Improving the Effectiveness of Juvenile Justice Programs: A New

(1999, pp. 85–93) reported, empirical evidence of the
effectiveness of the Rahway State Prison Scared Straight
program was lacking from the beginning. Evaluations
of other Scared Straight–type programs were mixed but
generally showed negative results (pp. 129–39; see also
Petrosino, Turpin-Petrosino, and Finckenauer, 2000).
Curfew laws are another approach to reducing juvenile
crime and victimization that have not been supported by
empirical research (Adams, 2007). Adams’ conclusion was
based on at least a dozen research studies that include,
for example, a national study that examined the effects
of new curfew laws in 57 large cities (McDowall, Loftin,
and Wiersema, 2000). That investigation found that the
introduction of juvenile curfew laws was not followed
by reductions in juvenile arrests in any serious crime
category. The researchers noted that “any impacts of the
laws were small, and they applied only to a few offenses”
such as burglary, larceny, and simple assault (pp. 88–89).
Neither juvenile nor adult boot camps
have proven to be effective according to a
comprehensive meta-analysis.
Neither juvenile nor adult boot camps have proven to be
effective according to a comprehensive meta-analysis
(Wilson, MacKenzie, and Mitchell, 2005). When boot
camps are designed as paramilitary regimens, research
shows that boot camps and other forms of disciplinary
programs increase recidivism by about 8 percent, on
average (Lipsey, 2009). About the only positive thing that
can be said about boot camps is that the inmates in them
view their environment as being more therapeutic than
traditional juvenile reformatories (MacKenzie, Wilson,
Armstrong, and Gover, 2001), which may say more about
the reformatories than the boot camps. Any advantage that
boot camps confer, however, appears to be offset by the
potential in boot camps for psychological, emotional, and
physical abuse of youngsters—particularly for children
with a history of abuse and family violence.
Moreover, research has not supported the effectiveness of
large, congregate, custodial juvenile corrections facilities
for rehabilitating juvenile offenders. Studies have shown
that in large, typically overcrowded correctional facilities,
both treatment opportunities and effectiveness of service
delivery are diminished, and that larger facilities are
more likely than smaller ones to be crowded (Snyder
and Sickmund, 2006, p. 223). Large facilities with little
treatment programming in states such as California and
Texas have been accompanied by very high recidivism
rates (Blackburn et al., 2007; Ezelle, 2007; Lattimore et
al., 2004; Trulson et al., 2007). Custodial concerns tend to
override concerns about the delivery of treatment services
in these settings, and program quality suffers (Roush and
McMillen, 2000).
Similarly, it has been found that the most restrictive
out-of-home placements for mental health treatment,
including psychiatric hospitalization and placement in
residential treatment centers, are not effective for most
child and adolescent offenders (Burns et al., 1999; Knitzer
and Cooper, 2006; U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2001). Inpatient hospitalization is the least
effective of all (U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services, 2001, p. 171); indeed, it may do more harm than
good in many cases (Weithorn, 1988).
These examples demonstrate the potential for a number
of widely used programs, adopted with good intentions,
to be ineffective for reducing subsequent delinquency
and, more troubling, to actually be harmful—that is, to
increase rather than decrease delinquency. None of the
programs or approaches described above was subjected
to rigorous evaluation research before it was implemented
at scale. Their attractiveness was based on their intuitive
appeal, not on credible evidence of effectiveness. Had
such research been conducted and attended to by the
respective decision makers, it is likely that at least some
of these programs would never have been implemented
or, at least, not implemented as widely. Limiting
investment to programs and approaches shown to be
effective by research in pilot and demonstration projects
prior to implementation would not only avoid the often
considerable waste of human and financial resources
associated with supporting ineffective programs, but also
reduce the potential for harm to the juveniles subjected to
those programs.
It is recognition of this history in juvenile justice, and
similar histories in other service areas, that has largely
14 Improving the Effectiveness of Juvenile Justice Programs: A New Perspective on Evidence-Based Practice