a guide to peace support operations - The Watson Institute for ...

A GUIDE TO
PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
Edited by John Mackinlay
i

Published by
The Thomas J. Watson Jr.
Institute for International Studies
Brown University, Box 1970
2 Stimson Avenue
Providence, RI 02912
USA
Telephone: (401) 863-2809
Fax: (401) 863-1270
E-mail: IIS@Brown.edu
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Watson_Institute/
Thomas J. Biersteker, Ph.D., Director
Thomas G. Weiss, Ph.D., Associate Director
Frederick F. Fullerton, Writer/Editor
Nancy Soukup, Writer/Editor
Amy M. Langlais, Communications Assistant
Statements of fact or opinions are solely those of the authors; their publication does not
imply endorsement by the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies.
Copyright 1996 by the Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies. All rights
reserved under International and Pan American Convention. No part of this report may
be reproduced by any other means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopy,
recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written
permission from the publisher. All inquiries should be addressed to Publications Group,
Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies.
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CONTENTS
Forword .......................................................................................................................1
Preface.........................................................................................................................2
List of Authors............................................................................................................3
Part I: Introduction .................................................................................................9
The Evolution of Peacekeeping ..........................................................................9
Developments After the Cold War ...................................................................12
Challenges at Operational Level ......................................................................15
Operational Responses ......................................................................................21
Part II: Emergency Response, Recovery, and Aid............................................31
1. Introduction to Civil Elements in Peace Support Operations ........................31
2 Government Donors ..........................................................................................39
3. United Nations Agency Response Roles .........................................................47
4. UN Civil Elements: Civil Administration .......................................................75
5. UN Civil Elements: Elections...........................................................................79
6. Nongovernmental Organizations ......................................................................93
7. International and Intergovernmental Organizations .....................................121
8. Human Rights ..................................................................................................133
Part III: Military Forces and Civilian Police ..................................................139
1. Introduction to Armed Forces in Peace Support Operations........................139
2. Land Forces Operations ..................................................................................157
3. Maritime Forces...............................................................................................175
4. Air Force Operations in Support of Peacekeeping........................................193
5. UN Civilian Police Element ...........................................................................213
Part IV: Coordination .........................................................................................221
1. Negotiations .....................................................................................................221
2. Working Together............................................................................................231
Annexes ..................................................................................................................245
1. The United Nations System ............................................................................245
2. The Department of Political Affairs...............................................................246
3. The Department of Peace-keeping Operations..............................................247
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4. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs ......................................................248
5. United Nations Security Phases......................................................................249
6. Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross
and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Relief .........................250
7. United Nations Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials...............258
8. Acronyms .........................................................................................................263
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FOREWORD
The end of the Cold War increased demands for outside involvement in a variety
of armed conflicts, particularly by the United Nations. The need for enhanced professionalism
in international military operations as well as for coordination of a wide
variety of military and civilian inputs has grown accordingly.
The present volume responds to this need and is a more substantial version of its
predecessor, published by the Watson Institute under the title, A Draft Concept of
Second Generation Multinational Operations 1993. Support for the earlier publication
and much of the travel and research for the present volume was generously
provided by the Ford Foundation. In addition, the Ploughshares Fund has made
possible through a special grant the commissioning of several chapters of this volume
and the costs associated with its production. Brown University would like to thank
Shepard Forman and Sally Lilienthal for their interest in this crucial undertaking.
The appearance of such a guide would not have been possible without the contributions
of many persons. The authors who provided the raw material for individual
chapters are listed at the front of the volume. We are also indebted to the Conflict
Resolution and Peacekeeping Programme of the Mountbatten Centre for International
Studies at the University of Southampton for the provision of the services of
the assistant editor and the organization of the validation process in the United Kingdom.
Moreover, the final text benefited from comments made at discussions organized
in Washington, D.C. and New York by the National Defense University and the
UN’s Department of Peace-keeping Operations. We would like specifically to thank
John Simpson, Stuart Johnson, and Christopher Coleman, respectively. It is also
important to acknowledge the production efforts at the Watson Institute of Fred
Fullerton, Nancy Soukup, Amy Langlais, and Jennifer Patrick.
Most important, however, I would like to record here my personal and, on behalf
of the Watson Institute, institutional appreciation for the conceptual and professional
efforts by John Mackinlay over the last half decade that he has been associated with
Brown University. We pride ourselves on working at the interface between academic
inquiry and applied research. The present guide is designed for practitioners working
in headquarters or the field, be they military or civilian and from governmental,
intergovernmental, or nongovernmental organizations. This useful and unusual product
would not have been possible without John Mackinlay’s dedication and mastery of
the subject matter, reflecting his wide research and first-hand experience in this field.
Thomas G. Weiss
Associate Director, Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International Studies
July 1996
1

PREFACE
WHY WE NEED A GUIDE
The word “peacekeeping” took on a new meaning in the 1950s. It described the
UN’s earliest attempts to contain conflict by peaceful means that were known as
peacekeeping. After several decades, peacekeeping activities took on a greater diversity
and began to involve larger and more powerful forces, including greater numbers
of nonmilitary organizations. Terms like “peace building,” “peacemaking,” and “peace
enforcement” were added to the language of the peacekeepers to describe each additional
category of response. “Peace Support Operations” (PSO) describes the operations
and activities of all civil and military organizations deployed to restore
peace and/or relieve human suffering. Peace support operations may include diplomatic
actions, traditional peacekeeping, and the more forceful military actions required
to establish peaceful conditions.
In this context, a multinational response comprises several elements, including
humanitarian, military, civil administration, and infrastructure development agencies
and teams of political negotiators. The civil and military assets for peace support
operations can be provided by different sources: collectively by the UN and regional
organizations, or individually by nations and nongovernmental organizations. Although
divided by outlook, status, and political orientation, each element involved
in a PSO is, or should be, working toward the same long-term outcome.
This guide is for all who are involved in these international efforts to establish
peace and relieve human suffering. It is a common reference for military staff officers,
government officials, and civil aid workers in emergency relief organizations. Its
purpose is to promote a better understanding of each other’s organization and function.
It has two objectives: first to give military staff and civilian executives a working
outline of the characteristics, role, modus operandi, and limitations of all the
elements in the operational area; and second to explain the existing structures for
cooperation between the agencies in a UN force at the operational level. The military
sections also provide the basis for a common concept of operations for contingents
from different nations that may otherwise have differing approaches. The guide is an
independently created information resource. It does not represent the official views
of any single organization. Although the authors are serving officials and staff officers
in most cases, they are writing here in a private capacity as leading experts in their
particular fields. For this reason the guide has been able to address issues in a style
that is not constrained by the official position of nations and institutions. It is intended
to be used as an up-to-date resource that can be adapted to individual needs
of all the involved parties. It is published in English, Russian, and Spanish.
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LIST OF AUTHORS
Editor: Dr. John Mackinlay, Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College, London
University, Strand, London
Assistant Editor: Ms. Emily Bailey, Projects Manager, Mountbatten Centre for International
Studies, University of Southampton, United Kingdom
Part I: Introduction
Dr. John Mackinlay
Part II: Emergency Response, Recovery, and Aid
Section 1 - Introduction to Civilian Elements in Peace Support Operations
Mr. Randolph Kent
Special Adviser for Transitional Arrangements, Department of Humanitarian Affairs,
United Nations
Section 2 - Government Donors
Ms. Cleo Small
International NGO Training and Research Centre, Oxford, United Kingdom
Section 3 - United Nations Agency Response Roles
Mr. Giles Whitcomb
Humanitarian Affairs Consultant to International Organizations, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
United States
Section 4 - UN Civil Elements: Civil Administration
Ms. Lyndall McLean
Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Canberra, Australia
Section 5 - UN Civil Elements: Elections
Mr. Michael Maley
Director, International Services and Special Projects, Australian Electoral Commission,
Canberra, Australia
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Section 6 - Nongovernmental Organizations
Mr. Hugo Slim
Centre for Development and Emergency Planning, Oxford Brookes University, Oxford,
United Kingdom
Section 7 - International and Intergovernmental Organizations
Mr. Michel Veuthey
Adviser to the President, International Committee of the Red Cross, Geneva
Mr. Giles Whitcomb
Section 8 - Human Rights
Mr. Pádraig Czajkowski
Emergencies and Information/Communications Consultant
Part III: Military Forces and Civilian Police
Section 1 - Introduction to Armed Forces in Peace Support Operations
Dr. Raffi Gregorian
Science Applications International Corporation, McLean, Virginia, United States
Section 2 - Land Forces Operations
Lieutenant Colonel Philip Wilkinson
Directorate of Land Warfare, Ministry of Defence, Upavon, United Kingdom
Section 3 - Maritime Forces
Commander Robin Davis
Maritime Warfare School(s), HMS Dryad, United Kingdom
Dr. Raffi Gregorian
Captain Brad Hayes
U.S. Naval War College, Newport, Rhode Island, United States
Commander Leslie Sim
Directorate of Operational Requirements-Sea, Ministry of Defence, London, United
Kingdom
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Section 4 - Air Force Operations in Support of Peacekeeping
Wing Commander David C. Bernard
Air War Centre, RAF Bently Priory, United Kingdom
Wing Commander Robert Evans
Air Warfare Centre, RAF High Wycombe, United Kingdom
Dr. Grant Hammond
U.S. Air War College, Maxwell Airforce Base, Alabama, United States
Major Leonard Murin
Airforce Doctrine Center, Langley Airforce Base, Virginia, United States
Group Captain Gordon Wooley
Operational Doctrine and Training, U.K. Air Warfare Centre, RAF Cranwell, United
Kingdom
Section 5 - UN Civilian Police Element
Mr. Frank Gregory
Senior Lecturer, Department of Politics, University of Southampton, Southampton,
United Kingdom
Deputy Assistant Superintendent John Rixon
General Policing Policy and Arrangements Division, Australian Federal Police, Canberra,
Australia
Part IV: Coordination and Support
Section 1 - Negotiations
Mr. Charles McLeod
School of Management, Cranfield University, Cranfield, United Kingdom
Section 2 - Working Together
Dr. John Mackinlay
5

DEDICATION
This guide is dedicated to the “operators,” the government officials, military staff
officers, civilian aid organizers, politicians, community leaders, journalists, negotiators,
diplomats, and international civil servants whose efforts are critical to the successful
relief of human suffering and the peaceful resolution of conflict.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
The authors and editors wish to thank all those who helped them to revise and
redraft the guide. In particular, they wish to pay tribute to the following for their time
and valuable comments:
Lieutenant Colonel J. Baxter, Ministry of Defence, U.K.
Dr. H. Binnendijk, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
Ms. E. Cadzow, Peace Support Operations, East Meon, Hampshire, U.K.
Mr. D. Casson Coutts, World Food Programme, New York
Ms. L. Charrington, Opportunities Trust, Oxford, U.K.
Mr. R. Chatterton Dixon, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, U.K.
Professor M. Clarke, Centre for Defence Studies, London University, U.K.
Mr. C. Coleman, Political Affairs, DPKO, UN Secretariat, New York
Colonel R. Cousens, U.K. Army, HQ TRADOC, Fort Monroe, Virginia
Mr. W. Day, Opportunities Trust, Oxford, U.K.
Colonel M. J. Dziedzic, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
Colonel C. Van Egmond, DPKO, UN Secretariat, New York
Ms. G. Evans, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, London, U.K.
Mr. M. Evans, Disaster Preparedness Centre, Shrivenham, U.K.
Lieutenant Colonel F. Freeman, Joint Warfare Centre, Poole, U.K.
Mr. J. Ginifer, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Southampton, U.K.
Mr. S. Green, Policy Analysis Branch, DHA, UN Secretariat, New York
Mr. M. Goulding, Under Secretary-General, DPA, UN Secretariat, New York
Lieutenant Colonel D. Healy, HQ Joint Forces, Canberra, Australia
Mr. R. Hill, INTERTECT, Dallas, Texas
Dr. J. F. Hillen III, Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.
Group Captain (Rtd) A. E. Hotchkiss, Joint Warfare Centre, Poole, U.K.
Mr. K. Jessop, International Organization for Migration, London, U.K.
Dr. S. E. Johnson, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
Mr. K. M. Kennedy, Complex Emergency Division, DHA, UN Secretariat, New York
Commander M. Knowles, RN, Ministry of Defence, London, U.K.
Colonel P. Leentjes, Training Unit, DPKO, UN Secretariat, New York
Mr. T. Lanzer, Refugee Study Programme, Oxford, U.K.
Dr. W. Lewis, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
Mr. L. Minear, Watson Institute, Brown University, Providence, R.I.
Ambassador R. Oakley, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
6

Colonel B. Orrell, USAF, National Defense University, Washington, D.C.
Captain C. Page, RN, Ministry of Defence, U.K.
Mr. H. Petter Boe, International Organization for Migration, Washington, D.C.
Colonel S. Radar, Science Applications International Corporation, McClean, Virginia
Ms. A. Raven-Roberts, UNICEF, New York
Mr. Malcolm Ridout, OXFAM, U.K.
Mrs. S. Rogerson, Peace Support Operations, East Meon, Hampshire, U.K.
Mr. J. Sands, Center for Naval Analysis, Alexandria, Virginia
Ms. V. Shankland, Military Analyst for SIAC - AMSEC, Naval Doctrine Command,
Norfolk, Virginia
Ms. H. Shimura, Formerly of DPKO, UN Secretariat, New York
Mr. A. Skeat, Mountbatten Centre for International Studies, Southampton, U.K.
Major P. Solli, Norwegian Air Force, NUPI, Oslo, Norway
Mr. A. Timpson, Save the Children Fund, London, U.K.
Professor M. Walsh, Army Peacekeeping Institute, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania
7

PART I: INTRODUCTION
THE EVOLUTION OF PEACEKEEPING
1. Restrictions of Cold War Rivalry (1950s-1980s)
In a Security Council divided by bipolar rivalry during the Cold War, the deployment
of peacekeeping forces allowed the United Nations to engage in conflict containment. To
avoid confronting superpower interests, peacekeepers were constrained in their operations,
and only on rare occasions did the Security Council authorize the full deployment
of UN forces by land, sea, and air as envisaged in Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The
gradual acceptance of the concept of neutral interpositional forces by the international
community gave the peacekeeper, working between opposed armies, a recognized sense
of immunity. At the same time, the UN’s operational aid agencies and the leading NGOs
established their credibility as impartial relief organizers. In the majority of cases, aid
workers and officials also enjoyed a neutral status and freedom of movement in the
conflict zone. Although UN troops were involved in a variety of contingencies during the
Cold War period, UN peacekeeping doctrine was derived from and continues to be
influenced by the long-standing interpositional forces operating in the buffer zones of
Cyprus, Golan, and the Sinai, in what is sometimes referred to as “traditional peacekeeping.”
2. Traditional Peacekeeping
a. Definitions
In its initial manifestation, “peacekeeping” had no commonly accepted definition.
The term was misapplied outside the UN context to describe non-UN
multinational and unilateral interventions, as well as UN operations that did not
have the accepted characteristics of peacekeeping. The UN referred to peacekeeping
as “an operation involving military personnel, but without enforcement
powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore international
peace and security in areas of conflict.” This definition and its related
operating concept were accepted among the major contributing countries of the
UN contingent to describe the constrained, mainly interpositional, peacekeeping
forces that were deployed during the period of the Cold War.
b. Principles
The principles of early interpositional peacekeeping included:
• need for support by the mandating authority, the Security
Council;
• requirement that the operation be deployed only with the
consent of the warring parties;
9

Part I, paragraph 2
c. Security Council Support
- regulations for command and control of the force;
- balanced multinational composition of the force;
- restrictions that force be used only in self-defense; and
- need for complete impartiality in the performance of the
functions of the force.
A peacekeeping force had to have the full confidence and backing of the Security
Council, but in practice this was not always forthcoming. A divided Security
Council resulted in mandates that were sometimes based on a minimal area of
common agreement. Often, following the deployment of an operation, no
adjustments could be made to the mandate, and this reduced the effectiveness of
peacekeepers in the field whose operational flexibility and problem-solving
capability were minimal.
d. Force Composition
In traditional peacekeeping, a UN force comprised a number of contingents
provided by selected countries on the request of the secretary-general. The
contingents would be selected in consultation with the Security Council and with
the parties concerned, bearing in mind the need for equitable geographic representation.
By tacit agreement, this excluded permanent members of the Security
Council from participating in peacekeeping operations, although there were
exceptions. Command in the field would be exercised by a force commander
appointed by the secretary-general with the council’s consent. The commander
would be responsible to the secretary-general.
e. Use of Force
Peacekeepers would not use force except in self-defense or to resist attempts by
forceful means to prevent the UN force from discharging its duties under the
Security Council’s mandate. Escalating the use of force beyond self-defense was
regarded as enforcement. Without sufficiently powerful military forces or the
authority to take problem-solving action, except at a very local level, peacekeepers
had to rely more on their international status and moral pressures exerted by
the international community.
f. Conditions in the Operational Area
In the context of Cold War period operations, peacekeepers were involved in
containment of conventional, interstate combat that could be highly destructive.
Conflict between conventionally armed forces might be limited in area, but its
intensity threatened to destroy the local population remaining in the area, their
homes, and essential civilian facilities. Despite the ferocity and destructiveness
10

of hostilities, a reliable interstate peace agreement could be organized if the
parties were under regional pressure to stop fighting, especially if the risk of
renewed fighting threatened wider security interests. States, particularly those
with democratic governments, were increasingly accountable to the international
community. Sanctions on their freedom to trade, travel, and communicate exerted
leverage on their compliance to a peace agreement. Loss of respectability,
credibility, and the threat of international legal procedures against them acted as
additional pressures. In most cases, armed forces, involved at state level in
hostilities, were subordinated to state government and accountable both as
military units and individuals. Conscripted state-wide, the state’s soldiers were
more disciplined; local issues were less likely to become the cause of emotionally
motivated military acts. They were also more accountable to international bodies,
for example in the investigation of war crimes.
g. Consent at State Level
In the above circumstances, consent to the peace process and the presence of a UN
peace force between opposed armies was sustained at the operational level by
state agreement. The absence of civilians, the established authority of the United
Nations in the separation area and the relatively impersonal attitude of rank and
file soldiers at the interface reinforced overall consent and a degree of indifference
to UN activities. Breakdown of consent might reflect a state’s change of
policy; reconciliation might have to be negotiated above the operational level.
The host state’s attitude toward a peace process and its UN supervisors was likely
to be uniform and consistent among armed forces commanders.
h. Impartiality
Part I, paragraph 2
The impartial status of national contingents and relief agencies associated with a
peace process was emphasized by the conventions of peacekeeping. Their
acceptability was agreed on a case-by-case basis by each party involved in the
conflict. When assembled together in a separation zone, the peacekeeping
contingents and observers usually were regarded uniformly by both sides as an
entity and not individually as national contingents. However, at the interface,
United Nations impartiality could be weakened by continuing rivalry between the
opposed parties. Assistance to wounded, investigation of prisoners’ conditions,
collection of human rights information, and the disposal of mines and battlefield
ordnance might threaten interests of a party and alter their acceptance of the
impartiality of the involved UN units.
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Part I, paragraphs 3-4
DEVELOPMENTS AFTER THE COLD WAR (1990S)
3. End of the Cold War Era
After the Cold War, political tension in the Security Council was reduced, allowing
the UN to become more responsive to conflicts in which the interests of the United States
and former Soviet Union had previously prevented its effective involvement. As a result,
the number of UN forces involved in conflict resolution increased. The nature of conflict
had not changed, but the focus of the Security Council had moved to civil wars and
intercommunal violence, in many cases to states that had degenerated to anarchy. UN and
coalition forces were deployed with more intrusive mandates than before. The scale and
complexity of these operations now called for more capable multinational forces, and the
permanent members of the Security Council began to increase their interest and
involvement.
4. Threats to Security
Ending superpower confrontation did not reduce global conflict. Problems, suppressed
by the imperatives of East-West rivalry, emerged in regions and states that
previously had been comparatively stable. As Cold War forces withdrew and reduced in
size, violence was fueled by the abundance of weapons in the former war zones. In some
cases, weapons were left by demobilized armies, or supplied to client states that had
become the proxy front lines in the superpower struggle beyond Europe. In the post-Cold
War era, continuing conflict and humanitarian disasters were less often caused by
territorial aggression than by the long-term effects of:
• population increases that imposed a growing demand for
space and resources;
• poverty increases of 40 percent since 1980 that left 1.4
billion people on the margins of survival, vulnerable to
conflict and natural disaster;
• economic imbalance that faced poor countries with increasing
debt and a lack of access to world markets, while rich
nations continued to maintain and exploit their dominance;
• environmental damage;
• competition for raw materials and vital resources including
water;
• collapsing states, particularly artificially created multiethnic
states held together by superpower interests during the Cold
War that became vulnerable to demands for recognition of
their culturally distinct elements;
• civil violence fueled by communities striving for ethnic and
cultural self-determination; and
• population migration and the displacement of civilian communities
on a large scale by violence and terror.
12

Part I, paragraphs 5-7
5. Civilian Casualties
The proportion of civilian casualties in war already had increased in the seventy years
before the end of the Cold War. By far the greatest number of casualties in this period were
civilians, either as a direct result of hostilities or indirectly as a consequence of disruption
and deprivation following a military attack. But in the post-Cold War era, the civilian
population increasingly has become the primary war objective and focus of violence.
Rival militias attack civilian communities far more frequently than they attack each other,
measuring their power by their control of local populations. Militias threaten minorities
to achieve “ethnic cleansing” and civilian populations are deprived of food to attract
humanitarian relief that can be plundered, extorted, and generally added to war resources.
6. Collective Interests
As stronger continental systems have developed, regional and international organizations
proliferated and became more pervasive. Now states rely increasingly on each
other for movement, trade, and communications. This interdependence spreads the
effects of violence and disasters more swiftly across frontiers to neighboring states. The
expansion of continental systems makes states more mutually reliant with common
interests for their prosperity and survival, and their populations move more freely across
frontiers legally or otherwise. They have become less able to act alone to protect their
strategic interests. Shared facilities now bind them together, eroding sovereignty by
collective use of continental systems; these include:
7. Multilateral Responses
a. Collective Security
• international roads and railways;
• airways;
• sea lanes;
• international electronic communications;
• security structures and agreements;
• trade agreements;
• international financial systems and business communities;
• legal, immigration, and policing agreements;
• environment and shared resources; and
• energy resources.
When collective interests are threatened by the distant effects of conflict or
natural disaster, the response is likely to be multilateral; nations seldom have the
power or inclination to act alone to protect a threatened collective interest. A
collective response is organized by combining elements from several “overlapping
and interlocking” international organizations (for example, the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization [NATO] and Western European Union [WEU])
13

Part I, paragraphs 7-8
together with individual nations. The UN remains the overarching global organization
that can arrange a multinational response, and authorize its deployment
through the Security Council.
b. Motives
Nations that respond to an emergency in this category may have different
underlying motives for their participation. Some have a direct interest in maintaining
stability in the conflict zone where they may have strategic interests.
Others may have more complicated reasons to influence international response
mechanisms. Participation in peace operations, for example, may offer a desirable
raison d’être to armed forces that are domestically unpopular. Overall,
national contingents will find themselves in the same force, with the same
apparent local tasks, but with varied political motives.
c. International Consensus
To be successful, the elements of a PSO that may be divided by political diversity
and composition depend on being well-coordinated. Besides achieving agreement
among contributor nations and the relief agencies, coordination relies on
achieving a political consensus among regional powers that influence or sustain
the warring factions. Unless adjacent states and regional powers agree on a
workable long-term strategy for reconciliation and recovery, a conflict of
interests at this level will sometimes fuel the sources of conflict and energize
warring parties to continue fighting. Political cooperation is essential at a global
level in the UN Security Council. A successful recovery plan also will need the
support of donor nations, which underwrite the cost of rebuilding the infrastructure
and restoring the vital political, government, and social institutions in a
collapsed state.
8. Complex Emergencies
In the post Cold War period, international civil servants and military staff sometimes
refer to contingencies arising from civil conflict as complex emergencies. Complex
emergencies are distinct from the interstate conflict that is associated with traditional
peacekeeping in several important respects.
a. Definition
A complex emergency is a humanitarian disaster that occurs in a conflict zone and
is complicated by, or results from, the conflicting interests of warring parties. Its
causes are seldom exclusively natural or military; in many cases, a marginally
subsistent population is precipitated toward disaster by the consequences of
militia action or a natural occurrence such as an earthquake or drought. The
presence of militias and their interest in controlling and extorting the local
14

population will impede and in some cases seriously threaten relief efforts. In
addition to violence against the civil populations, civilian installations such as
hospitals, schools, refugee centers, and cultural sites will become war objectives
and may be looted frequently or destroyed.
b. Tasks
A crisis that is precipitated by several distinct factors will require a response
group that has a corresponding span of diverse capabilities. Each of these may be
provided by a different agency or military contingent. For a multinational
response group operating in a war zone, military awareness is essential. The
military elements may be required to act as an overall security enhancing presence
to encourage an environment in which the civil organizations can work. In
addition, military contingents can assist the other elements of a disaster response
group in the initial stages with its reliable logistics, communications, and
mobility. However, once a reasonable level of security has been established, the
primary task will be to rebuild and restore social and political structures; this will
fall to the relief agencies and the military element will be subordinated to
maintaining secure working conditions for them. Acting individually or as a
group, the response elements may have to:
• provide immediate humanitarian relief;
• negotiate cease-fires;
• resettle displaced populations;
• rehabilitate demobilized militias;
• restore essential services;
• establish an interim government;
• restore the economy;
• rebuild the civilian infrastructure;
• reconcile opposed parties;
• investigate human rights issues; and
• organize elections.
Part I, paragraphs 8-9
9. Need for a Fresh Approach
CHALLENGES AT OPERATIONAL LEVEL
In the 1990s, as a consequence of becoming involved in intrastate violence and the
need for larger and more powerfully equipped forces, the status of the peacekeeper and
the aid worker began to alter. Insurgent forces of the host state were less reliable to deal
with than accountable state armies of traditional peacekeeping experience. In the bitter
and mutually destructive fighting that characterizes civil conflict, the response elements’
immunity became less credible and the threat to withdraw consent and therefore their
immunity was used manipulatively against them by local forces. Increasingly the
15

Part I, paragraphs 9-10
peacekeeper and aid worker became part of the matrix of hostilities, and their activities
either facilitated or blocked the achievement of factional war objectives.
International forces and relief agencies were now being deployed to complex
emergencies, sometimes before cease-fires had been negotiated successfully, to states
where government and law and order had broken down. In particular, the integrity of local
“consent” and the perceived “impartiality” of the response group generally were being
eroded. The UN’s traditionally accepted principles for success (see paragraph 2b),
developed largely from traditional peacekeeping experience, became less easy to observe
as essential preconditions of United Nations involvement.
As a result, the military element had to be less symbolic, better organized, more
capable, and better protected. The civilian element had to work more closely together and
accept a key role in the overall strategy for success, which tended to curtail individualistic
approaches. In situations where the immunity and impartial status of the aid worker were
in doubt, a better cooperative relationship was needed between them and the military
element to organize the growing number of response agencies and protect them.
10. Host States
In place of the traditional buffer zone, multinational response groups now find
themselves operating state-wide in less defined surroundings, without the familiar
structures of a functioning state. In some cases, local government has totally collapsed
and the peacekeepers face a chaotic and continuously changing environment.
a. Operations in a Collapsed State
A state may collapse for a variety of reasons related to its multiethnic composition
and the inability of a weak political system to provide the strong governance
needed to hold it together. The intercommunal violence that results is characterized
by intense personal hatred and brutality. The operational environment for
both the civil and military elements of the response group is therefore dynamic
and the relationship and status of the local government and the communities
within the state are constantly changing. In these circumstances, it is legitimate
that each element of the response group may have a different long-term purpose.
For example, the political/military elements may seek to restore the state
government, but the nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) may be more
concerned with creating a viable social environment in the short term and/or with
long-term development issues.
The factors that distinguish these operations from the UN’s traditional, interstate
experiences are:
• operational zones are physically larger and ill-defined;
• presence of sizable civilian communities;
• greater number of parties involved that will not always be
easy to identify;
16

Part I, paragraph 10
b. Key Functional Areas
• civilians and civil amenities become targets for hostilities;
• warring parties’ lack of accountability to the conditions of
the peace process;
• armed factions’ local hostility to UN and NGO activities; and
• extortion of relief supplies by local armed elements.
A response group may expect to interact at all levels with its host state. The
harmony and cooperation achieved in this relationship has a direct bearing on the
overall success of the operation. There are several key areas of interface:
(1) Government
The effectiveness of the host government is crucial to the long-term
success of a peace process, particularly in the restoration of the
economy, political systems, and, in the case of a prolonged conflict,
the rehabilitation of fighters and military forces. Host governments
exercise an important influence on the freedom of the individual
elements of the response group to enter and operate in the conflict
zone. However, if the host government is hostile to a party in the
dispute, a close relationship with the host government may compromise
a response element’s impartiality. A country with no effective
government is likely to have no overseas diplomatic representation or
security of borders. In some cases, these will be provided by an interim
government, which is convened and empowered under the guidance of
the United Nations.
(2) Armed Forces
Armed forces play an important role in the stability and continuity of
government. The failure of a government may be linked to the break
up or defeat of the armed forces. Response group elements may have
to maintain good relations with host armed forces involved in the
dispute, facilitating movement and favorable recognition in areas that
these forces control. After a successful peace settlement, it may be
necessary to disarm large numbers of irregular fighters and militia
troops whose numbers have grown as a consequence of prolonged
hostilities and who will now jeopardize the peace process if they
continue to prey on the local population. An important task for the
response group will be to rehabilitate them and reconstitute a much
smaller number into a new defense force; this action should restore
some power back into the hands of the elected government.
17

Part I, paragraphs 10-11
(3) Population
In most cases, the response group will work closely with the population.
In a host state divided by intercommunal conflict, the civilian
population may have been victims of every kind of misfortune including
dislocation, starvation, and the physical dangers of existing in a
war zone. Very often this trauma will cause profound social changes
that challenge long-established hierarchies and alter ethnic distribution,
power structures, and clan values. In these turbulent circumstances,
populations may be manipulated, very often in a ruthless
manner by warlords and even the host government, armed forces, and
officials. To survive, they also are capable of highly manipulative
behavior. Once the success of the peace process begins to improve
their security, the population should seek its own solutions to their
immediate problems. Relief is delivered “with people” and not “to
people.” By this process, the victims become involved in their own
recovery and gradually transform from being victims to participants in
the solution. Providing for survival needs and long-term desires for
reconciliation and rehabilitation is demanding and complicated; recently
arrived elements of the response group constantly should seek
advice from more experienced NGO, UN, and government officials.
(4) Infrastructure
11. Dealing with Factions
a. Characteristics
After years of internal conflict, the infrastructure of the host nation
will be changed and diminished in its effectiveness and facilities. In
addition to the visible installations that facilitate communications,
trade, and good government, there may be unseen damage that also
reduces the speed of long-term rebuilding plans. National education
programs probably have been suspended, reducing the pool of educated
labor. Professional classes, including lawyers, police, doctors,
teachers, civil servants, and interpreters may have fled or been depleted
by execution and massacres.
It is important to understand that armed factions, militias, and irregular forces in
collapsed states are fundamentally different in character and organization to
disciplined forces of a functioning state. Armed irregular forces comprise
individuals banded together under a local warlord, sometimes to protect themselves
from threats to their community or to survive civil war. Despite grandiose
organizational titles, local gangs are loosely constituted into bands under the
18

aegis of a faction identity. For this reason a faction has a loose, tenuously
controlled structure with unreliable vertical and horizontal communications.
Fighters vary in age, education, and professional experience; they seldom receive
regular pay or logistic supplies. Individuals may have intense personal reasons for
becoming fighters. Their highest motives may include the sincerely held desire
for ethnic or political self-determination. Unfortunately, some irregular forces
attract individuals driven by less positive motives including revenge, venal
exploitation, and cultural or ethnic bigotry. Unlike the state soldier, faction
fighters are sustained by local resources or looting and therefore take a close,
personal interest in local issues. If the activities of an international force impinge
on the rapine activities, which are necessary for survival, they will become hostile
to the international presence. Where culturally or ethnically different communities
are in confrontation, revenge and fundamentalist bigotry can drive factions
to behave in a way that is unacceptable to civil society. Isolated by war, and
blinded by local passions, fighters may not see that what to them are routine acts
of war are regarded as serious crimes and violations of human rights by the
international community.
b. Faction Leaders
As a rule, faction leaders have little experience of statesmanship or reliance on the
rule of law. Few state level representatives at peace negotiations can control with
assurance local leaders who obstruct a peace process for parochial motives. The
immediate, practical needs of local factions will be beyond the scope of international
negotiations. After long periods of fighting, local elements of a faction may
become geographically and politically dispersed into a diversity of smaller
groups or gangs. Power devolves downwards, out of the hands of state level actors
to local leaders, making the negotiation of state-wide peace agreements hard to
execute in a reliable manner.
c. Consent at the Tactical Level
Part I, paragraph 11
Although conditions for a UN deployment may appear to be authoritatively
negotiated at operational level with representative faction leaders, these agreements
in reality may not be observed at local or tactical levels. Tenuous
communications, lack of control, and personal interests of local factions dictate
an uneven interpretation of what may appear to be universal consent at national
level. Faction leaders may even promise cooperation as a ploy, knowing that
locally their promises cannot be honored. Unless an overall faction leader can
exercise area-wide control, consent (to any UN or multinational force activity)
has to be negotiated case-by-case with local fighters. In cases where a local band
impedes a UN mandate or relief activity for unnegotiable reasons, an international
military force may have to act without their consent, if necessary using force to
protect their mandate.
19

Part I, paragraphs 11-12
Unevenness of local support can favor multinational peacekeepers in these
circumstances. Confrontation between them and faction fighters, as a consequence
of protecting the mission at local level, does not mean a widespread
withdrawal of consent across the whole operational area. Each factional subgroup
will follow its individual interests and a reconciliation can be negotiated locally.
12. Maintaining Impartiality
a. Compromised Impartiality
Relief agencies and peacekeepers no longer can rely on universal recognition of
their traditional status as impartial actors. Despite their activities appearing
unconnected to the outcome of factional hostilities, in civil violence they become
part of the matrix of involved parties for different reasons. Where starvation,
extermination, or removal of a civil community is a faction’s war aim, a relief
agency that seeks to impede, prevent, or by evacuation facilitate that war aim
cannot expect to be perceived as impartial.
b. Variable Impartiality within the Force
Although the legal status of the response elements is derived collectively from the
Security Council’s mandate, local perception of their impartiality may vary. Also,
within a crisis response group, attitudes toward maintaining impartiality vary
between its elements and agencies. Military elements generally have to maintain
a clear public position of impartiality, whereas the UN’s civil agencies may
succeed in negotiating deals with factions on a bilateral basis. In some cases, to
be successful, these agencies have to advocate covertly in a way that could
compromise their impartiality. NGOs are even more free to act partially or
impartially for reasons that are explained in Part II.
c. Impartial Use of Force
In the impartial execution of their mandate, international troops should challenge
any local faction that impedes or evades the conditions of that mandate in an
impartial, even-handed fashion. In some cases, a military element may have to use
force against a local faction to protect a mandate. Challenged for these reasons,
a local faction may feel the international troops acted against them with partiality;
but as long as an effective overall level of civil support for the peace process
continues, locally challenged factions usually can be persuaded to accept the
consequences of their unlawful behavior without allowing an isolated incident to
be a motive for long-term revenge.
20

Part I, paragraphs 12-13
d. Loss of Impartiality
If the military element of a response group exceeds the impartial policing of a
mandate and targets a faction or its leader in a way that seeks to alter the tactical
balance of forces, they may lose their impartial status and become a factor in the
conflict. Once the military force is irretrievably perceived to have taken sides, and
the consequence of this can be measured effectively in a changed tactical balance,
its impartial status will be hard to restore. Furthermore, relief agencies and civil
elements associated with that mission also may be compromised.
OPERATIONAL RESPONSES
13. Response Elements
The international community responds to complex emergencies by deploying assets
to the crisis zones that have multiple capabilities. Although collectively we refer to them
in this document as the “response group,” most of its elements are individually
established and controlled.
a. International Structures
After the Cold War, the larger and more powerful military operations continue to
be authorized by the UN Security Council, but the necessary military assets may
be provided from security organizations and ad hoc coalitions. The military
command structures and staff are usually provided from the same source. This
development is significant in mid-level and high-level operations (see paragraph
16) where there may be a separation of authority between the mandating body,
which is usually the UN Security Council, and the military force structure that
may be directly under the control of the ad hoc coalition or regional structure. For
example, a coalition of NATO and Eastern European forces may combine to
operate with the authority of a UN mandate but under the military direction of
NATO headquarters.
b. Civilian Organizations
Some development and relief agencies will have been operating in the host
country for several years before the crisis. Usually, elements of the response
group will not arrive as part of an orchestrated plan. In each complex emergency,
they will develop focal points from which their conduct of operations will be
managed. These are described in greater detail in Part II. The modus operandi and
the organization of the coordinating committees are ad hoc procedures that will
develop with the crisis. In some operations, the civilian elements have worked
successfully together toward the same objectives, but in other cases, civilian and
military operations have not been successfully coordinated. Each crisis therefore
takes on individual characteristics and its own organizational dynamic. The
21

Part I, paragraphs 13-14
constant elements are the major components of the crisis response group, which
are:
14. Role of the UN Secretariat
• international military, maritime, and air assets;
• principal UN agencies (United Nations High Commissioner
for Refugees [UNHCR], United Nations Children’s Fund
[UNICEF], World Health Organization [WHO], Food and
Agriculture Organization/World Food Programme [FAO/
WFP], United Nations Development Programme [UNDP]);
• UN civilian elements (Human Rights, Civil Administration,
Electoral Staff, and Development Staff);
• UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL);
• International Committee of the Red Cross/Crescent (ICRC);
• bilateral national donors; and
• NGOs.
Since 1948, the majority of international peacekeeping forces have been authorized
by the United Nations. After the Cold War, the UN Secretariat was reorganized to reflect
the sudden increase in the number of UN forces (from 10,000 to 75,000 troops) and the
complexity of their missions. The new structure of departments reflects somewhat the
diversity of the international response elements in a complex emergency. The key
elements of United Nations Secretariat involved in peace support operations are: the
Department of Political Affairs (DPA) (see Annex 2), the Department of Peace-keeping
Operations (DPKO) (see Annex 3), and the Department of Humanitarian Affairs (DHA)
(see Annex 4).
a. The Department of Peace-keeping Operations
(1) DPKO is responsible for the planning, preparation, conduct, and
direction of all United Nations field operations, in particular peacekeeping
operations. It is based in New York, and headed by an undersecretary-general
who acts on behalf of the UN secretary-general.
DPKO serves as the operational arm of the secretary-general for all
United Nations field operations, in particular, the management and
direction of peacekeeping. It establishes new peacekeeping operations
and supervises the effective functioning of ongoing operations.
(2) The department’s tasks are to:
• secure, through negotiations with governments, military units
and equipment, as well as other military, police, and civilian
personnel recruited for peacekeeping operations;
22

• develop plans for operations including election monitoring;
• undertake contingency planning for possible new peacekeeping
operations;
• propose resource requirements;
• arrange logistic and administrative support for field operations;
• maintain contacts with the parties to the conflict and Security
Council members concerning the effective implementation
of the Security Council’s decisions; and
• liaise and coordinate operational needs with member states,
United Nations agencies, and NGOs.
(3) The department’s organizational elements are:
• Office of the Under-Secretary-General, including the undersecretary-general,
the military advisor, Policy and Analysis
Unit, and Situation Centre;
• Office of Operations including four geographical divisions
(Africa, Asia and Middle East, Europe, and Latin America)
and an Electoral Assistance Division; and
• Office of Planning and Support including a Planning Division,
(Mission Planning Service, a Civilian Police Unit, a
Demining Unit, and a Training Unit), and a Field Administration
and Logistics Division.
b. The Department of Political Affairs
(1) The DPA provides advice and support on all political matters to the
secretary-general. DPA is based in New York and headed by an undersecretary-general.
(2) The department’s main tasks are to:
Part I, paragraph 14
• monitor and assess political developments throughout the
world;
• identify potential or actual conflicts in whose control and
resolution the United Nations could play a useful role;
• recommend to the secretary-general appropriate action in
such cases and execute the approved policy;
• assist the secretary-general in carrying out political activities
in the areas of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping,
and peace building, including arms limitation and
disarmament;
23

