a guide to peace support operations - The Watson Institute for ...

of hostilities, a reliable interstate peace agreement could be organized if the
parties were under regional pressure to stop fighting, especially if the risk of
renewed fighting threatened wider security interests. States, particularly those
with democratic governments, were increasingly accountable to the international
community. Sanctions on their freedom to trade, travel, and communicate exerted
leverage on their compliance to a peace agreement. Loss of respectability,
credibility, and the threat of international legal procedures against them acted as
additional pressures. In most cases, armed forces, involved at state level in
hostilities, were subordinated to state government and accountable both as
military units and individuals. Conscripted state-wide, the state’s soldiers were
more disciplined; local issues were less likely to become the cause of emotionally
motivated military acts. They were also more accountable to international bodies,
for example in the investigation of war crimes.
g. Consent at State Level
In the above circumstances, consent to the peace process and the presence of a UN
peace force between opposed armies was sustained at the operational level by
state agreement. The absence of civilians, the established authority of the United
Nations in the separation area and the relatively impersonal attitude of rank and
file soldiers at the interface reinforced overall consent and a degree of indifference
to UN activities. Breakdown of consent might reflect a state’s change of
policy; reconciliation might have to be negotiated above the operational level.
The host state’s attitude toward a peace process and its UN supervisors was likely
to be uniform and consistent among armed forces commanders.
h. Impartiality
Part I, paragraph 2
The impartial status of national contingents and relief agencies associated with a
peace process was emphasized by the conventions of peacekeeping. Their
acceptability was agreed on a case-by-case basis by each party involved in the
conflict. When assembled together in a separation zone, the peacekeeping
contingents and observers usually were regarded uniformly by both sides as an
entity and not individually as national contingents. However, at the interface,
United Nations impartiality could be weakened by continuing rivalry between the
opposed parties. Assistance to wounded, investigation of prisoners’ conditions,
collection of human rights information, and the disposal of mines and battlefield
ordnance might threaten interests of a party and alter their acceptance of the
impartiality of the involved UN units.
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