figures, only 27 TV
sets are in use per 1 000 of the population, compared
to 117 per 1 000 of the population in the case of
Colombia (Lexis-Nexis Academic Universe 1999:6).
Angola's current telephone network has only 56 000
lines, compared to Zimbabwe's 212 000 and Colombia's
1,89 million (1994) (Lexis-Nexis Academic
Universe 1999:7; Sowetan, 2 March 2000:23) At the
most, only small, heavily guarded islands of strategic
political and economic centres exist (e.g. oil refinery
works in Cabinda) ± strategic, due to their importance
as generators of foreign capital investment and
revenue for the ruling e lite.
Angola exists by default rather than on merit ± it is
not a socio-political reality where Angolans can
peacefully develop to their full potential. Similarly to
Colombia, the Angolan state is clearly recognizable on
a world map; it enjoys equal national sovereignty and
territorial integrity among other nation-states; it has
embassies worldwide and participates in international
organizations such as the UN. However, domestically,
their respective governments have never been willing
or able to fully extend the power and range of a more
or less autonomous national political unit, either by
legal force, national identity, alliances, bargaining,
chicanery, and/or administrative encroachment. Both
tend to act and negotiate from a point of weakness.
Notable examples are the Pastrana government's
willingness to recognize the largest guerrilla force
FARC's freedom of movement and control over large
parts of Colombian territory for the sake of peace
negotiations (the so-called Plan Colombia). In Angola
the MPLA government has been willing to
recognize UNITA's control over certain diamond
producing areas (Fituni 1995; Sweeney 1999).
Differently from Colombia, where deep-rooted
political factionalism and social class discrimination
has fuelled violence, Angolan state formation has
been plagued by a mixture of Cold War ideological
divisions, nationalist politics and ethnic polarization
(Messiant 1998:150). Colombians are largely a nation
of Creoles (people of mixed blood: 58 per cent of the
ISSN 0256±6060±Unisa Lat. Am. Rep. 16(2) 2000 7