Part I, paragraphs 14-15
• provide the secretary-general with analysis, assessment, and
advice on all disarmament matters; and
• provide electoral assistance.
(3) The department’s organizational elements are:
• Office of the Under-Secretary-General, including the undersecretary-general
and an Executive Office;
• Electoral Assistance Division and a Center for Disarmament
Affairs;
• geographical divisions (Americas, Europe, East Asia and
Pacific, Africa, and West Asia); and
• General Assembly Affairs Division and a Security Council
Affairs Division.
The organization and role of the DHA is explained in Part II.
15. Response Options
a. The international community has no universally agreed, multilateral, or interdisciplinary
concept of response to complex emergencies. Procedures change as the
community crosses each new threshold of operational experience. The varying
status and condition of the military forces, political leadership, and civilian
communities in the host state are the key factors that distinguish the different
levels of operations. These variables dictate different responses.
b. Among developed nations there is a broad agreement of military doctrine that
identifies two response options: peacekeeping and peace enforcement. Military
staff of more developed nations attach great significance to the threshold between
peacekeeping and peace enforcement, and forces from these nations have the
ability to conduct both types of operations. However, the significance of the
peacekeeping and peace enforcement threshold as the only distinction between
response options may not recognize the military limitations and political inhibitions
of less developed nations. Nor does this approach recognize the changes of
modus operandi that occur within the growing civilian element of the overall
response group.
c. For these reasons we describe three levels of response. Low- and mid-level
responses fall within the overall concept of peacekeeping, and for the military
element, follow the general principles of peacekeeping as explained in paragraph
2, and in greater detail in Part III. The third level, high-level response, falls into
the military category of peace enforcement. The first two categories, low- and
mid-level, explain the significance of the changing conditions within peacekeeping
for the response group of involved agencies, without confronting existing
national military doctrines.
24

d. The three response options (low-, mid-, and high-level) are not linked as a
continuum. The size and military power of a response group involved in peace
support operations sometimes has been increased and its ability to enforce
conditions has grown in a way that escalated the overall response option from
mid-level to high-level. But as a rule a response option is not altered except by a
deliberate political decision that is supported by the necessary means to effect the
operational change.
16. Response Levels
a. Low-Level Response
A low-level response corresponds largely to traditional peacekeeping. Security
conditions within the host nation are, relatively speaking, reliable enough to allow
international response elements to work in safety. There is likely to be a
recognized peace agreement between parties that authorizes the presence of an
international force. Power within the state is effectively centralized and the armed
forces also are controlled and organized at the state level.
The UN or international military element is small, but not entirely symbolic in its
role and duty. Troops may carry personal weapons, but there is little expectation
that they will have to use them. Consequently, some nations may deploy
contingents to a low-level response with minimal combat training; their troops are
psychologically and professionally unprepared to take part in a serious exchange
of fire. With only a few infantry battalions deployed, the UN’s military command
and conduct is at tactical level. Troops drive in white vehicles to emphasize a
peaceful and impartial presence.
The civilian organizations, including the UN agencies, NGOs and bilateral aid
donors, are organized in a loose confederation; they act as a distinct body from
the military element. Within this community are several hubs and committees
around which agencies of similar interests meet and coordinate activities.
Individuals in each agency move freely in unprotected vehicles. They may have
a disaster response role, but the climate for long-term, individually executed
development is also favorable.
b. Mid-Level Response
Part I, paragraphs 15-16
Although a mid-level response falls within the overall military definition of
peacekeeping, less favorable conditions in the host country dictate a larger and
better organized response. A mid-level response may be made to a complex
emergency in a collapsed state, in which government and infrastructure are
weakened by prolonged civil conflict. The state’s armed forces may no longer be
effective or cohesively loyal. Consequently power devolves from state level to
substate actors, faction leaders, and warlords. Political agreements made at state
25

Part I, paragraph 16
level may not have local support at the tactical level. For this reason, consent to
the presence of an international force is likely to be less solid than in the low-level
option. There may be widespread social turbulence and population displacement.
There is greater expectation of local confrontations and, as a result, the international
or UN’s military element may be up to ten times larger than a low-level
response. In addition to their personal weapons, UN troops may bring support
weapons such as medium mortars, which are more powerful but less discriminating.
A higher proportion of vehicles will be armored, with heavy weapons
mounted. There may be elements of air and maritime offshore support present.
The headquarters of the military element will be much larger due to its increased
need for reliable logistics, information, and communications; military command
and conduct will be at an operational level. Despite the expectation of minor
confrontations, a peacekeeping ethic will prevail. Troops will continue to drive
white vehicles and wear distinctive blue or neutral headgear (European Union
monitors wear white; Multinational Force and Observers [MFO] Sinai, orange)
to denote their peaceful, impartial status. But in contrast to a low-level response,
the expectation of an exchange of fire dictates greater emphasis on combat
training before deployment and protection by “hardening” or bomb-proofing
living quarters and offices.
Civilian elements of the response group face a less viable work environment.
Individually sponsored, long-term development projects give way to a disaster
relief mode that is reactive. Each organization is less able to function independently.
Although the loose federation of the relief community still operates, there
is now a greater need for cohesion, concentration of resources, and less competition
of effort. Whereas in a low-level response most civilian organizations
operated independently from the UN headquarters and the military element in
particular, in the mid-level, greater coordination is needed for the security of
individuals and protected movement.
c. High-Level Response
When a peace process is seriously threatened by a particular party, leading nations
may be determined to act more decisively than allowed under the principles of
peacekeeping. In this case, they would deploy a high-level or peace enforcement
response. The objective of such action may be to alter the political circumstances
that threaten or impede a peace process. For example, the explicit or implicit use
of force may put pressure on an uncooperative political leader. Militarily, the
high-level option may be used to improve the tactical environment for the peace
process. In either case, unless the intervening force behaves even-handedly, it is
likely to lose its impartial status.
A high-level response is distinguished from low- and mid-level responses by the
strength of international consensus to take effective action, and the intensity of the
26

military action that results. Before 1996, there have been relatively few instances
of successful high-level deployment.
The UN (or coalition’s) military element may be up to one hundred times larger
in strength and commensurably much more capable than a low-level response.
Initially, the operational environment and plan will be dominated by military
considerations. But the overall objective may be complex and politically influenced
so that a purely military solution is inappropriate. As far as possible the UN
military element should continue to operate within the principles of peacekeeping,
maintaining its impartiality, acting with local support, and using only the
minimum force necessary. The distinction between a high-level deployment and
the low- and mid-levels is that in this case, because it is so much stronger, the
international force can, if it chooses, override peacekeeping principles and
impose tactical conditions. By deploying in overwhelming strength, the likelihood
of a confrontation by local bands or armed factions is reduced.
The authority of the host state may be vested in an interim administration
empowered under an emergency regulation. The movement and activity of
civilian relief organizations also can be regulated by emergency powers. However,
once security is restored to a workable level, the importance and influence
of the military element is reduced, their role subordinated to a long-term process
of national restoration, elections, and rehabilitation of armed elements.
17. Principles for Peace Support Operations
In PSO, especially peacekeeping operations, the degree of consent both within the
host state at the operational level and at a much higher level regionally and globally will
influence the selection of the appropriate response level and its conduct. This also dictates
the nature of the mandate.
a. The principles which generally apply to all aspects of a PSO are: clearly defined
objectives, unity of effort, political awareness, legitimate conduct, and security.
b. The principles more specifically applicable to low- and mid-level (peacekeeping)
responses are: consent, impartiality, minimum use of force, transparency, and
mutual respect.
18. General principles
The following principles apply to all peace support operations:
a. Clearly Defined Objectives
Part I, paragraphs 16-18
A clearly defined and attainable objective or end point is essential for success.
These should be described in the operational mandate and must include a
27

Part I, paragraph 18
description of conditions that define mission failure and success. The mandate
must address all the elements of the response group and establish mechanisms
whereby they can be coordinated to achieve maximum unity of effort.
b. Unity of Effort
In a multifunctional force, it is unlikely that unity of command will be achieved
beyond the UN military and the subordinated elements of the UN’s civilian
agencies. Nevertheless, unity of effort between the military and civilian components
of the operation will be essential to achieve a coherent approach to their
common objectives. A workable level of coordination between the elements can
be achieved only by dialogue and consensus and not command.
c. Political Awareness
Political factors have a pervasive influence on PSO. National government
officials must be aware of how national policy impacts on tactical decisions, and
must ensure that over-control and political directions do not divide the response
group and act against its mandate. PSO staff should be aware of long-term
requirements of post-conflict peace building, its significance in the mandate and
how political factors influence the overall campaign plan, choice of military
weaponry, tactics, the degree of force exerted, and the operational concept.
d. Long-Term Planning
Although some peace operations may be short in duration, most will require longterm
civilian development projects that involve several elements of the response
group. Underlying causes of intercommunal violence and the resulting damage
to the society of the host nation will take decades to heal and rarely have a clear
or decisive resolution. Therefore, there is the need to assess operational viability
as long-term strategic and political commitments.
e. Legitimate Conduct
The perception that all the elements of a response group are acting justly and
correctly is derived first from their mandate. It is also essential that forces act and
are seen to act within domestic, national, international, and military law, as well
as within the authorizing mandate and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
Failure to do this will prejudice the force’s authority and ultimately its operational
effectiveness.
f. Security
Self-defense is an inherent right for all the elements and individuals in a response
group. A degree of security sometimes can be assumed in maintaining an
28

Part I, paragraph 18
impartial and noncombatant status because the military element force protection
is a command responsibility. In mid- and high-level PSO, where consent is
fragmentary and the situation volatile, the military force may be given specific
responsibility for the protection of the civilian components of the operation.
29

PART II: EMERGENCY RESPONSE, RECOVERY, AND AID
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL AGENCIES IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
1. Introduction
Civil agencies now constitute the major response element of many peace support
operations. Part II describes the roles and responsibilities of such agencies. Sections 1-
3 review the major UN agencies involved in humanitarian assistance as well as in civil
administration and elections. Section 4 looks at the nongovernmental organizations
engaged in humanitarian work, while Section 5 focuses on the organizations or government
agencies that are normally the main source of funds for peace support operations
and humanitarian assistance.
The principal factor that determines the response levels of peace support operations
is “the strength of international consensus to take effective action” [p. 26]. Consensus is
difficult to generate among the myriad of agencies covered in Part II; the single
characteristic that applies to most of the agencies covered in this part is their diversity.
Most of the agencies covered in Part II are directly or indirectly engaged in
“humanitarian assistance,” or relief and recovery responses to natural disasters and
complex emergencies. However, in almost all cases, these agencies are not solely
involved in humanitarian response. In fact, the majority would describe themselves as
principally “development agencies” forced into humanitarian assistance by sheer necessity.
The pressures of sheer necessity are most acute in situations described as “complex
emergencies” (see Part I, paragraph 8a). The combination of political disruption and
conflicts offer little prospect for any effective development. All too often the only hope
for development is to seek ways to ensure the survival of those who may be caught in the
turmoil and upheaval of complex emergencies until peace returns. The prospects for
peace, frequently supported through the efforts of peace enforcement or peacekeeping
forces, are promoted through the considerable efforts of civilian agencies focusing
immediately on humanitarian assistance and post-conflict recovery programs.
The principal objective of humanitarian assistance is to save and protect human life
and not necessarily to support the peace process. Yet, this seemingly straightforward
objective is complicated by a host of factors, including the operational environment in
which humanitarian activities normally occur, the very diversity of the actors involved,
and the institutional differences that too often result in “turf” fights between the response
agencies, which result in a loss of effectiveness.
The fact that humanitarian operations so often achieve their objectives under
these circumstances is an interesting reflection on the good sense and commitment of
officials normally at the field level. As peacekeepers and humanitarian workers find
themselves working more closely together, a clear understanding of the complex world
of the humanitarian network becomes more important.
31

Part II, Section 1, paragraph 2
2. The Operational Environment
a. Loss of Impartiality
Humanitarian assistance is supposed to be neutral and impartial. This precept is
fundamental to the whole humanitarian ethos. However, the reality is that, no
matter how neutral and impartial one might wish humanitarian assistance to be,
it is increasingly perceived as biased and partisan. The reason for this changing
perception reflects to some extent the very nature of complex emergencies.
More and more, conflict associated with complex emergencies stems from deeply
felt ethnic, economic, and social tension. The resulting violence increasingly
involves civilian populations, the direct targets of other groups of civilians. Men,
women, and even children are perpetrators as well as victims of large-scale
violence.
There is growing cynicism, even among beneficiaries, about humanitarian aid’s
alleged impartiality and neutrality; those who provide such assistance find
themselves increasingly at risk. The relief worker is seen as aiding and abetting
the enemy. As a result of increased risks and growing animosity, the UN Security
Council is often compelled to ask for peacekeeping or enforcement forces to
protect international aid workers. The growing gap between those who provide
humanitarian assistance and those for whom it is intended is perhaps one of the
most fundamental changes in the operational environment.
In a number of instances, humanitarian assistance operations take place in the
midst of conflict, or in situations where affected populations can be reached only
by crossing battle lines. In such circumstances, access to those in need may
require extensive negotiations not only with government forces but also with the
opposition. Again, the supposed impartiality of humanitarian assistance is put
into question by each side, since each perceives any concession as a benefit to the
other.
b. Host Governments
Often the attitudes of the local population to the personnel of civil agencies and
to the entire international humanitarian operation depend upon the host government.
From the perspective of the host government, or the government of the
nation in crisis, there may be a variety of reasons for a negative attitude toward
foreign humanitarian intervention, no matter how well intentioned.
Humanitarian intervention confronts national sovereignty. Well intentioned
foreign relief officials may inadvertently fail to respect the political sensitivities
of host governments. Agency officials may assume that the priority of their
humanitarian tasks will be clearly understood by their government hosts. Often
32

agencies fail to appreciate that their very presence is a reflection of the government’s
own weakness, and that the supposed humanitarian concerns of the outsider may
be contrary to the political priorities of the government.
The status of internally displaced persons [IDP] becomes an issue. People within
a country may flee their homes out of fear of persecution or some related sense
of danger. Members of the international community believe such people deserve
protection and assistance. Yet host governments may regard this same assistance
as direct or indirect support to opposition groups, or as sheltering those who have
seriously contravened national laws; one side’s perceived impartiality is another’s
perceived bias.
The effectiveness and capability of most major multilateral, bilateral, and
nongovernmental organizations on the ground can be considerably greater than
their respective host counterparts. There may be a sense that the privileges that
governments are obliged to extend to international humanitarian agencies (e.g.,
customs exemptions for humanitarian goods) will be abused. Host governments
resent international agencies attracting civil servants away from their employment
by higher pay, and despite their reservations, agency priorities prevail due
to strong bilateral donor pressure. There is a tendency for NGOs to rush into a
relief operation with little appreciation for overall humanitarian needs or distribution
mechanisms and with the unintended consequence of overwhelming the
host government.
c. Cooperation
Part II, Section 1, paragraph 2
There is the need to work with a wide range of people in circumstances that are
frequently dangerous and stressful. Relief work involves numerous relief organizations,
as well as a beneficiary population who are by no means passive
recipients of assistance. Beneficiaries are not victims and should not be treated as
such. The people who bear the burden of a disaster or complex emergency expect
to be part of the process that determines their individual and group destinies.
Imposing assistance eventually will lead to direct or indirect efforts to undermine
even the best intentioned efforts of the relief worker.
Coordination is usually a matter of consensus building. For example, if success
is dependent upon the delivery of large amounts of priority relief goods and roads
and port facilities are limited, then a consensus building process becomes crucial.
The fact that the humanitarian relief network lacks a conventional command and
control system complicates the process. The diversity of the actors and the
separate reporting mechanisms for many of them , whether bilateral, multilateral,
or nongovernmental, underscore the complexity of the operational environment.
“Pluralism run riot” has been one description of the conditions in which humanitarian
assistance is provided, and reflects in many respects the operating environment
in which the peacekeepers and the humanitarians frequently meet.
33

Part II, Section 1, paragraph 3
3. The Humanitarian Response Network
a. Characteristics
The first step in understanding the dynamics of international humanitarian
agencies is to comprehend that the UN, bilateral agencies, national authorities,
and nongovernmental organizations are more a network than a system. “Network”
implies no permanent or fixed framework, no coherent or common goals,
and few patterned relationships. Yet it does suggest various functional and
practical linkages that result from operational requirements.
The “international relief network” is a loose system of nonbinding contacts,
sustained by various channels of communication and an awareness of “who is
around.” On a case-by-case basis, components will align themselves as a network
to promote particular interests and work together to assist in relief. However, such
arrangements are rarely enduring, and, when they do occur, create little more than
short-term dependencies.
b. Competition
Diversity and competition underscore the wide network of humanitarian actors
that are in action during an emergency. In theory, each type should be able to
fulfill a function that the other cannot; in practice most situations are more
complicated.
Within the UN system, most agencies involved in humanitarian assistance have
their own sources of funds, procedures, mandates, and individual governing
bodies; the last comprising representatives of individual states. Governing bodies
determine the policies and ultimately the resources for their individual agencies.
They also influence agency goals and in a broader sense agency operations. They
do this with little reference to a wider system beyond their individual agencies.
Consequently, the work of the individual agencies is difficult to harmonize, let
alone coordinate. There are a variety of mechanisms that attempt to facilitate
operational coordination, but in reality the UN system remains a “nation” of
semiautonomous baronies, reluctant to subjugate their individual independence
to a more united vision.
Bilateral donors’ support for humanitarian operations is related to national
interests; this introduces the possibility of significantly different agendas from
their multilateral or nongovernmental colleagues. Donors may not only have
different agendas, but the practical assistance that they might choose to provide
may reflect their institutional capabilities and have nothing to do with the general
consensus toward relief requirements.
34

Nongovernmental organizations are in theory the least prone to collaboration or
coordination. Each NGO observes the needs of its individual constituents,
organization, and mandated objectives. However, some experienced nongovernmental
organizations are more willing to collaborate with a wider humanitarian
body of organizations than their UN counterparts. Their greater concern for
practical collaboration may be due to greater delegation to executives in the field
that characterizes major NGOs. Institutional turf interests are replaced by
operational priorities when headquarters pressures are less and practitioners in
the field have the resources and authority to get on with the job.
c. Common Issues
Despite basic institutional differences, there are at least three issues common to
all those involved in the humanitarian relief network:
(1) Political Actions
Most emergencies ultimately stem from political conflict. Politics
concern social structure and allocation of resources, and there is a link
between politics, poverty, and humanitarian crises. Politics also concern
the lack of will in the international system to support the work of
humanitarian agencies. Lack of political support often leaves humanitarian
agencies picking up pieces that states seem unwilling to touch.
Humanitarian agencies, for example, are often forced to negotiate
with very reluctant national authorities about access to emergencyaffected
peoples, frequently without any support from supposedly
concerned states that have power to influence such authorities.
In situations where large numbers of innocent people become victims
of violence and find themselves in urgent need of humanitarian relief
aid, humanitarian agencies are forced to intervene because diplomacy
has failed. The international community’s lack of political will perpetuates
crisis and indirectly provides resources that enable contending
forces to go on fighting. In practice, crisis management seems to
mean humanitarian relief; humanitarian assistance becomes the alternative
to political initiative. This means the impartiality and neutrality
of the humanitarian mandate will be compromised, and the provision
of humanitarian assistance made even more complicated.
(2) Dynamic Problems
Part II, Section 1, paragraph 3
Our understanding of complex emergencies is growing. Each new
crisis demands a major adjustment in the perspective and procedures
of relief agencies and results in very intense “on-the-job-training.” In
a period of a few years, agencies have had to learn how to provide
35

Part II, Section 1, paragraphs 3-4
assistance during conflict: when there is no host government, when
several competing authorities claim the right to govern, or when a
victorious guerrilla force seeks revenge against those who opposed it.
Previous experience provides few insights into the complexities of the
next crisis. There is a sense that the humanitarian network is always
one step behind a crisis or fighting the new war with the strategy and
tactics of the previous one, exacerbated by the unpredictable and
rapidly changing nature of emergencies.
(3) Resourcing New Roles
Complex emergencies introduce issues beyond the mandates or capacities
of most agencies. Demining and demobilization activities are
two examples. The list of new activities has grown and expanded the
concept of “humanitarian aid.” More and more humanitarian aid is
seen as an instrument to provide “relief” for fragile societies that, if
not assisted quickly, may slide back into conflict. Humanitarian aid
therefore may encompass such post-conflict recovery activities as
constructing military barracks, establishing police forces, and even
building prisons. None of these activities has ever been seen as
conventionally “humanitarian,” but without them, there may be only
the prospect of more violence. The need to deal with a growing number
of different activities has not led to a clarification of UN agency
mandates and capabilities. This lack of clarity encourages confusion
and competition for “turf” or institutional territory. When mandates
are not clear, the fight for turf is inevitable.
A critical factor of the growing competition concerns resources. An
agency’s capacity to fulfill its intended program is dependent upon the
funds and material it can attract from donor governments and other
sources. Agencies spend a great deal of time and effort in raising
resources, and perhaps the worst turf battles occur in those situations
where mandated responsibilities are ambiguous and resource stakes
are potentially high.
4. The Peacekeepers and the Humanitarians
Stereotyped mutual images flourish when peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies
work together in the same operational area. Peacekeepers look with dismay at the looseknit
and apparently “shambolic” civilian structures that are intended to provide humanitarian
assistance, while the civilians view the peacekeepers as inflexible and culturally
insensitive. The relationship is fragile. The humanitarian community does not wish to be
seen as the instrument of the peacekeepers, and peacekeepers often bring with them a
significant capacity to become engaged in humanitarian assistance and resent the fact that
this capability is rejected by humanitarian agencies. Yet, the peacekeepers and the
36

humanitarians find themselves in complex emergencies relying upon each other to
accomplish their respective objectives, each side increasingly seeking the support of the
other.
Humanitarian agencies on more and more occasions request the assistance of the
peacekeepers for protection of relief convoys, security, mine awareness and demining,
and military assets for relief activities. Peacekeepers are growing increasingly aware that
the work of the humanitarian agencies is an essential component for ensuring stability,
and that some humanitarian agencies have considerable understanding and experience
about their environment, the society, and people where peacekeepers may be operating.
There seems to be a growing recognition for the individual courage of some humanitarian
agencies that they fulfill their missions effectively and that humanitarian responses
pervade the work of the peacekeepers.
Despite this each side is ignorant of the other. To date, few efforts are made either
before or during peacekeeping missions to provide broad-based orientation sessions or
mechanisms that would enhance the awareness of both sides about the work of each. The
large and often unwieldy collection of humanitarian agencies—the network—has few
opportunities to learn about peacekeeping missions, and their various perspectives reflect
the ad hoc information that is picked up through miscellaneous contact.
UN resident coordinators or humanitarian coordinators can overcome this lack of
understanding and ineffective communications by establishing a “cell” of representatives
from peacekeeping operations that serves as an information conduit between the
peacekeepers and UN agencies, NGOs and even bilateral donors. Normally, representatives
from such cells or from command headquarters attend networkwide meetings to
garner the views and concerns of participants. During these same meetings, the peacekeepers
might give briefings on security, mining, and peacekeeping operations. Casual
use of the capacities and assets of the peacekeepers for humanitarian objectives can be
very valuable in saving time and costs. For example, peacekeepers’ engineers have been
used to construct sewage systems and dig bore-holes for water, and have helped in setting
up camps for displaced peoples. Medical teams assigned to peacekeeping operations have
expanded their remit to care for the injured, disease in villages, and displaced persons
camps. Proposals for peacekeepers’ support for humanitarian operations and from the
peacekeepers to provide humanitarian assistance should be channeled through a focal
point, normally the office of the resident or humanitarian coordinator.
5. Diverging Views of Coordination
Part II, Section 1, paragraphs 4-5
The military elements of a response group often despair at the lack of clear command
and control structures among UN or other civil agencies. In many respects they are right.
Designated UN coordinators rarely give orders and instead spend a great deal of time
establishing consensus. Even where coordinators and UN agencies are working together,
civil agencies are disinclined, let alone obliged, to follow coordinators’ proposals or
suggestions.
Coordination does not mean a single command structure that assigns and deploys
humanitarian organizations to an agreed strategy. Coordination is based on a lighter
approach and concerns an effective flow of information, as well as an agreement on how
37

Part II, Section 1, paragraph 5
to fill gaps in mandates when they appear. It involves the process by which contingency
plans are made and interagency appeal documents are produced. Each agency knows its
role, therefore directing that agency to fulfill its responsibilities is not a useful task for a
coordinator. Light coordination does not determine how individual agencies’ resources
can be utilized. There is little alternative to a system of “light coordination.” UN agencies
are virtually semiautonomous, and NGOs are subject to no in-country authority other
than that of the host government. Nor has the United Nations committed itself to improve
coordination by gaining a degree of clarity on central in-country UN functions. In dealing
with humanitarian affairs in an emergency-affected country, the relationship between the
special representative of the UN secretary-general and the UN humanitarian coordinator
remains ambiguous. Similarly, the roles of the UN resident coordinator and of the UN
humanitarian coordinator not only are often unclear but also duplicate on many functions.
In Part II of the guide, many models and organizational descriptions uncritically
reflect the best case scenarios. In reality, there are many factors that can upset these
perfect models, some of which have been described above, others that will be part of the
experience of each individual reader.
38

PART II: EMERGENCY RESPONSE, RECOVERY, AND AID
SECTION 2
GOVERNMENT DONORS
1. Government Donors
Governments are by far the greatest source of funds for a peace support operation.
Governments provide support for the military response elements through their defense
budgets, and channel “official aid” to a large number of PSO actors through their donor
agencies (often simply referred to as “the donors”). The European Union (EU) has its own
donor agency that operates in much the same way. Over 90 percent of all official aid
comes from the 21 Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
countries that are members of OECD’s Development Assistance Committee (DAC).
Donor organizations are often large and complex. Providing emergency aid is only
one of their functions; they may also provide food aid, nonfood aid, and aid for refugees.
In some countries, one particular department in the donor organization may be responsible
for emergency aid. For example, the donor agency of the United States is the United
States Agency for International Development (USAID). Within USAID, the Office of
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) is responsible for the administration of emergency
aid.
Donor organizations are essentially nonoperational. However, they may have a
presence in the field for gathering information on which to base funding decisions, for
managing the distribution of funds, and for monitoring what has been achieved. Donors
are increasingly concerned to show that their funds are properly used.
2. Funding
Aid can be channeled to emergencies in various ways:
a. Core Multilateral Funding
Donors fund PSO response elements indirectly through regular, usually annual,
contributions to the UN agencies. Member states of the EU also give regular
contributions to the European Commission. In “core” funding, donors tend not to
micromanage resources, but concentrate on ensuring that recipient agencies have
an effective plan for resource allocation and account for the use of funds.
b. Responsive Funding
In addition to regular contributions, donor governments will provide responsive
funding for emergency needs arising on a case-by-case basis.
39

Part II, Section 2, paragraph 2
(1) Multilateral
Responsive funding may consist of emergency-specific funding to the
UN agencies and/or to the European Community Humanitarian Office
(ECHO). “Service packages” are standing arrangements between
donors and UNHCR to make certain assets available when the need
arises (see Part II, Section 3, paragraph 9b). Emergency specific
funding is also made in response to individual appeals launched by UN
agencies and ECHO or consolidated interagency appeals launched by
the DHA. UN agencies can have a role as donors themselves; for
example UNHCR plays a central role in funding NGOs and other
organizations in the field. UNICEF, WFP, and other UN agencies (as
well as some large NGOs) also may be important donors.
(2) Bilateral
Donors also may fund operational agents directly. Organizations
funded in this way may include the International Federation of Red
Cross and Red Crescent Societies (IFRC), international nongovernmental
organizations (INGOs), local NGOs, and NGO umbrella associations,
and agents of the governments of the affected states or private
sectors that are available for subcontracting. Bilateral funding gives
donors greater visibility, may be swifter, can provide a wide choice of
outlets that increases the political and operational flexibility of donors,
and allows responses to be suited to different contexts. It also
enables the donor, if it wishes, to have greater control over how
resources are used. However, many donors do not have the resources
for this kind of micromanagement in emergencies.
(3) Amounts of Funding Donated
Donors differ greatly in the amount they channel bilaterally to emergency
aid. Broadly speaking, ECHO is now the largest emergency aid
donor, followed by the United States and Germany (see Table 1).
40

Part II, Section 2, paragraph 2
Table 1
DAC Donor Countries: Scale of Bilateral Emergency Funding (Not Including Food Aid)
($ Millions)
Organization chiefly responsible for emergency aid in parentheses.
Over 500
EU (ECHO), US (OFDA of USAID)
150 to 500 Germany (BMZ), Italy (MFA), Netherlands (Development
Corporation), Sweden (SIDA), Canada (IHAP of CIDA),
UK (EMAD of ODA)
50 to 150 Norway, Austria, France (MFA), Denmark (DANIDA),
Switzerland (SDC)
10 to 50 Japan, Finland (FINNIDA), Australia (AusAID), Belgium
(AGCD)
Less than 10
Ireland, Luxembourg, Spain, New Zealand, Portugal
(Sources: ActionAid 1994, DAC Report 1995).
Accurate figures for the scale of emergency aid spending are, however,
extremely difficult to establish, for several reasons:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
The amounts of emergency aid given by each donor can vary
significantly from year to year.
Donors vary greatly in recording and reporting methods. Figures
for emergency relief may or may not exclude food aid or support
to refugees. Some donors list “contributions to NGOs” in a
separate category although this may also include emergency
funding.
The distinction between “emergency aid” and “development
aid” is often far from clear, especially in prolonged conflict.
Contributions to peacekeeping forces are not counted as “aid
expenditure” (DAC ruling). However an emerging norm is that
expenses that are additional to basic running costs will be
counted as “aid.” 1
In addition, overall figures for emergency aid obscure the fact that
some smaller countries have very generous aid programs. As a propor-
41

Part II, Section 2, paragraphs 2-4
tion of GNP, the emergency aid spending of Norway and Sweden rank
the highest. Also, Japan’s bilateral emergency aid program is still
fairly small, but Japan is the largest aid donor overall. Figures also do
not indicate the quality of the aid provided or how much of these funds
are available to NGOs.
3. Recent History: Changes in Bilateral Emergency Aid
There are several recent changes in the nature of bilateral emergency aid:
a. While the total amount of government aid has stagnated and even declined, aid
for humanitarian and emergency relief has increased to an all time high of 10
percent of all overseas development assistance expenditure in 1994. 2 In part this
trend is due to the rise in the number of emergencies, although it also may
represent some shift in donor priorities.
b. There has been a significant increase in aid to Eastern Europe and the former
Soviet Union in recent years, although this now appears to have stabilized. 3
c. Channels chosen by donors are changing. Government-to-government aid, which
once amounted to the bulk of bilateral emergency aid, now only represents a small
fraction of the total flow (falling from 95 percent to less than 6 percent of
European emergency aid 1976-1990). 4 Governments of affected countries may
still be an important channel for response to a natural disaster when the host
government agencies are effective; but in complex emergencies, when there is
political instability, multilateral channels such as the UN, EU, or World Bank and
NGOs are favored.
4. Presence in the Field
a. Information
(1) Embassies and Aid Missions
Embassies have long been used as vital sources of information. The
embassy officials are the donor’s eyes and ears, keeping home governments
in touch with funding needs and giving advice on the suitability
of funding proposals. The embassies send back regular reports based
on information gathered locally. As well as being in contact with their
own headquarters, donor embassies interact with UN agencies, the
EU, and other donors present in a given country. They also can act as
a focal point for liaising with the media and NGOs.
42

(2) Assessment Teams and Technical Experts
The growth in both the volume and complexity of PSO funding has
increased donor concern for coherent funding strategies and accountability.
Mechanisms, in addition to embassy staff, may be used for
these purposes. Donors may recruit their own teams of assessors, and
also may set up field offices to define and administer funding strategies
and monitor their achievement. Donors with a particularly active
field presence include ECHO, USAID, ODA, SIDA, and CIDA.
b. Grants and Funding
Embassies and field officials also may have the capacity to grant small funds
themselves. A U.S. chief of mission, for example, has an “Ambassador’s
Authority” to make grants of up to $25,000. Usually, however, funding applications
must be made to the donor country itself. Nevertheless, those seeking
funding often use embassies and field offices as the first point of contact in order
to find out the specific procedures and conditions that a donor requires.
Donor requirements can be stringent and need to fulfill their defined criteria of
“relief.” ECHO, for example, stipulates that relief projects must be short-term and
therefore completed within six months. Applications may require a specific
budget and submission on a specific form. Donors argue that they need to exert
greater control over projects to ensure funding strategies are effective and
accountable. NGOs are concerned that this may mean politicization and loss of
autonomy.
Donor attitudes toward funding local NGOs also vary. The United States and
Norway have particular experience in local funding, but others do not work with
local NGOs. INGOs may be selected in favor of local NGOs because of their wellestablished
NGO and government relations, their familiarity with the application
process, and the greater visibility acquired by donors this way. Donor procedures
and policies change over time, and in-field representatives keep actors informed
of requirements.
c. Limited and Full Operations
Part II, Section 2, paragraph 4
In some circumstances, donors have been developing their own operational
capability. Some may undertake stand-alone service packages for UNHCR,
others may become operational independently, although such cases are still rare
(see Part II, Section 2, paragraph 2b[1]).
43

Part II, Section 2, paragraphs 4-5
(1) Donors as Facilitators
Most often donor operations are of a facilitating kind. For example,
donors may become involved in organizing logistics and setting up
communication systems and information centers. United States Disaster
Assistance Response Teams (DARTs), ECHO, and ODA teams
have been deployed to fulfill this kind of role.
(2) Donors as Operators
Where donors have gone fully operational, some have provided relief
supplies and equipment through contracts with private companies or
agents of their own government. Donors also may recruit skilled
volunteers from the home country at short notice through national
organizations (for example Switzerland’s Disaster Relief Corps, U.K.’s
DRI following experiences in Iraqi Kurdistan, Japan’s disaster team
JDR, Norway’s NORDEM, and the German Technisches Hilfswerk).
Arguably, by becoming more operational, donors risk duplicating the coordinating
role of DHA and the operational capability of NGOs and the UN agencies.
However, although ECHO, for example, has a clear policy to develop a higher
operational role, others argue that their policy is only to respond if others are
unable to do so. However, it seems apparent that some donors may want an
expanded presence in the field to control their own funding strategy; there is also
pressure on donors to increase their visibility in the relief system.
5. Coordination
Increasingly, donors, NGOs, and other actors give high priority to sharing information
and coordinating with each other and with other actors both in and out of the field.
DAC members regularly meet out of the field to discuss donor policy. The committee
issues an annual report with a detailed assessment of each member’s aid performance.
Some donor organizations have set up NGO networks within their own country to help
them improve and rationalize their response when crises occur and to discuss policy
issues. As described above, special packages may be prearranged with UN agencies and,
once an emergency has been declared, the United Nations and ECHO may call donor
meetings to launch appeals.
In the field, the DHA or designated lead agency has the central responsibility for
coordination (see Part II, Section 3, paragraph 4, 5, and 6b). However, embassies (and/
or field offices) may perform an important function as central liaison points (see Part II,
Section 2, paragraph 4a[1]).
Generally, it is up to those seeking funding to approach donors, but donors also may
approach recipients, especially if a PSO has been given top political priority by the donor
government. Personal contacts are important for enabling coordination.
44

Part II, Section 2, paragraph 6
6. Policy and Politics
Donor organizations vary according to their funding policies and priorities. Priorities
are influenced greatly by government political interest.
Notes
a. Types of Response
Many donors still primarily respond to humanitarian crises by funding the
provision of food aid and other basic relief supplies (medicines, tents, blankets);
by funding emergency repairs (water, roads, communications, etc.); and by
supporting refugees.
Donors have received criticism from those who see this response as too restricted
in scope, especially in the context of prolonged conflict. Donor response may be
limited by restrictive mandates for funding, but there also may be political
pressure to remain involved in high visibility or “apolitical” activities.
Donors claim, however, that they are trying to diversify their approach. The
Dutch and the Scandinavians are considered particularly progressive, approving
funding for a wide range of responses that include principles of long-term
community development. In May 1995, DAC discussed best practices for
emergency aid, including greater emphasis on development; local/regional
ownership of the aid intervention; improved coordination of the international
response; and greater integration of diplomatic, humanitarian, and economic
strategies. Increasing demands for emergency aid also lead some donors to ask
whether conflict prevention and peace building activities could be a more cost
effective response to crises.
b. Politics
Donors only intervene when there is political will to do so. Motivation to respond
is influenced by political and commercial interests of donors and media pressure,
as well as by the advice of professional officials and appeals from affected nations
and the United Nations. Guidelines established at DAC or with the UN are not
always followed. The difference between humanitarian and political motivations
for action means that donor response may not necessarily coincide with NGO or
UN agency perceptions of need. NGOs are concerned that if donor agencies
contract for funding they may compromise their impartiality.
1.
ActionAid, Eurostep, and ICVA, The Reality of Aid (London: Earthscan, 1994).
2.
Development Cooperation (Paris: OECD, 1994).
3.
Ibid.
4.
J. Borton et al., NGOs and Relief Operations: Trends and Policy Implications (London: ODI Briefing
Paper, 1994).
45

Part II, Section 2
Further Reading
ActionAid, The Reality of Aid (London: 1993, 1994, 1995).
J. Borton, Recent Changes in the International Relief System (London: ODI,
1993).
J. Borton et al., NGOs and Relief Operations: Trends and Policy Implications
(London: ODI Briefing Paper, 1994).
Development Cooperation (Paris: OECD, 1994).
A. Hewitt, Crisis or Transition in Foreign Aid, ODI Special Report (London:
ODI, 1994).
IFRC, World Disasters Report (Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1995).
The Oxfam Handbook of Development and Relief (1995) (Oxford and London:
Oxfam UK and Ireland, 1995).
Paul Ryder, unpublished research, INTRAC.
I. Smillie, The Alms Bazaar (London: Intermediate Technology Publications,
1995).
I. Smillie and H. Helmich, Non-governmental Organizations and Governments:
Stakeholders for Development (Paris: OECD, 1993).
Acknowledgments
Hugo Slim, CENDEP, Oxford Brookes University, U.K.
Paul Ryder, INTRAC, Oxford, U.K.
Dr. David Nabarro and Guy Templar, ODA, London, U.K.
Joanna Macrae, ODI, London, U.K.
Malcolm Ridout, Marcus Thompson, and Emma Naylor, OXFAM
46

PART II: EMERGENCY RESPONSE, RECOVERY, AND AID
SECTION 3
UNITED NATIONS AGENCY RESPONSE ROLES
1. Introduction
This section covers the activities of different UN entities involved in emergency
response, recovery, and aid. For the sake of simplicity, they are all referred to as UN
agencies. In fact, they are programs, organizations, funds, or agencies depending on their
mandates or organizational status within the United Nations. DHA, which works closely
with these agencies, is part of the UN secretariat. Its activities also are covered in this
section (see Part II, Section 3, paragraph 6b).
UN agencies are present or represented in most developing countries to help improve
the social and economic well-being of the populations. But they also provide humanitarian
aid and assistance in emergencies and disasters especially when they are beyond the
means of the affected country. “Complex emergencies” (see Part I, paragraph 8) in
particular require a response that goes beyond the mandates or capacities of the UN
agencies and also would involve other international, intergovernmental, governmental,
and nongovernmental organizations.
The key UN response agencies are UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, WHO, and
UNDP. These agencies all have emergency-related programs and small units specialized
in emergency planning and response.
UN agencies have had to find additional financial, human, and materiel resources or
redeploy them from development programs to respond to the growing number of
“complex emergencies.” They also had to change policies and procedures and develop
relationships with new nongovernmental and military partners. In particular, they have
had to strengthen interagency coordination mechanisms. 1
With the nature and extent of involvement in emergencies differing between
agencies, their activities will concern:
• monitoring and early warning of potential emergencies;
• contingency planning;
• damage assessment of severity and determination of emergency
and recovery needs of affected areas and populations;
• mobilization of resources;
• coordination of response;
• information collection and exchange, analysis, and reporting;
• ensuring access to and protection of affected populations;
• procurement, transport, and delivery of supplies and services;
• monitoring respect of humanitarian principles, human rights,
and related conventions and agreements; and
• transition to reconstruction and rehabilitation.
47

Part II, Section 3, paragraphs 2-3
2. General Characteristics
UN agencies have a degree of commonalty; similar relationships to the UN Charter;
accountability to member governments of the UN; institutional commitments to improving
socioeconomic and human well-being and development; and similar organizational
cultures. However, undertaking common or coordinated approaches can be complicated
by different management structures and operating styles; different degrees of centralization
and delegation of authority; overlapping or unclear mandates; and, for certain
activities, dependency on the same donor sources of funding.
Responding to a complex emergency requires a high degree of coordination and clear
lines of authority and reporting. UN organizations face several constraints in meeting this
standard both within the UN system, and in the UN system’s interaction with other
entities (see Annex 1). 2 Ways to overcome them are being explored, but at present
procedures for coordination are developed on a case-by-case basis and are not necessarily
transposed from one emergency to the next (also see Part II, Section 3, paragraph 7).
UN agencies are operated, organized, recognized, and funded on the basis of their
mandates. Emergencies create multisectoral needs that may not fall neatly into an agency
mandate especially when they overlap. Lines of authority and coordination are complicated
by several factors. The UN system is a loose body of independent entities, which
report to their own boards and operate with a large measure of independence. The UN
secretary-general’s authority over them is limited. He does have direct authority over the
UN emergency relief coordinator (ERC), who is also head of the DHA, but this official
has no authority over staff of other agencies. Furthermore, in certain emergencies the
appointment of a special representative of the secretary-general introduces new reporting
and coordination possibilities. Emergency management has been improved by new
procedures and training. The frequency of complex emergencies has increased the
numbers of experienced personnel in different agencies.
Agencies have inherent advantages in emergency response. They are likely to have
been present in the affected country or region for many years and have developed
organizational structures that reach into the field. As a result, they will have established
relationships with officials, NGOs, and community leaders in different sectors. This
degree of local knowledge is not normally found among short-term relief actors. UN
agencies will have acted for some time between donors and aid recipients in the affected
country; they can adapt these relationships and mechanisms to emergency and recovery
assistance programs. Finally, agency staff in-country will include international and
national personnel who in a crisis can operate between international and national bodies.
3. Affected Populations
Complex emergencies cause large numbers of people to move. Humanitarian
assistance programs aim, first, to enable populations to stay where they are; second, if
they do move, to ensure the particular needs caused by displacement are addressed; and
third, to assist refugees and displaced persons to return to and live in their places of origin
under acceptable circumstances.
48

Persons who are forced to move or chose to move are described as refugees or IDPs.
This distinction is based first on whether or not the movement is within the country of
origin, or across its border.
In the case of refugees, there is an internationally recognized definition: any person
who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, or political opinion, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or
unwilling to return. Such persons come under the mandate of the UN High Commissioner
for Refugees (see Part II, Section 3, paragraphs 5a and 6c).
In the case of IDPs, there is no internationally recognized definition. But a UN report
on IDPs has provided a commonly accepted working definition within the United
Nations:
persons who have been forced to flee their homes suddenly
or unexpectedly in large numbers, as a result of
armed conflict, internal strife, systematic violations of
human rights, or natural or man-made disasters, and who
are within the territory of their own country.
Although no single agency has a mandate for IDPs, the UN secretary-general has
designated a special representative responsible for monitoring their problems and for
developing appropriate policies and procedures with responding international actors.
(See below paragraphs 5b and 6c.)
For all severely affected populations, the basic survival needs are the same—food,
water, shelter, medical care, and security. People who are most susceptible to illness,
injury, psychological trauma, and death in crisis situations require special care. These
vulnerable groups include unaccompanied minors; pregnant, lactating, or single women;
the elderly; the physically and mentally disabled; and victims of physical abuse or
violence. All affected populations, whether they remain in place or not, are also covered
by several international human rights instruments and conventions. (See Part II, Sections
7 and 8.)
Categories of problems that need to be addressed, whether affected populations move
or stay in place, and the related agency’s response are covered below. The problems and
responses specific to mass movements of populations are covered in paragraph 5.
4. Actions for All Affected Populations
Part II, Section 3, paragraphs 3-4
The following paragraphs concern the humanitarian problems that arise in complex
emergencies and a normal breakdown of responsibilities between the response agencies.
In most cases, agencies do not carry out operational tasks themselves. They assess
conditions; define needs, emergency aid, and programs to meet these needs; mobilize the
necessary resources; and make operational arrangements with national and international
governmental and nongovernmental bodies, and private contractors or community
organizations. In particular, agencies work with or through government counterpart
ministries or departments.
49

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 4
a. Food and Nutrition 3
(1) Circumstances and Problems
The main problems are:
• actual or foreseeable lack of access to adequate food;
• actual or foreseeable serious malnutrition, especially among
vulnerable groups (see paragraph 3 above); and
• lack of means to prepare and cook food.
Malnutrition can be due to an absolute shortage of food in an area, but
also to a lack of purchasing power; poor distribution of resources
between communities, households or individuals; disease; and ignorance
or taboos over eating certain foods that are available.
Feeding programs are of three main types:
• general feeding, whereby basic foods are provided for all
persons in an affected area or population;
• supplementary feeding, whereby additional food is given to
selected, nutritionally vulnerable persons to compensate for
specific deficiencies in the foods that are available; and
• therapeutic feeding, whereby intensive feeding is provided
under close medical supervision.
(2) Responsible Agencies
(a)
WFP conducts assessments of food needs and crops (with FAO).
It mobilizes, coordinates, and provides emergency food aid,
including appropriate staple/cereals; sources of protein (e.g.
dried skim milk, pulses); concentrated sources of energy (fats or
oil); and “nonfood items” such as logistic equipment, tools, and
cooking fuel. It provides storage, handling, transport, and delivery,
and organizes food-for-work programs aimed at increasing
food availability (see paragraph 6f).
Through food aid and logistics information systems, WFP monitors
food aid flows, including emergency food aid, and makes
detailed data available to the international community concerning
requirements, donor allocations, delivery schedules, etc., as
an aid to international planning and coordination. WFP aims to
monitor commodity movements for emergency feeding operations
to reflect the actual food situation in a country and give
early warning of food shortages in the pipeline. WFP assists
50

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 4
donors to procure, transport, and/or monitor the distribution of
certain bilateral food aid consignments.
Although WFP provides substantial quantities of food and is
responsible for almost all multilateral food aid, it is neither
responsible nor able to meet all emergency food needs. The
majority of international food aid is provided bilaterally.
(b)
(c)
FAO conducts food, need, and crop assessments (with WFP),
including the operation of the Global Information and Early
Warning System on Food and Agriculture (GIEWS). In recovery
phases, it provides technical assistance in agriculture and livestock
production and some material such as seeds, fertilizers,
crop protection chemicals, small agricultural tools, veterinary
and animal feed supplies, and transport and storage facilities.
UNICEF aims to ensure that sufficient, appropriate food is
available for infants, young children, and pregnant and lactating
mothers. It conducts nutritional surveys and provides appropriate
treatment of children suffering from severe malnutrition. In
exceptional circumstances, UNICEF provides basic food supplies
for population groups or plays a direct role in the restoration
of staple crop production. These activities would normally
be undertaken with WFP and FAO.
b. Health 4
(1) Circumstances and Problems
The main problems are:
• lack of or loss of medical personnel, facilities, equipment,
and transport;
• lack of drugs and other essential supplies;
• outbreaks of communicable diseases; and
• casualties.
These problems are likely to be aggravated by the disruption of
preventive and/or long-term treatment and control programs.
The main aims in addressing these problems are:
• to save lives by providing necessary medical treatment for
casualties and the sick; and
• to preserve the health of the surviving population by restor-
51

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 4
(2) Responsible Agencies
ing or providing appropriate health services, and preventing
or mitigating any foreseeable outbreaks of disease.
(a)
(b)
WHO addresses technical aspects of health care and advises on
emergency medical assistance. Its services include assessments,
surveillance, emergency health supplies, deployment of medical
staff, collection and analysis of data for disease control, assistance
in the reestablishment of national health infrastructures,
and services for the rehabilitation of war victims.
UNICEF addresses health problems and foreseeable health risks
of children and their mothers. It also acts to ensure that essential
health care services for children and their mothers are provided
or restored as quickly as possible and in a way to facilitate longterm
improvement. UNICEF is not normally involved in casualty
management, or in directly sponsoring foreign medical
teams, but it can provide medicines and medical supplies and
prosthetics for children.
c. Water, Hygiene, and Sanitation 5
(1) Circumstances and Problems
The main problems are:
• insufficient safe water for drinking, personal hygiene, and
domestic purposes;
• proliferation of disease-bearing insects and rodents;
• inadequate personal and domestic hygiene; and
• lack of water for animals and irrigation.
The main aims in addressing these problems are:
• to save lives and preserve health by making minimum quantities
of reasonably safe water available;
• to restore previously existing sources, including pumping,
storage, and distribution systems, or to make alternative
temporary arrangements (e.g. bulk water delivery);
• to prevent the spread of disease and promote the establishment
of a safe environment;
• to provide the means for personal and domestic hygiene; and
• to provide supplies for livestock and irrigation purposes.
52

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 4
(2) Responsible Agencies
UNICEF aims to make sufficient safe water available for hygiene and
domestic use in feeding and communal centers, households, and
institutions and services benefiting children, and ensures the availability
and efficient use of water for household or community-level
food production. It provides support for a wide range of hydrological
and water treatment and distribution services, and ensures conditions
of hygiene and sanitation that will minimize the threat of disease to
children. Public education is emphasized.
d. Shelter and Personal Protection 6
(1) Circumstances and Problems:
The main problems are:
• lack of adequate shelter; and
• lack of essential personal and household items, clothing,
blankets, utensils, etc.
The main aim in addressing this problem is to save lives and facilitate
the normal patterns of life by ensuring the minimum necessary
provision of shelter, clothing, and other household items.
(2) Responsible Agencies
(a)
(b)
UNHCR has overall responsibility for providing appropriate
shelter, clothing, and household items for refugee populations
(and IDPs when assigned that responsibility). This involves
determining the location and layout of camps, the kind of shelter
or housing needed, who is to construct it, and how long it should
last.
UNICEF addresses needs for shelter, clothing, and household
items essential to the survival of children and their families. It
provides some advisory and materiel assistance in community
reconstruction.
53

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 4
e. Mines and Other Types of Unexploded Ordnance
(1) Circumstances and Problems
The main problems are:
• mines prevent or impede the provision of humanitarian
assistance and postemergency recovery and rehabilitation;
and
• mines are laid in large numbers, hard to find, and costly and
labor intensive to remove.
Land mines directly affect all aspects of UN peace support operations.
Mines proliferate in long-standing conflict zones. They continue to
remain active and lethal long after their tactical need has expired.
Climatic conditions such as rains, floods, or snowdrifts can change
their locations. Laid on roads, in irrigation, water-delivery, and
electrical power systems, and on pastoral and agricultural land, they
seriously impede humanitarian assistance, repatriation, relocation of
refugees and IDPs, rehabilitation, and resettlement. Mines render
arable lands unusable, increasing dependency on outside food aid.
Children are especially affected. Medical skills and facilities are
usually inadequate for treatment and rehabilitation of the wounded.
Military countermine technology and techniques chiefly address clearing
narrow avenues so that forces can pass through rapidly. This does
not meet civilian needs because all mines must be removed from a
village or an agricultural field. This form of demining is a slow, laborintensive,
and a low-technology process.
Other types of ordnance are a lesser but related problem, especially the
small explosive devices contained in cluster munitions.
The main aims in addressing these problems are:
• to ensure surveys are undertaken of mined areas and that
mines are marked and removed;
• to train local populations in mine awareness; and
• to provide special medical care and physical or psychological
rehabilitation for mine casualties.
(2) Responsible Agencies 7
(a)
DHA is the focal point within the UN for demining and land mine
related issues. DHA maintains a global land mine database
54

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 4
providing updated information on a country-by-country basis
through mine clearance program reports. It also manages a
United Nations Voluntary Trust Fund for Mine Clearance.
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
(f)
WFP utilizes trained national demining teams in connection with
the delivery of aid in countries where the UN has organized
mine-action programs. In other countries, it hires demining
contractors and equipment, and works through international
NGOs and local military units.
UNHCR aims to ensure that refugees routes and destinations are
free of mines. It has funded mine marking and mine clearance
activities, conducted mine surveys, and carried out mine awareness
campaigns and training. UNHCR also funds physical rehabilitation
and vocational training for disabled mine victims.
UNICEF conducts mine-awareness education campaigns for
children and rural mothers, helps map mine-infested areas, and
conducts programs of physical and psychological recovery and
social reintegration for children maimed or traumatized by
mines.
UNDP sets up and supports mine survey and clearance projects.
WHO provides expertise and trained assistance to national
health services in the treatment and rehabilitation of mine victims.
f. Transport and Logistics
(1) Circumstances and Problems
The main problems are:
• Insufficient logistic capacity (transport, handling, warehousing)
to receive, load/unload, and/or deliver the required
assistance to those in need; and
• Lack of management capacity and/or expertise to organize
and control the overall operation.
Logistics units are often the largest and most complex element of
emergency operations and the most expensive if air transport is
involved. Relief logistics are mostly concerned with large-scale movement
of bulk food supplies, goods, equipment, and people. But there
also can be a need for deliveries within a country or from outside, for
55

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 4
example communications equipment, water and sanitation equipment,
lifeline repair materiel, and specialized personnel.
Relief logistics often need to be organized quickly under many
constraints. There is likely to be low logistical capacity: limited or
damaged ports, airfields, rail, roads, and waterways; inadequate warehousing
and commodity handling; fuel and parts shortages; and weak
commercial capacity. Ports, warehouses, and distributions systems
are subject to political influence and conflict. Relief vehicles are
vulnerable to robbery, extortion, and mines; supply centers and
distribution points are subject to theft, looting, and attack.
Relief logistics, transport delivery, and distribution of bulk food and
other supplies for large and dispersed populations require efficient
planning, monitoring, and tracking of commodities.
The main aims are:
• to mobilize or develop the logistical capacity needed to
deliver assistance;
• to ensure efficient management;
• to reestablish normal logistical capacities and lines of communications
required for normal economic life; and
• to provide safe transport assistance to affected populations.
(2) Responsible Agencies
(a)
(b)
WFP assists in-country logistics. It assesses logistical systems
and supply capacities, provides technical and material assistance,
and trains warehouse personnel. It may help or intervene
with governments of countries that lie on the main supply routes
to facilitate and expedite the passage of relief goods. It may
subsidize the costs of internal transport, storage, and handling
(ITSH) of WFP supplied commodities and, in major food emergencies,
provide logistical support for ITSH operations (e.g.
transport units, storage, and handling equipment and expertise).
Either directly or through contracts with other competent organizations,
WFP helps to set up and manage major transport and
logistical units, especially the transportation of food aid commodities
from ports to regional depots.
UNHCR, WFP, and UNICEF mainly use their own and chartered
vehicles, air and water craft. Both UNHCR and WFP will
undertake logistical coordination of air and road transport,
setting up ad hoc special units for this purpose. Computerized
56

tracking systems are used routinely by UNHCR and WFP. The
purpose of these systems is to track deliveries and project needs,
and ensure adequate supplies of food and other supplies in the
pipeline from point of origin to point of delivery.
Agencies concerned, if necessary, will undertake projects to
repair roads, railways, airports, and port facilities for the transport
and delivery of humanitarian assistance.
5. Action for Mass Movements of People 8
a. Refugees
(1) Circumstances and Problems
Refugees vary in number from several dozens to thousands needing
protection and assistance. There may be little time for preparation of
the necessary camps, facilities, supplies, and services.
The main problems are:
Part II, Section 3, paragraphs 4-5
• supplies and logistics: emergencies involving refugees are
often removed from sources of supply and communications
arteries;
• site selection, planning, and shelter: a suitable and wellplanned
site and adequate shelter are often lacking in the
early stages of a refugee emergency. This can affect the wellbeing
of refugees and in some cases their protection, as well
as the delivery of assistance;
• health: refugees are exposed to many factors that can increase
the risk of disease. Typically these factors include
overcrowding, inadequate water and food, and poor sanitation;
• food and nutrition: refugees need partial or complete food
support. Some may need nutritional rehabilitation;
• water: may not be available in adequate quantity or quality,
creating a major health hazard;
• sanitation: social disruption, overcrowding, and lack of sanitation
facilities can lead quickly to conditions hazardous to
health; and
• social services and education: social and psychological problems
can be created or exacerbated.
57

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 5
The main tasks in meeting these problems are:
• delivery of the basic material needs of the refugees;
• provision of suitable shelter and related buildings and services
on an appropriate and properly planned site;
• organization to promote good health and prevent, control,
and treat disease;
• provision of sufficient quantities of appropriate food to
maintain refugees’ health and when necessary improve the
condition of those who are already malnourished;
• provision of safe water for individual and communal needs;
• establish sanitation services, facilities, and procedures that
will avoid the spread of disease and promote a safe environment;
and
• take appropriate measures to meet special social and psychological
needs.
Initial concerns are:
• suitable locations for camps;
• organization and administration;
• reception and registration of refugees;
• delivery of emergency services;
• provision of shelter;
• security; and
• ensuring logistical support.
These arrangements have to be negotiated with national and local
officials of the country of asylum, especially when there is a possibility
of friction with surrounding communities. Administrative, management,
and logistical arrangements also have to be made, and
financial and material resources have to be raised.
(2) Responsible Agencies
(Also see International Organization for Migration (IOM), Part II,
Section 7, paragraphs 8-9.)
(a)
UNHCR provides international protection for refugees, seeks
durable solutions to their plight, and furnishes them with material
assistance. Protection involves preventing the forcible return
of a refugee to a country where he/she may have reason to
fear persecution. Durable solutions include assisting those who
wish to go home as returnees and reintegrate into their home
communities. When this is not possible, refugees are helped in
countries of asylum or resettled in other countries. Material
58

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 5
assistance is provided in the form of food, shelter, medical aid,
education, and other social services. Much of it is channeled
through UNHCR’s implementing partners, i.e. the government
of the asylum country and NGOs. UNHCR makes arrangements
with other UN agencies to provide services in their respective
areas of competence related to refugee assistance.
UNHCR seeks to ensure that certain principles are observed by
all concerned in activities related to refugees. Refugees as
civilians are obliged not to engage in political or military activities
against their country of origin. Consequently, those who
work with refugees must be impartial. Refugee camps must have
a strictly humanitarian and civilian character that can be respected
by all parties, above all by the government of the country
of asylum. No military training or recruitment may take place in
the camps. The staff must enjoy immunity. Durable solutions for
refugees must be considered without political pressures, and
decisions to repatriate must be taken freely and on an individual
basis.
(b)
By agreement with UNHCR, other agencies, notably UNICEF,
WFP, WHO, and UNDP work in their respective areas of competence.
b. Emergencies involving IDPs
(1) Circumstances and Problems
Under camp conditions, IDPs’ circumstances and problems are similar
to those of refugees (see paragraph 5a[1]). They require material
assistance in the form of food, shelter, medical aid, education, and
other social services.
They may also require assistance:
• passing through front lines and evacuating dangerous areas;
• avoiding forced returns by local authorities; and
• maintaining freedom of movement, the right to choose to
return home, and the possibility of seeking asylum.
(2) Responsible Agencies
No single UN agency has a global mandate for IDPs. Lead responsibility
and division of labor can vary in each emergency. A designated
lead agency may take responsibility for IDPs; otherwise the DHA or
59

Part II, Section 3, paragraphs 5-6
UNDP would have the lead responsibility. Agencies work in their
respective areas of competence, with interorganizational arrangements
made under the responsibility of the lead entity.
6. Characteristics of Main UN Organizations
a. The United Nations Secretariat
The UN secretariat provides support to the secretary-general in carrying out his
responsibilities as defined in the UN Charter, and in undertaking the tasks asked
of him by competent bodies such as the UN Security Council and the General
Assembly. Of the secretariat’s seven departments the three most concerned with
peace support activities are DPKO, DPA, and DHA. The first two have been
covered in Part I. (See Part I, paragraph 14.) The DHA, which is the most
concerned with emergency response, recovery, and aid, is covered in this section.
b. The Department of Humanitarian Affairs
The DHA is based in New York and Geneva and is headed by an under-secretarygeneral
who also holds the title of UN ERC (see Annex 4). The ERC is the UN’s
principal policy advisor, coordinator, and advocate on humanitarian issues and
chairs the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC) (see paragraph 7a). DHA is
represented in developing countries by the UN resident coordinators and by
humanitarian coordinators in situations where these have been appointed. The
mission of the DHA is to mobilize and coordinate the collective efforts of the
international community, in particular those of the UN system, to meet the needs
of those exposed to human suffering and material destruction in disasters and
emergencies, and to see that this response is rapid, effective, and integrated. DHA
plays a leading advocacy role promoting the establishment of humanitarian
policy and principles on humanitarian assistance. DHA is the designated UN
focal point for mine clearance activities.
With respect to complex emergencies, the department’s main functions include:
• organizing joint interagency needs assessment missions;
• preparing consolidated appeals, tracking responses to the
appeals, and issuing periodic situation reports on an emergency;
• facilitating access to emergency areas for operational organizations;
• serving as a focal point with governments and intergovernmental
and nongovernmental organizations concerning UN
emergency relief operations and mobilizing their emergency
relief capacities;
• promoting, in close collaboration with concerned organiza-
60

tions, the smooth transition from relief to rehabilitation and
reconstruction; and
• managing the Central Emergency Revolving Fund (CERF)
and assisting in the mobilization of resources (see paragraph
8c).
The department is also responsible for the interagency mechanisms described in
paragraph 7a below and is the designated UN focal point for mine-related matters.
c. UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 9
UNHCR is a field-oriented organization with offices in some ninety countries. Its
headquarters is in Geneva. The high commissioner is elected by the General
Assembly on the nomination of the secretary-general. UNHCR’s activities are
subject to review by an executive committee composed of government representatives.
UNHCR’s principal functions and activities are:
Part II, Section 3, paragraph 6
• providing international protection to refugees and seeking
permanent solutions for the problem of refugees;
• promoting the adoption of international standards for the
treatment of refugees in national law and procedures and
supervising their implementation;
• facilitating the voluntary repatriation of refugees and reintegration
into their country of origin, or, when this is not
feasible, facilitating integration in a country of asylum or a
third country; and
• providing humanitarian assistance, counseling, education,
and legal assistance.
In practice these activities entail human rights monitoring and assistance to
governments to meet their obligations as set out in international instruments
concerning refugees and human rights (see Part II, Section 8).
Since UNHCR was founded in 1951, its scope of activities has expanded
considerably. In particular, UNHCR provides protection, emergency relief, and
other forms of assistance to groups of persons not falling within the internationally
recognized definition of a refugee and populations within their own countries.
These include IDPs, vulnerable minority groups, besieged populations, and
war-affected individuals in their own homes. UNHCR action with respect to IDPs
is usually initiated by a request from the secretary-general, his special representative
for IDPs, NEW or a competent organ of the UN (e.g. the General Assembly,
the Security Council, or ECOSOC) and the consent of the concerned state.
UNHCR’s work is funded from public and private sources, and it makes regular
61

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 6
international appeals for specific refugee situations. There are specific allocations
for crisis response within its general program budget. UNHCR also has
experts who can respond to immediate problems of health, nutrition, water,
sanitation, logistics, communication, and physical planning, and can identify
expertise required for longer periods.
d. United Nations Children’s Fund
UNICEF is responsible for fostering cooperation to ensure the survival, protection,
and development of the child “without discrimination.” It is mandated with
the emergency and long-term needs of vulnerable children, with a particular focus
on underdeveloped countries and countries subjected to the devastation of war
and other calamities. Among UN agencies, UNICEF benefits from a unique
internationally recognized mandate of assisting children in all parties to a
conflict. Its intervention is thus not subject to agreement from the government of
the affected country, as is the case for other UN agencies. UNICEF has its
headquarters in New York, and is represented in 117 countries. In the UN system,
UNICEF has been recognized for its strong field-based structure, decentralized
authority, flexibility, and ability to innovate. UNICEF has the ability to respond
rapidly when required. It can quickly mobilize staff and access resources and
emergency supplies (through its warehouse in Copenhagen). UNICEF is totally
dependent on voluntary contributions from governments and the general public.
It has an extensive international network of UNICEF national committees.
e. Food and Agricultural Organization
FAO’s headquarters is in Rome. The task of the organization is advise on reducing
vulnerability to food supply failures and help in the rehabilitation of agriculture,
livestock, and fisheries. FAO’s emphasis is on local food production. FAO
assesses and monitors production, exports and imports food, and forecasts any
requirements of exceptional food assistance. In conjunction with WFP, it conducts
crop and supply assessment missions.
f. World Food Programme
WFP is the food aid organization of the UN system. A joint UN/FAO program,
its headquarters is in Rome. A WFP director of operations is responsible for WFP
programs in most developing countries. WFP provides food aid primarily to lowincome
countries, assists in the implementation of economic and social development
projects, and meets relief needs of victims of natural and other disasters. The
program also administers the International Emergency Food Reserve (IEFR)
with a target of providing 500,000 tons of cereals per annum. Its emergency
functions are to provide advice on emergency food aid requirements and to plan
and manage food aid interventions. Subject to its resources and the assessed need
for international food aid, it also meets emergency food needs. WFP mobilizes
62

and coordinates the planning and delivery of food assistance and provides
logistical support.
g. World Health Organization
WHO’s headquarters is in Geneva, where it maintains a division of emergency
and humanitarian action (DEHA). Within the UN system, DEHA coordinates the
international response to emergencies and natural disasters in the health fields, in
close partnership with the other member agencies of the UN’s IASC. WHO
coordinates efforts to raise health levels worldwide, undertakes projects to
develop primary health care, and combats major health problems. WHO monitors
compliance with international health regulations to prevent the international
spread of disease, encourages medical research, sets and advises on medical
standards, and provides medical training and guidance. WHO has an early
warning system of epidemic disease outbreaks, and it collects and disseminates
epidemiological and statistical health data. WHO provides the following technical
and material services:
• epidemiological assessments and surveillance;
• emergency health supplies;
• deployment of medical and epidemiological staff;
• support in the collection and analysis of epidemiological
data for disease control;
• assistance in the reestablishment of national health infrastructures;
• physical and psychosocial rehabilitation of war victims;
• provision of drugs and medical supplies; and
• coordination of health care programs.
h. The United Nations Development Programme
Part II, Section 3, paragraph 6
UNDP’s headquarters is in New York. The program is represented in virtually all
developing countries by UNDP resident representatives. The resident representative
heads offices staffed by both international and national UNDP staff. He/she
also is appointed normally as the UN resident coordinator. UNDP administers
and coordinates most of the technical assistance provided through the UN system.
UNDP provides assistance to developing countries to accelerate their economic
and social development through country programs, designed jointly with national
governments. Country programs cover periods of three to five years and are
prepared within the framework of an indicative planning figure (IPF). The IPF is
the amount of UNDP funds and resources that will be available during the
programming period. Programs in a wide range of sectors are executed by the host
governments, UN agencies, and regional economic institutions.
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Part II, Section 3, paragraph 6
i. United Nations Volunteers (UNV)
The United Nations Volunteers program is not an agency, but a source of
personnel and expertise available to all UN agencies and to the IOM. Established
by the UN General Assembly in 1970, with its headquarters in Bonn, the UNV
program is administered under the auspices of UNDP. The UNV program, the
sole volunteer arm of the UN system, serves as an operational partner in
developmental, humanitarian, and peace building projects deploying “volunteer
specialists” at the request of UN member states or UN system bodies. The
program aims to deploy competent and dedicated professional people in significant
numbers at short notice for a wide range of responsibilities. UNV specialists
are typically one-third the cost of UN staff. The UNV program identifies and
contracts volunteer specialists with the requisite experience and qualifications.
The program maintains a roster of 5,000 men and women of over 100 nationalities.
Assignments are for two years, but for humanitarian relief, rehabilitation,
and peace operations, the tour of duty is normally between three months and one
year. UNV specialists contracts differ from those of regular UN personnel.
Nonetheless, they are subject to certain UN rules, notably with respect to
adherence to the security directives.
Typical roles of UNVs in humanitarian operations, peace support, and democratization
are:
j. Other agencies
• demilitarization/demobilization;
• camp construction and management;
• electoral activities and training;
• conflict resolution training;
• crime prevention, security assessment, and planning;
• human rights protection and promotion;
• food aid distribution;
• monitoring transport/shipping and air traffic control;
• psychotherapy and counseling;
• water/sanitation engineering;
• epidemiology;
• public and constitutional law; and
• public information, telecommunications, and computer programming/analysis.
Aside from the UN agencies described above, other agencies might be involved
for specialized functions, especially in postemergency recovery and reconstruction.
These could include:
64

(1) The World Meteorological Organization (WMO), which can provide
medium-term forecasts of extreme weather conditions to affected
populations and humanitarian assistance operations;
(2) United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization (UNESCO)
addresses the reestablishment of education facilities and programs;
(3) The World Fund for Population Activities (WFPA) supports family
planning programs; and
(4) United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP) provides programs
on environmental protection and natural resources management.
7. Coordination and Control
a. Interagency Coordination at Strategic Level
(1) The UN Emergency Relief Coordinator
The ERC holds the rank of under-secretary-general, answers directly
to the UN secretary-general, and is the head of DHA. The ERC
coordinates and facilitates the humanitarian assistance of the UN
system (see paragraph 6b).
(2) The Inter-Agency Standing Committee
Part II, Section 3, paragraphs 6-7
The IASC is the principal mechanism for coordination of humanitarian
activities among UN agencies. It comprises the executive heads of
UNHCR, UNICEF, WFP, FAO, WHO, and UNDP and is chaired by
the emergency relief coordinator. The committee also includes the
executive heads of three intergovernmental organizations—ICRC,
IFRC, and IOM. Standing invitations to the regularly held IASC
meetings are extended to other intergovernmental and nongovernmental
organizations concerned. The IASC sets and coordinates
policies related to humanitarian emergency activities, reviews
interorganizational roles and responsibilities, and monitors ongoing
and possible emergencies. It meets several times a year. The IASC is
supported by an Inter-Agency Working Group (IASWG) comprising
the heads of emergency units within these agencies and a small
standing secretariat, the Inter-Agency Support Unit (IASU) at DHA,
Geneva.
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Part II, Section 3, paragraph 7
(3) The Joint Consultative Group on Policy (JCGP)
The JCGP is a group of funding agencies—UNDP, UNICEF, United
Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), WFP (UNHCR is
an observer)—that discusses, promotes, and harmonizes
interorganizational policies, procedures, and arrangements in development
and emergency assistance.
b. Coordination at Operational Level
(1) Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG)
The SRSG is the secretary-general’s representative to the government
of the host country. The SRSG would normally also be the overall coordinator
for a UN operation, rationalizing the operational objectives of the political,
military, and humanitarian components of the operation.
(2) Lead Agency
In certain cases the secretary-general will designate a lead agency to
carry out or oversee functions that go beyond its mandate, but for
which it has the necessary capacity. The lead agency also will have the
primary responsibility for general mobilization of resources and
interagency coordination.
(3) The UN Resident Coordinator
At the operational level, one of the agency representatives, usually the
resident representative of the UNDP, is appointed by the UN secretary-general
as the UN resident coordinator for operational activities
for development. The resident coordinator serves as “first among
equals” of the in-country representatives of agencies, heads the UN
country team, and chairs the UN disaster management team (DMT)
(see paragraph 7b[5]).
The resident coordinator is expected to provide leadership in:
• the establishment of collaborative arrangements between the
UN system and national authorities in the definition and
prioritization of needs for emergency assistance from the UN
system and also for the receipt and distribution of such
assistance; and
• the establishment of coordination mechanisms within the
UN system and between the UN system and other international
actors concerned.
66

In a complex emergency, the resident coordinator reports to and works
under the guidance of the ERC, and in-country reports to the SRSG
when one is appointed.
(4) Humanitarian Coordinators
In complex emergencies the ERC in consultation with the IASC
designates a humanitarian coordinator. This person also may be the
UN resident coordinator. The humanitarian coordinator reports to the
ERC and, if a SRSG is appointed, the humanitarian coordinator
functions under his/her overall authority.
In a complex emergency, the primary function of the humanitarian
coordinator is to facilitate effective and well-coordinated humanitarian
assistance. The humanitarian coordinator’s terms of reference
(TOR) cover:
• coordination mechanisms and agreements to facilitate rapid
effective and integrated humanitarian assistance;
• assessing and addressing humanitarian needs;
• humanitarian advocacy; and
• information dissemination.
(5) UN Disaster Management Teams
Part II, Section 3, paragraph 7
In some developing countries, especially those that are disaster-prone,
representatives of UN agencies will form a standing DMT. (These
interagency teams will sometimes go by another name.) The primary
purpose of the UN-DMT is to encourage a prompt, effective, and
concerted response by the UN system at country level in the event of
a natural disaster or emergency. The team also facilitates similar
coordination of UN assistance to the governments in respect to postemergency
rehabilitation and reconstruction. The composition of the
DMT depends on the types of emergency to which the country is prone
and which organizations are present. The team normally should
include a core group consisting of country-level representatives of the
FAO, UNDP, UNICEF, WFP, WHO, and where present UNHCR. It
may be enlarged to include additional representatives or project
personnel.
The UN resident coordinator is chairman of the DMT, whether or not
he or she is also designated humanitarian coordinator for a complex
emergency. Should there be a complex emergency, the DMT might
serve as the basis of a strengthened interagency mechanism. New
interagency mechanisms also may be created for a specific situation.
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Part II, Section 3, paragraph 7
(6) InterAgency Assessment Missions
InterAgency Assessment Missions determine basic emergency requirements
and, when the nature of the emergency alters, define new
or projected requirements and revalidate current estimates. The purpose
is to establish the basis for integrated multisectoral assistance
programs that can be proposed for funding in consolidated interagency
appeals. The missions are led by the agency most concerned
with the emergency. In the case of multisectoral emergencies, DHA or
a designated lead agency would head the mission. Such missions are
normally subject to the approval of the government of the affected
country.
(7) Emergency Coordination Arrangements
Each complex emergency gives rise to coordination mechanisms that
can differ in name and to varying degrees in purpose, procedures, and
interorganizational relationships. Typically, the functions of a field or
operational level coordination mechanism would include:
• conduct of regular interagency relief coordination meetings;
• coordination of humanitarian activities with the host government;
• facilitation/preparation of international appeals;
• production of reports;
• information collection, collation, analysis, and dissemination;
• liaison with donors to encourage support of international
humanitarian programs;
• liaison with nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations
and the ICRC;
• planning for transition from emergency to rehabilitation and
development;
• establish/oversee task-specific coordination (e.g. logistics,
communications, commodities tracking, and reporting); and
• programs not falling into a specific agency mandate.
(8) Special Mechanisms (UNDAC/OSSOC)
DHA has developed UN Disaster Assessment and Coordination Teams
(UNDAC) for natural disaster response. Trained teams of disaster
management experts from UN agencies, and particularly teams loaned
by governments, can be mobilized quickly to facilitate coordination,
undertake damage and needs assessments, facilitate international
assistance, and promote exchange of know-how. Linked to the UNDAC
68

8. Resources
teams are On-Site Operations Coordination Centers (OSSOC). The
OSSOC has two roles: first to provide local emergency management
authorities with a system for coordinating the operational activities of
international relief agencies, and second to provide a framework for
cooperation and coordination among disaster relief teams at a disaster
site. UNDACs and OSSOCs may be deployed in future complex
emergencies.
(9) Interagency Arrangements
In certain cases, standing interorganizational arrangements are formalized
in Memoranda of Understanding (MOU) either as standing
arrangements or ad hoc for specific emergencies (for example, the
MOU between WFP-UNHCR on the provision of food for refugees).
DHA, DPA, and DPKO have developed a “Framework of Cooperation”
to facilitate analysis of early warning information, planning of
preventative action, fact finding, and operational planning during a
crisis.
a. Ensuring that Resources Are Available
Part II, Section 3, paragraphs 7-8
There are four main means by which agencies access the considerable financial,
human, and material resources needed for emergency response:
(1) Internal: designated funds or budgets to which funds are specifically
allocated for use in emergencies; staff, equipment, and supplies
specifically assigned to emergency-related functions and programs.
(2) Internal: funds, staff, equipment, and supplies reallocated or borrowed
from regular (nonemergency) programs.
(3) External: funds, seconded staff, equipment, and supplies for specific
purposes in specific emergencies obtained by means of an agency’s
specific request to one or more donor sources, or by means of an
agency appeal or an interagency consolidated appeal (see paragraph
8c).
(4) External: staff equipment and supplies predetermined as being needed
under certain conditions, for which agencies have made standing
agreements with donors to provide on an as-needed basis (see paragraph
9).
69

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 8
b. Organizing Resources
The financial, human, and material needs of an emergency response invariably
exceed the resources readily available to agencies, both the budgetary resources
allocated for emergencies and “borrowed” or reallocated resources from developmental
programs. As the funding or “in-kind” resources have to be obtained
externally, an assessment of needs, a request or appeal to meet these needs, and
guarantees of their correct utilization will be needed. Standing arrangements
between agencies and non-UN providers of staff and equipment act to mobilize
the needed resources, and ensure the availability of specific assets.
c. Appeals
Each agency has its own constituency and funding arrangements. In emergencies
that are essentially monosectoral, this does not pose a problem. Complex
emergencies are multisectoral, and there is a risk of several similar requests being
made to the same source of funding. Uncertainty and confusion is created among
potential donors as to how to provide support rationally and effectively.
(1) Consolidated and Flash Appeals
The “consolidated appeal” is the product of a Consolidated Appeals
Process (CAP) coordinated by DHA. It is addressed to donor governments
and organizations to mobilize funds, equipment, supplies, and
personnel. The appeal, normally prepared with the government of the
country concerned, is based on the assessments or requirements of
different agencies in respective sectors. It provides a consolidated
picture of a situation, and of the humanitarian aid and programs
proposed. The pressure of time in the initial states of an emergency
may not allow for the preparation of a consolidated appeal; therefore,
an initial “flash appeal” may be coordinated and issued by DHA to
advise on immediate needs. These will be determined on the basis of
quick assessment and consultation.
(2) Resource Tracking and Reporting
Each agency issues reports on the evolving emergency and its planned
and current actions to the consolidated appeals. Similarly each agency
has some system of tracking and reporting on the level of overall
supplies and financial, material, and human resources, particularly for
those for which it is the “channel” or implementing authority. These
tracking and reporting mechanisms provide information both for
resource management and to keep operational partners and donors
informed on the status of external support provided. UNHCR’s Commodities
Tracking System (CTS), WFP’s International Food Aid
70

Information System (INTERFAIS), and WHO/PAHO’s SUMMA are
examples of tracking and reporting systems. At the international level,
DHA tracks and reports periodically on the response to consolidated
appeals to provide an overview of requirements that have been met and
shortfalls. It also provides an overall picture of an emergency in
periodic situation reports (SITREPS).
(3) The Central Emergency Revolving Fund
There is a revolving fund authorized at a level of $50 million, under
DHA’s responsibility, from which UN agencies can draw to meet
needs in the initial stages of an emergency, subject to reimbursement
within a set time. The CERF is funded from donor contributions and
the interest it generates. The purpose of the CERF is to make it
possible to respond to urgent needs immediately without having to
wait for donor decisionmaking or allocation processes.
(4) UNDP Round Tables
In the post-emergency phase, UNDP Round Tables are used to bring
international aid groups together with the national authorities in
different sectors to agree on programs for national reconstruction and
rehabilitation.
9. Strengthening Arrangements for Emergency Resources
Numerous mechanisms and standing arrangements exist or are under discussion to
make special or increased resources available to UN agencies quickly on the basis of
predefined needs. Examples of these are:
a. Military and Civil Defence Assets (MCDA)—DHA
DHA, in consultation with an international Standing Coordination Group (SCG),
has arranged for the employment of military and civil defense assets on international
humanitarian missions. Procedures for these were agreed to as the “Oslo
Guidelines” at an international meeting in Norway in 1994. The types of activities
envisioned for MCDA include air, land, and sea assessments. Specialized staff
would be seconded for communications and logistics support and explosive and
ordinance disposal.
b. Service Packages—UNHCR
Part II, Section 3, paragraphs 8-9
As noted in Part II, Section 2, paragraph 2b(1), “service packages” is a term that
UNHCR has used to describe military or civilian assets (equipment, material,
personnel, and systems). Governments provide service packages to UNHCR to
71

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 9
increase its resources and capacities for large-scale humanitarian operations.
Service packages are self-contained, “stand-alone units” in terms of administration,
accommodation, transport, and communications. They are provided for
specified requirements and periods. Service packages fall under the high
commissioner’s executive direction and command; they are humanitarian and
distinct from UN political/military activities.
Examples of service packages are:
c. Quick Response Mechanisms
• airport services and airhead management;
• logistics base services;
• road servicing and road security;
• site preparation; and
• provision of domestic fuel, sanitation facilities, and water
management.
In recent years, UNHCR, UNICEF, WHO, WFP, FAO, and UNDP have strengthened
their internal emergency response and support units or divisions. These
strengthening measures have included establishing rapid response entities (DHA-
Rapid Response Unit, WFP-Rapid Response Team, UNICEF-Rapid Response
Team). The purpose of these mechanisms is essentially to provide quick and
specialized resources in planning and preparing for a fuller agency and interagency
emergency response.
d. Stockpiles and Warehouses
(1) DHA Warehouse in Pisa, Italy
DHA maintains a permanent (renewable) stock of disaster relief items
near an airbase in Pisa. These are essentially nonfood and nonmedical
relief items, such as tents, blankets, etc., that have been donated by
various governments. WFP and WHO also are considering using this
facility for food and medical supplies.
(2) UNIPAC-UNICEF
An emergency stockpile is maintained at UNIPAC, UNICEF’s supply
division and warehouse in Copenhagen, a system that facilitates rapid
response to requests for emergency operations. Items in the warehouse
usually can be dispatched within hours. A listing of supplies and
their costs is kept up-to-date and available at all UNICEF offices.
Procurement and shipment of other supplies required for an emergency
is undertaken on an accelerated basis. The reimbursable pro-
72

curement facilities of UNIPAC are available to other organizations
and agencies.
(3) Central Register of Disaster Management Capacities
10. Administration
a. Security
DHA maintains a central register of information on:
• International Search and Rescue Teams;
• National Emergency Response Offices;
• Emergency Relief Services; and
• Emergency Stockpiles of Disaster Relief Items.
Registers on Disaster Management Expertise and Military and Civil
Defence Assets are under preparation.
The international and national staff of UN agencies and organizations follow a
security system supervised by the Office of the United Nations Security Coordinator
in the UN Secretariat in New York. At country level, the UN security
coordinator (SECOORD) appoints the most senior UN official (in most cases the
UNDP resident representative) as the “designated official” (DO). The DO is
responsible for ensuring the security and safety of UN personnel and dependents
(international and national). The DO establishes a Security Management Team
(SMT) of representatives of agencies concerned, and appoints wardens and area
coordinators with security-related responsibilities for UN staff and dependents in
defined geographical areas. In countries where the threat to security is high, a fulltime
field security officer (FSO) will be recruited. The FSO’s functions cover the
preparation and implementation of a security plan, security assessments, information
collection and dissemination, liaison, emergency communications, office
and residential security, and interagency coordination and training related to
security. For a full explanation of the five UN Security Phases (which may differ
within the same country), see Annex 5.
b. Security Staff and UN Guards
The United Nations Field Administration and Logistics (UNFALD) maintains a
UN Security Guard force. The main tasks of the guards are the security of UN
facilities, personnel, and bodyguard duty for the UN secretary-general and other
senior UN officials. Most UN guards are unarmed and in uniform. In one instance,
the UN Inter-Agency Humanitarian Programme for Iraq, a lightly armed (essentially
side arms) UN Guard Contingent (of up to 500 guards), was fielded to escort
UN relief convoys, protect UN personnel, assets, and operations, and to maintain
a climate of security in specific areas of tension.
73
Part II, Section 3, paragraphs 9-10

Part II, Section 3, paragraph 10
Notes
c. Staff Security Categories and Passes
Emergency assistance operations are likely to be carried out under insecure
conditions. The UN General Assembly has approved a “Convention of Safety of
UN and Associated Personnel” as one step to address the risks faced by both
United Nations staff and non-UN staff working with UN operations. (As of
September 1995, the convention is awaiting ratification by member states.)
There is no standard pass or identification document common to all United
Nations personnel. Most regular staff of UN organizations will have a “laissezpasser.”
The laissez-passer is a form of passport that accords the bearer a limited
diplomatic immunity in the performance of official duty. Many of the staff
recruited by or associated with UN agencies will not be entitled to a laissezpasser.
These may be issued a standard identity card known as a UN certificate,
or they are issued with other cards by the headquarters of the different agencies
or by their country offices.
1
In December 1991, the UN General Assembly passed a key resolution—46/182—to strengthen UN
humanitarian emergency assistance by calling for more rational and coordinated actions to ensure
protection and assistance to civilian victims on all sides of a conflict. The resolution provided that
humanitarian assistance should take place with the consent, though not necessarily at the request of, the
affected state. Finally, the resolution reaffirmed the guiding principles of humanity, neutrality, and
impartiality for humanitarian assistance—principles drawn from the Statutes of the International Red
Cross and Red Crescent Movement.
2
The UN system consists of three kinds of intergovernmental organization: the United Nations itself
(sometimes referred to as the “UN-proper” or the “central UN”), the specialized agencies, and the technical
agencies.
3
This draws heavily on Assisting in Emergencies, UNICEF handbook (New York: UNICEF, 1986).
4
Ibid.
5
Ibid.
6
Ibid.
7
Information derived from Department of Humanitarian Affairs background documentation to the
“International Meeting on Mine Clearance” held July 5-7, 1995 in Geneva.
8
This draws on Handbook for Emergencies (Geneva: UNHCR, December 1982).
9
Drawn from A UNHCR Handbook for the Military on Humanitarian Operations (Geneva: UNHCR,
1984).
74

PART II: EMERGENCY RESPONSE, RECOVERY, AND AID
1. Characteristics
SECTION 4
UN CIVIL ELEMENTS: CIVIL ADMINISTRATION
The UN has no standing organization charged with responsibility for dealing with
civil administration matters. The UN’s civil administration components are distinguished
from other standing UN bodies such as UNDP, UNICEF, and UNHCR by their
transient status in the hierarchy of UN organizations and the unusual scope and nature of
their tasks. The incorporation of a civil administration element in a peace support
operation is a recent innovation and still rare. Even though this element may ultimately
be the most important for the success of a mission, it is usually relatively small in terms
of finances and personnel. UNTAC, the UN Transitional Authority in Cambodia, was the
first to attempt to formalize a role for control of the civil administration.
The parties to a dispute normally will agree to the establishment of a civil administration
component. Its functions in the zone of conflict generally would be authorized by
Security Council resolution, which also provides the mandate for its operations. Although
future UN interventions in a collapsed state may not demand host nation
agreement, its operations could be severely hampered by the absence of local support.
Lack of this agreement and a proper legal basis can prevent enforcement of decisions.
In peacekeeping operations, the UN’s military, police, electoral, and human rights
components generally have clearly defined areas of activity. In the host nation, their
responsibilities may be respectively: to monitor or control the activities of the local
military and militias, the police, political parties and election administrators, and human
rights components. The mandates for each UN component is generally enshrined in
various UN conventions and charters of national legislation. By contrast, the role and
responsibilities of the civil administration component is less easily found in existing
legislation, even the clear-cut criminal, administrative, or humanitarian codes. Consequently,
a UN intervention in the host nation’s civil administration has to establish at the
outset a clear definition of the reasons for, and the extent of, the intervention.
2. Tasks
The primary objective of the civil administration component is to protect the rights
of ordinary citizens of a nation involved in political or military conflict by limiting abuse
of civil power by the local authorities and other parties to the conflict and seeking to
ensure fair and equitable access to services. Where there has been a total breakdown of
the civil authority, the aim of a UN intervention may be to reestablish essential services.
Government, officials, or people in positions of authority have the power to grant or
withhold rights and benefits from individual citizens. They may abuse their civil powers
for personal gain to ensure their own financial position and security regardless of the
outcome of the conflict, or for political gain by manipulating communities or individual
75

Part II, Section 4, paragraph 2
citizens into supporting their party or organization. These abuses may occur in the
following areas of day-to-day civil affairs:
a. Financial Corruption
• granting of business approvals, contracts, or tenders;
• collusion on taxation assessment;
• falsification of budgets for government departments;
• disguised monetary benefits for senior officials;
• distortion of audit trails, nonreceipting of commercial or
cash transactions.
b. Manipulating Grants of Land and Property Title
c. Withholding Access to Services
• grant or promise of title in exchange for political support or
financial payments;
• seizure or threatened seizure of property or eviction of
citizens to exert pressure.
• manipulating access to education, scholarships, pensions,
health care, and employment for political supporters.
d. Control of Essential Goods and Materials
e. Control of the Media
f. Judicial System
• manipulating the distribution of essential goods, i.e. food,
fuel, etc.;
• extortion through customs controls.
• control by intimidation of print and electronic media organizations;
• financial or physical control of media outlets.
• intimidation or financial manipulation of judges, prosecutors,
witnesses, lawyers;
• distorted interpretation of law to ensure politically desired
outcomes.
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Part II, Section 4, paragraphs 3-5
3. Organization and Control
The control and organization of the component depends on the extent of its mandate,
which is determined at the outset. Generally, a director of civil administration is
appointed by the UN secretary-general. While having overall management responsibility
for the component, he/she is responsible to the special representative. Under the director,
a number of deputy directors may be responsible for specific sectors or issues, identified
as areas of high priority or concern. These could include financial affairs, public
information and media control, public security, and judicial process.
Deputy directors identify existing administration procedures in their areas of responsibility,
protect them from abuse or manipulation, and restore facilities that were failing
to operate at all. They also determine, and as far as possible establish, the controls required
at national, provincial, municipal, or local levels depending on the circumstances of the
host country and the state of the existing administration. In the main, the extent of these
controls is dependent upon the availability of UN personnel.
4. Recruitment of Administration Staff
The UN faces severe problems in the recruitment of personnel for civil administration
tasks. Effective control and implementation of civil administration systems, rather than
merely monitoring, is highly resource-intensive in terms of placing UN personnel at all
levels of administration in all key ministries, departments, and financial institutions. The
financial costs for supporting such a large UN team in the field are prohibitive. Even if
the financial resources are available, there are problems in finding correctly qualified
personnel. Staff for civil administration positions must have a background in government
procedures and administration, an area of specialist experience, and if possible some legal
knowledge. The UN system is only able to provide a very limited number of people that
fit this profile from existing staff and must therefore recruit on contract from donor
countries. Personnel of the necessary caliber and skill are not readily available at short
notice. A complicating factor, more so in civil administration than in any other component,
is the need for language skills. The intrusiveness and effectiveness of any UN
controls on existing administrative systems is measurably diminished by the need to rely
on interpreters.
5. Limitations
In addition to difficulties in recruiting appropriately skilled staff, a major limitation
of civil administration effectiveness arises from the lack of legal sanctions. It is
imperative that in the existing legislation of the host country, sanctions or penalties can
be brought to bear on officials or individuals found to be abusing their position of
authority. If no appropriate legislation exists, the UN mandate must include the possibility
to introduce these penalties, raising questions about sovereignty and the duration and
modality of any UN legislation. There are also issues of judiciary independence, whether
UN instituted courts are legally viable and whether the UN has the right to remove
77

Part II, Section 4, paragraphs 5-6
officials from their positions. UN control or monitoring of the civil authorities may be
impossible if it cannot take remedial action when a violation or abuse is identified.
In addition to the problems associated with the need to rely on interpreters is the need
to access and somehow overcome the problems of documentation and document
analysis, most of which are not in the language of the UN staff. Early study is required
of local decisionmaking processes, whether they are documented and whether such
documents correctly reflect the modality and responsibility for decisions.
6. Relationship to Other Force Elements
The administrative component must work in close liaison with all the other force
elements because much of its work is interlinked. Most important, however, is likely to
be its relationship with CIVPOL (see Part III, Section 5) and Human Rights (see Part II,
Section 8). The component often will need to call upon the investigative, enforcement,
and protection capacity of the police. Victims of abuse or intimidation are often fearful
of assisting the civil administration component without guarantees of protection.
It is essential that the legal basis for the UN intervention is clearly expressed in the
mandate or in the instructions derived from it. This includes CIVPOL’s mandate to arrest
or detain individuals separate from the local police or, in the absence of that provision,
their capacity to induce local police to take action (see Part III, Section 5, paragraph 3c).
CIVPOL’s powers also must be interpreted in relation to their authority in criminal
matters and/or their civil and administrative jurisdiction. Clarification and interpretation
of these issues will require a close working relationship with the civil administration
component.
Most instances of official corruption occur with the tacit assent of the local police and
military authorities. Consequently CIVPOL and UN military force elements are crucial
in ensuring that a measure of monitoring and control is exerted over local authorities if
the civil administration element is to have any chance of success in meeting its
responsibilities. Examples of issues where cooperation between the UN force elements
and the UN administration is essential are: bearing and using weapons, crowd control,
location and movement of refugees/displaced persons, and control of prisons. In all these
instances, the civil authority often determines policy. In most cases, it is the civil
administration component’s responsibility to ensure that those policies are executed in
a fair and correct manner. Under these provisions, CIVPOL and the UN military
components ensure that the local police and military do not distort or abuse implementation
of the policies.
78

PART II: EMERGENCY RESPONSE, RECOVERY, AND AID
1. Introduction
SECTION 5
UN CIVIL ELEMENTS: ELECTIONS
Not all peacekeeping missions have an electoral dimension. Electoral elements have
only formed part of PSOs recently, but they are now incorporated more frequently. Where
there is an electoral dimension it is likely to be one of the most important aspects of the
mission: conducting an election will be a fundamental element of the overall political
agreement, and the holding of the election will be a milestone that marks the successful
conclusion of the mission as a whole. Electoral elements of a mission are demanding,
requiring an efficient marshaling of the entire resources of the mission, often supplemented
by additional resources from outside.
2. Types of UN Electoral Involvement
The UN’s guidelines for electoral operations (A/47/668/Add.1) identify the following
six basic operational concepts for UN electoral assistance:
a. Organization and Conduct of an Electoral Process
The UN may be called upon to run an election or a referendum requiring a wide
range of electoral administration tasks as part of a peacekeeping mission.
Organizing and conducting an election is so complex and resource intensive as
to be qualitatively different from the other forms of electoral assistance that may
be provided. The UN may have to recruit, train, deploy, and pay the polling staff,
equip all the voting stations, and provide the necessary logistic support for the
process. It also will be typically responsible for providing security for the process.
b. Supervision of an Electoral Process
This includes the need to certify:
• the impartiality of the electoral authorities, and freedom of
organization, movement, assembly and expression of political
parties and alliances;
• that opportunities are given to parties to deploy agents to
observe all aspects of the process;
• fair access to state media and other state resources;
• registration of voters; and
• the conduct of the polling and the count, including the proper
training and conduct of election officials, and in some cases
the transport of voting materials to and from polling stations.
79

Part II, Section 5, paragraph 2
Sometimes the supervision process may include the conduct by the UN of a
“quick count;” an independent tabulation of the results of counting at a number
of counting centers, which may give a rapid and reasonably accurate preliminary
indication of the likely result of an election or referendum.
Supervision to this extent is rare, since the requirement for formal UN certification
impinges on the national sovereignty of the country involved. It may arise as
part of a peacekeeping operation in circumstances where national sovereignty has
not been established or is in dispute.
c. Verification
A country conducting its own election may request the UN to verify the freedom
and fairness of certain aspects of the process. Verification missions tend to be
sustained and resource intensive. The tasks resemble those in supervision
missions, but the mechanisms adopted are less intrusive, in keeping with the fact
that the mission is operating by invitation. Verification may be undertaken as part
of a peacekeeping mission with a military element, or may be purely civilian in
character.
d. Provision of Support to International Observers
Several countries and intergovernmental or nongovernmental organizations may
be invited to send observers to an election. The UN’s electoral component may
be required to integrate and coordinate the operations of the various bodies,
thereby increasing the efficiency of their observation efforts.
e. Technical Assistance
This is the most common type of UN involvement in electoral matters. Assistance
can include analysis, advice, equipment, or training to government institutions.
Training of election administrators and polling officials may be a particularly
important form of technical assistance, not only because of the critical role that
they will play in an election, but also because the development of a core group of
skilled people in a territory can serve to sustain democratic institutions after a
PSO has concluded.
Technical assistance of this type can be provided in a peacekeeping context.
f. Following an Electoral Process
The secretary-general may ask the resident coordinator of the UN system in a
country to “follow the electoral process and report to him on its results.” This type
of operation provides a possible response to a member state’s request that may be
used in cases where the lead time is too short to enable the electoral process to be
80

followed adequately either chronologically or geographically.
As tasks in the same mission, “organization and conduct,” “supervision,” and
“verification” are mutually exclusive—no mission can involve more than one of
them. “Following an electoral process” by its nature does not arise in peacekeeping
missions. Since 1992, some national observer groups on request have been
assisted by the UN.
3. Scale of Mission
The scale of these tasks associated with organizing and conducting an election or
referendum is proportional to the voting population; as a rough guide, for every million
voters, about 10,000 polling officials are required. This is one factor that imposes a limit
on how large an election the UN could run. Other limiting factors include the distribution
of the population: if most people live in inaccessible areas, the provision of polling
facilities may require resources beyond those available to the mission. These limitations
do not apply to supervision or verification, because it is possible to use random checks
rather than 100 percent coverage. The details of a mission are likely to be spelt out in the
political agreement that led to UN involvement. This increases the degree of variation that
can be found from mission to mission.
4. Main Stages of an Electoral Operation
An electoral operation typically requires five areas of activity, which tend to be
undertaken in overlapping phases.
a. Establishing Policy and Legal Framework
The success of an electoral operation depends on how much it is accepted as
legitimate and binding by the participants in the political process. If there is
disagreement on a fundamental aspect of the process, for example the voting
system to be adopted, or the extent of the franchise, then the operation may well
be doomed to failure. The resolution of major policy issues at the outset in a legal
form ensures the later phases of the process are conducted in a systematic way.
The underlying issues of supervision or verification missions need to be resolved
in the same way, since policy parameters and the legal framework will be major
factors in the overall success of the operation, unless they have been totally
predetermined in a peace agreement. This phase requires high-level interaction
between the UN and the participants in the process.
b. Establishing Administrative Structures
Part II, Section 5, paragraphs 2-4
In contrast to a military command structure for a peacekeeping operation, there
are no formed units of electoral administrators or observers that can be deployed
in toto to undertake specific tasks. In addition, electoral administrators or
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Part II, Section 5, paragraph 4
observers typically have to achieve a greater penetration of the countryside than
the military and other civilian components. This phase of an operation requires
cooperation with bodies such as the Field Personnel Section of the Field
Administration and Logistics Division in New York, in some cases with the UN
Volunteer Administration in Geneva, and with other components of the mission.
It also raises questions regarding the relationship between the electoral component
and the rest of the UN mission. In some cases, the electoral component may
wish to maintain a distinct position within the mission and to ensure that their
neutrality is maintained in the eyes of the participants in the political process,
while other components of the mission, usually the military, are imposing
sanctions on the same participants.
c. Voter Registration
In some elections, there is no separate registration, and voters instead bring
specified documents to the voting station to establish their right to vote. The
advantages of registration are that it enables an individual’s right to vote to be
resolved before the poll, avoiding disruptive disputes in voting stations. It also
generates detailed information about the locations of concentrations of voters,
which can be used to great effect in the planning of the polling, and in ensuring
that voting stations have the correct supplies of materials. Voter registration
requires considerable logistic support regardless of whether the UN is conducting,
supervising, or verifying it, and close cooperation with other elements of the
mission is required.
d. The Campaign
A free and open campaign is generally accepted to be a necessary precondition
for a free and fair election. Depending on the circumstances, the electoral
component may have a role to play in implementing procedures designed to
ensure this condition; for further details, see paragraph 5l. The success of a
campaign also will be critically affected by the broader human rights situation in
the territory, which in turn may be influenced by a number of different components
of the mission.
e. The Polling and Count
These tend to be the most active and demanding parts of the process because,
unlike voter registration, they are undertaken under immutable time constraints,
and in circumstances where a failure to meet deadlines may be seen as representing
a major failure of the entire peace process. This requires a high degree of
logistic planning regardless of whether the election is being conducted or only
supervised or verified.
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Part II, Section 5, paragraph 5
5. Detailed Tasks of Election Components
During the stages of an electoral operation, the UN’s electoral component’s tasks may
include the following:
a. Advance Election Planning
An Advance Election Planning Unit (AEPU) may deploy prior to the development
of an election plan to gather data essential for the planning process,
including cartographic and demographic information. The need for and feasibility
of a separate AEPU will depend on how well the infrastructure of the territory
is already documented, and on the overall implementation timetable for the
mission. If the mission can be mounted quickly there will be no need for a separate
AEPU, and its functions will become functions of the field staff of the electoral
components.
b. Legal and Procedural Preparations
Preparatory action is required to draft electoral law and procedures, and, once
established, to promulgate their content and educate the electoral officials. In
drafting a law, a balance typically will have to be drawn between the need to
prescribe in detail the processes that are to be implemented and the need to retain
flexibility in dealing with unforeseen circumstances and problems as they arise.
In general, it is most undesirable for significant changes in procedures to be made
at the last minute before an election. Such changes are disruptive for all
participants in the process and are seldom able to be implemented consistently
throughout the territory.
c. Cartography
In addition to accurate geographical data, electoral planners need to know or
decide on electoral boundaries and promulgate this information. The basic
requirement for maps to support activities in the field is unlikely to be much
different to the cartographic requirements of other components of the mission,
and might be satisfied by a common-use cartographic unit providing a missionwide
service, rather than by dedicated electoral cartographers. If the cartographic
base of the country in which the mission is located is sufficiently strong, there may
not even be a need for a distinct cartographic unit to meet these needs. Dedicated
electoral cartographers are, however, likely to be needed for the definition of
electoral boundaries. In addition, cartographers have skills that go beyond mere
map drawing, encompassing a familiarity with geographical and boundary
definition issues and geographic information systems, and these may be an
important resource in a verification mission where these sorts of issues arise.
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Part II, Section 5, paragraph 5
d. Constituency Delimitation
Constituency delimitation is a most important part of election administration, and
could arise as a function either if the UN were conducting an election using
constituencies, or if the construction of constituencies became a controversial
issue in an election being subjected to supervision or verification. It has not,
however, been a function performed to date by the UN as part of a peace support
operation.
e. Management of Operational Field Staff
Very large numbers of auxiliary electoral staff, recruited on a volunteer basis
from all walks of life, may be deployed to assist during the most active phase of
the electoral process. The recruitment, briefing, and training of such staff, and the
development of an effective method for paying them promptly, is a substantial
project in itself, and one which may influence significantly the overall success or
failure of the election process. Typically, large numbers of both international and
local staff will be required, and recruitment of translators, interpreters, and drivers
can constitute a special challenge. The day-to-day management of field staff and
the protection of their well being is a major responsibility. Supporting them may
involve ensuring that prompt answers are provided to queries that have been
raised with headquarters; monitoring the use of resources in the field; investigating
particular problems that have arisen in the field; inspecting field offices; and
holding meetings with field staff. When field staff are deployed in high risk
environments, their management also will involve making appropriate security
arrangements, a process that typically will involve the military component (see
paragraph 8a[1] and Part III, Section 2, paragraph 3).
f. Computerization of Registration, Procedures, and Results
The computerization function could involve a number of different tasks, depending
on the nature of the mission. At its lowest level, it would involve no more than
automating the office of the electoral component. Where an election is being
organized, supervised, or verified, however, functions that might require some
computerization could include:
• voter registration (including production of voters lists);
• constituency delimitation;
• logistical arrangements;
• compilation of election results;
• maintenance of a database of polling officials;
• forms design (including design of ballot papers);
• compilation and analysis of reports from observers; and
• management of the resources of the electoral component.
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The electoral component also might be required to verify the proper functioning
and administration of computerized systems being used by the electoral authorities
of the host state.
g. Logistical Support
This function is likely to encompass:
h. Liaison
Part II, Section 5, paragraph 5
• the preparation of a plan for the staffing or observation of
voter registration points or polling stations;
• the determination of the locations of voter registration points
or polling stations;
• the identification of requirements for premises such as counting
centers and warehouses, and liaison with those components
of the mission responsible for obtaining and securing
such premises;
• the identification of vehicle requirements;
• the planning and execution of the distribution of forms and
materials;
• the planning of the movement of forms and materials during
and after polling;
• the planning of the movements and logistical support of
international staff;
• the development of a plan for security and possible evacuation
of staff; and,
• the development of a communications plan.
In most supervision and verification missions there is probably a need for
extensive liaison with electoral authorities of the host state. In some cases it might
be necessary or desirable to establish a dedicated unit within the electoral
component to liaise with those authorities. This might be the case, for example,
if the authorities themselves requested the establishment of such a unit, or if there
were perceived benefits in channeling communication with the authorities
through a particular route.
Where the mandate of the mission involves supporting the activities of NGOs,
this function is likely to predominate. Even in other sorts of missions, however,
there may well be a need for NGO liaison, either because specific NGOs are active
in the field, have resources that could be coordinated usefully, or are in a position
to influence perceptions of the effectiveness of the mission. The types of
arrangements that may be made with NGOs will vary according to the circumstances
of each mission.
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Part II, Section 5, paragraph 5
i. Operations Room
In observation and verification missions, information is at a premium during and
immediately after the polling period. To enable a prompt verdict on the validity
of the election process, it may be necessary to have a dedicated operations room
performing functions such as:
• gathering, collating, and analyzing information on events in
the field;
• monitoring complaints from participants in the electoral
process and, where necessary, instigating investigations;
• managing on a centralized basis the activities of observers or
field staff; and
• handling urgent security matters.
Depending on the nature of the mission, military and/or CIVPOL involvement in
the running of the operations room might be desirable or necessary.
j. Handling Information
The voting public and parties involved require information on the conditions and
procedures for the election. Electoral staff, UN elements, and host nation officials
need to be kept informed on the progress and outcome of the election and the
progress of its preceding arrangements. Depending on the nature of the mission,
functions to be performed in the area of electoral information could include:
• providing information on the electoral activities of the mission to
the public, the media, and participants in the electoral process;
• in the case of a supervision or verification mission, monitoring
the public information activities of the responsible authorities
to ensure that they are effective, unbiased, and
appropriate in the circumstances;
• preparing reports, information pamphlets, posters, and other
information materials for publication;
• devising and implementing public awareness activities;
• designing and coordinating advertising campaigns;
• coordinating the dissemination of information throughout
the component’s structures—particularly throughout any
field structures—by the publication of an in-house newsletter
or by other appropriate means;
• overseeing the activities of field staff in the area of information
and providing them with assistance as necessary; and
• where the mission also has a separate information component,
liaising with that component to ensure that messages
being given out are consistent and effective.
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The provision of accurate and unbiased information is particularly important as
a means of preserving the credibility of an electoral process in situations where
some of the parties may be lukewarm in their support of, or even openly hostile
to, the peace support mission. In some cases, establishing a radio station has been
a particularly effective way of communicating directly with the populace.
k. Voter Education
Tasks that could arise in the area of voter education include:
• reviewing any previous research relating to voter education
undertaken in the host state;
• examining and evaluating voter education programs undertaken
by electoral authorities, NGOs, etc.;
• developing, producing, and distributing electoral education
curriculum and promotional materials; and
• providing training on educational techniques to staff engaging
in voter education.
In addition, in the case of a supervision or verification mission, tasks could
include:
• liaising directly with the electoral authority staff responsible
for voter education;
• examining and evaluating proposed strategies and plans for
voter education programs at the central level; and
• monitoring the implementation of voter education programs.
Voter education is seen as particularly important in transitional situations,
especially in developing countries, where democratic processes may be unfamiliar.
l. Complaints and Electoral Law Enforcement
Activities that fall under this heading often include:
Part II, Section 5, paragraph 5
• devising or reviewing penal provisions of electoral legislation
and codes of conduct and recommending amendments as
necessary;
• establishing procedures for monitoring and handling complaints
regarding implementing and enforcing the electoral
law and code of conduct;
• establishing procedures for ensuring or monitoring the exercise
of rights critical to the electoral process;
• establishing a framework within which campaigning can
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Part II, Section 5, paragraph 5
m. Party and Candidate Registration
take place safely (which may include time tabling of political
meetings, and in extreme cases, providing security to enable
candidates or political activists to enter hostile territory);
• investigating complaints regarding alleged breaches of human
rights, the electoral law or code of conduct, and reporting
on the outcome of such investigations;
• overseeing investigations conducted by field staff and providing
them with assistance as necessary; and
• liaising with relevant legal structures established by the host state.
Task that fall under this heading included:
• devising procedures for implementing legal provisions relating
to party and candidate registration;
• providing advice to political parties and candidates seeking
registration on their legal rights and obligations, and on
procedures that have been devised;
• applying any legally required tests to determine whether a
party is eligible for registration;
• preparing analyses of applications for registration and advice
for the officer authorized to grant registration on whether
a particular party should not be registered;
• preparing any required legal documents and instruments; and
• maintaining the register of political parties.
In a supervision or verification mission, the functions just described normally
would be undertaken by the electoral authorities of the host state, but in that case
there might be a need for examination of how those functions are being
performed, particularly in cases where administrative discretion could be used.
n. Media
Where access to the media is an important element of the fairness of an electoral
process, a mission may be required to:
• establish procedures for monitoring the implementation of
any relevant legislation governing media access;
• devise guidelines for access to media on an equitable basis;
• monitor the output of the various relevant media;
• monitor and investigate complaints from participants in the
electoral process relating to media; and,
• prepare reports on the media’s handling of political and
electoral issues.
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Part II, Section 5, paragraphs 5-7
o. Finances
If the legal framework of an election being organized, supervised, or verified
contains provisions either restraining aspects of political financing or requiring
disclosure of relevant financial transactions, the electoral component may be
called upon either to administer such arrangements or to monitor their administration
by the authorities of the host state. A related function, which also may have
to be performed by the electoral component, is to ensure that state resources are
not used to benefit a political party.
6. Composition of an Electoral Component
There is no standard structure for an electoral component; its composition depends
on its mission and mandate. Functions that are electoral also may be performed by the
UN’s Information Component, which deals with the dissemination of electoral information;
the Military Component, which provides election-related logistics and security; and
the Human Rights Component, which may investigate the election-related human rights
violations. In addition, some functions may be contracted out to private companies,
particularly computing. The allocation of functions to the various parts of the electoral
component will depend on the priorities within the mission and is likely to be influenced
by political factors, including the need for maintaining an identity that can be separated
from that of the general mission.
7. Planning
a. During Negotiations
Some aspects of an electoral process will be so politically important and
controversial that they will have to be resolved before an overall agreement
between the disputants can be reached. It is important for the UN to ensure that
issues that only can be resolved by the contending parties are properly addressed
and that what is agreed to is feasible. There are also mechanisms that can be
introduced during the development of an agreement to encourage participation by
political disputants who might otherwise not take part in the electoral process. For
example, seats may be reserved for specified minorities that might not otherwise
succeed in gaining representation; positions in the executive government may be
guaranteed to parties that gain a specified percentage of the vote; or a special
majority in a constituent assembly, for example two-thirds, may be made a
requirement for the adoption of a constitution.
b. Pre-Mission Planning
An electoral survey mission may define a broad operational plan for the electoral
process and a budget that is sufficiently detailed for Security Council endorsement.
There have been problems with the exclusive use of survey mission results;
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Part II, Section 5, paragraphs 7-8
it is the antithesis of integrated planning, excluding the other elements of the
mission, even the military. Due to the swift and superficial nature of a survey
mission, it may reach crucially misleading conclusions. The UN Department of
Peace-keeping Operations is seeking to address this weakness through the
development of a Survey Mission Handbook.
c. Planning During the Mission
No matter how well a mission performs its task, there still will be detailed
planning required in the course of events. The “Project Management” technique
is best for operations such as elections that have defined objectives, inflexible
deadlines, and multidisciplinary input.
8. Coordinating with the Military Elements
a. Military Support
Support for the electoral process from the UN military component is required (see
Part III, Section 2, paragraph 3) in two key areas:
(1) Security
The electoral component will have an interest in ensuring the security
of its own staff and, at election time, that of voters. It therefore will
require advice on security issues, based on up-to-date information
about the situation on the ground, and also will look to the military
component for the provision of physical security. In addition, the
military component may be tasked to secure sensitive ballot materials
and keep all ballot boxes under military guard.
(2) Logistics
b. Coordination
Elections are demanding logistic operations, and only the military
component has the expertise and the resources—particularly in the
areas of transport and storage—required to bring them to a successful
conclusion. There often will be a need for the movement of large
quantities of election materials and large numbers of personnel. A
joint military and electoral working group may be established before
the election for logistic planning.
The nature of the command and control arrangements for the electoral side of a
mission will depend on its nature and the extent of interelement integration. The
scale of an election operation will require full mobilization of the resources of a
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Part II, Section 5, paragraph 8
UN mission at election time, when it is hoped that integration between the
electoral and military components has been successful. The military’s command
and control arrangements generally form the backbone of the plan at election
time. At local level Joint Operations Centers, headed by sector commanders,
become the focal points for all communications and decisionmaking relating to
the election process. In the host nation capital, an Election Support Coordination
Center may be established within the Military Operations Branch, with electoral
component representation acting as the focal point for all incoming and outgoing
communications.
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PART II: EMERGENCY RESPONSE, RECOVERY, AND AID
SECTION 6
NONGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
1. Nongovernmental Organizations
In most humanitarian emergencies and PSOs, NGOs form an essential part of the
response community. The last 10 years have seen NGOs emerge as a favorite channel for
emergency funding by donor governments and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).
This had led to the rapid growth of particular NGOs and to the proliferation of this type
of organization in emergency situations.
The NGO sector is extremely diverse and includes thousands of very different
organizations—differentiated by size, maturity, expertise, quality, and mission—which
makes it difficult, even hazardous, to generalize about NGOs. Most of the observations
in this chapter are made with particular reference to the few very large international
NGOs (10 U.S. NGOs and 20 European Union NGOs) that handle an estimated 75
percent of NGO emergency aid. However, where possible, the chapter also recognizes the
many smaller NGOs who operate in today’s humanitarian emergencies.
PSOs are likely to encounter both large and small NGOs, but will probably have more
dealings with the former. In most emergencies, NGOs will be found managing a wide
variety of field operations, including food distribution; emergency health; transport and
logistics; family tracing for separated children; agricultural rehabilitation; and water and
infrastructure repair programs. To manage these programs they usually will maintain
offices and staff in the national capital and at regional and at field levels.
2. Terminology
“NGO” is an official term used in the United Nations Charter (Article 71) to describe
a wide range of primarily nonprofit organizations motivated by humanitarian and
religious values, and that are usually independent of government, UN, and commercial
sectors. Its French and Spanish equivalents form the acronym ONG, but in the United
States, the terms PVO (private voluntary organization) and VOLAG (voluntary agency)
are still sometimes used to describe the same spectrum of organizations. An NGO can
range in size from a small soup kitchen to a multinational health or food distribution
agency, with its headquarters in London, Paris, or New York and an annual budget of
many millions of dollars.
NGOs are legally different from UN agencies, the ICRC, the IOM, and national Red
Cross/Crescent Societies. NGOs form themselves and write their own charter and
mission. In contrast, UN and Red Cross agencies were formed and operate under
international or national government mandates, conventions, and legislation (see Part II,
Section 3, paragraphs 1-2, and Section 7, paragraphs 1-2 and 8). UN agencies and the
ICRC are therefore strictly international organizations or IGOs. NGOs are not set up by
governments, although they may be recognized by them and enter into particular
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Part II, Section 6, paragraphs 2-3
contracts with them. Instead, NGOs are set up and operated by private individuals each
with its own mission and charter.
3. Recent History: The Growth and Proliferation of NGOs
Although overall levels of overseas development funds have remained frozen or
decreased in recent years, the proportion directed specifically toward humanitarian
assistance has increased. In 1993, emergency aid accounted for around 10 percent of
overseas development assistance and totaled around $5.0 billion. An additional $5.6
billion was spent on UN peacekeeping. 1
a. Organization of Choice
An estimated 60 percent of this emergency aid is channeled through NGOs.
Changing political commitment in many western governments has minimized the
role of the state and increased the role of the private sector and civil society. NGOs
therefore have become the main beneficiaries of the privatization of development
and humanitarian aid, and often are the organization of choice for many western
donors in their aid funding strategies. NGOs are now much bigger than they were
10 years ago and there are many more of them. NGOs have become fashionable
and its sector has proliferated enormously in recent years. 2
There are five main reasons why NGOs have received increasing funding in
recent emergencies:
(1) In many complex political emergencies, dominated by host-government
breakdown and intrastate conflict, western governments have
found it impossible or politically unacceptable to fund national institutions.
(2) NGOs are thought to have more effective “reach.” They can get aid
through faster and more effectively than larger bilateral or multilateral
organizations because they are often already operational at the community
level in the country concerned.
(3) Western governments and the European Union take pride in their
national NGOs and have developed close working relationships with
them.
(4) NGO operations often attract publicity. Donor governments therefore
consider them to be a good way of making their aid visible.
(5) NGOs offer donors good value for money. NGO operations are still
relatively cheap compared to military operations and UN agency
programs.
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Part II, Section 6, paragraph 3
b. NGO Growth
The subsequent growth of NGO operations has been significant. For example, the
percentage of British food aid distributed through NGOs in 1988 was 39 percent.
By 1990 this figure had risen to 94 percent. 3 The trend is the same for many major
western donors and NGOs. While NGO growth has been accompanied by an
increasing professionalism, it also has brought problems:
(1) The comparative advantage of NGOs is their relatively small size and
independence. Rapid growth in size may stretch them beyond their
optimal effectiveness as flexible, fast moving organizations. Some of
the larger NGOs are becoming increasingly complex international
organizations.
(2) Because some large NGOs are dependent on government funding in
humanitarian emergencies, there is a big question as to how genuinely
nongovernmental they are. Even if NGOs still have the freedom to
design and manage programs in their own style, there is an increasing
concern that they are now “donor-led” and inevitably associated with
the policies of the powerful member states of the international community.
In complex emergencies, this perception of NGOs as the
instruments of international policy has made them the targets of the
factions involved.
c. NGO Proliferation
NGO proliferation has a serious downside. The enormous rise in the number of
humanitarian NGOs can be a major contributing factor to the confusion of the
early stages of any humanitarian emergency.
In most emergencies, the main NGO players will be numbered in tens rather than
hundreds. However, in extreme and dramatic complex emergencies, NGOs can
number in the hundreds. At the height of the relief operations in Rwanda for
example, there were some two hundred NGOs, and it has been estimated that there
were around eight hundred NGOs operating in Haiti at the peak of Operation
Uphold Democracy. Such NGO overcrowding and overcapacity has the following
results:
(1) It can deter more experienced and expert NGOs from intervening in a
situation that they see as too confused.
(2) It increases competition among NGOs and raises the urgency to
publicize their relief operations. In today’s emergency, an NGO has to
be seen to be humanitarian. Visibility and media coverage are therefore
a major priority for all NGOs.
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Part II, Section 6, paragraphs 3-5
(3) Coordination becomes extremely difficult and time-consuming.
(4) The quality of NGO operations is not easily monitored and regulated.
4. Mission and Values
Most NGOs have humanitarian aims that drive their work. These might range from
a general remit to “alleviate poverty” to a specific mission to “support health care services
in communities affected by conflict,” or to support child welfare in a specified country.
An NGO’s mission is usually underwritten by values or principles that guide their
conduct. Such values might include:
• “working with the full participation of the community,”
• “assisting people irrespective of race and religion,”
• “paying special attention to the needs of women.”
Many NGOs express their mission and values in terms of human rights, emphasizing
that their work promotes rights to life, food, water, health, freedom of expression, etc. The
mission and values of an NGO usually are embodied in some form of organizational
charter that is recognized by state authorities in the NGO’s country of origin, the UN, and
government authorities in countries where they work.
5. The NGO Sector
The NGO sector falls between the government sector and the commercial sector, and
is referred to as the “third sector.” It is characterized by its great diversity comprising a
mass of different sized organizations with various management structures and diverse
missions. Nevertheless, within the sector as a whole, NGOs can be characterized into the
following groups:
a. International NGOs
There are now over 4000 development NGOs in OECD countries alone whose
main mission is to work overseas. 4 The OECD refers to those NGOs that work in
more than three countries as INGOs.
While most are not primarily emergency organizations, many will mount emergency
operations if the need arises in or beyond their normal program areas.
Organizations like Save the Children, CARE, and Médiçins Sans Frontières
(MSF) are examples of INGOs with a strong specialty in emergency programs.
b. Multinational INGOs
Many INGOs now have sister organizations in countries around the world and an
international umbrella organization that represents them as a whole. A multina-
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tional structure is increasingly important to INGOs if they are to influence the
institutions of the international community and raise funds from them in a
concerted fashion. For example, Save the Children has 21 sister organizations
(Save the Children Sweden, U.S., Australia, Japan, Tunisia, etc.), which form the
International Save the Children Alliance (ISCA) based in Geneva. MSF, CARE,
and Oxfam all have similarly multinational structures.
Religious NGOs also may have a similar international and supranational structure.
Catholic INGOs are represented by CARITAS in Geneva, and national
branches of World Vision come together as World Vision International (WVI) in
California and Geneva. In contrast, there are many smaller INGOs that do not
have sister organizations and supranational structures. These might work out of
a single northern headquarters and only have projects in one or two countries
worldwide.
c. Coordinating Organizations
There are many coordinating bodies for international NGOs. In the United States,
InterAction is a membership organization that represents U.S. international
NGOs. In Europe, international NGOs have formed coordinating organizations
on particular issues. For example, EURONAID is made up of European NGOs
working with food aid and food security and is based in The Hague. The
International Council for Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) is the main global NGO
coordinating body with NGO members from all parts of the world and is based
in Geneva.
d. National NGOs
Part II, Section 6, paragraph 5
Beyond the OECD countries, there are an estimated 20,000 other NGOs that often
work as the operational partners of INGOs or international development donors
and UN agencies. 5 These national NGOs also are known as local NGOs as
opposed to international NGOs. The majority of these organizations are not
primarily emergency organizations but mount emergency operations if appropriate.
e. Community-Based Organizations and Grassroots Organizations
In addition to the larger, formally constituted NGOs, there is a wide range of
smaller community institutions and social organizations that fall within the term
NGO. These are often described as community-based organizations (CBOs),
grassroots organizations (GROs), or people’s organizations (POs).
Essentially, these are popular membership organizations like cooperatives,
parish associations, mosque committees, women’s groups, neighborhood associations,
disability groups, peasant associations, and workers’ organizations.
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Part II, Section 6, paragraph 5
Their objectives are social action and representation; in emergencies they can be
important community representatives, essential for liaison and effective relief
planning and management.
f. First and Second Generation NGOs
Some NGOs have more experience than others, and each humanitarian crisis
generates new NGOs organized especially for that emergency. NGOs are
distinguished by their history and experience. Their degree of organizational
development is an important factor to be considered when dealing with them.
In every humanitarian emergency, there will be a mixture of older “first generation”
NGOs that have preexisted the crisis, and brand new “second generation”
NGOs who have been born out of this particular crisis with no previous
experience of other humanitarian operations. 6
(1) First Generation
Older first generation NGOs like Save the Children (1919), Oxfam
(1943), CARE (1945) and MSF (1964) are different from the NGOs
that spring up in every new crisis. “First generation” NGOs may have
experience of other humanitarian emergencies, a long history of
working in the countries concerned, and sophisticated working relationships
with the relevant donor organizations, UN agencies, and the
media.
(2) Second Generation NGOs
Organizational experience and professionalism do not necessarily
make first generation NGOs more effective than second generation
NGOs. New NGOs can be inspired by people who have extensive
experience of the country and the affected population. The small scale
of their operation and lack of bureaucratic structure may allow them
to take risks and move faster than larger NGOs. However, these new
NGOs can be a liability when their passion and enthusiasm is unseasoned
by experience. “Mercy missions” to threatened communities
become a serious problem to wider aid coordination strategies that
demand UN security forces and media attention disproportionate to
the small scale of their activities. Some of these new NGOs develop
into larger organizations with programs beyond the emergency in
which they were founded. But others do not last as long, and despite
great publicity may only mount a few quick convoys or send one or
two flights of supplies. These short lived NGOs are known as “Come
N’Gos.”
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Part II, Section 6, paragraph 5
g. Nonpolitical and Political NGOs
Many NGOs value the importance of being nonpolitical as an essential part of
their mission and of the impartiality that is at the heart of traditional humanitarianism.
Their mission therefore will concern the improvement of particular
humanitarian needs irrespective of people’s politics or race.
In contrast to nonpolitical groups, some NGOs view a particular political stance
as an inevitable and essential part of working for social justice, and so reject the
idea of impartiality in favor of solidarity. This may involve taking the side of a
particular social group or an especially vulnerable section of society; or a
commitment to the self-determination of a particular people may be at the heart
of an NGO’s mission. This kind of position also can be taken by mainstream
NGOs in certain situations, but is more common to solidarity groups and “single
issue” NGOs.
Solidarity groups can be a particular feature of the complex political emergencies
in which PSOs are likely to operate, and where ethnic or factional conflict is a
factor of the humanitarian crisis. In these situations, the partiality of such NGOs
may be in stark contrast to the impartial mandate of the PSO. Cooperation with
such groups may compromise the political credibility of the PSO mission. PSO
personnel should be well-briefed on the particular missions of different NGOs,
and NGO and other PSO staff should clarify their respective positions to one
another.
h. Religious NGOs
The NGO sector is broadly divided between NGOs who have a primarily secular
mission and values, and others that have an essentially religious mission and
values.
Many NGOs—both large and small as well as international and local—grow out
of a religious conviction and represent the practical dimension of religious
movements and their faith. All mainstream religions have NGOs of some
description working to improve people’s quality of life by providing relief in
times of crisis and emergency. There are Christian, Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, and
Jewish NGOs; there are also religious CBOs and GROs organized around
mosques, churches, temples, and religious schools. In many cultures these
religious centers and their leaders still represent an important focal point and
source of leadership for the community.
Denominational Differences: Within each religion there are further distinctions
as different NGOs represent different denominations. For example, among the
large international Christian NGOs there are Catholic NGOs (e.g., Catholic
Relief Services—CRS), mainstream Protestant NGOs (Lutheran World Federa-
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Part II, Section 6, paragraphs 5-6
tion—LWF), and interdenominational NGOs (World Vision). These INGOs
often work with local religious NGOs that share their denominational perspective,
although this may not be possible if the predominant religion of the mission
area is different from that of the NGO. Different denominational NGOs are
similarly represented in the NGOs of the other world religions.
Proselytizing NGOs: A major area of disagreement among religious NGOs—
from whatever religion or denomination—is how much they proselytize and seek
to convert people as part of their humanitarian mission. Nonproselytizing NGOs
see their humanitarian mission being concerned with physical, material, and
social improvements to people’s lives. They view such a mission as a sign of faith
in action that bears witness to their God, but does not impose belief. In contrast,
proselytizing NGOs regard the spiritual conversion of the communities they work
with as being as important as any response to physical suffering. For these NGOs,
a missionary purpose goes hand-in-hand with relief objectives, and the totality of
their mission is not fulfilled until people have turned to their particular faith.
It important to know which NGOs have a proselytizing mission and which do not.
This will help to understand the differences that often arise between religious
NGOs. Nonproselytizing religious NGOs and secular NGOs often seek to
distance themselves from proselytizing NGOs and are reluctant to cooperate with
them. Sometimes they will not even attend the same meetings.
6. NGO Operations in Emergencies
a. Legal Status
(1) With governments: In most emergencies where the national government
is still functioning effectively, NGOs are required to enter into
legal agreement with that government before they operate in-country.
Such agreement usually takes the form of official registration with,
and accountability to, a particular government ministry. In most cases,
such agreements embody contracts of technical cooperation in sectors
like health or agriculture. NGOs therefore will have legal status as
partners of the ministry of health, the ministry of agriculture, or other
technical ministries. In many countries, however, separate ministries
are set up to manage relief operations. This ministry then usually takes
primary responsibility for NGO coordination and registration and will
often be a co-signatory to any NGO’s agreement with a technical line
ministry. For example, an NGO implementing emergency health
programs may operate under a joint contract with the relief ministry
and the ministry of health and be answerable to both. In some
countries, responsibility for a national emergency is taken directly by
the office of the head of state. In such circumstances, NGOs may be
required to register directly with the office of the president or prime
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minister. An increasing number of emergency-prone countries are
taking steps to introduce more rigorous legislation to govern the
conduct of international and national NGOs. Such legislation seeks to
make NGO registration a more thorough process and to ensure that
NGOs are more financially and operationally accountable to government.
(2) With the United Nations: Many NGOs also operate in association with
UN agencies. In refugee emergencies, for example, UNHCR tends to
contract NGOs to implement health, feeding, or transport programs at
camp level. These NGOs will operate in line with legal agreements,
identifying them as partners of UN agencies in an emergency. Such
agreements often run in tandem with government agreements, and
NGO contracts are very often signed as tripartite agreements between
the NGO, national government, and UN agency.
(3) Failed states: In political emergencies where effective government
has collapsed, NGO registration can be effectively nonexistent. In
these situations, NGOs operate on the legal basis of their contracts and
agreements with UN agencies, or independently as sole operators
negotiating access and programs autonomously of UN auspices. Such
independent operators can be a particular concern to PSO personnel.
With no official links to the main relief operation, they may not abide
by the agreed security arrangements of the PSO. At times, therefore,
PSO personnel may need to distance themselves from autonomous
NGO operators to prevent the wider operation being brought into
disrepute with one side or another. At other times, however, NGOs
also may call for help from PSO forces, which can complicate and
even compromise the work of PSO personnel (see paragraph 11a).
b. Program Types
Part II, Section 6, paragraph 6
The wide variety of humanitarian emergencies requires NGOs to run programs
that reflect the needs and diversity of each situation. The most common NGO
operations will include
• famine early warning;
• food supply and distribution;
• emergency feeding;
• water and sanitation;
• public health programs (immunization, disease monitoring
and control);
• curative health programs (clinics, inpatient services, etc.);
• human rights monitoring and reporting;
• conflict early warning;
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Part II, Section 6, paragraph 6
• conflict prevention;
• peace building and conflict resolution;
• family tracing and the reunification of separated children;
• psychosocial care;
• the rehabilitation of agriculture (seeds and tools);
• income generating (cash grants and loans);
• educational activities (school books, buildings, and teacher
training); and
• the reconstruction of civil society and civic institutions.
Single Sector Expertise: Some NGOs have specific areas of expertise. They
might concentrate on a single issue in emergency health care, food distribution,
family tracing, or conflict resolution. These NGOs can be described as NGOs
with a single sectoral expertise, working mainly in one field.
Multisectoral Expertise: many NGOs, particularly the larger ones, have developed
expertise in several fields and are willing to move into new areas of work
as and when the needs of the affected population demands. This means that a large
INGO, or a national NGO, might support a trucking fleet, a health program, a
famine early warning program, a conflict resolution project, and an income
generation scheme simultaneously in a single emergency.
c. Operational Style
NGOs operate in humanitarian emergencies in four main ways:
(1) Direct implementation: an INGO or local NGO recruits its own staff,
procures its own equipment, and manages all aspects of a program
itself. Some NGOs refer to this as “being operational.”
(2) Subcontracting: increasingly INGOs are being used as subcontractors
to the large bilateral donors or UN agencies that will give them funds
and responsibility to carry out particular relief tasks, notably largescale
food transportation and distribution. This can involve NGOs
“being operational” on a massive scale. For example, the U.S. INGO,
International Rescue Committee (IRC), was subcontracted in 1993 to
manage a $50 million program by USAID and UNHCR in Bosnia.
(3) Working through partners: INGOs or NGOs channel their emergency
funds and resources through a third party organization that acts as their
operational partner. These partner organizations might be a local
NGO, government ministry, CBO, or GRO that is best placed to
implement the program. In this case, the INGO or NGO takes the role
of donor, adviser, and monitor of the relief program but does not
implement it directly. This kind of partnership model is also usually
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a part of a longer-term development aim in which the INGO or NGO
wishes to “capacity build” local organizations.
(4) Staff secondment: Some INGOs work in humanitarian emergencies
by seconding members of their staff as advisers and technicians to
other operational organizations. These might be local NGOs, CBOs,
or GROs working at a grassroots level. But NGOs also second staff to
more strategic policy levels in government ministries and UN agencies
to advise and influence national or regional humanitarian policy.
7. Advocacy and Campaigning
a. Public Advocacy
Large NGOs (and some particularly vocal solidarity groups) speak out on behalf
of the people they are trying to help. Public advocacy through the media combined
with face-to-face lobbying of government and United Nations personnel is seen
as an essential part of their mission. There are three main reasons for this:
(1) Public advocacy draws both national and international attention and
resources to the emergency in question.
(2) NGOs realize that advocacy is an effective way of “scaling-up” the
impact of their organizations and extending their humanitarian influence
beyond their immediate projects. For example, an NGO may
have good reason to believe that a refugee population requires a better
food ration than it is currently receiving. But the NGO also realizes
that it alone cannot provide the extra food supplies. It then makes good
sense to lobby the relevant decisionmakers to increase the food ration.
If the NGO succeeds in changing the relevant policy and securing
more food, then it will have brought benefits to a much wider group
of people than its own immediate project community.
(3) NGOs make a priority of public advocacy through the media because
they themselves need publicity—it is the oxygen that sustains their
reputation, their fundraising, and their influence.
b. Importance of NGO Advocacy
Part II, Section 6, paragraphs 6-7
NGO advocacy is an essential part of the international community’s response to
humanitarian crises. All too often, it has taken an alliance between a committed
NGO “on the ground” and the media to force the issue of a humanitarian disaster
to the top of the international agenda.
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Part II, Section 6, paragraphs 7-8
It is essential for PSO personnel to recognize and respect the priority given to
advocacy by NGOs in many of today’s humanitarian emergencies. It is a vital part
of their mission of working with people who cannot speak up. On occasion, NGOs
will develop their advocacy into full-scale and well-orchestrated international
campaigns. Many of the large NGOs have highly skilled departments dedicated
to this purpose at their headquarters.
c. Campaigns Against the UN and PSOs
NGOs have frequently campaigned against what they consider to be the negligence,
incompetence, and misconduct of the international community and the
UN. In particular, human rights NGOs like Amnesty International, Africa Watch,
and African Rights make a priority of monitoring the performance of UN and
other peacekeeping operations. African Rights’ very serious criticisms of human
rights abuses by UN soldiers in Somalia is one example of this kind of campaign. 7
Sometimes, the objectives of NGO advocacy campaigns will coincide with the
concerns and interests of the UN personnel engaged in peace support operations.
Sometimes they will not. While respecting the rights of NGOs to mount advocacy
campaigns, UN military staff also should learn how to assess campaigns, check
the substance of their position, and counter them when necessary.
8. NGO Coordination and Liaison
The proliferation of NGOs in today’s emergencies (see paragraph 3c) means that
coordination and cooperation is becoming increasingly complicated, has sometimes
failed completely, and takes up an increasing amount of UN military personnel time.
NGOs have a reputation for resisting coordination and for asserting their independence
at all costs. But NGOs—particularly the large ones—can coordinate effectively with one
another and work closely together. However, they resist being badly coordinated by
others.
a. Inter-NGO Coordination
In many humanitarian emergencies, NGOs set up some form of formal or
informal system of inter-NGO coordination. NGOs consider coordination a
priority because of the need to
• allocate particular roles and responsibilities among themselves;
• avoid the duplication of effort and resources;
• share and exchange information, resources, and expertise;
• present a united front to government, donors, UN, and media;
and
• set common standards of good practice, pay, etc.
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PSO personnel should always make a point of working with NGOs’ own
coordinating mechanisms or within existing UN coordinating systems that are
working effectively. This is usually better than creating new mechanisms and
demanding that NGOs follow them—an approach that can cause animosity as
NGOs perceive a threat to their independence. However, if PSO personnel respect
NGO coordinating bodies, NGOs often will also respect separate PSO mechanisms
and take part in these, too, if they are seen as adding value to existing bodies.
In most emergencies, NGOs form some kind of independent NGO network. In the
early part of an emergency, these may be ad hoc forums. As the emergency
develops, the forums take on a more defined structure in the form of an NGO
umbrella group or consortium. The Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief
(ACBAR) in Afghanistan, CRDA in Ethiopia, LINK in Mozambique, and the
International NGO Consortium in Somalia are examples of such NGO coordination
bodies. Administrative costs are shared by NGOs or donors, and it is chaired
in rotation by different NGO directors in-country. Recently arrived PSO elements
should be aware that in countries with a long history of complex emergencies,
famine, or flood, such umbrella groups may have decades of experience and can
be extremely effective organizations. Very often, coordination groups will be set
up to mirror these field mechanisms at NGO headquarters in London, Brussels,
Geneva, Paris, or New York. At these meetings, headquarters desk officers for the
country in question will meet regularly with their counterparts from other NGOs.
NGO umbrella groups often will set up technical subcommittees. These might
include representatives from NGOs working in a particular sector like health,
water, conflict resolution, personal security, or food distribution. These subgroups
allow NGOs to discuss technical issues of common interest in more detail
and agree on matters of policy and good practice across their operations.
NGO umbrella groups are the most common channel for the NGO community as
a whole to cooperate and communicate with UN forces. UN military staff should
seek to attend NGO meetings as observers, use these forums to keep NGOs
informed of military plans and activities, and attend the relevant subgroups,
particularly those relating to security. In turn, military staff also should encourage
representatives from the NGO umbrella group to attend similar UN coordinating
groups. The development of good personal contacts in this way is crucial to
smooth working relationships between UN and NGO operations, and should be
a priority for any PSO.
b. Government Coordination of NGOs
Part II, Section 6, paragraph 8
In emergencies where the national government is still effective, the government
also will take steps to coordinate NGOs. Such steps will be more or less effective,
depending on the level of resources the government has at its disposal for such
coordination. In general, governments will seek to coordinate NGO activities as
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Part II, Section 6, paragraphs 8-9
a whole and sectorally via line ministries in health, agriculture, water and
sanitation, etc. The main mechanisms for this coordination tend to be meetings
that the relevant PSO personnel should seek to observe. Coordination usually will
operate at the central, regional, and district levels.
c. UN Agency Coordination of NGOs
In emergencies where UN agencies are taking a lead role (see Section 3), the UN
lead agency often will set up its own coordinating group for NGOs contracted to
its wider program. For example, in Bosnia and Tanzania, UNHCR has played a
lead role in NGO coordination; in South Sudan, all NGOs supporting Operation
Lifeline are coordinated by UNICEF and WFP; when DHA is coordinating an
emergency, DHA staff may take the lead in bringing together NGOs in a separate
UN-organized forum as in Angola.
Nevertheless, in all cases of UN coordination of NGOs, there will be NGOs that
refuse to operate under UN-agreed procedures and seek to remain independent.
Uncoordinated NGOs can become a diverting and risky factor in PSO programming,
and it is important that PSO personnel clarify the consequences of this
independent approach.
9. NGO Operational Strengths and Weaknesses
NGOs have particular operational advantages in humanitarian emergencies, and UN
military staff must be aware of their operational characteristics and comparative advantages
over government, UN, and military humanitarian operations. But it is also
important for the military staff to recognize the myths surrounding NGO effectiveness.
Western governments and NGOs themselves have an interest in overemphasizing NGO
strengths. The international news media need stories about humanitarian emergencies in
which individuals and organizations play the role of undisputed rescuer and hero. 8
NGOs—particularly international NGOs—have filled this role and will continue to do so
until it suits the media’s purpose to cast them in another part. This section looks at some
positive and negative characteristics of NGO operational style and the image that
surrounds them.
a. NGO Strengths
The following characteristics summarize the main strengths of the larger and/or
more professional NGOs in humanitarian emergencies, which UN military staff
should seek to maximize in their relations with the NGO sector:
(1) Independent and Nonpartisan
Operational independence and perceived impartiality are extremely
important to NGOs and play a major part in the rhetoric of their
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mission and values. Most NGOs aim to respond to emergencies purely
on the basis of the “humanitarian imperative” alone.
The same humanitarian imperative also requires them to be nonpartisan.
Their response is intended to be based on need alone, regardless
of race, religion, or nationality. Complete independence and impartiality
are seldom achieved in the complexity of many of today’s
political emergencies. Nevertheless, NGOs will maintain the principle
of these two positions at all costs because without them their
credibility would be severely depleted and their potential field of
operation drastically limited. Independence and impartiality have
been traditionally an NGO’s best form of protection in conflict related
emergencies, but these factors are increasingly difficult to assert and
an increasing number of NGO staff have been killed.
UN military personnel need to be aware of the importance of independence
and impartiality to NGO operational posture. On occasion, the
NGOs’ need to reassert these principles publicly may lead them to
distance themselves from the PSO and its operations. These principles
may even draw them into open confrontation with PSO staff and
policy. On the other hand, an NGO’s reputation for independence and
impartiality sometimes may allow PSO staff to extend relief supplies
into areas normally inaccessible to them or other UN agencies.
(2) Fast, Flexible, and Nonbureaucratic
Part II, Section 6, paragraph 9
NGOs frequently can move fast into and within any situation because
organizational authority and power is devolved to field level—the
person in charge on the ground makes many of the key operational
decisions.
Most NGOs (even the very large ones) are still essentially face-to-face
organizations and communication between field directors and top
headquarters executives can be fast and informal. Emergency operational
decisions may be made quickly and without committees or
undue bureaucratic procedures. Many of the large NGOs are also
flexible organizations and set no limit to the kind of operations they
will manage: if roads need repairing, they will hire engineers; if health
care is lacking, they will set up clinics; if public information is wanted,
they will start a radio station; and if money is required after a disaster,
they will start a small bank.
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Part II, Section 6, paragraph 9
(3) Radical and Experimental Risk-Taking
NGOs see their role as being at the cutting edge of humanitarian
operations. More than other aid organizations, they are ready to take
risks and to experiment—both in terms of security and new ideas.
Security: Some NGOs operate in situations considered too dangerous
by other organizations or mount cross-border operations behind the
lines of civil conflicts. For example, while UN staff were evacuated
from Somalia for a total of some 11 months in 1991, Save the Children
staff were evacuated for just seven days over the same period. 9
First in: as part of their role to draw world attention to a crisis situation,
NGOs often will be first into an emergency and so set a moral lead to
the rest of the international community, often alerting world opinion
by radical and dramatic gestures. For example, in 1984 Oxfam UK
purchased 10,000 tons of grain on the world market, hired a ship, and
sent it to Ethiopia to shame the world community into action. This
action was well beyond their usual scope of operations. More importantly,
however, NGOs are often already working in a country when
an emergency develops and have the advantage of several years
experience over other new arrivals.
Experimental: Much of what is now considered standard humanitarian
practice has been developed from innovative NGO programs—for
example, the provision of cash grants or loans in emergencies rather
than simple food or shelter supplies; the development of high energy
biscuits and special feeding programs in famines; sophisticated family
tracing programs; and new initiatives in community-based peace
initiatives.
(4) Well-Informed, Well-Connected, and Committed
NGOs with a history of experience in a country tend to have a depth
of contacts and a high level of commitment to a country and its various
communities. NGOs with this type of profile are likely to be:
• National NGOs indigenous to the conflict zone that are a part
of that society.
• INGOs whose history and experience in a given country is
highly developed, with national staff and extensive longterm
programs.
This can make certain NGOs particularly well-informed and give
them significant local knowledge and expertise. But it may also give
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them vested interests that are positive and negative factors in conflict.
For example, they may have a history of working with one group rather
than another, or may have a staff profile made up predominantly of one
political or social group. Nevertheless, a commitment to the grassroots
and the poor of any society puts them very close to the ground and
means that they are in touch with people experiencing the full horrors
of any emergency. Because of this, they are often in a unique position
within an international relief operation to gauge and relay people’s
feelings and priorities. With their history of commitment to a community
or country, local communities and local authorities also may be
more at ease in dealing with NGOs than with the more formal
organizations of the international community.
(5) Participatory and Capacity-Building
In emergencies, most NGOs seek to involve the maximum participation
of the communities they are assisting. This requires the mobilization
of community leaders and affected populations in the management
of relief operations. NGOs also focus their efforts on rebuilding
the capacity of existing community institutions (clinics, schools,
water supply systems, etc.) rather than replacing them with international
teams outright. This community-based approach is a key part of
NGO practice, and is associated with notions of partnership and
empowerment. This degree of delegation may give the impression that
the NGO is not in charge of its own programs. Simple decisions may
need consultation instead of a simple “yes” or “no” and the inevitable
delay may look as if the NGO is dodging responsibility. In cases where
these programs form part of the rehabilitation process and therefore
need to be coordinated, appropriate PSO liaison staff should ask to be
actively involved in the consultative process and accelerate it from
within.
(6) Long-Term Perspective
Part II, Section 6, paragraph 9
NGOs with a long history of commitment to a country and a developmental
way of working usually have a valuable long-term perspective
on any given crisis and its aftermath. Many of the larger NGOs
frequently work to five year strategic plans in-country. Their ability to
look forward beyond the immediate emergency phase can be an
extremely useful resource to PSO staff and should be respected and
utilized. These NGOs are likely to stay in country long after a PSO is
phased out. Their interests and those of the communities and organizations
they work with should be taken into account by PSO planners
and policymakers.
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Part II, Section 6, paragraph 9
(7) Reach
With the above characteristics, NGOs can be in a position to influence
the parts of an emergency with which other organizations cannot
engage. This attribute is referred to as “reach.” 10 NGOs often value
humanitarian principles over international sovereignty. This has enabled
them to pioneer, for example, cross-border operations. But, in
view of the range in size and quality of NGOs, this image can be an
oversimplified, over optimistic view of the sector as a whole and
should be treated with caution. An effective PSO unit may have more
community reach than some NGOs, and PSO staff will need to assess
NGO information on local conditions on a case-by-case basis.
b. NGO Weaknesses
(1) Uneven Quality
Some NGOs are better than others. The standard and quality of NGOs
working in any emergency is uneven. Some NGOs will have many of
the organizational strengths outlined above, others very few. Being an
NGO does not automatically make an organization a good NGO. The
success of much NGO advocacy, campaigning, and fundraising depends
on NGOs projecting the strengths described earlier. It is important
to check NGO rhetoric against performance, and make independent
assessments about each organization’s ability and credibility.
UN field staff should be in a position to assess the differing quality of
particular NGOs working in their area. Successful cooperation with
poor quality NGOs may need clearer operational directives, more
monitoring, and closer liaison.
(2) Self-Importance
Because of their high visibility in so many emergencies, some NGOs
may develop a sense of importance beyond their immediate impact. In
particular, many of the smaller NGOs can lose sight of the relative
unimportance of their particular operations in the wider canvas of
events. Absorbed in the urgency and priority of their own programs,
they may try to place unrealistic and dangerous demands on UN
military resources.
(3) Limited Perspective
Very few NGOs operate across the whole field of a humanitarian
emergency. As a result, few have an overview of the whole emergency.
Instead, most NGOs manage programs in particular geographi-
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cal areas and in particular technical sectors. Whereas a good NGO may
know a great deal of detail about conditions in their area, they may
know very little about conditions 20 or 100 miles away. NGO statements
about conditions in one area should not be allowed to influence
the UN’s wider planning trends and should always be cross-checked.
What may be right in one place may not be appropriate across the
whole emergency.
Some NGO staff may feel they understand more than they do about the
wider situation. Experienced NGO staff seldom will speculate about
what they do not know for certain. Inexperienced NGO staff sometimes
talk beyond their expertise, and the media are particularly good
at eliciting comment in this way and vesting it with the authority of a
news release.
(4) Competition
Within the community, individual NGOs are extremely competitive.
Each prides its performance and seeks to outshine its rivals in its
operational results and media coverage. NGOs gain kudos and profile
from working in the worst affected areas of an emergency, in the most
dangerous places, and in particularly high profile fields like emergency
feeding, transportation, water, and health. Such competition
can affect coordination—particularly in the initial division of responsibilities
in an emergency when NGOs compete for particular geographical
and sectoral roles.
(5) Fashion
The NGO community is prone to fashion. Fashionable programs may
be valuable and often prove innovative, but from time to time competing
NGOs feel they must be seen to be involved in fashionable
programs, particularly when donors are eager to fund them. In some
emergencies, particular types of program can become fashionable and
there can be a rush to become involved with them to the detriment of
more commonplace and perhaps more fundamental needs. Recent
examples include the new wave of psychosocial programs, family
tracing, and the current interest in conflict early warning and peacebuilding
initiatives. Overcapacity and duplication is the most obvious
result of such trends.
10. NGO Staff and Security
Part II, Section 6, paragraphs 9-10
Personnel in the NGO sector are characterized by their enormous variety, but it is
possible to identify some broad categories within the NGO culture. Many NGOs employ
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Part II, Section 6, paragraph 10
staff on short contracts of one, three, or six months. This high turnover of personnel—
which is mirrored in PSO staff turnover rates—can make it difficult for PSO and NGO
personnel to establish consistent rapport and good relations. There is often a succession
of new faces and long gaps between one person leaving and the arrival of a replacement.
In most emergencies, NGO staff can be divided into international and national staff,
often referred to as “expatriate” and “local staff.”
a. International Staff
Most expatriates are strongly committed to the mission and values of their
organization. They tend to be people sincerely seeking to make the world a better
place, with a strong sense of idealism that sometimes translates into strident
activism. At best, NGOs attract and cultivate extremely dedicated, pragmatic, and
effective operators. But in some cases, NGOs (like other relief agencies) attract
misfits, ill at ease within their own society, for whom humanitarian emergencies
offer a fantasy of overseas adventure.
Youth: Increasingly, NGO workers are relatively young with little previous
experience. In view of the growing number of hazardous humanitarian emergencies,
their energy, courage, and innovation are advantages, but their lack of
institutional memory, previous emergency experience, and political sophistication
may turn out to be serious disadvantages. But experience can come fast in
emergencies and idealism may soon be seasoned with operational pragmatism in
the field. The learning curve in emergencies is a very steep one. New staff are put
straight “in at the deep end,” with little formal emergency training or induction.
In recruiting for the NGO sector (particularly at the less professional end)
availability and enthusiasm can be more important factors than experience or
relevant skills. This may be in stark contrast to certain forces in a PSO, for whom
training and professionalism are highly valued.
Experienced Staff: While every emergency attracts NGO novices, it also has its
quota of hardy professionals who have been in several other emergencies. These
people know how NGOs work and are often extremely effective operators
managing large and complicated programs. In recent years, an increasing number
of ex-servicemen and women have started to join NGOs, finding it a good second
career move. This is particularly so in the large INGOs that now have a more
developed career structure. At present, ex-service personnel are found in NGO
logistics and demining operations, or as advisers on NGO personal security and
communications.
b. National Staff
Although it is the image of an international relief worker that dominates the
popular imagination, it is important to remember that the vast majority of NGO
personnel are national staff. It is national staff who do the bulk of the work in any
112

NGO and it is through them that NGOs develop their relative reach and
effectiveness in emergency programs.
Most national staff of national or international NGOs are motivated by the ideals
of their organization. But national staff are also part of the society and communities
affected by the emergency. This means they may have a more direct interest
in and commitment to the situation around them. It also can mean that they run much
greater risks of intimidation and violence from within the conflicting parties.
Key Information Sources: In reality, therefore, the greater part of NGO emergency
programs are managed by national staff, despite the high profile presence
of international staff. National staff are the key sources of information for and
advisers of international staff. This can put them at increased risk from pressure
and threats from within their own communities. It should be noted that the great
majority of relief workers killed in recent years have been national staff.
Sometimes it also can offer them an element of perceived international protection
from the conflict around them.
Attractive Wages: In most emergencies, NGOs soon become one of the best
paying employers in the crisis area, and this means that national staff in INGOs
in particular can become a local elite. This can separate them from their own
communities. It also means that many people are attracted to NGO jobs simply
for survival reasons, especially in the professional or middle class. The economic
impact of NGO recruitment should not be underrated.
c. NGO Personalities
Many of the smaller second generation NGOs—national or international—are
founded by particularly determined and dynamic individuals. Such people
already may be celebrities. NGOs therefore can be driven by the charisma and
energy of one individual, but these personalities can be difficult to deal with,
particularly when the media is covering this person’s activities and building him
or her up as a media story. Many of the world’s great NGOs (e.g. the Red Cross
and Save the Children) have been founded by such people and their vision. But
it is important for UN personnel to distinguish genuine and constructive vision
from opportunism in these personalities.
d. NGO Security
Part II, Section 6, paragraph 10
PSO personnel need to be aware of the way in which NGO staff and resources
make them obvious targets of violence and extortion. In areas where communications,
trade, and employment have totally broken down, NGOs easily become
the significant sources of hard currency and cash. In areas dominated by warlords,
NGOs can be perceived as important economic resource holders, and extortion
and protection rackets can evolve around them. In Somalia, for example, local
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Part II, Section 6, paragraphs 10-11
armed factions regarded the money and resources held by NGOs as far more
important than the humanitarian work they were trying to do. This led to excessive
salary scales, armed robbery, kidnapping for ransom, and the murder of NGO
staff over financial disputes.
In addition to the resources they hold, international and national NGO staff are
also vulnerable to attack on account of the political position they are perceived as
representing in any conflict. The nationality of particular international staff
members can put them at risk. An NGO also can be perceived as party to, and
implementors of, unpopular decisions and aid strategies of the international
community. Equally, local frustration with the international order can vent itself
by simply lashing out at the nearest apparent representative of that order—in
many cases a national or international NGO.
In recent years, many NGOs have taken steps to improve and standardize
procedures for their own security. Most of the large international NGOs now have
well-developed security manuals and guidelines governing the conduct of staff
in conflict emergencies. In several emergencies, NGOs also have hired their own
armed guards from local militia forces to protect staff and resources. In most
situations where a UN agency is taking a lead role, the UN also will instigate
security guidelines and procedures with which both large and small NGOs will
comply. Most NGOs keep security conditions under constant review at the field
level, and NGO coordination bodies also tend to have a subgroup that meets
regularly and is charged with security concerns. It should be noted that most NGO
and UN security guidelines are directed primarily toward the protection of
international staff. Equally secure and appropriate arrangements also should be
prioritized for national staff members of NGOs.
PSO personnel will need to familiarize themselves with particular NGO security
arrangements and influence them and redirect them as necessary. Where the
mandate of a PSO specifically involves the protection of humanitarian agencies,
PSO personnel obviously will be expected to take the lead role in setting and
maintaining NGO security guidelines.
11. Working Together: NGO/Military Relations
The art of military/NGO liaison and cooperation will need to be developed by all PSO
personnel to shape a pattern of creative working relationships between PSO forces and
NGOs (see Part IV, Section 2). Effective cooperation will have a major impact on the
success of an operation.
In emergencies, new relationships between civilian and military humanitarian
organizations have to be formed under intense pressure. The two organizational cultures
(military and NGO) are different and it is important that each group is aware of and
respects the distinctive style of the other. In general terms, the points of tension in the way
in which one side has perceived the other can be outlined as follows:
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Part II, Section 6, paragraph 11
a. NGOs on the Military
Recent comment on the military by NGOs and the civilian relief establishment
has been distinguished by mixed messages. This is unsurprising from such a
diverse community, but it also serves to illustrate the civilian dilemma with
military humanitarianism and PSOs. For example, in Somalia and Rwanda, some
NGOs called for and welcomed military involvement one moment and then later
criticized and distanced themselves from it. In broad terms, NGO concerns about
the military can be gathered under the following eight areas:
(1) Insensitive and Technically Inappropriate
NGOs have frequently criticized UN military staff as insensitive and
ill-informed, particularly on local conditions. Once the military role
goes beyond moving supplies and standing guard, it may be seen by
NGOs as a liability. They feel the military sledge hammer approach is
inappropriate for the many small nuts of today’s complex emergencies.
This criticism has been leveled especially at UN military efforts
relating to the reconstruction of civil society in the aftermath of
complex emergencies in Somalia and Cambodia. But military efforts
at food supply and distribution, emergency health care, and emergency
water systems also have met with justifiable NGO criticism on
technical grounds.
(2) Expense
A major concern voiced by NGOs is the relative expense of military
humanitarian interventions (as above in health, water, and transport)
when compared to NGO costs.
(3) Maintaining Distance
Association with military forces may be linked to a perceived loss of
NGO impartiality and makes NGOs wary of working closely with the
military. In most military interventions, there is a point where PSO
forces enter into direct conflict of some kind or become extremely
unpopular with the affected community, as in Somalia and the former
Yugoslavia. This may be the result of its being given an unworkable
mandate or when a national PSO force is seen to respond to a national
political agenda beyond UN resolutions. It may appear that the PSO
military have taken sides or made enemies. In these situations, NGOs
often fear that their efforts will fail by association with the PSO
military, and that their credibility and reputation will suffer serious
damage from the latter’s policy.
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Part II, Section 6, paragraph 11
In such circumstances, NGOs make great efforts to distance themselves
from the UN military, assert their independence, and argue
strongly for a definite delineation between the humanitarian and
politico-military agenda. They regard this as essential to their sense of
impartiality, their safety, and the preservation of long-term partnerships
with communities in the country in question. PSO personnel
need to be aware of the fact that sometimes NGOs do not want the
protection of PSO forces or even to be associated with them.
(4) Political Suspicion
NGOs often suspect the motives of PSO military contingents and their
operations. Increasing military humanitarian intervention is seen by
some international NGOs as a cynical development in international
realpolitik, whereby powerful member states of the international
community invest in domestically appealing telegenic intervention at
the expense of long-term political commitment.
Some NGOs fear that PSOs are sometimes used simply as a mechanism
to freeze and contain a situation until it is politically feasible to
withdraw. Similarly, they see rapid state-building and election monitoring
exercises as a means of quickly installing new friendly governments
without achieving lasting social and political transformation in
that society.
NGOs are also suspicious of a military lobby that is eager to find a new
role for military forces in humanitarian missions at a time when
conventional military budgets are being cut. Some of the larger
international NGOs have argued that western militaries in particular
have a vested interest in developing a new PSO role to protect their
forces from being scaled down.
(5) Cultural Differences
Personnel from the NGO community and UN military may originate
from different political and social backgrounds. Since the NGO
movement became radicalized in the 1960s, some staff continue to see
themselves as part of a movement for an alternative society, in
opposition to the establishment and status quo. Many relief workers
have ambivalent feelings about military forces as allies and partners.
In their eyes, uniforms and weapons are akin to the forces of reaction,
and they find it hard to accept that soldiers may be enlightened and
idealistic like themselves. There is also an element of admiration.
Relief workers value logistical skill, courage, and endurance that are
associated with the military. NGO staff also may find themselves in
116

awe of certain military technical capabilities and skills. There is
therefore a fascination with and a resistance to the military among
many NGO personnel that may account for some of the mixed
messages.
(6) Competition
UN military and NGO relations are jeopardized by turf issues. As the
beneficiaries of exponential growth in recent years, the NGO community
may fear that military and other PSO organizations are increasingly
becoming the organizations of choice for the international
community in complex emergencies. The military cannot take over
the day-to-day work of NGO relief agencies, but they may be taking
over an increasing share of the power, authority, and leadership for
humanitarian emergencies in the conflict area. (For example, the
organizational structure of UNOSOM II in Somalia, with its military
controlled decisionmaking structure, alarmed many NGOs and UN
agencies.) The UN military also has intruded in some of the traditional
media images of humanitarian emergencies attracting attention away
from NGO workers. This is a cause for concern for NGOs who need
publicity for fundraising and influence.
(7) Length of Commitment
A perceived difference between UN military and NGO communities
is in their approaches to time and success. As has been seen, many
NGOs have long-term commitments and investments in the countries
in which they work. This requires them to take a long view. Preservation
of their contacts, their credibility, their reputation, their staff, and
their infrastructure is vitally important to them. NGOs fear that
military aspects of PSOs are often managed with a short-term view
and very immediate (military style) goals to be achieved at all costs.
(8) Ends over Means
Part II, Section 6, paragraph 11
Many NGOs fear that the military are more concerned with the
objectives of a mission than with the process with which that mission
is achieved. This concentration on ends over means alarms NGOs,
which may have to live with the consequences of military approaches
that are culturally, socially, and politically unacceptable to the local
community.
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Part II, Section 6, paragraph 11
b. The Military on NGOs
It is equally important that the PSO military staff recognize the attitudes they
bring to their relationship with NGOs in PSOs. These might be characterized in
the following four concerns:
(1) Conflict of Media Styles
The military tend to recognize the important humanitarian work that
NGOs carry out and often describe them as gallant, dedicated, and
expert; but they have a tendency to be irritated by the theatrical manner
in which NGOs carry out their tasks. In particular, military staff can
find NGO advocacy hard to reconcile with their own professional
ethos. NGOs see the publicity and the media as assets to be solicited.
By contrast, the military’s training for warfare has given them a
tradition of secrecy and a view that the media should be controlled.
Although this ethos has been transformed in recent PSOs, remnants of
it still remain in some national forces.
(2) Different Management Styles
The independent and consultative style of NGO operations may
appear extremely muddled to a military mind concerned with command
structures, organization, hierarchy, and procedure. Sometimes
NGOs may be disorganized, but at other times the apparent muddle
may be a feature of their operational style. Military staff need to
remember that it is this organizational style and culture that gives
NGOs their strength and flexibility and allows people to feel that they
have a stake in them.
(3) Operational Liability
The activities of some NGOs may impinge upon the mission and
safety of PSO military units and staff in the conflict area. PSO leaders
have good reason to be concerned that uncoordinated NGOs working
in the conflict area can draw their forces into dangerous situations or
result in additional responsibilities for which there are no additional
assets. There is a feeling that some NGOs can generate extra tasks and
contribute to “mission creep” by demanding logistical support or
protection at short notice out of a situation of their own making.
(4) Two-Faced
In such situations, PSO personnel often have found certain independent
NGOs to be “two-faced”—criticizing PSO forces and distancing
118

12. NGO Code of Conduct
themselves from them at one moment, and then running to them for
help the next.
In the last two years, a number of international NGOs have teamed up with the IFRC
to produce a code of conduct for the NGO community in emergencies. To date, some 52
NGOs have signed up to the code, including many of the largest international NGOs. It
is hoped that eventually all NGOs will be able to agree to the code’s principles and abide
by them.
This is an attempt to standardize NGO operating principles and encourage the NGO
community to follow agreed procedures for emergency operations. It is also hoped that
donor governments will insist that any NGO they fund will sign up to and abide by the
code. The code is a useful guide to PSO personnel who should aim to respect it as a basis
for future cooperation. The code clarifies what military staff and others can expect from
the NGO community and will enhance transparency and cooperation in line with agreed
standards. A copy of the ten point code is attached at Annex 6.
Notes
Part II, Section 6, paragraphs 11-12
1
ActionAid, The Reality of Aid (London: 1994).
2
J. Borton et al., NGOs and Relief Operations: Trends and Policy Implications (London: ODI, 1994).
3
Ibid.
4
M. Edwards and D. Hulme, Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a Changing World
(London: Earthscan/Save the Children, 1992).
5
Ibid.
6
M. Duffield, An Account of Relief Operations in Bosnia Network Paper 3, Relief and Rehabilitation
Network, ODI (London: ODI, 1994).
7
African Rights, Somalia: Human Rights Abuses by the United Nations Forces (London: African
Rights, 1993).
8
J. Benthall, Disasters, Relief and the Media (London: I.B. Taurus, 1994).
9
H. Slim, and E. Visman “Evacuation, Intervention and Retaliation: UN Operations in Somalia 1991-
1993,” in J. Harris, The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (London: Pinter and Save the Children,
1995).
10
Borton, NGOs and Relief Operations.
Further Reading
Oxfam, The Oxfam Handbook for Development and Relief (Oxford and London:
Oxfam, 1995) especially Volume 2, Section 6 “Emergencies and Development,” 799-
976.
I. Smillie, The Alms Bazaar: Altruism Under Fire: Non-Profit Organizations and
International Development (London: IT Books, 1995).
M. Edwards and D. Hulme, Non-Governmental Organization’s Performance and
Accountability: Beyond the Magic Bullett (London: Earthscan and Save the Children,
1995).
M. Edwards and D. Hulme, Making a Difference: NGOs and Development in a
Changing World (London: Earthscan and Save the Children, 1992).
119

Part II, Section 6
J. Macrae and A. Zwi, War and Hunger: Rethinking International Responses to
Complex Emergencies (London: Zed and Save the Children, 1994).
J. Harriss, The Politics of Humanitarian Intervention (London: Pinter and Save the
Children, 1995).
J. Bennett, Meeting Needs: NGO Coordination in Practice (London: Earthscan,
1995).
J. Bennett, NGO Coordination at Field Level: A Handbook (Geneva: ICVA, 1995).
H. Slim, “The Continuing Metamorphosis of the Humanitarian Practitioner: Some
New Colours for an Endangered Chameleon,” Disasters 19, no. 2 (1995).
120

PART II: EMERGENCY RESPONSE, RECOVERY, AND AID
SECTION 7
INTERNATIONAL AND INTERGOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS
1. Introduction
THE INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS
ICRC was founded in 1863 by five citizens of Geneva as the “International
Committee for Relief to the Wounded.” This led to the creation of the National Red Cross
(and later Red Crescent) Societies and to the development of modern international
humanitarian law as first expressed in the Geneva Convention of 1864. While the
committee is Swiss, both its activities and the legal treaties that lay down its mandate are
international. The ICRC employs many who do not hold Swiss passports at its Geneva
headquarters and at its delegations abroad. It relies on the skills of local personnel and
closely involves the National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in its relief
operations.
As a compliment to Switzerland, the original organization adopted the red cross on
a white background, formed by reversing the federal colors of Switzerland. There are now
two symbols currently in use: the red cross and the red crescent both have the same
protective value. The emblem protects not only persons wounded in battle but also those
bringing them aid. It also protects all medical units, regardless of their status or
nationality. Both symbols should prompt combatants to show restraint and respect.
The ICRC is financed by voluntary contributions from governments (85 percent), the
National Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies (10 percent) and private sources (5
percent).
2. Organization
a. The ICRC, the National Societies and the Federation are independent bodies.
Each has its own individual status.
1) The ICRC
The ICRC, an independent humanitarian institution, is the founding
body of the movement. Acting as a neutral intermediary in the event
of armed conflict or disturbances, it seeks on its own initiative, or on
the basis of the Geneva Conventions and Protocols, to protect and
assist victims of international or noninternational armed conflict and
those affected by internal disturbances or tension.
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Part II, Section 7, paragraphs 2-3
2) The National Societies
In its own country, a national (Red Cross) society serves as an
auxiliary to the public authorities in humanitarian matters. Its primary
task is to back up the army medical services in time of conflict. To do
that, it has to prepare itself in peacetime. Each national society may
carry out specific activities such as collection of blood, training of
first-aid workers and nurses, running of dispensaries or hospitals, and
providing aid to the disabled, young people, and the elderly. Out of
169 recognized national societies (May 1996), 143 have adopted the
red cross as their emblem and 26 the red crescent.
3) The Federation
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
provides support for the humanitarian activities carried out by the
national societies on behalf of vulnerable groups. By coordinating
international relief operations in natural disaster situations and encouraging
development aid, it endeavors to prevent and alleviate
human suffering.
b. Cooperation with other Organizations
During the 1990s, the ICRC has found itself dealing with new players on what has
traditionally been its exclusive turf. Sometimes, its initial instinct has been to
resist what is seen as encroachment. But delegates on the ground and the
organization as a whole have recognized the need to cooperate with new
organizations in the interests of the victims. Cooperation is needed to ensure, for
example, that detainees do not suffer as a result of confusion and rivalry among
local authorities about which agencies are permitted to do what. By maintaining
relations with, for example, churches, human rights NGOs, and UN human rights
monitors, the ICRC hopes to identify complementary roles and to preserve the
special mandate entrusted to it by the Geneva Conventions.
The ICRC cooperates with many international organizations but insists on its
independence. Where other organizations operate in the same context, care is
taken to avoid duplication of effort and overlapping of activities through a process
of coordination that takes into account the mandate assigned to the ICRC by the
international community.
NGOs are becoming increasingly active in the humanitarian field of action. In its
own humanitarian activities, ICRC attaches importance to ensuring that NGOs
understand its approach and special role so as to foster cooperation and coordination
at the operational level.
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Part II, Section 7, paragraph 3
3. International Humanitarian Law (IHL)
The Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two additional Protocols of 1977 include
559 articles; 29 articles deal with noninternational armed conflicts.
a. The First Geneva Convention: concluded in 1864, concerned the improvement
of conditions for the wounded in armies in the field; the protection of military
personnel wounded on land was its starting point. This is now the concern of the
First Geneva Convention of 1949.
b. The Second Geneva Convention: after three disasters at sea (Lissa in 1866, Cuba
in 1898, Tsushima in 1905), governments adapted the humanitarian principles of
the First Geneva Convention to naval warfare. The Second Geneva Convention
of 1949 now concerns the protection of shipwrecked and of hospital ships.
c. The Third Geneva Convention: during World War I (1914-1918), only 17 articles
of the 1907 Hague Regulations governed the treatment of seven million prisoners
of war. This experience led to the Geneva Convention relative to the treatment of
prisoners of war, concluded in 1929, now the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.
d. The Forth Geneva Convention: introduced after World War II. Following a global
conflict that caused millions of civilian casualties, prisoners of war, shipwrecked,
and wounded, the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 took into account these
experiences and updated the international instruments of humanitarian law.
e. Common Article 3: another innovation in the four 1949 Geneva Conventions is
Common Article 3 that protects victims of noninternational armed conflicts. This
is an important text and according to the International Court of Justice, these rules
are the elementary considerations of humanity.
f. Additional Protocols of 1977: decolonization and the Vietnam War brought the
most recent step in the development of humanitarian codification in 1977, a
reaffirmation and development of the four 1949 Geneva Conventions with two
Additional Protocols:
• The First Protocol extends the protection of victims of
International Armed Conflicts, especially civilians against
hostilities.
• The Second Protocol develops and supplements Common
Article 3 of the four 1949 Conventions for the protection of
the growing number of victims of Non-International Armed
Conflicts. This is a very important albeit short instrument. Its
first case of application was in El Salvador.
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Part II, Section 7, paragraph 4
4. The Red Cross Fundamental Principles
In addition to International Humanitarian Law Treaties, the ICRC’s duty is to uphold
Seven Fundamental Principles, officially promulgated in 1965 at the Twentieth International
Conference of the Red Cross, Vienna. The principles are:
a. Humanity
The Red Cross, born of a desire to bring assistance to the wounded on the
battlefield, endeavors in its international and national capacity to prevent and
alleviate human suffering wherever it may be found. Its purpose is to protect life
and health and to ensure respect for the human being and promote mutual
understanding, friendship, cooperation, and lasting peace among all peoples.
b. Impartiality
The Red Cross movement makes no discrimination as to nationality, race,
religious beliefs, class, or political opinions. It endeavors to relieve the suffering
of individuals, guided solely by their needs, and to give priority to the most urgent
cases of distress.
c. Neutrality
To maintain the respect of all parties, the movement may not take sides in
hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious,
or ideological nature.
d. Independence
The Red Cross is independent. The national societies (of the Red Cross and Red
Crescent), while auxiliaries in the humanitarian services of their governments and
subject to the laws of their respective countries, must always maintain their
autonomy so that they may be able at all times to act in accordance with the
principles of the movement.
e. Voluntary Service
The Red Cross is a voluntary relief organization not prompted in any manner by
desire for gain.
f. Unity
There can be only one Red Cross or Red Crescent Society in any one country. It
must be open to all. It must carry on its humanitarian work throughout its territory.
124

Part II, Section 7, paragraphs 4-5
g. Universality
The Red Cross is a worldwide institution in which all societies have equal status
and share equal responsibilities and duties in helping each other worldwide.
5. Field Operations to Assist and Protect Victims
a. Legal Mandates in International Armed Conflicts
The following activities are mandated as shown:
(1) Visit and interview without witnesses prisoners of war (Article 126 of
the Third Convention) and detained or interned civilians (Articles 76
and 143 of the Fourth Convention);
(2) Provide aid to the populations of occupied territories (Articles 59 and
61 of the Fourth Convention);
(3) Search for missing persons and transmit family messages to prisoners
of war (Article 123 of the Third Convention) and to civilians (Article
140 of the Fourth Convention);
(4) Offer services for the establishment of hospital zones and localities
(Article 123 of the Third Convention) and security zones (Article 14
of the Fourth Convention);
(5) Receive requests for aid from protected persons (Article 30 of the
Fourth Convention);
(6) Exercise its right of initiative; this means that the ICRC may ask the
parties to a conflict to agree to its assuming other humanitarian
functions in the event of a noninternational armed conflict (Article 3
common to the four Geneva Conventions of 1949) and international
armed conflicts (Article 9 of the First, Second, and Third Conventions,
and Article 10 of the Fourth Convention).
b. Mandates in Noninternational Conflicts
In times of internal disturbances, which are not considered armed conflicts, the
ICRC has a “right of initiative” to offer its services based on its own statutes and
those of the International Red Cross. According to Common Article 3 of the 1949
Conventions, “the ICRC may offer its services to the parties to the conflict.” As
in noninternational armed conflicts, governments are free to accept or reject these
offers.
125

Part II, Section 7, paragraphs 5-6
c. Prisoners
ICRC delegates visit prisoners of war, civilian internees, and political detainees
in their places of detention and interview them without witnesses. Between 1990
and 1996 over half a million prisoners in over 60 countries were visited by ICRC
delegates. These visits have the twofold purpose of protecting the detainees by
preventing forced disappearances and by approaches to the authorities to improve,
when needed, their treatment, and in some cases distribution of relief.
Regardless of the legal regime in force, the ICRC submits to the authorities a set
of standard conditions for visits to detainees. Delegates must be allowed to:
• see all detainees falling within the ICRC’s mandate and have
access to all places where they are held;
• interview detainees of their choice without witnesses;
• draw up, during the visits, lists of detainees within the
ICRC’s mandate or receive from the authorities such lists
which the delegates may verify and if necessary complete;
• repeat visits to detainees of their choice as frequently as they
may feel necessary. The ICRC also endeavors to restore
contact between detainees and their families.
In order to guarantee acceptable living conditions for detainees, the ICRC
engages in a constructive dialogue with the detaining authorities, to which it
submits confidential reports.
d. Separated Families: Red Cross Message Service
Mass movements of people and widespread loss of contact between family
members as a result of conflict has greatly increased in the 1990s. The role of the
Red Cross movement in tracing and reestablishing family ties, including maintaining
or restoring contact with relatives separated by conflict or as a result of one
of them being detained, can make all the difference to victims. Speed in
forwarding messages and processing information is one of the ICRC’s primary
objectives.
6. Taking Action
a. Advocacy
ICRC strives to achieve its mandate by combining three approaches:
• achieving universal ratification by states to the instruments
of international humanitarian law;
• training and educating all concerned on the rules and prin-
126

. Implementation
ciples of those instruments; and
• implementing and enforcing those rules and principles in all
armed international and noninternational conflicts.
The Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I designate the governments
bound by the Geneva Conventions, the protecting powers, the ICRC, and the
United Nations as the agents for implementing international humanitarian law.
(1) Governments
Governments bound by the Geneva Conventions have the primary
responsibility for implementing international humanitarian law in
peacetime as in time of war, including “to respect and to ensure respect
for those treaties in all circumstances” (Common Article 1 to the 1949
Geneva Conventions).
Governments have a dual responsibility for their own behavior as a
party to a conflict or as a neutral country in time of conflict as well as
in war time, including for the prosecution of grave violations, and
ensuring respect for IHL by other states.
Governments discharge this responsibility by:
• diplomatic démarches;
• mobilizing member states;
• using public denunciations;
• using confidential procedures;
• bilateral coercive measures;
• measures decided by the Security Council; and
• supporting humanitarian efforts by the ICRC.
(2) The Protecting Powers
Part II, Section 7, paragraph 6
A protecting power is a state, neutral or nonparty to the conflict and
nominated by one party to the conflict and accepted by the opposing
party, that is prepared to undertake the task of safeguarding the
interests of the party to the conflict that nominated it. The protecting
powers are still useful in international conflicts. Their basic role is to
supervise the condition of prisoners of war and interned civilians,
parallel to ICRC’s activities in this domain.
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Part II, Section 7, paragraphs 6-7
(3) The ICRC
The specific role of the ICRC, in accordance with the 1949 Geneva
Conventions and the 1977 Protocols is, generally speaking, to serve as
a neutral intermediary between parties in conflicts and provide protection
and assistance to the victims.
(4) The United Nations
The involvement of the UN in the implementation of IHL has taken
many forms, including the denunciation of violations of IHL in the
Security Council or the General Assembly. The most important step
taken by the UN in this context is the establishment of international
criminal tribunals such as the International Tribunal for the Prosecution
of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International
Humanitarian Law committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia,
established by the Security Council in 1993, and the International
Tribunal on Rwanda, established in 1994. The Statute of the International
Tribunal on Rwanda encompasses the crime of genocide,
crimes against humanity, as well as violation of Common Article 3 of
the 1949 Conventions and Protocol II of 1977. The existence of the
tribunal does not do away with the requirement in the 1949 Geneva
Conventions for all states party to see to the punishment of grave
breaches wherever they occur.
7. Translating Humanitarian Principles into Action
It is ICRC’s policy to promote cross-cultural exchange to encourage common
humanitarian values. This includes the need to reach all authorities (army, police, all
arms-bearers, political parties, media, traditional authorities, and communities) to
explain the movement’s aims, identity, and its readiness to press for humanitarian action
and offer protection and assistance to victims. Action includes education, training,
preventive diplomacy, and post conflict reconciliation.
By using an impartial approach and emphasizing quiet negotiations and persuasion,
ICRC obtains access to conflict victims and political detainees. The confidential nature
of ICRC reports, sent to the authorities following visits to prisoners, for example, is
particularly important. Discretion gains access to victims and ensures continuing
confidence.
Once violations of humanitarian law are observed by its delegates, the ICRC makes
confidential approaches, oral or written, to those responsible, and sends reports and
recommendations to the parties to the conflict. If these efforts prove ineffective, the ICRC
may, under particular circumstances, break its self-imposed rule of discretion.
The ICRC enlists the media in its efforts to stimulate humanitarian mobilization. It
constantly seeks to maintain a balance between the right to information and the
constraints imposed by its humanitarian action in the field.
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Part II, Section 7, paragraphs 8-9
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION
8. Introduction
IOM is an intergovernmental organization with 59 member states and 41 observer
states. Although formally established outside the United Nations system, IOM holds
observer status in the UN General Assembly and actively participates in coordination
mechanisms established within the United Nations. IOM works closely with a number of
UN partners including UNHCR, UNDP, DHA, UNFPA, and the International Labour
Organisation (ILO).
Founded in 1951 in Brussels as an operational agency, IOM was set up with the
original aim of resettling Europeans displaced by World War II who needed assistance
to reach resettlement countries. Since then, the organization’s focus has expanded to offer
programs that assist migrants and governments worldwide. With its headquarters in
Geneva, IOM has 1,200 staff spread over 77 regional and country offices.
9. Role
IOM is committed to the principle that humane and orderly migration benefits
migrants and society. It acts with its partners in the international community to:
• assist in meeting the operational challenges of migration;
• advance understanding of migration issues;
• encourage social and economic development through migration;
and
• work toward effective respect of the human dignity and wellbeing
of migrants.
In the context of its constitution, individuals of concern to IOM include economic
migrants, displaced persons, refugees, nationals returning to their home country, and
other individuals in need of international migration assistance.
Historically, IOM has emphasized assistance to migrants resettling permanently in
another country. In recent years, however, the organization’s activities and functions
have changed to meet the new and evolving needs and challenges faced by the
international community, and in particular in relation to the link between migration and
development. This has taken the form of programs to return and reintegrate qualified
nationals to participate in the reconstruction and development of their native countries,
and programs to return home irregular migrants such as rejected asylum-seekers and
trafficked migrants.
The organization also undertakes large programs to assist internally displaced
persons as well as demobilized combatants whose transport home and reintegration are
essential to the transition from conflict to a peaceful civil society. While involved in
helping the resettlement or return of victims of most major forced population movements
over the past 45 years, IOM increasingly focuses on the migration aspects of emergen-
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Part II, Section 7, paragraph 9
cies, for example in the Gulf War and in Chechnya. Generally, IOM activities include
registration and documentation, emergency transportation (overland, by sea or airlift),
escorting, providing temporary shelter, and camp management.
In post-emergency situations, IOM may provide assistance in the following areas:
• return and reintegration of IDPs;
• civilian reintegration of demobilized combatants in cooperation
with UN military;
• return of qualified nationals;
• repatriation of refugees in cooperation with UNHCR;
• tracing and family reunification in cooperation with ICRC;
• capacity building in migration related areas;
• migration information and job referral services;
• micro projects to facilitate reintegration of returnees; and
• local communal governance to alleviate migratory pressures.
The migration assistance IOM provides to internally displaced persons can cover a
wide range of interrelated activities, such as arranging transport, evacuations, returns,
health care, temporary shelter, and other material relief. IOM also provides rapid analysis
of migratory flows and early warning; technical cooperation to governments; national
population information systems; and census taking.
In its cooperation with the United Nations, IOM participates in coordinated international
humanitarian response and the consolidated interagency appeals issued by the
UNDHA (see Part II, Section 3, paragraph 8c). IOM’s independent status occasionally
has permitted it to operate in areas, such as Iraq and Kuwait during the Persian Gulf crisis,
and in Chechnya, at a time when the UN was unable to gain access.
IOM’s budget is composed of an administrative part, funded by assessed contributions
from all member states according to an agreed percentage scale, and an operational
part funded wholly by voluntary contributions from government, multilateral, and
private sources. IOM maintains a limited emergency revolving fund for emergency
assessment use and for initial start up of emergency operations before actual receipt of
external operational funding.
Further Reading: ICRC Documents and Resources
International Red Cross Handbook, 13th ed. (Geneva: ICRC/Federation, 1996).
Contains all the texts that serve as a basis for the various activities of the ICRC, the
Federation, or the National Societies, including the Fundamental Principles of the
Red Cross and Red Crescent, the instruments of international humanitarian law now
in force, statutes, and regulations. Available in English, French, and Spanish.
Pierre Perrin, Guerre et santé publique: manuel pour l’aide aux prises de décisions
(Geneva: ICRC, 1995).
For officials and health personnel in charge of conducting humanitarian operations
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Part II, Section 7
in situations of armed conflict, the book shows how to set up a health system to meet
the basic needs of conflict victims, and of the displaced in particular. Available in
French only.
Water and War: symposium on water in armed conflicts (Geneva: ICRC, December
1995).
The first step in an effort by the ICRC to draw the attention of the international
community to the problems of more effective protection of the victims of war, especially
where water installations and supplies are affected by hostilities. Available in
English only.
Jean-François Berger, The humanitarian diplomacy of the ICRC and the conflict in
Croatia (1991-1992) (Geneva: ICRC, 1995).
ICRC’s Yugoslavia Task Force in 1991 and 1992: achievements and shortcomings
of the negotiations, taking into account in particular the viewpoints of the protagonists
of this difficult process. Available in English and French.
Michèle Mercier, Crimes without punishment: humanitarian action in former Yugoslavia
(1991-1993) (London: Pluto Press, 1995).
The steps taken by humanitarian organizations in general, and by the ICRC in particular,
to maintain safe areas and to assist the victims of the conflict, and takes stock
of their successes and failures. Available in French, English, and German.
Challenges of the nineties: ICRC special report on activities 1990-1995 (Geneva:
ICRC, 1995).
An overview of some of the major features and events that have dominated the
international humanitarian work of the ICRC around the world in the first half of the
decade. Extensively illustrated. Available in English, French, and Spanish.
Landmines must be stopped (Geneva, CICR, 1995).
Overview of the problem of antipersonnel landmines, illustrated; includes numerous
personal accounts from landmine victims. Currently available in English only.
Prepared for action: law of war: a guide for professional soldiers August 1995.
Available in English, French, Spanish, Arabic, Russian, and Portuguese.
This brochure is a special publication for senior military commanders, containing
information about the ICRC’s courses in international humanitarian law for armed
forces.
Random Ambush
This is a multimedia CD-ROM on indiscriminate use of antipersonnel mines for
teenagers and students. Distributed through Red Cross National Societies and available
in 1996 for Apple Macintosh and Windows-PC platforms.
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Part II, Section 7
Periodicals:
ICRC Annual Report, ICRC, Geneva, 1949-
The International Review of the Red Cross
ICRC publications may be obtained by contacting the International Committee of the
Red Cross, Public Information Division, 19, avenue de la Paix, CH 1202 Geneva
Switzerland. E-mail: webmaster.gva@gwn.icrc.org, Fax ++ 41 22 733 20 57
132

PART II: EMERGENCY RESPONSE, RECOVERY, AND AID
SECTION 8
HUMAN RIGHTS
1. Historical Development
Concern for human rights and freedom from oppression are common to most cultural
and religious beliefs in all parts of the world. This concern has been voiced by
philosophers and political leaders and, toward the end of the eighteenth century,
expressed internationally by ardent calls for the abolition of slavery and the slave trade.
At the end of the nineteenth century, vigorous debate led to labor legislation that brought
healthier living conditions for workers in industrial societies. By the end of World War
I, public concern for human dignity and rights was expressed in the Covenant of the
League of Nations by which member states agreed to secure and maintain fair conditions
of labor for men, women, and children, and to ensure just treatment of the indigenous
inhabitants of colonized territories. In 1919, the ILO was established with the aim of
preserving universal peace based on social justice.
The horrors of World War II led to a widespread conviction that effective protection
of human rights was an essential condition of international peace. A first expression of
this conviction was the Atlantic Charter of August 14, 1941, later endorsed by 47 nations.
The creation of the United Nations Organization also was a direct outcome of World War
II. Among other things, the United Nations would “facilitate solutions of international
economic, social and other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights
and fundamental freedoms.”
2. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights
One of the very first tasks of the United Nations was the preparation of an
international bill of rights. This was undertaken by the Commission on Human Rights that
was established in 1946. It embarked upon the preparation of two documents: one, a
declaration that would set out general principles or standards of human rights; the other,
a convention that would define specific rights and their limitations. Together, these
documents became known as the International Bill of Human Rights. Meeting in Paris,
the General Assembly adopted on December 10, 1948 the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights
as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and
all nations, to the end that every individual and every
organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in
mind, shall strive by teaching and educating to promote
respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive
measures, national and international, to secure their universal
and effective recognition and observance, both
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Part II, Section 8, paragraphs 2-3
among the peoples of Member States themselves and
among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
The task of preparing the accompanying convention has taken 18 years—from 1948
to 1966. It was decided to draft two separate covenants on human rights: one containing
civil and political rights, and the other containing economic, social, and cultural rights.
In addition, a protocol also was prepared to provide the means to handle complaints from
individuals. These Covenants and Protocol—together with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights—form the International Bill of Rights.
3. International Humanitarian Law
Human rights have two distinct aspects: the first are those inalienable rights that we
can claim by virtue of our common humanity. These are moral rights that recognize that
each one of us is no more, but also no less, than a human being. The second aspect
concerns legal rights that are those rights upheld by the due process of law and enacted
with the consent of the governed.
Human rights have evolved slowly. After the adoption of the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights in 1948, the two International Covenants were adopted in 1966—but
did not come into force until 1976. Similarly, it was not until 1993 that a United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights was appointed—42 years after the idea was first
suggested by Uruguay in 1951. Even though the post has now been created, it comes with
little real power. This is because there was fierce opposition from many member states
of the United Nations, a sad pointer to the fact that life, liberty, freedom from arbitrary
arrest, freedom of movement, speech, press, assembly, and worship are not truly
universal human rights.
Nevertheless, there are at present 89 international legal instruments—declarations,
conventions, protocols—which the United Nations has enacted to promote human rights
throughout the world. Seven monitoring bodies have been established to supervise the
implementation of particular international treaties. The seven bodies are:
• Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination;
• Human Rights Committee;
• Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women;
• Committee on Social, Economic, and Cultural Rights;
• Committee against Torture;
• The Group of Three (i.e., three expert “crime watchers” who
report to the General Assembly); and
• Committee on the Rights of the Child.
It is probably fair to argue that these international legal instruments represent the
greatest achievement of the United Nations. However, there are other bodies that have
developed a body of human rights legislation. Of all the international legal instruments
relating to human rights, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, containing some 400
134

articles, are among the best known (see Part II, Section 7, paragraphs 1-7) and cover the
following:
• protection of the wounded and sick in armed forces in the
field;
• protection of wounded, sick, and shipwrecked members of
armed forces at sea;
• treatment of prisoners of war; and
• protection of civilians in time of war.
International humanitarian law is seen today as part of human rights law applicable
in armed conflict. Its origins can be traced to restrictions on hostile activities that are
found in many cultures and often stem from religious values. Manuals of humanitarian
law cite chivalry, humanity, and military necessity as being at the root of its development;
it would be a positive development if a humane awareness was ever-present in the
professionalism of today’s military personnel.
The success of the ICRC can be judged by the fact that 187 countries have acceded
to the Geneva Conventions. Although the ICRC works specifically on behalf of victims
of armed conflict, it is also involved in the field of human rights—in particular with regard
to judicial guarantees. Given that human rights law is concerned with behavior within
states, it is perhaps conceivable that resistance to future armed conflict may emerge from
pressure by human rights groups.
4. Regional Human Rights Conventions
Part II, Section 8, paragraphs 3-4
Three regional intergovernmental organizations—the Council of Europe, the Organization
of African Unity (OAU), and the Organization of American States (OAS)—have
adopted international conventions that aim to promote the observance of human rights in
their respective regions.
Under the auspices of the Council of Europe, the European Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms was adopted in 1950. This
convention provided for the establishment of the European Commission on Human
Rights, and the European Court of Human Rights. Both are based in Strasbourg, France.
The OAU drew up the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights in 1981. This
was the first international convention to guarantee in a single document the civil and
political rights of individuals as well as their economic, social, and cultural rights. The
African Charter also established an African Commission on Human and Peoples’ Rights
based in Banjul, Gambia.
The OAS, for its part, adopted the American Declaration on the Rights and Duties of
Man in 1948. It also concluded the American Convention on Human Rights in 1969,
which provided for the establishment of an Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights based in San José, Costa Rica, and an Inter-American Court of Human Rights
based in Washington, D.C. The OAS has been active in preparing legislation to abolish
torture, forced disappearances, and the death penalty. It is also concerned with the defense
and promotion of rights of indigenous peoples.
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Part II, Section 8, paragraphs 5-6
5. Nongovernmental Organizations
Nongovernmental organizations (see Part II, Section 6) are concerned with a great
variety of causes that animate ordinary citizens: saving famine-stricken populations,
preventing nuclear war, and protecting political prisoners or assisting victims of disaster
and war. Today, the names of groups such as Oxfam, the Campaign for Nuclear
Disarmament, Greenpeace, Amnesty International, the Red Cross, or MSF are as much
household words as the Anti-Slavery Society and Dr. Barnardo’s Homes were in the last
century.
Ordinary people around the world recognize the need to express solidarity with the
poor, the stricken, the degraded—all the more so in the face of frequent government
indifference. It is therefore almost impossible to stress the fundamental importance of
NGOs in the struggle to ensure that human rights (or animal and environmental rights)
are respected.
Many NGOs that have an interest in human rights have consultative status with the
United Nations and take part actively in the deliberations of the Commission on Human
Rights. They are particularly active in the proceedings of the UN Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities that meets every year in
Geneva throughout the month of August. The NGO community plays an important role
in submitting written information concerning allegations of human rights abuses. This
information is considered admissible when based on direct and reliable knowledge of the
violations involved.
6. Implementing Human Rights
Clearly, it is not enough for states to ratify international humanitarian conventions—
there must be political will to implement them effectively down to the level of the
oppressed people in every society. There is often a gap between human rights aspirations
and reality; unfortunately the practicalities of the implementation of human rights are not
as developed as the international legislation that underpins them. Human rights are not
the exclusive affair of states or warring factions, if these are routinely violated (say, by
mass killings, indiscriminate bombardments, or use of chemical weapons). In cases of
grave breaches of human rights, the international community has an important role to play
and a collective attempt must made to respect and ensure respect for law.
The International Red Cross has long used delegates in conflict zones. There are
currently over 1,000 delegates working in some 60 countries. Their presence aims to
prevent, or at least alleviate, suffering in situations of internal strife. The ICRC is a
nongovernmental body that is traditionally extremely discreet. Delegates report directly
to headquarters in Geneva and findings are rarely made public. But delegates are usually
among the best informed people in the field. Their advice should be sought whenever
possible.
More recently, the United Nations has begun to develop a network of human rights
observers. The function of such observers is to verify respect for human rights as laid
down in the constitution of the country in question and in the international instruments
to which that country is party. The observer missions may report directly to the United
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Part II, Section 8, paragraph 6
Nations headquarters in New York or to the Center for Human Rights in Geneva. The
missions also may be joint ventures with another intergovernmental organization (as was
the case in 1993 with the International Civilian Mission to Haiti (MICIVIH), which was
made up of 133 human rights observers from the United Nations and a similar number
from the Organization of American States).
A large-scale deployment of human rights monitors may be something of a mixed
blessing in the field. Monitors sometimes have no experience of complex emergencies.
Whether young law graduates or seasoned UN agency workers, they seldom had to
coexist with military peacekeepers and for many the very word “military” may conjure
up the worst excesses of the armed forces of an authoritarian regime. As a result, a number
of them refuse to work with peacekeepers for fear of compromising their own “neutral”
image. This situation is exacerbated by the United Nations, which, in an effort to save
money, may in the future deploy United Nations Volunteers for this purpose. While the
majority of observers and UNVs generally are highly motivated and enthusiastic they
sometimes lack hands-on experience, for example, of prison conditions or forensic
investigation. Nevertheless, it is important for both human rights and international forces
to develop a cooperative modus operandi.
Other UN agencies such as UNHCR, UNICEF, and UNDP are usually among the first
to arrive in the crisis area. Although they have no direct mandate to cover human rights,
their presence may constitute a safeguard against excess. The same is true of the NGOs
whose presence is sometimes even more effective because they are not so restricted by
the polite rules of diplomatic respect for governments. NGOs often break stories to the
world’s press and face expulsion by the host government as a result.
The implementation of human rights law sometimes may be an ad hoc affair,
especially in countries where the content of those rights is not known, hence the
importance of dissemination long before any crisis occurs. Dissemination of human
rights and humanitarian law should be considered a built-in responsibility by all elements
of a response group; ignorance can only cost human suffering and life. In many host
countries to which international forces are deployed, fair systems of justice have yet to
be created. Judicial reform, creating an honest police force, revamping a savage prison
system, or investigating past human rights abuses are all essential elements in a transition
to democracy. If justice is not fairly administered, then the rule of law is fiction. The
problems that usually plague the administration of justice are:
• Armed forces, police, and paramilitary groups that may be
hired to threaten, torture, or kill opponents, including judges
or political leaders.
• Corruption and extortion at every level of the legal system.
For example, jailers who demand a bribe before a family can
bring food to a detained member.
• Courts that lack even the most elementary materials to
function. For example, do not have a copy of the country’s
legal code.
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Part II, Section 8, paragraphs 6-7
7. Conclusion
• A scornful attitude among ordinary citizens to the justice
system.
• The impunity enjoyed by the powerful sectors of society.
In the aftermath of World War II, the idea grew that human rights should be
guaranteed to all peoples. Both the UN and the ICRC gave strong support to a series of
treaties that, taken together, form a substantial body of legislation in favor of the rights
of the individual citizen.
The application of this legislation is another matter. Censorship, intimidation, torture,
and extrajudicial execution still form part of the repressive character of many states.
Similarly, many multinational corporations and even the United Nations are sometimes
willing to disregard these abuses to protect their interests or further their enterprises. It
is nevertheless the duty of richer and freer societies to ensure that rights and freedoms can
be exercised universally. The cooperation between human rights monitors and the other
elements of a peace support operation will contribute toward greater vigilance.
Further Reading
Françoise Bory, Origin and Development of International Humanitarian Law
(Geneva: ICRC Publications, 1982).
Louise Dowsald-Beck and Sylvain Vité, “International Humanitarian Law and
Human Rights Law,” International Review of the Red Cross no. 293 (March-April 1993).
International Committee of the Red Cross, Basic Rules of the Geneva Conventions
and their Additional Protocols (Geneva: ICRC Publications, 1987).
——Essentials of the Law of War (Geneva: ICRC Publications, 1992) (offprint of:
F. De Mulinen, Handbook on the Law of War for Armed Forces).
Independent Commission on International Humanitarian Issues, Winning the Human
Race (London: Zed Books, 1988).
Leah Levin, Human Rights: Questions and Answers (Paris: UNESCO, 1989).
United Nations, Human Rights: A Compilation of International Instruments,
E.94.XIV.1 (New York and Geneva: United Nations, 1994).
——United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights, E.94.XIV.11 (New York
and Geneva: United Nations, 1994).
——Universal Declaration of Human Rights, New York.
Ian Williams, The U.N. for Beginners (New York: Writers and Readers Publishing,
Inc., 1995).
138

PART III: MILITARY FORCES AND CIVILIAN POLICE
SECTION 1
INTRODUCTION TO ARMED FORCES IN PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS
1. Introduction
Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only a soldier can do it. Dag Hammarskjöld.
The armed forces element—the land, naval, and air forces of contributing countries—
are an integral and frequently the most visible part of a PSO response group. They are
unique by virtue of the fact that the UN or some other international organization has
authorized them to implement the will of the international community. 1 Most armed
forces are supposed to be capable of self-sustained operations in hostile and remote
environments. As a result, they can perform a variety of tasks that, though often ancillary
to their raison d’etre of combat, augment the response group capabilities.
This section explains the general characteristics, organization, modus operandi, and
constraints on armed forces in PSO. It will address those issues that collectively concern
the armed forces, and that can offer to the nonmilitary reader some insights into how
armed forces operate. More specific information on land forces, naval forces, and air
forces may be found in Sections 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
2. Characteristics of Armed Forces
a. Organizational Culture
Armed forces are trained, equipped, and organized for combat, an activity that
demands the collective action of a large number of people working toward
common goals. To control armed forces under extremely stressful circumstances
of combat requires discipline and coordination. Because the requirements and
environments differ for combat on land, at sea, and in the air, each branch of the
armed forces has its own individual organizational culture. These may be broken
down further within branches, for example, by the differences between infantry
and artillery in the land forces, aviators and warship operators in naval forces, and
fighter and transport pilots in air forces. Consequently, armed forces can appear
to outsiders as parochial and monolithic, unable to adapt quickly to changing
circumstances. The reality is that, despite being large, conservative, bureaucratic,
and hierarchical structures, armed forces can adapt, but are sometimes constrained
by rivalry and different organizational cultures.
b. Force Structure
Armed forces normally have several layers of support behind their combat units.
This facilitates their movement, and keeps them supplied with food, water,
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Part III, Section 1, paragraph 2
clothing, medicine, munitions, and spare parts. Broadly speaking, land, naval,
and air forces each consist of both combat and support forces. It is support forces
that are most often needed in a PSO, and in some missions the overwhelming
majority of military units are support forces. But for reasons that vary from
country to country, support forces are generally in short supply, even in times of
relative peace.
(1) Combat Forces
Combat forces are those military, naval, and air units designed to
directly engage enemy forces. Land combat forces are: infantry (light,
airborne, marines, mechanized, etc.), armor (tanks, armored cavalry,
etc.), and field artillery. 2 Naval combat forces include warships such
as aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers, frigates, corvettes, patrol
craft, and attack submarines. Air combat forces include fighters,
bombers, ground attack aircraft, and attack helicopters.
(2) Support Forces
(a)
(b)
(c)
Land forces have two classes of support forces, those that
provide fire support and operational assistance to combat forces
(combat support, or CS), and those that ensure aspects of supply,
maintenance, transportation, health, and other services required
by aviation and land units (combat service support, or CSS).
Combat support elements include air defense artillery, engineers,
military police, signals, and intelligence. Combat service
support elements include such units and services as: field and
base hospitals; maintenance shops and depots; personnel administration;
air, beach, and rail head logistics management; port
handling; postal; and mortuary.
Naval support elements include auxiliary and transport ships
that serve to provide at-sea replenishment; tug boats; firefighting
boats; floating repair shops; hospital ships; food, water, oil,
munitions, supply, and troop transports; landing craft; command
and control ships; and intelligence-gathering vessels. Some
naval forces have amphibious or shore-based support units
similar to certain land force units, such as construction battalions
(i.e., engineers); explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) units; field
hospitals; and air head, beach head, and port handling units.
Air support elements, which may belong to either naval forces or
air forces, may be either rotary wing (i.e., helicopters) or fixed
wing aircraft, or specialized ground-based elements. Support
aircraft include utility, transport, or search-and-rescue (SAR)
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Part III, Section 1, paragraph 2
c. Generic Capabilities
helicopters; transport aircraft; airborne warning and control
aircraft (AWACS); airborne fuel tankers; and electronic warfare,
reconnaissance, and intelligence-gathering aircraft. Groundbased
elements may include airfield construction units; air
traffic control (ATC) units; bulk fuel management; and
firefighting.
The armed forces bring a tremendous range of capabilities to a PSO, and these are
discussed in terms of individual branches in the sections that follow. There are,
however, a number of generic capabilities that will be present to some degree in
most PSOs in which armed forces are present:
(1) Coordinated Action
Through organization, discipline, common equipment, and standard
operating procedures, armed forces are capable of coordinating their
actions. Such coordination may occur over short or long distances,
such as within a town or over an entire country, region, or sea.
(2) Situational Awareness
Human and technical reconnaissance, surveillance, intelligence gathering,
analysis, dissemination, and situational awareness inform commanders
of the location and disposition of friendly, neutral, and
enemy forces. This process also provides information on terrain,
weather, and their own forces supply levels. Through this capability,
armed forces are able to focus their efforts, avoid casualties, and foster
resources.
(3) Maneuver
In the military sense, maneuver capability allows forces to move and
operate in adverse conditions, possibly under hostile fire, and to
concentrate quickly. Combat forces and support forces collectively
provide this capability, which is made more effective through coordinated
action and situational awareness.
(4) Protection
Protection is the armed forces’ capability to protect themselves and
others from the effects of weapons. This is accomplished through both
passive (armored vehicles, fortifications, staying out of weapon range)
and active (destruction or suppression of the weapon’s fire, demining
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Part III, Section 1, paragraph 2
or defusing ordnance) measures. Awareness and maneuver capabilities
can augment this capability by identifying high risk areas or
maneuvering to deter or destroy the source of a threat.
(5) Versatility
d. Limitations
Armed forces are capable of conducting more than just their primary
combat mission. For example, warships that specialize in antiair
warfare are also capable of maritime interdiction and of rescuing
castaways. Helicopters specializing in antisubmarine warfare can be
used sometimes for search and rescue. Artillerymen or engineers can
be employed in an infantry role, or infantrymen put in an engineer role
building earthworks.
(1) Resource Constraints
Financial and material resource constraints can dictate the size of the
armed forces deployed to a PSO, and the possibility exists for disparity
between stated ends and provided means. Sometimes United Nations
Security Council Resolutions (UNSCRs) have demanded highly ambitious
military actions on the ground that have not been underwritten
by the necessary military resources to do the job. Public expectations
are often pegged to the stated political objectives rather than the
adequacy of resources, which leads to animosity among elements of a
response group. Civilian elements blame the armed forces for apparently
ineffective performance, and the armed forces resent what they
see as unfair criticism.
(a)
Financial: Inadequate financial resources can constrain the ability
of armed forces to operate successfully in a PSO. In addition
to politically-imposed resource limitations, chronic problems
with the UN’s peacekeeping assessment, receipt, and payment
system result in delayed reimbursements to troop-contributing
countries. This causes financial hardship for less wealthy nations,
and delays the deployment of a force.
(b)
Material: Although the UN tells troop-contributing countries
their contingents must be fully equipped and self-sustaining for
60 days (i.e., before an assumed UN field administration and
logistics system is fully operational), contingents arrive lacking
crucial equipment such as weapons, radios, or suitable uniforms.
Such contingents are unable to perform assigned tasks, and those
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Part III, Section 1, paragraph 2
tasks are then assigned to another contingent, which must spread
itself thinly to carry out the task. It also strains a logistics system
that is in the process of establishing itself. Contingents use
different types of equipment and require special rations or other
supplies; this hampers logistics systems and reduces
interoperability.
(c)
Shortage of Support Forces: PSOs place a heavy burden on the
limited support forces of national armed forces. Support forces
are expensive: their personnel must have technical skills and
equipment that require longer and more expensive training than
their combat counterparts. Many armed forces have limited
support forces, which is exacerbated by individual national
requirements and political reluctance to commit national support
resources. Limited or unique support includes such specialized
units as satellite communications, water purification, and radio
frequency management, but also applies to specialist capabilities,
for example: airlift and air movement staff, medical personnel,
and civilian police, which are usually in short supply in their
home countries.
(2) Political Constraints
Both individual countries and multinational organizations impose
political constraints on PSOs, initially through the mandate but also by
imposing direct control lines that override the multinational command
structures. This creates separate and sometimes conflicting chains of
command within a PSO. These limit the responsive ability of the
armed forces, and sour relations within the force. Countries impose
additional restrictions by specifying acceptable locations and tasks, as
well as promulgating their own versions of the rules of engagement
(ROE).
(3) Personal
Poor personal relations among political, military, and civilian officials
can arise from their different cultural and professional attitudes
toward the same problem. In isolated stations in the field, military
commanders are often older (and therefore sometimes more experienced
in management techniques) than their equivalent counterparts
in other elements. Although in isolated stations, individuals from
different response elements often develop good personal and
interelement relationships. When they fail, their rivalry can be very
destructive and lead to crucial communication failures and the withholding
of cooperation.
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Part III, Section 1, paragraphs 2-3
(4) Technical
There are some tasks armed forces cannot do, or which some countries
can do but others cannot. For example, without transport helicopters,
infantry forces will not be able to move rapidly over jungle or
mountainous terrain. Some nations have aircraft that are equipped to
fly in all types of weather and even at night, but many countries do not.
Depending on which aircraft are deployed, the armed forces may or
may not be able to operate in certain conditions.
(5) Procedural
3. Conduct of Operations
Among force members, a lack of common or agreed procedures for
operations, staffs, communications, and supply can severely limit
performance and effectiveness.
a. Operational Environment
Terrain, weather, climate, demographics, culture, politics, threat level, and the
existence and state of roads, airports, and port facilities in a host state/crisis area
will determine the resources and support armed forces need to bring with them.
When the threat level is high, the physical environment is hostile, or the civilian
infrastructure undeveloped, the support element is proportionately higher. If the
armed forces are constrained by the number of personnel they are allowed or able
to deploy, the fact that a greater proportion of the force is involved in merely
sustaining itself as opposed to conducting its other mission(s) means that the
overall ability of the force will drop accordingly. 3
b. The Mandate
The mandate is not, as some believe, a single document setting out the size, nature,
sources, and activities of response group elements; neither is it the relevant
UNSCR. Instead, the mandate flows from a collection of documents, agreements,
and resolutions relating to a crisis. This collection normally includes, but is not
limited to:
• one or more UNSCR, or similar resolution from another
multinational organization;
• the secretary-general’s report, or similar document from a
multinational organization;
• a SOFA with the host state(s);
• TOR from either the multinational force sponsor or individual
nations;
144

• national and multinational rules of engagement;
• relevant treaties or agreements; and
• international laws and conventions.
The individual components of a mandate are frequently the result of compromise
or ambiguity; this leads to differing interpretations by the parties to a conflict and
even among elements of the response group. A military commander charged with
putting the mandate into operational terms useful to armed forces faces a difficult
task.
c. Operational Responses
(1) Three factors collectively define the role of armed forces in peace
support operations:
• the response level and associated response option dictated by
the situation;
• the operational environment of the crisis area; and
• the mandate.
The overall role of the armed forces element may be a matter of
consensus, but implementation can be a matter of differing interpretations
among leaders at all levels and from all countries. The roles
may be clearly defined, but there is no guarantee that all the financial,
political, and materiel resources needed will be available. Consequently,
the gap between stated intent and provided means can cause
great difficulty for armed forces and lead to mission failure in some
circumstances.
(2) Response Levels
Part III, Section 1, paragraph 3
The three response levels and associated options for the armed forces
are described in Part I, paragraphs 15 and 16.
In low-level peace support operations the consent of the belligerent
parties is essential for both the success and survival of the mission. In
these circumstances, the use of force is largely an option of selfdefense.
In high-level missions, where the military element is both
more powerfully armed and psychologically prepared to use force for
the protection of its mandate, the consent of the belligerents is seldom
a precondition for the survival of the mission, although in the long
term it will aid success. The success of the mission and the protection
of the military and civilian components will depend on the ability of
the military to use or threaten credible force.
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Part III, Section 1, paragraphs 3-4
Once the political decision has been made as to the level at which the
operation should be conducted, then practitioners on the ground must
act consistently with it. A transition from low-level and mid-level
operations to high-level operations is a policy decision that fundamentally
changes the structure, deployment, and nature of the operation.
When the decision is made, all the international response elements
present should adopt a consistently protected approach. This would
require substantial force restructuring and redeployment, the evacuation
of vulnerable monitors and civilians, and the possible termination
of humanitarian operations. In reality it is seldom possible to get all the
civil and military elements of an international response group to act
uniformly in keeping with a large-scale change in operational approach.
For this reason, the stepping up of an armed response—for
example, when a mandate is unlawfully challenged by local
belligerents—may be jeopardized by and prove dangerous to independent
elements of the response community that wish to maintain their
distance from military activity for humanitarian reasons.
4. Preparation and Planning
The following activities comprise a sequence of actions that precedes the deployment
of the military element:
a. Campaign Planning
Once an enabling UNSCR or other relevant resolution has been promulgated, the
task of the senior officials at the operational level, under the direction of the head
of mission, normally the SRSG, should be to translate the political mandate into
a campaign plan. Ideally, this should include a concept of operations, a clearly
defined end state, and direction or guidance—whichever is appropriate—to the
military, political, humanitarian, and economic elements of the response group.
The plan also should establish relationships and coordination mechanisms
between the independent elements that normally lie beyond the purview of the
UN.
b. Mission Analysis
Military operations at the tactical level should be planned within the context of
the head of mission’s campaign plan. At all levels, military operations will need
to be coordinated with other involved organizations and agencies. This procedure
should ensure that all plans are consistent in the immediate and long-term with
strategic and political requirements and objectives expressed in the mandate.
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Part III, Section 1, paragraphs 4-5
c. Estimate
Having conducted the analysis of his mission, the military force commander
considers the significance of immediate factors such as the belligerent parties, the
operational environment (terrain, weather, local culture), and allocated forces
and resources. He will have to review his considerations as the situation develops
or changes. Factors to be considered will vary with each type of mandate or
mission. The political decision as to whether the operations should be peacekeeping
or peace enforcement will affect the techniques available to the commander
and his estimate. The estimate should take into account the possibility that the
political mandate may change during the course of the operation.
The concept of operations is in effect the commander’s plan that tasks and
coordinates the application of resources and those operational techniques identified
as leading to the success of the mission. A PSO generally will consist of the
following phases:
(1) Preparation: including all diplomatic and military activities before the
departure of the force.
(2) Theater Entry: this may be a forcible entry or a pacific deployment.
Movement into the theater may be by land, sea, or air. Should there be
concerted opposition to the operation, the insertion of military forces
will need to be a deliberate joint operation.
(3) Establishment: before operations can commence, the force will need
time and secure facilities to establish and sustain military effectiveness.
(4) Execution: all tactical actions taken to carry out the mission.
(5) Redeployment: the redeployment phase starts with the hand over of
military activities to other agencies. In the case of a peace enforcement
mission, this will be the hand over of the mission to a peacekeeping
force.
5. Relationships with the Civil Elements
a. Attitudes of the Armed Forces Element toward the PSO
The attitudes of the armed forces range from grudging to whole-hearted participation.
Different attitudes give rise to a variety of approaches toward the same
long-term objectives. The factors that influence these differences of approach
between contingents and individuals may include:
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Part III, Section 1, paragraph 5
(1) Constitutional status of armed forces within the contributing state: are
troops professional or largely conscripted?
(2) Economic circumstances: do individuals see participation as an opportunity
for financial improvement or as a military adventure?
(3) Political state of development and general level of education in
contributor states: some civilians working along side military contingents
imagine that all military, regardless of origin, behave in a
uniformly, politically correct or incorrect manner. In reality, military
institutions in most cases reflect fairly accurately the prevailing state
of their country of origin.
(4) Degree of previous experience in PSO: paradoxically, military newcomers
to a PSO can be intolerant of the need to find a common
operational standard, which they will usually view as inferior to their
familiar national procedures.
(5) Degree of institutional contacts with outside world: military cultures
that spend a majority of time based in isolated forts or encampments
tend to have a problem with reconciling their highly-developed
warfighting approach with a civilian-dominated environment that
they find in a PSO.
b. Attitude of Armed Forces Element toward Other Response Group Elements
(1) Nongovernmental Organizations (see Part II, Section 6, paragraph 11)
Armed forces prefer to do things their own way: formalized, analytical,
and practical in approach. They value coordinated action and are
perplexed by or distrust elements that refuse to coordinate, yet that
may demand help from them. As NGOs and armed forces gain more
experience about each other, greater coordination is developing and
fewer redundancies occur. Armed forces are beginning to appreciate
the local knowledge and expertise of many NGOs. Steps have been
taken to facilitate greater coordination without the appearance of
subordination or compromise. An example is the Civil-Military Operations
Center (CMOC), which serves as a forum to discuss problems,
coordinate actions, and facilitate communications among the
various response group elements.
(2) Media
Since most military operations require security of information, armed
forces can be suspicious of media personnel, viewing them as poten-
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Part III, Section 1, paragraphs 5-6
tial threats to security and mission success. Some members of the
armed forces understand the utility of working with and assisting the
media and that a successful relationship can promote the mission’s
objective without compromising security. Military Public Affairs
offices are therefore an important element of armed forces in PSOs.
6. Relations among Armed Forces
a. Between National Contingents
Relations between national contingents can be affected by ethnic, religious,
cultural, institutional, and political factors. The armed forces of NATO and WEU
share a common European heritage, have standardization agreements that govern
the way in which they operate together, and often have similar political goals with
respect to a PSO. Consequently, they tend to have smoother working relationships.
Armed forces from some Commonwealth countries have a number of
procedural and organizational similarities with the United Kingdom that allow
them to operate efficiently together.
Sometimes hostile nations operate successfully together in a multinational force
and use the experience as a bridgebuilding opportunity. However, this is not
always the case, and some nations have used the unguarded presence of a habitual
enemy as an opportunity for a clandestine continuation of hostilities. Military and
political leaders must therefore treat with great sensitivity not only the choice of
which national contingents participate in a PSO, but also where historical
adversaries may be located with respect to one another, or to which tasks they are
assigned.
b. Between Different Armed Services of the Same Nation
Sometimes rival branches of a nation’s armed forces continue to seek to preserve
or enlarge their share of power and prestige while operating together in the same
PSO. These power struggles can cause confusion or inefficiency and bewilder the
outsider with the use of service-specific jargon, procedures, or equipment. It also
can result in an army element that can communicate with a foreign army element,
but is wholly incapable of communicating with its own air and naval forces.
c. As Subordinate Contingents within a Multinational Force
Nations that participate militarily in a PSO may have less evident national
interests that they will pursue as well. At times these may not be in concert with
the direction of the commander. For this reason, a successful multinational force
requires a much more widely talented commander than a national force of the
same capabilities.
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Part III, Section 1, paragraph 7
7. Command and Control of Armed Forces in a PSO
Command and control (C2) is the exercise of authority and direction by a properly
designated commander over assigned forces in the accomplishment of a mission.
Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel,
equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed by a commander in
planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations.
a. UN Force Headquarters
(1) UN peacekeeping forces are under UN control, vested in the secretarygeneral,
who is responsible to the Security Council. This arrangement
recognizes the key role of the Security Council in establishing a PSO,
while it allows the secretary-general some flexibility and discretion in
implementing Security Council resolutions.
(2) There is no standard staff organization common to all UN force
headquarters. Minor differences reflect local requirements or the
preferences of the officers who created the headquarters. The staff is
grouped into three main categories: the force commander’s personal
staff, military staff, and civilian staff.
(a)
(b)
(c)
The force commander’s personal staff normally consists of a
military assistant, a political adviser, a legal adviser, a public
affairs officer, an interpreter, and liaison officers from the armed
forces of the parties in the conflict.
The military staff normally consists of a chief of staff, a deputy
chief of staff, and an operations staff (intelligence/information,
plans, training, engineer, communications, air traffic control,
security, police operations, observer groups, administration,
logistics, and health services).
The civilian staff, provided by the UN secretariat in New York,
at a minimum consists of a chief administrative officer (CAO).
The CAO is responsible for the direction of all administrative
matters having financial implications and for the overall direction
of the force’s administration. The CAO deals directly with
the Office of General Services (OGS) in the Department of
Administration and Management (DAM) and the Field Administration
and Logistics Division (FALD) in DPKO at UN headquarters
in New York.
(3) The force commander is appointed by and responsible to the secretarygeneral,
who coordinates and obtains the consent of the Security
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Council. The force commander conducts day-to-day operations but
refers all policy matters to the secretary-general. The force commander
is normally selected from the nations that traditionally contribute
peacekeeping forces and whose qualifications are acceptable
to the Security Council. The force commander also must be acceptable
to the host nation and all the parties in the conflict.
(4) Staff size must be closely controlled for economic reasons (the
General Assembly will question any alleged or perceived extravagance
when voting on a force’s budget) and because host nations may
be concerned about the size and cost of operations.
(5) When a peacekeeping force includes an observer group in its mission,
the force headquarters staff may be expanded to provide oversight for
the observers.
b. Military Command and Control
(1) UN-Sponsored Operations
Part III, Section 1, paragraph 7
UN-sponsored operations have the following command relationships:
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
The most effective command relationship has one force headquarters
and one force commander responsible for the PSO. The
force commander usually will be given operational control over
military units assigned to the peacekeeping force and has general
responsibility to ensure that parent forces take all necessary
action for the good order and discipline of the force. The force
commander may make investigations, conduct inquiries, and
request information, reports, and consultations.
A national contingent consists of a nation’s entire contribution—its
units as well as its staff officers on the force headquarters. National
contingent commanders report directly to the force commander.
When large peacekeeping forces are spread over a wide area, it
may be necessary to require the addition of a subordinated UN
brigade or higher headquarters. Additions such as these are
particularly important where the complexity of the situation
demands increased staff support.
Each unit commander is ultimately responsible for supervising
and coordinating the accomplishment of his mission, communicating
changes to the mission, and responding to needs and
requirements of the units.
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Part III, Section 1, paragraph 7
(e)
The national contingent commanders are responsible for disciplinary
action within their own contingents in accordance with
their national codes of military law. Authority for national
contingent commanders to carry out their national laws in the
host country’s territory should be included in the SOFA for the
PSO. In the event of a major disciplinary breach, the force
commander will discuss the case with the contingent commander
and may refer the matter, through the secretary-general, to the
troop-contributing government concerned.
(2) Non-UN-Sponsored Operations
Non-UN-sponsored operations may be set up in different ways. The
decision will depend largely on the time available, political factors,
and the willingness or ability of the parties to cooperate. These
extemporaneous operations may be set up in the following ways:
(a)
(b)
A single headquarters to coordinate both political and military
activities.
Two headquarters: one to control military operations, and one
for political direction. This arrangement requires increased attentiveness
to preserve unity of effort.
c. Commanders’ Directives
(1) The force commander’s directive should outline clearly who is empowered
to give orders to contingents and under what circumstances.
A unit commander must be assured that the orders have the authority
of the force commander and the sanction of the UN secretary-general,
or, in the case of a non-UN PSO, the appropriate authority. As a
corollary, unit commanders cannot accept orders from other sources,
whether they come from the host nation or the parties in a conflict,
except in the limited sphere of discipline and matters of domestic
concern. An exception may occur in a non-UN force when national
contingents are placed directly under their ambassadors to the host
nation.
(2) National contingent commanders may issue their own directives
based on an analysis of the force mandate and the force commander’s
directive.
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Part III, Section 1, paragraph 8
8. National Training and Preparation
a. Training
Ideally, personnel detailed for a PSO will receive predeployment training
relevant to the operational environment in which they are likely to find themselves.
Units also should endeavor to continue relevant training during the
operation to hone existing skills or to learn new ones suggested by experience intheater.
Combat units will need to be retrained for their combat missions once
redeployed from a PSO.
With the exception of high-level response operations, PSOs require armed forces
to adjust their attitude and approach. Even so, many of the skills that enable a unit
to perform combat missions are applicable to a PSO. These common skills
include observing and reporting; communications; patrolling; navigation; explosive
ordnance safety precautions; locating, identifying, and marking mines;
physical fitness; marksmanship; and battle inoculation (i.e., live fire training to
help soldiers adjust to being under fire and respond accordingly). As more and
more nations have participated in post-Cold War PSOs, the need for improved
means to prepare for new contingencies have become apparent.
Nationally and collectively within regional security organizations, new doctrine
and training programs are being developed. In the past few years, a general
consensus on doctrine has emerged, and the number and quality of specialized
training courses and centers for both units and staff officers have increased
markedly. The UN also has developed training programs and, in essence, a set of
minimum training standards for preparing staff officers and infantry battalions
for peacekeeping duties. That being said, the actual results of such training can
be mixed. In some cases, such as in low-level operations, the use of less highlytrained
soldiers may be acceptable. But in more intense situations, rudimentary
training may jeopardize unit or force effectiveness.
b. Manpower
Realizing the political sensitivities involved in PSOs, and the fact that the whole
world is watching their armed forces, most countries will send only their best
units. These may be all-volunteer, specialist peacekeeping, or elite units; few
countries permit conscripts to serve in PSOs unless they are volunteers. Countries
not so concerned with appearances may send a contingent for less praiseworthy
reasons such as earning hard currency or to improve the otherwise tarnished
image of the armed forces at home. Such contingents may cause problems in their
assigned areas or for the force in general.
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Part III, Section 1, paragraph 9
9. Principles
Most of the military principles for high -level operations are the same as those for war
fighting; the unique nature of PSOs is reflected in the principles that follow, but not
exclusively to low-level and mid-level operations:
a. Consent
Consent is viewed from two perspectives: first as an environmental condition
based on the perception of the belligerents, and second as a factor that guides the
behavior of the PSO soldier. Peacekeeping operations must have the political
consent of the leaders of the belligerent parties at the operational level as an
essential precondition. At the local level, consent may be less assured, and its
withdrawal used as a negotiating leverage against UN forces. The actions of the
peacekeepers must be designed to promote consent to their presence and support
for the peace process. The need to maintain consent constrains the peacekeeper’s
freedom of action. But if consent is withdrawn at the operational level, a
peacekeeping operation (at low- or mid-level) will neither succeed nor survive.
In a high-level (peace enforcement) operation, the promotion of consent also may
be critical to the long-term success of the operation when civil processes (relief,
restoration, etc.) take priority, but not to the short-term survival of the force.
b. Impartiality
Like consent, impartiality is viewed from the perception of the belligerents and
as a doctrinal and behavioral determinant. At low-level, consent and impartiality
will be essential prerequisites. In mid-level, where both may be more fragmentary,
the peacekeeper must work hard to be perceived to be impartial. Actions
must be driven by the need to retain an impartial status and actions must be
determined by the mandate, not by partiality toward a favorably disposed party.
Consequently, force—if necessary concentrated at an overwhelming level—is
used against a party or individual because of what they are doing, not because of
who they are. An impartial position also should be maintained as much as possible
in a high-level or enforcement operation. But the abandonment of impartiality by
a response group in a low- or mid-level peacekeeping mission will alter its
operational status to peace enforcement and threaten the success of the mission.
c. Minimum Force
Maintaining the good will and consent of the parties dictates that the use of force
should be legal, proportionate, and the minimum necessary. In low- and mid-level
peacekeeping operations, the need to maintain the support and good will of
belligerent forces and civilian populations will restrict the level, location, and
objective for the use of force. In high-level operations, the short-term survival and
success of the military element are less dependent on belligerent party consent
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Notes
and more on the UN’s ability to underwrite its mandate with effective force.
However, in the long term, the elements of the response group cannot succeed in
an environment that is sustained by force alone; if promotion of consent will
become relevant to long-term success, only the minimum necessary force should
be used. In all PSOs, before direct force is applied, all other methods of persuasion
and less violent coercion should be considered.
d. Transparency
All parties to a peace process, including the population of the host country and
individual elements at the edge of the response group, should be aware of the
mandate, mission, intentions, and likely techniques of the UN military element.
A failure to communicate these will foster suspicion and may prevent the
development of the trust and confidence on which long-term success may depend.
e. Mutual Respect
Military and civilian elements of the response group should understand and
respect each other and the parties in the host state. Prejudice, chauvinism, and lack
of cultural awareness will damage mutual respect and diminish prospects of
success. Affirmative action is needed to promote mutual respect for the laws,
religion, customs, and culture of the response group elements and host nation.
1
Individual members of the armed forces often serve in the capacity of military observers, usually
unarmed. Though these military observers serve a crucial purpose in many PSOs, they are not considered
here as members of the armed forces element of a response group.
2
Some armies consider field artillery to be a combat support element, as it normally engages an enemy
with indirect fire.
3
That is unless the mission is to provide the means of movement and sustenance required by other
elements of a response group or by the target population (e.g., in missions to provide humanitarian
assistance).
Further Reading
Armed Forces in Peace Support Operations:
Part III, Section 1, paragraph 9
United States, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook
for Peace Operations (Fort Monroe, Va.: Joint Warfighting Center, 1995).
United States, Joint Staff, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Peacekeeping
Operations, Joint Pub 3-07.3 (Washington, D.C.: DAMO-FDQ, 1994).
United States, Air Land Sea Application Center, Multiservice Procedures for Humanitarian
Assistance Operations, FM 100-23-2 (Fort Monroe, Va.: TRADOC, 1994).
Great Britain, Inspector General Doctrine and Training, Wider Peacekeeping (London:
HMSO, 1995).
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Part III, Section 1
Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE), Allied Command Europe,
NATO Doctrine for Peace Support Operations (Mons: SHAPE, 1994).
John Mackinlay and Jarat Chopra, A Draft Concept of Second Generation Multinational
Operations (Providence, R.I.: Thomas J. Watson Jr. Institute for International
Studies, 1993).
David S. Alberts and Richard E. Hayes, Command Arrangements for Peace Operations
(Washington, D.C.: NDU Press, 1995).
Stephanie L. Davis and John McDonald, Preparations for Peacekeeping: A Survey
of Nine Nations (McLean, Va.: SAIC, 1993).
United Nations, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, A Peace-keeping Training
Manual (New York: UN DPKO, n.d.).
International Peace Academy, Peacekeeper’s Handbook (New York: Pergamon
Press, 1984).
156

PART III: MILITARY FORCES AND CIVILIAN POLICE
SECTION 2
LAND FORCES OPERATIONS
1. Introduction
Peace support operations normally are conducted on land; consequently land forces
provide the major military component at the tactical level. However, military activities
will be only one element of an integrated plan in which political, humanitarian, economic,
and electoral successes are as important as military success. The military element may
not be the lead element of the response group. Peace enforcement operations that escalate
into open conflict and require an approach more appropriate to fighting a war will always
involve all three armed services. Joint command and control arrangements need to be
agreed and established before the operation. Overall success will depend on the degree
that component elements coordinate their efforts toward the achievement of the same
mandate or political objective.
2. Land Force Organizations and Equipment Categories
It is a national responsibility to ensure that troops are prepared and equipped for the
anticipated tasks. For planning purposes, the main characteristics of land forces are:
a. Infantry
Infantry normally will represent the most significant component of the PSO force.
Infantry are suited to hold positions, provide presence and observation, man
checkpoints, and conduct patrols. Armored infantry normally deploy in tracked
fighting vehicles with a mounted gun or cannon. Mechanized infantry deploy in
wheeled armored personnel carriers and do not mount a gun or cannon. Armored
infantry vehicles are well-protected for such tasks as interposition. In general, the
infantry of all nations are organized along similar lines. The smallest team
generally consists of about 10 personnel and is known as a section, squad, or
“brick.” Three sections make up a platoon, sometimes known as a troop,
commanded by a junior officer, and three platoons make up an infantry or rifle
company. The company strength of headquarters staff is normally about 120.
Three rifle companies plus specialist support weapons (mortars and antitank
weapons) companies make up a battalion.
b. Armor
Armor usually refers to tanks, which in some armies also are referred to as
“cavalry.” Tanks may not be politically appropriate or practical in peacekeeping
operations. However, armored reconnaissance units are particularly useful in a
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Part III, Section 2, paragraph 2
PSO, especially when a unit’s geographical area of responsibility is large.
Armored reconnaissance units will be equipped with smaller, more agile vehicles
armed with a cannon. Some armored reconnaissance or “recce” vehicles will
resemble a small tank. Armored reconnaissance vehicles have firepower, mobility,
protection, and communications that suit them for liaison, control points,
convoy security, quick reaction, and proving routes. When the threat level to the
PSO force is high, the greater combat power available to tanks may be required
for defensive and offensive operations.
c. Aviation
Helicopter aviation units may perform a range of essential functions in PSOs,
including reconnaissance, surveillance, liaison, transport and medical evacuation,
escort, deterrence, and combat actions. The very presence of combat
aviation has a considerable deterrent effect and long-range precision firing may
be used as a demonstration to deter or compel compliance.
d. Special Forces
The characteristics of special forces are useful assets in PSOs. Their ability to be
deployed discreetly at long range with secure communications renders special
forces capable of short notice liaison, reconnaissance, and assessment tasks.
Their intensive medical and language training make special forces highly suited
to civil affairs, community relations, and community information activities as
well as raising, training, and reforming indigenous irregular armed groups and
host nation security forces.
e. Engineers
Engineers can be used to support civil affairs programs. This assistance might
include the supply or maintenance of civilian infrastructure facilities such as the
provision of shelters, waste disposal facilities, and electrical power, and the
procurement, storage, and distribution of water. Engineers also will be able to
supervise the location, removal, and disposal of mines and other unexploded
ordnance. The improvement of roads and tracks is another important task for
engineers, especially for the protection and delivery of humanitarian relief
supplies to remote areas. Engineers can make a major contribution to force
protection when a response group is threatened by local hostility. Engineer
representatives should be included in reconnaissance parties.
f. Artillery
Artillery may fulfill a deterrent role as well as providing a capability to respond
to sudden escalations of violence. In the guarantee and denial of movement,
artillery—particularly air defense—may be used to enforce a no-fly zone.
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However, the deployment and use of fire support assets may be provocative in
PSOs. In low-level operations, mortar and artillery can be used for illumination.
In enforcement operations, artillery may be used to strike targets at a distance
rather than engaging them in close combat.
g. Military Police
Military police usually only have jurisdiction over their own national military
contingent. Their precise responsibilities vary from nation to nation, and each
mission may have a differently mandated military police element. Military police
can perform security tasks, implement control measures, and undertake general
police duties. Military police may work in close cooperation with host nation
civilian police and assist in the maintenance of law and order. They also may be
used to detect and curtail possible illegal activities (such as black marketeering)
by members of the PSO force.
h. Medical Services
Military medical services are primarily deployed for the support of the military
element. In some cases and in some emergencies, they may provide medical cover
for personnel from other elements of the international response group. Military
medical services also have the capability to be used in a wider role in humanitarian
relief operations.
i. Veterinary Services
Animal welfare is most important in certain rural societies. For PSOs conducted
in a rural environment, advice to the commander on veterinary matters may prove
crucial because veterinary services can play a vital role in many community
relations programs.
j. Logistics
Part III, Section 2, paragraph 2
In UN PSOs, nations generally are responsible for providing the logistic support
for their immediate needs (in military terms, first and second line logistic
support), and the UN will provide for the longer-term or third line support.
Contingent owned equipment will be checked into and out of the theater by the
UN. Meeting logistic demands will be a complex and demanding process
requiring dedicated logistic planning and liaison staffs. In peacekeeping operations,
the logistic staff should be the first into the theater. Logistic units usually
specialize in a particular task rather than provide general support. The overall
logistic function is often known as combat support services (CSS). CSS functions
include supply, repair, equipment support, medical, provost, and welfare services.
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Part III, Section 2, paragraph 3
3. Operational Tasks
PSO tasks for land forces will range from unarmed observer missions to operations
close to fighting a war. There is no continuum linking peacekeeping to peace enforcement.
Peace enforcement forces may be mandated for operations ranging from impartial
enforcement actions, for example to protect air deliveries, to aggressive counterforce
operations against a designated party, such as to protect a threatened community against
a belligerent attack. Essentially, PSOs are different from fighting a war in that they are
designed with a long-term objective to restore peace. The following categories of tasks
should not be regarded as exhaustive. There is no attempt to describe tasks that are
principally war fighting, even though they may have a part to play in peace enforcement
operations. Tasks often overlap; military action required by one peace support activity
may be common to others.
a. Observation and Monitoring
Soldiers may be employed individually or in small multinational teams to
observe, monitor, verify, and report. Specific tasks include early warning,
monitoring the withdrawal of belligerent parties to establish a demilitarized line
or area, liaison, investigation, and negotiation. The role of observers in battlefield
stabilization and confidence-building measures between belligerent parties has
evolved over several decades of traditional or low-level peacekeeping experience.
Soldiers employed as observers generally are unarmed and rely greatly on
their impartial and neutral status for their protection.
At levels of reduced tension, observation may be carried out by unarmed
personnel in small multinational teams, often including civilian representatives.
At higher levels of tension, observers may be lightly armed and grouped in singlenationality
military teams.
b. Supervision of Truces and Cease-Fires
Land force elements may be deployed to supervise and ensure that belligerent
parties comply with truces and cease-fires. In this role, UN military elements may
be armed and deployed in greater numbers than for an observer mission. Their
tasks, generally agreed and specified in the detail of their mandate, could include
the supervision of:
• the return of prisoners and bodies;
• compliance with arms control agreements;
• liaison between belligerent parties and between the parties
and the peacekeeping force;
• negotiation and mediation; and
• impartial investigation of complaints and alleged breaches of
agreements.
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Part III, Section 2, paragraph 3
c. Interposition
Interposition is often described as “separation of forces operations.” Interposition
operations can be conducted as peace enforcement without the consent of the
belligerent parties. However, they are usually preplanned with their consent and
normally follow (but could precede) the withdrawal and assembly of opposing
factions from a cease-fire line.
Whether the interposition force has separated the opposing forces by peace
agreement, cease-fire, or enforcement, the mechanics of the delineation will be
managed by the following:
(1) Cease-Fire Line
The cease-fire line marks the forward limit of the positions occupied
by opposing factions. It is by its nature usually the subject of contention,
particularly when it adjoins significant tactical features.
(2) Buffer Zone
A buffer zone is a neutral space or no-man’s-land between cease-fire
lines. The width of the buffer zone may be based on line-of-sight or
weapon ranges. A buffer zone may contain residents, farmland, or
other assets that the force should patrol, monitor, and protect. Otherwise,
access to buffer zones and perhaps the air space above it will be
strictly controlled and limited to the supervising authority.
(3) Control Zones
Control zones are mutually agreed areas on either side of the buffer
zone, the forward limits of which will be the cease-fire lines. Mutually
agreed upper limits are set for numbers of personnel, tanks, artillery
(by caliber), and missiles permitted in the control zone.
The interposition may be phased with advance groups deployed to provide a
screen between withdrawing factions. Once in position, forces may be required
to protect the parties to a conflict from outside interference and attack, as well as
to take action against the violators of cease-fires. Interposition also may be used
as a short-term emergency response to forestall or manage a local crisis.
d. Demobilization Operations
In civil conflict, stability may be threatened throughout the area of operations by
the activities of irregular forces or militias. In prolonged civil conflict, a
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Part III, Section 2, paragraph 3
disproportionately large element of the population will be armed, either for selfdefense
or because they are involved in militia forces. In the event of a peace
settlement, the main tasks of the UN military element will be to reduce the
numbers of men under arms and assist in their rehabilitation into more stable and
productive employment. In some cases, the UN’s military element may have to
maintain security and assist in upholding law and order. By creating a stable
environment for the peace process, the other elements of the response group can
move and work more freely and effectively. The military element may be
involved in the following stages of the demobilization process.
(1) Securing Agreements
The opposed parties will seldom make the mutual concessions that are
essential in any lasting settlement until all possibility of improving
their tactical situation has been exhausted and war weariness makes it
impossible to energize their fighters or replenish their war resources.
An agreement reached in advance of these conditions may not prove
to be durable. Demobilization that occurs as a consequence of diplomatic
pressure or coercion before the conflict has reached a stalemate
will be more difficult to manage. In all cases the details of the
agreement should include the mechanisms of establishing and managing
the cease-fire.
(2) Withdrawal and Assembly of Belligerent Forces
Following a cease-fire, demobilization operations may require the
coordinated disengagement and withdrawal of belligerent forces into
cantonment areas. For security reasons, this should occur simultaneously
throughout the entire theater of operations. Effective reception
arrangements and efficient administrative and logistic support
systems are essential to success. As a consequence, these operations
are manpower intensive.
(3) Disarming Belligerent Forces
Successful disarmament depends on the confidence that the belligerent
forces have in the demobilization process as a whole. Critically, it
hinges on their trust in the peacekeeping force to impartially maintain
the security environment. Disarmament by one party that is not
matched by an equivalent disarmament by others leads to vulnerability
and distrust. Therefore the phases of disarmament should be
mutually agreed. Besides collecting weapons from combatants, disarmament
will include the collection of war supplies from stockpiles
and depots and the interdiction of supply routes. The custody and
accurate accounting of weapons and material is essential.
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Part III, Section 2, paragraph 3
(4) Dispersal and Rehabilitation of Belligerent Forces
Having selected those who should be trained as the new government’s
security forces, effective support measures will need to be created for
the efficient dispersal and rehabilitation of the remainder of the
belligerent forces. This is principally the responsibility of the civil
authorities and will be carried out in conjunction with the reconstitution
of all other means of government. The organization and protection
of an electoral process may be the most important event at this
stage of the process (see Part II, Section 5, paragraphs 5e and 8a). The
principle tasks of the military will be to provide the training functions
and general administrative support to the civil authorities, particularly
to the electoral component if elections are to be held.
e. Conflict Prevention
A threatened state or population may call on the international community,
through the UN, to internationalize the dispute, gain sympathy and support, and
above all, assist in its survival. Diplomatic activity is the preferred conflict
prevention instrument; however, in the event of a diplomatic failure, international
forces may be deployed in a conflict prevention role. Conflict prevention
deployments that take place in response to a threat of this kind may be lightly
armed observers in a monitoring role, or deployed in strength with a view to resist
or deliver some form of retribution on an expected attacker. A conflict prevention
operation may take place in an area of actual or potential conflict. Whether the
operation should be one of peacekeeping or peace enforcement is a policy level
decision based on the nature of the conflict, the level of consent to the operation,
the force levels available, and the political support for the operation.
(1) Conflict Prevention Activities
Despite the possibility that international forces may have been deployed
because of diplomatic failure, conflict prevention activities
will be most effective in support of preventative diplomatic activities.
There are four peacekeeping activities that contribute to the prevention
of conflict or the resurgence of hostilities:
(a)
(b)
Early Warning: By identifying the threat of an outbreak or
escalation of violence, early warning may buy time for a range
of preventative diplomatic and military actions to be effected.
Commanders therefore must focus their information assets on
any potential crisis situation within their areas of operation.
Surveillance: The presence of widespread and impartial surveillance
in an area of operations will deter breeches of the peace by
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Part III, Section 2, paragraph 3
parties to a conflict. Effective surveillance is a key conflict
prevention technique. Full use should be made of the entire range
of techniques and equipment available including observation,
monitoring, patrols, and attended and unattended electronic,
optical, and acoustic surveillance devices. Airborne reconnaissance
may be particularly important.
(c)
Stabilizing Measures: This may contribute to the lowering of
tension in an area and may represent the first step toward
negotiations for a political settlement. They may take several
forms:
• establishment of effective communication mechanisms between
all parties;
• mutual and balanced reductions in personnel and equipment;
• the establishment of demilitarized buffer zones;
• zonal restrictions on the deployment of weapons and manpower;
• advance reporting of military activities or exercises;
• joint inspections of disputed areas; and
• the exchange of liaison teams.
(d)
Preventative Deployment: This action is likely to take place in an
area of potential rather than actual conflict. Although there will
be consent to the operation, a peace plan or formal cease-fire may
not have been agreed and the situation may be characterized by
sporadic outbreaks of violence. To be effective, the force must
not only be strong enough to deter hostile actions but also must
be perceived to be so. A preventative deployment force may need
to be armed and structured for protective tasks that go beyond the
demands for self-defense and supported by strong reserves. Such
a force must be prepared to transit to peace enforcement should
it lose the consent of one or more of the belligerent parties.
(2) Intervention Activities
Intervention activities are designed at the tactical level to maintain the
current status quo and prevent further acts of aggression. At the
operational level, such activities may include the forcible separation
of belligerents.
(a)
Preventative Deployment: Such a deployment would not have
the consent of one or more of the belligerent parties and consequently
the military element, and some sections of the response
group would have to be fully prepared to become involved in
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Part III, Section 2, paragraph 3
fighting a war should that prove necessary. However, its actions
should be designed principally to deter further hostile actions.
(b)
Forcible Separation of Belligerents: This is the ultimate means
to counter a serious threat to peace and security and should be
used only when all other means of conflict resolution have been
exhausted. However, as the desired end state is not to destroy one
or more of the belligerent parties but to force their separation and
disengagement, commanders should, as far as possible, conduct
operations in as an impartial a manner as possible. The belligerents
should be given the option to disengage and withdraw. If they do
not, an alternative is to pursue the operation vigorously to its
conclusion.
e. Military Assistance
Military forces may be employed to assist civil authorities within a state or region
where effective government has ceased to exist. In extreme conditions of civil
war, such assistance may need to be preceded by an enforcement operation to
create the conditions under which a legal government can be established. Military
assistance operations will tend to be a post conflict activity and as such the
principles of consent, impartiality, and minimum force will still govern military
activities. Military assistance also can be used to provide support to civilian
elements in the election process. Military assistance tasks cover a broad range of
activities within the following categories:
• supervision;
• administration;
• protection;
• reaction;
• control; and
• coordination.
f. Humanitarian Relief and its Protection
(1) The assistance and protection of displaced persons, refugees, and
resident communities at risk from the results of conflict is a growing
aspect of PSOs. Military forces have the capability to conduct limited
humanitarian operations, to provide assistance to others doing so, and
to provide protection to both. Operations can be conducted as part of
or in parallel to other peacekeeping activities; but they will be more
difficult, if not impossible, to sustain in peace enforcement operations.
In most humanitarian assistance operations, it is probable that
a broad variety of international civil agencies already will be involved,
including the UN agencies, NGOs, and bilateral donors. Military
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Part III, Section 2, paragraph 3
resources will need to be committed to liaising with all of these
agencies and to assisting coordination mechanisms designed to enhance
unity of effort.
(2) Categories of Humanitarian Relief Operations
Military relief operations will be designed either to provide emergency
relief and/or administrative assistance. Emergency relief tasks
may include the need to protect human rights and sustain or safeguard
life. Administrative assistance concerns the reprovision of the basic
life support infrastructure facilities: water, fuel, and the means of selfsupport
and sustainment.
(3) Technical Assistance
Having brought or assisted others to bring emergency life sustaining
relief to the victims of the conflict, subsequent tasks for the military
will be to assist in the rebuilding of the infrastructure needed to
provide more long-term sustainment. Typically, such operations would
involve digging wells, reconnecting water and electricity grid systems
(where they exist), and rebuilding a communication network.
(4) Protection of Humanitarian Assistance Operations
When relief is obstructed by extortion, looting, and the collateral
dangers of ongoing conflict, humanitarian relief operations may need
protection. This may extend to the protection of convoys, depots,
equipment, and those responsible for their operation. Such activities
will need the closest cooperation and coordination, not least to
maintain the neutral status of the aid agencies.
g. Establishment and Supervision of Protected Areas
As part of either a peacekeeping or peace enforcement operation, protected or safe
areas may be established. A military force tasked with establishing and supervising
the protected or safe area must have clear guidance on what criteria define
“protected” and “safe.” The establishment and supervision of protected and safe
areas where belligerent factions are in active conflict or at war will require peace
enforcement.
The precise nature of the operation will be dictated by conditions on the ground,
the level of consent for the operation, the state of the conflict, and the level of
resources allocated to the mission. These areas may contain residents, refugees,
displaced persons, and substantial numbers of forces of one or more of the
belligerent forces. Forces may be charged with the establishment and supervision
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of such areas and to provide support and assistance to other organizations within
the safe area. Specific military tasks may include not just defending these areas
but also ensuring that they are not used as safe bases from which one belligerent
faction can attack another. For such operations to be credible and successful, they
need the combat power available to deter or match force at whatever level it might
be used by the belligerents, either against one another or against the PSO force.
h. Mine Awareness and Mine Clearance Operations
Part III, Section 2, paragraph 3
Mines and unexploded munitions pose a significant threat to all people and
animals during, and long after, the termination of a conflict. The minefields in a
combat zone, however, still belong to the belligerent party that laid them. In
theory, they remain part of their obstacle plan should the PSO force withdraw. If
the PSO force wishes to retain its impartial status, it is obliged not to give away
one party’s minefields to the other, although it should try to ensure that they are
discreetly and adequately marked. It follows, therefore, that unless the mandate
specifies otherwise, a force is not permitted to lift a party’s minefields, except to
destroy or remove mines and unexploded munitions that prevent the force from
carrying out its mission, or that offer a hazard along tracks in use by the force and
local civilians.
Within the international community, overall responsibility for mine awareness
and mine clearance operations rests with the DHA LDDL (see Part II, Section 3,
paragraph 4e), although other organizations and agencies also may be tasked with
particular responsibilities. Mine clearance operations should be undertaken
principally by the party that laid them; however, military pioneers and engineers
from the PSO force can be employed to mark, isolate, and clear mines and
unexploded munitions. The primary task of the PSO team should be to train
indigenous forces to do the same.
The military generally will actively seek to identify hazard areas. This information
will be marked on a master map and made available for dissemination to all
elements of the PSO. Nonmilitary personnel who realize that they may be about
to venture into an area at risk from mines and unexploded munitions should check
with the military first.
i. Guarantee and Denial of Movement and the Enforcement of Sanctions
Military operations involving the enforcement of sanctions and the denial of
supplies, rather than the denial of diplomatic and trading facilities, are inextricably
linked to operations that guarantee and deny movement. These operations to
guarantee and deny movement by air, land, and/or sea are invariably joint
(including air and maritime forces) and generally conducted at the operational
level. Land force commanders may have to employ a wide range of forces to
support such missions, including infantry, armor, engineers, aviation, military
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Part III, Section 2, paragraphs 3-4
police, and air defense assets. Field artillery assets will be required should the
operation escalate to peace enforcement or a war fighting operation.
4. Operational Techniques
The conceptual approaches for low-level and high-level operations are different and
should not be confused; however, certain operational techniques may be common to both.
Just as the use of force may be a valid operational technique in operations where consent
is fragmentary, so consent promoting techniques or a “hearts and minds” campaign may
be appropriate in peace enforcement. The key to success lies in the selection of the most
appropriate techniques and an understanding of the levels at which each technique will
achieve most effect.
a. Techniques to Maintain Consent
Consent as a precondition for successful peace support operations is described in
Part I, paragraph 17. Each element of a multinational response group will have a
different approach toward the need to foster consent according to their function
in the operational area. In most UN agencies and NGOs, their fundamental
reasons for participation are inherently for promoting consent. For example, they
provide highly desired items such as food or emergency medical care. However,
the military element’s presence in the operational area does not always inspire
local support for them. For this reason, land forces will have to spend more time
and effort, down to the individual level, in consent promoting activity.
(1) Negotiation and Mediation
Negotiation refers to direct dialogue, and mediation describes the
activities of a go-between (See Part IV, Section 1). Negotiation and
mediation will be conducted between the military and civilian components
of the PSO operation and between these components and the
belligerent parties. The necessary skills to conduct both these activities
must be taught to all PSO practitioners.
(2) Liaison
Liaison is designed to communicate and coordinate potentially counteracting
activities. Conflict thrives on rumor, uncertainty, and prejudice.
The timely passage of accurate information based on a trusting
relationship is a key method of combating uncertainty and promoting
stability in a conflict region. Liaison is therefore a vital tool of a PSO
force. Failure to liaise risks misunderstanding, friction, opposition,
and escalation of the conflict.
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Part III, Section 2, paragraph 4
(3) Civilian Affairs
Winning the hearts and minds of the local population by a sustained
program can improve the security environment and permit the safe
accomplishment of a wide range of mission support tasks. They are
also the basis of a longer-term stabilization process that relies on the
fostering of good community relations.
Civilian affairs projects may embrace a wide range of activities within
local communities including medical and veterinary care; the provision
and distribution of water, waste disposal, and electrical power;
the removal of unexploded ordnance; the restoration of public services;
and the construction and development of schools and civilian
aid centers. It is important to seek at an early stage the advice of local
officials, nongovernmental organizations, and relief agencies that
may be operating similar projects and to coordinate programs with
them. All elements of the PSO force should support such programs in
a coherent and consistent way. However, projects will invariably
entail the commitment of specialist resources including engineers,
medical, veterinary, military police, and special forces elements, and
are likely to require extensive logistic support.
(4) Community Information
Community information can be used to influence the behavior of
target audiences and can act as a useful means to help to achieve
cooperation within the area of operations. In this role, community
information seeks to promote popular support for the peace process
and the agencies involved; it also can respond to counter information
from parties hostile to the peace process. It should educate local
people in an honest manner about the aims, achievements, and human
face of the PSO force. It also stresses the responsibility of local
nationals to resolve their own differences. Community information
usually has a coordinating function including the broadcast of warnings,
future intentions of the controlling authorities, and details of
agreements reached between opposing factions. Community information
has the potential to make significant contributions to the overall
conflict resolution process.
(5) Public Information
Multinational operations will attract intense public interest and scrutiny
that may restrict or promote a commander’s freedom of action.
Favorable media attention is often the product of a well-managed
public information policy. Positive reporting reassures domestic audi-
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Part III, Section 2, paragraph 4
ences of the contributing nations about the validity and competence of
the operation, and locally explains the activities of the intervening
military forces in a favorable manner. A void in information may be
filled by media speculation or by hostile information generated by
parties opposing the peace process. An effective public information
service is an essential element of the PSO. The information needs of
the media require dedicated specialist staff and resources and often the
personal attention of the commander. A successful public information
campaign will depend upon supplying a high quality of service and
being open and honest.
(6) Community Relations
Community relations, as an element of both the public information
and community information programs, refers to fostering good relations
between intervening military forces and the local population.
The purpose of community relations is to create favorable perceptions
locally and encourage cooperative responses to the PSO force’s
activities. Community relations, by words and actions, seek to convey simple
and positive messages about the peace process as a whole and the good
intentions of the military element in particular. Community relations may be
developed through events such as sports days, musical concerts, displays, and
recreational outings. Community relations activities can be conducted at a
low level on a daily basis by specialized teams or by the initiatives of
local commanders. Programs should not be conducted in a way that
might prejudice the PSO force’s perceived impartiality, and all elements
of the local population should be included.
b. Security Management Techniques
(1) Information and Intelligence
In PSOs, there is a distinction between military intelligence and
military information. In low-level, noncombatant peacekeeping operations,
the covert acquisition of intelligence is not conducive to
promoting mutual trust. Sources of information are open and rely on
contacts among troops, civilian organizations, and the local population.
But in high-level peace enforcement operations, the covert
acquisition of intelligence is less inhibited by the need to retain
consent to the operation. Mid-level operations fall between the above
categories and provides the UN with a dilemma on whether or not to
remain uninformed on the future activities of a potentially hostile
party. Within the UN, a reluctance to accept the requirement for
information and intelligence has significantly limited the conduct of
military operations. Information and intelligence are as relevant to
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success in PSOs as they are in all military operations. The needs of the
commander in PSOs are more complex because of the multinational
organizations involved. In PSOs, a number of other agencies and
NGOs will have been in-theater long before the military arrive. They
can prove an invaluable source of information, but one has to be
careful not to compromise their impartial status.
Military intelligence and information works through the continuous
cyclical process of direction, collection, interpretation, evaluation,
collation, and dissemination of information. The intelligence and
information organization must be flexible and task organized, and
probably will require considerable augmentation to include specialists
in a wide variety of fields. Intelligence in some PSOs is provided
individually to contingents from national sources that may not be
under the control of the force commander.
(2) Observation, Monitoring, and Investigation
Observation and monitoring are fundamental techniques. Tasks may
range from the observation of cease-fire lines by unarmed individuals
and/or small multinational teams in peacekeeping operations to the
covert acquisition of intelligence by special forces teams in peace
enforcement operations. Methods used by observers might include the
manning of static observation posts and checkpoints as well as foot
and vehicle patrols. Effective liaison with all parties involved is a
critical element of most of these methods. Success depends largely on
accurate, timely reporting using reliable communications.
Investigation and verification may be required when violations are
observed and reported, and could include gathering evidence on
human rights abuses.
(3) Supervision
Part III, Section 2, paragraph 4
Supervision tasks can be conducted by local civil authorities and PSO
forces. It also may be possible to delegate certain supervised tasks
jointly to the parties to a conflict; such action would encourage their
joint cooperation and contribute significantly toward the conciliation
of the parties concerned. Investigation of complaints and alleged
breaches of agreement, as well as supervisory tasks, should be conducted
according to previously agreed procedures and governed by
the principles of objectivity, thoroughness, and impartiality. Not all
complaints will be dealt with as official complaints. Those that are
minor often can be dealt with at a low level; however, they must still
be reported and recorded fully.
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Part III, Section 2, paragraph 4
The investigation of war crimes is a highly sensitive political activity,
usually conducted by specialist teams of war crimes investigators who
generally will work outside of the PSO force chain of command.
(4) Control Measures
Control measures will be designed to limit or deny access and freedom
of movement. In peacekeeping operations, such measures ideally
should be agreed to by the belligerent parties in a cease-fire agreement.
In a peace enforcement operation, such measures may be
imposed, possibly in the form of a curfew. Rather than peacekeeping
forces being directly responsible for control measures, local police
forces should be used at the interface with the local population.
Control may be achieved by the use of guards and checkpoints.
Checkpoint requirements and the procedures and tactics they employ
will depend on the provisions and authority of the mandate, the SOFA,
and the PSO force Standing Operational Procedures (SOPs). Guards
and checkpoints may constitute a major interface between the military
element and local populace, and it is very important that they behave
with good manners and respect local customs.
In a military assistance situation, the PSO force may be required to
support the civil authority in controlling a public assembly. This is
probably one of the most challenging tasks for a junior commander,
and small mistakes can have large consequences. The armament,
number of troops deployed, and scale of reserves will depend on the
situation. Reconnaissance, deployment of reserves, liaison with the
civil authority, and minimum force will be critical factors guiding the
execution of such a control measure.
(5) Patrolling
Patrolling is a key activity in PSOs and may be used to gather
information, to provide additional security for guards and at checkpoints,
and to escort representatives of the PSO force, relief agencies,
aid convoys, members of the civil authority, and threatened elements
of the local populace. Patrolling can be used also to carry out aspects
of most PSO tasks, including mobile checkpoints, investigation,
interposition, supervision, liaison, negotiation, and “flying the flag”
to reassure and calm troubled areas, deter lawbreakers, and promote
the credibility and prestige of the PSO force.
Patrols may be carried out on foot or by any alternative means that
might be available including “soft-skinned” and armored vehicles,
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fixed or rotary wing aircraft, and sea vessels. The protection of the
patrol in the prevailing situation will be a key factor in determining the
means to be used.
(6) Cordon and Search
Cordon and search operations are generally a peace enforcement
activity that can be conducted in both urban and rural environments.
Their purpose is to isolate a specific urban or rural area to enable a
thorough and possibly violent search operation without interfering
with civilian routines in the surrounding area, or allowing suspects
inside the cordon to escape.
5. Creating a Command Structure
Part III, Section 2, paragraphs 4-5
The complexity and political nature of PSOs create command challenges that cannot
always be addressed by ad hoc organizations. National military forces have headquarters
with trained commanders and staff who are practiced in many of the skills required for
the successful management of large-scale multifunctional operations. In past operations,
the UN has in some cases overcome the unstructured nature of multinational deployments,
particularly headquarters, by taking an already-established military headquarters
and using it as a framework structure for other components to join (see Part III, Section
1, paragraph 5).
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PART III: MILITARY FORCES AND CIVILIAN POLICE
SECTION 3
MARITIME FORCES
1. Introduction
The vast majority of peace support operations occur on land. Seventy percent of the
world’s population and centers of government lie within 100 kilometers of a coastline,
and in this littoral region, naval forces often are able to influence and/or support peace
support operations. Naval forces also are often the first major military elements of a
response group to arrive in the vicinity of a crisis area; in some cases, they may already
be on scene before deciding to deploy a military element of a response group. They have
an advantage in that they usually can remain on station for long periods of time if an atsea
replenishment capability exists, and they can avoid getting involved except when
needed. Naval forces become directly involved when they land or remove amphibious
troops, attack land targets, or conduct emergency evacuations of response group
members. Ships may carry joint force headquarters elements that have the ability to
command and control naval and military assets, land amphibious forces and supplies, and
monitor events with ship-borne aircraft and other assets. With these capabilities, naval
forces can greatly influence both land and sea crisis areas.
2. The Maritime Environment
International law provides legal access for ships to move freely at sea. Throughout
the world, the movement of ships and their communications with other vessels are
regulated through standards derived from hundreds of years of custom, ritual, and law.
International law provides legal access for ships to move within the 200 mile exclusive
economic zones (EEZ) claimed by coastal countries. The exception is movement in
territorial waters, which are generally recognized to extend 12 miles out from a nation’s
shore. Even within territorial waters, warships sometimes maintain the right of innocent
passage for the purpose of a continuous transit.
3. Naval Organization and Equipment Categories
a. Organization
Naval forces are task organized according to the missions and tasks they must
perform and the threat they expect to face. Task organization for sea control
missions might range from a full aircraft carrier battle group, to a cruiserdestroyer
group, to a single ship operating on its own. Task organization for
power projection missions include any of the preceding options with the possible
addition of amphibious support ships and marine units (i.e., naval infantry). Most
modern, Western navies have a well-practiced capability to integrate with and
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Part III, Section 3, paragraph 3
operate ad hoc as part of a multinational force at short notice, depending on the
complexity of the task and the degree of threat.
b. Equipment
Naval forces worldwide can be classified into one of three categories: major
combatants, minor combatants, and auxiliaries. Combatants, as the name implies,
are ships built expressly for combat, while the auxiliary ships support the
combatants by providing fuel, food, munitions, and other supplies.
(1) Major combatants
The major combatants are generally the largest and most heavily
armed ships. They are used predominately in blue water (i.e. out at sea)
or noncoastal areas, although this does not prevent their use in power
projection missions. Major surface combatants include aircraft and
helicopter carriers, amphibious assault ships, cruisers, destroyers, and
frigates. Cruisers and destroyers are normally designed for anti-air
warfare but also may have an anti-submarine warfare capability;
frigates are generally designed for anti-submarine warfare. Larger
ships such as carriers and cruisers often have extensive command,
control, and communications suites that allow them to act as floating
command centers. Most modern major surface combatants carry one
or more helicopters on board, or at least are capable of having one take
off or land from them.
Submarines are often counted as major combatants. Although they are
not generally needed in most peace support operations, they do have
particular capabilities that make them valuable in certain circumstances.
Besides protecting surface ships from surface and underwater
attack, submarines are an excellent platform for covertly tracking and
monitoring surface vessels and activities on shore, inserting or removing
small numbers of specialist troops, and, for those equipped with
land-attack missiles, attacking targets ashore.
(2) Minor Combatants
These are smaller ships and craft (less than 1,000 tons) whose primary
role is the protection of the sea approaches and coastline of a state.
Included in this category are mine-laying and mine countermeasure
ships, patrol craft, corvettes, and missile and torpedo boats.
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Part III, Section 3, paragraphs 3-4
(3) Auxiliaries
This class contains vessels of all sizes. Of relevance to PSOs is the fact
that critical support capabilities are often found on these ships. In
addition to ships that carry bulk supplies of food, munitions, POL
(petroleum, oil, lubricants), and other stores, the auxiliary class also
consists of ships that perform specialist functions such as medical care
(hospital ships) and repair and maintenance of shore-based equipment.
4. Naval Tasks in Peace Support Operations
The three broad peacetime functions of sea power can be categorized as diplomatic,
constabulary, and military, and correspond to low-, mid-, and high-level peace support
operations identified in Part I. The potential for naval involvement in peace operations
is expanding and naval forces have a role to play in disputes that are centered ashore.
Almost as long as there have been naval forces, naval units have helped to enforce
embargoes, contributed to nation-building by their presence in inland river deltas, served
as floating bases offshore, and provided a venue for peace meetings off the coast. Outside
territorial waters, warships have freedom of movement and can “poise” close to a coastal
state without infringing on its sovereignty. Warships can be deployed to a crisis for
lengthy periods without increasing anxiety levels in the host state. These examples
illustrate the versatility of naval forces in contributing to missions that fall short of war
fighting. With their reach and flexibility, navies are a key asset in a wide variety of crises.
a. Naval Diplomacy
Naval diplomacy is action designed to influence leaders of a state or faction in
which naval forces can be used to deter and coerce troublemakers or support and
reassure a fragile host government. Naval forces can be used symbolically to send
a message while not posing a threat themselves. The deployment of a substantial
multinational naval force could indicate a readiness to use force and the political
will to intervene.
b. Evacuation Operations
Where land options are deemed risky, or when airfields are closed, naval forces
can conduct evacuation operations from ports, helicopter landing zones, or, if
necessary, across a beachhead. Amphibious forces can be landed to secure and
defend beachheads and air heads, establish muster points for evacuees, protect
routes, and move evacuees to safety before withdrawing.
c. Sealift
Sealift refers to the strategic capability to transport and deliver bulk equipment
and supplies on a global scale. In a PSO, key elements of the response group will
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Part III, Section 3, paragraph 4
arrive by sea. Sea lift is flexible; it can be used for prepositioning, poise, and
resupply. Sealift supports peace forces ashore on a long-term basis by providing
logistics, maintenance, and support functions offshore. Finally, sealift is likely to
be used for backloading peace support contingents, either on successful completion
of the mission, or in an emergency. Many navies have sealift capability.
Those without it generally use commercial shipping, either by charter or through
governmental co-option of national shipping assets to provide sealift capability.
The proliferation of particularly quiet, advanced conventional submarines, sea
mining capabilities, and the vulnerability of unprotected shipping to air attack in
coastal areas means that sealift assets will have to be protected both in transit and
in-theater if a threat exists.
d. Offshore Support
In addition to sealift, typical roles fulfilled by naval forces in offshore support are:
• air support;
• naval gunfire support;
• surveillance;
• command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I);
• combat search and rescue;
• medical support;
• accommodation facilities; and
• logistic support.
Naval weapons and their associated sensors can engage targets on the sea, below
the sea, in the air, and on the land. Whereas naval gunfire support of land forces
is a traditional role for warships, the advent of precision-guided shells, bombs,
missiles, and cruise missiles fired from the sea or naval aircraft now permits
advanced naval forces to precisely strike targets hundreds of miles inland.
Manned naval aircraft have been used to support forces ashore; the development
of the Harrier vertical/short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) aircraft enabled several
mid-sized navies to have this capability. Because there are significant differences
between national doctrines on the use of naval forces to support land forces, it may
be advantageous to arrange for each nation’s land force contingent to be given
offshore support by its own national naval forces.
e. Mine Countermeasures
At sea the threat or presence of mines can seriously hamper naval operations. Sea
mines come in many forms and can be laid by surface vessels (not necessarily
warships), aircraft, and submarines. Even in their crudest form, they are highly
effective. Sea mines are countered in a variety of ways; active mine countermeasures
(MCM) are undertaken by specialist vessels, helicopters, and EOD teams
of divers. A sophisticated and comprehensive mine threat may require the
178

deployment of the whole range of MCM techniques. PSO naval forces may be
faced with a mine threat that their individual MCM are not designed to counter.
In this case, a high degree of multinational naval cooperation in the employment
of MCM assets may be required from the outset of an operation. Nations may
work independently in assigned areas, employ their differing MCM capabilities
sequentially in a common area, or work alongside each other as a totally
integrated MCM force.
f. Patrol/Embargo
The need to monitor sea movement and the ability, if required, to inspect,
guarantee, or restrict the movement of all or a portion of the traffic in a certain area
may be essential to support UN Security Council resolutions. Naval vessels are
ideal for achieving this goal with surveillance sensors, war fighting capabilities,
and endurance. The use of either organic or separately provided aircraft in
cooperation with a naval force will significantly increase the area under observation.
Patrol, inspection, and embargo missions can be conducted independently,
cooperatively, or in an integrated fashion.
g. Convoy/Escort
There may be a requirement for naval forces operating in support of United
Nations resolutions to guarantee the safe movement of certain vessels through a
sea area or route. This may be for their own sealift forces, vessels carrying
humanitarian supplies, general commercial sea traffic, specific types of vessels
(e.g., tankers), or their own naval forces. Convoying, screening, or close escort
arrangements will enable the naval forces assigned to this duty to provide the best
possible protection to shipping; however, this may require ship owners to adjust
schedules to meet coordination arrangements. If this is not acceptable, then a
defended lane concept might be viable. However, the protection provided is less
satisfactory and invariably calls for more protective forces to be employed to
guarantee the same level of protection as the convoy option.
5. Operations in Low-, Mid-, and High-Level Environments
A table containing the range of tasks that naval forces might conduct within the
various levels of the peace support and enforcement environment is in Figure 1 .
Figure 1: Naval Tasks
Part III, Section 3, paragraphs 4-5
LOW-LEVEL
Passive:
observe
monitor
provide a presence
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Part III, Section 3, paragraph 5
Active:
clear mines
separate forces
provide safe havens
collect weapons
provide logistic support
provide offshore headquarters
conduct environmental cleanup
provide interim public services (police, fire, coast guard, search and
rescue, power, medical, navigation)
provide humanitarian assistance
conduct noncombatant evacuation
provide airborne reconnaissance
MID-LEVEL
Passive:
Active:
observe
monitor
poise or conduct
preventive deployment
clear mines
separate forces
enforce safe havens
disarm/demobilize
conduct environmental cleanup
provide interim public services (police, fire, coast guard, search
and rescue, power, medical, navigation)
provide humanitarian assistance
hostage rescue/evacuation
refugee protection
protect commercial installations/practices
guarantee/deny movement
conduct combat air patrols
provide close air support to land forces
escort/protect noncombatant vessels through conflict area
HIGH-LEVEL
tasks as above
interdict sea and air traffic
sanctions
high intensity operations
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Part III, Section 3, paragraph 5
a. The Low-Level Environment
Low-level peace operations must be perceived to be impartial and the operating
posture must be low-key and reassuring in order to avoid antagonizing local
factions into aggressive action.
(1) Promoting Impartiality
Impartiality can be emphasized by establishing a neutral identity that
is associated with a multinational force that may be more acceptable
than national or alliance forces.
(2) Tasks
In a relatively benign environment and in most cases assigned with
simple tasks, multinational naval operations in support of a PSO raise
few problems. Common communication frequencies, together with a
mutual understanding of the task and some knowledge of each other’s
ROE, enables monitoring, patrolling, and embargo operations to take
place. More technically demanding tasks, such as mine clearance, may
be undertaken as a loose confederation of nations. These nations agree
on delineated operating areas, with the forces utilizing national methods
within their assigned localities.
(3) Operating Posture
Because a naval presence offshore does not impinge greatly on a host
nation’s sovereignty, naval operations in a PSO can be conducted in
a nonthreatening manner to local factions. It may be possible to base
naval forces outside territorial waters of the host state. Some vessels
have a long history of peacetime and precrisis port visits and are
familiar to many populations, so their presence in a crisis often does
not raise undue alarm. In this way they can be usefully tasked to
conduct or support low-level missions.
b. The Mid-Level Environment
Even though local support may be uncertain, peace forces must continue to
operate using minimum force, while at the same time maintain the capability to
defend themselves and their charges should local factions use violence against the
peacekeepers. Naval forces can respond in this environment.
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Part III, Section 3, paragraph 5
(1) War Fighting Capability
General purpose warships are equipped with surface-to-surface and
surface-to-air missiles, helicopters, and medium-range guns, offering
a comprehensive package for defense of friendly forces at sea, provision
for offshore power projection, and limited support of land forces.
They can observe and analyze the local environment and traffic
patterns. In certain circumstances, they also can exchange data automatically
with other naval, air, and land units. General purpose warships of advanced
navies are able to conduct extensive analysis of electronic data garnered from
ashore. In fact, a ship’s electronic listening capability and interpretation
equipment is usually far more sophisticated than that ordinarily deployed
with land forces in a PSO. As more naval services focus on the littoral
warfare environment, these capabilities are likely to become more common.
The presence of specialist naval intelligence gathering vessels, which
several nations’ forces possess, and the general capability of most units
to receive filtered information from national sources by means of
long-range communications or space-based systems will provide a
useful source of intelligence.
(2) Flexibility
With this comprehensive range of weaponry, there is generally no
need to augment their combat capability to cope with a changing
environment. Warships generally have three internal alert states that
govern their readiness: a cruising state, a defense state, and an action
state. As the local environment changes from benign to threatening to
one of actual or imminent attack, the ship’s posture also changes to
meet the threat.
c. The High-Level Environment
In high intensity operations, naval forces establish control of the sea around the
enemy’s coast and then use access to the coastline to project power to enhance the
land campaign. In these operations, “blue water” navies may integrate and
cooperate in UN-sanctioned enforcement actions. Multinational naval forces
may transfer command and control to a unified commander.
There are also nonconsensual operations that may result in high-level combat
such as blockades and embargoes. The UN is increasingly using sanctions as
leverage, and, in recent case histories, the threat to UN-sponsored naval forces has
been either nonexistent or never materialized. Although the consent of the parties
involved is not usually sought, multinational naval forces will have to be prepared
and capable of enforcing sanctions in the face of direct opposition and if necessary
providing an overwhelming show of force.
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6. Operational Techniques and Capabilities of Naval Forces
a. Poise (Presence)
Naval forces have the ability to poise at sea, remaining on station for prolonged
periods, keeping options open, signaling the political will of their nation,
deterring, compelling, and coercing. The ability to poise in international waters
avoids the political complications and military risks of deploying forces on land.
Warships can be withdrawn without the stigma of retreat or the embarrassing
abandonment of territory. They can match the pace and nature of diplomatic
activity ashore. The presence of a naval force can provide reassurance of
deterrence. It can maintain presence without occupation and coerce without direct
involvement.
b. Amphibious Operations
Many naval forces have a rudimentary capability to put ashore units of armed
sailors or marines (i.e., naval infantry). Although such landing forces are usually
capable of only small-scale operations of short duration, they often can provide
local, temporary security useful for evacuation and other operations. Some navies
include permanently constituted marine amphibious units, such as the U.S.
Marine Corps and the British Royal Marine Commandos. Supported by warships,
attack aircraft, helicopters, amphibious craft, and their own logistics train and
land vehicles, these marine forces can land ashore even in the face of opposition.
Depending on the nature of the opposition, marines are usually only able to fight
and maintain themselves ashore for limited periods of time, unless reinforced by
other land forces. Their chief advantages lie in their ability to poise off-shore until
needed, and that they are often the first substantial land forces able to enter a crisis
area (such as the U.S. Marines in Somalia).
c. Multinational Operations
Part III, Section 3, paragraph 6
Naval forces can operate either individually or as part of a larger national or
multinational group. Employing NATO procedures that are used increasingly by
non-NATO navies, they can integrate and operate multinationally. Assembling
multinational naval forces is often easier than putting together comparable land
forces. Ashore, a UN force commander may have to worry about integrating
many different units from battalions down to squads. At sea, however, force
integration is easier since it is accomplished at the ship level. There are complicating
factors, however. Since warships are considered sovereign territory,
operational control outside of national or alliance arrangements is granted only
reluctantly. This autonomy, and the fact that naval forces are often far removed
from the headquarters of a PSO, makes their operations more difficult to
coordinate with those of land and air forces. In past PSOs, the result has been that
naval forces have had limited communications (and little in common) with their
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Part III, Section 3, paragraph 6
land or air forces counterparts. Because this still remains a problem, recent
experience of naval forces in peace support operations and a growing emphasis
on joint operations has had an ameliorating effect.
d. Cooperation with Land Forces
Coordination problems emerge whenever naval operations approach the littoral.
For example, the preferred arrangement for amphibious operations involves
control of ship-to-shore movement of forces being exercised from the sea, with
command transferring ashore once the landing forces have been established there.
A great deal of sophistication and commonality in procedures are required to
coordinate the air, land, and sea elements of amphibious landings and support of
forces ashore. Nonetheless recent experience of advanced naval forces and
doctrine development is promoting greater cooperation between naval and land
forces. Operations on inland waterways have always demanded close coordination
with land forces. This may be difficult to arrange between commanders based
ashore and at sea. For this reason, navies prefer that light transport or patrol craft
running on inland waterways be delegated or report directly to land force
commanders.
e. Capabilities of Naval Forces in PSOs
(1) Mobility
Warships can travel over 450 miles a day; with access to more than two
thirds of the world’s surface, naval forces can respond to crises from
distant bases and may be the only forces able to do so, becoming
selectively visible and menacing, as required.
(2) Versatility
Warships deploy readily for any contingency. They can change swiftly
from a peacetime to combatant state. Frigates and destroyers designed
to counter submarine and air threats also can be used equally effectively
for the conduct of embargo operations, disaster relief, search
and rescue, and drug interdiction.
(3) Resilience
Warships are designed to absorb damage. Ships’ companies are
trained to repair the hull or restore equipment quickly so that the ship
can remain operational. Resilience allows a commander to approach
most peace support operations from low-level to high-level enforcement
with confidence.
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Part III, Section 3, paragraphs 6-7
(4) Endurance
Some naval forces can deploy with their own logistic support and
repair and medical facilities. They can operate for extended periods at
considerable distance from shore support.
(5) Extended Reach
Many warships have the extra reach endowed by their own organic air
assets. Besides the obvious example of aircraft carriers, most escorts
of the major naval powers carry helicopters.
(6) Lift Capacity
Ships are nearly always the cheapest—and sometimes the quickest—
means of transporting large numbers of personnel, equipment, and
supplies to a crisis zone. In some situations, ships may be the only
transport means available. They are able to transfer forces to the land
environment and could be vital in the support of the deployment,
resupply, and withdrawal phases of an operation or mission.
7. Interoperability and Integration
a. Successful interoperability of multinational naval forces will depend on common
goals and rules of engagement, equipment compatibility, overcoming language
problems, common doctrine, and combined training. There will be shortfalls, and
a balance has to be struck between integration and efficiency in any coalition of
naval forces.
b. The aim of integration within a force is to:
• enhance legitimacy;
• maximize offensive and defensive capability (force multiplier
effect);
• ensure economy of effort; and
• avoid mutual interference.
The sophistication of each weapon system on a warship and the degree of
technical expertise needed to use it effectively has dictated an increasing
specialization of tasks in naval forces. Warships operating together as part of a
long-standing naval alliance will in many cases have developed a high degree of
integration and interoperability. This means that in a group of ships all functions
concerned with one particular functional area are assigned to a single commander.
Thus the warfare commander charged with anti-air warfare will detail air
surveillance, friendly fighter tasking, and force missile assignments. When a
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Part III, Section 3, paragraph 7
threat develops, he will manage force reactions within an overall plan to
neutralize it. There are also coordinated arrangements for logistics, search and
rescue, and other task force needs.
It follows that warships that are not part of an existing alliance may be reluctant
to subordinate their functions to this degree. Political commitment and national
requirements to retain control may prevent the integration in its fullest sense even
when conducting a major high-level operation.
c. Levels of Integration
The levels of increasing integration of multinational naval forces may be
characterized as:
(1) Independent
• independent;
• coordinated;
• cooperative; and
• composite.
Naval operations may be conducted independently by each participating
nation, but this is unlikely. In establishing sea control over a
specific area and for a specific period of time, naval forces, even when
operating independently, will seek to exchange information on the location,
speed, and direction of other ships and objects of mutual interest.
(2) Coordinated Operations
Multinational naval forces may be unable to integrate due to language,
doctrinal, or equipment incompatibility, or through unwillingness at
the political level. These potential sources of friction must not be
underestimated. In such circumstances, allocation of sea areas to
individual nations contributing naval forces will enable naval missions
to take place. Offshore support, MCM, patrol, embargo, defended
lane, and escort duties may all be conducted in this manner.
The sharing of information about plans, methods, operations, and
intelligence will enhance efficiency. Coordination may be achieved
by United Nations action, between governments of contributing nations,
or, at the operational level, between the nations involved.
(3) Cooperative Operations
Cooperation implies a higher degree of fusion between contributing
nations and involves planning and interaction to ensure a higher level
186

of operational efficiency. Some naval functions may be integrated
(see Part I, paragraph 16b), although ultimate command and control of
naval units is likely to remain with national commanders. A cooperative
naval mission—for example, involving mine sweeping operations—may
include three levels of collective activity between the
contributing nations: local commanders conduct cooperative operations;
at a higher level, representatives of the naval staffs may meet in
each of the capitals to decide on how to delegate authority; and senior
officials representing ministers decide on the general framework and
the limitations of the operation.
(4) Composite Operations
Integration of forces is usually a reflection of international political
support of either the Security Council resolution or of the interpretation
put upon it by other coalition partners. If there is a high degree of
political commitment, command and control of naval units may be
transferred to a nation or commander leading the coalition. This may
result in a high-level of integration of naval forces, depending on the
levels of interoperability. However, in a potentially high threat environment,
contributing countries will be reluctant to subordinate a
warship under an ad hoc arrangement, particularly when this might
reduce the protection provided to their warships, which are valuable
in terms of equipment, personnel, and national prestige. This may
result in the coalition naval force having a core of fully interoperable
ships operating compositely in the high threat area, with other nations
conducting ancillary tasks at the periphery, which may give the
coalition a distinctly regional or alliance flavor.
8. Command and Control 1
Part III, Section 3, paragraphs 7-8
Full war fighting integration of naval forces in a coalition-type, high-level force
environment requires a participating nation temporarily to delegate local direction and
control of its naval contingent to the commander of the multinational naval force.
Delegation of such control will depend on a variety of factors at the political level, but
its smooth implementation at the force level will depend on the ability to communicate
between ships and exchange data electronically, common doctrines, and common rules
of engagement.
In a low- to mid-level environment, where naval units are in direct support of land
forces operating under the local control of a United Nations or other multinational force
commander, it is possible that individual nations may choose to retain even local control
of their naval forces, in particular their aircraft carrier task groups. By being outside a UN
or multinational response group, aircraft taking off from these carriers may encounter a
separate “no-fly” zone imposed by the response group in the crisis zone. These
arrangements require national flexibility to meet the political and operational impera-
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Part III, Section 3, paragraphs 8-9
tives, and there may be a price to pay in reaction times when something unexpected
happens due to the loss of “unity of effort.”
9. Planning Ahead for Future Naval Peace Support Operations
Where contributing nations are not prepared to place their warships under the
command of a coalition leader or force commander, a contributing nations’ multinational
naval planning forum will act as the interface between national command authorities and
operational forces. Most naval tasks can be met by a variety of arrangements within the
levels of cooperation and integration explained in paragraph 6c. Even when conducting
independent operations, efficiency will be enhanced by the exchange of at least some
information between nations providing naval units. The sequence of naval operations
planning might be as follows.
a. Force Packaging Considerations
The operational risk will determine both assets required and the willingness of
countries to contribute forces. Decisive factors include:
(1) Environmental Questions
Will the force be operating in inland waterways, littoral seas, offshore
in open ocean, or a mixture of these? What are the prevailing sea
states? What are the anticipated air and sea temperatures and the need
for foul weather gear that might not normally be on board?
(2) Operational Environment
Units may have to be reconfigured depending on whether they are
involved in low-, mid- or high-level operations, sometimes during the
operation itself. For example, fast patrol boats in support of an
operation calling for an unarmed force may want to make their
armaments more robust in the event of local support becoming less
reliable. For larger ships, the principle remains the same. Contributing
states would not send ships with little or no anti-air defense into areas
where the anti-ship missile threat was high. On the other hand, heavy
cruisers are not required for most maritime interception operations.
Matching assets to mission type and the threat environment is extremely
important.
(3) Coalition Requirements
Alliance navies, for example NATO, are immediately able to carry out
missions; however, when there is little familiarity between forces and
common procedures are lacking, it is of vital importance that some
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Part III, Section 3, Figure 2
Figure 2: Organizational Options
Method of Independent Coordinated Cooperative Composite
Organization
(possible mix of
type)
Commander NCA NCA through a combined naval CTF
group/staff
ROE National National National Common
or combined
Common Not required Not essential Required Required
Language
arrangements
Logistics National National or National or National or
combined combined combined
Communications National Either:
and reporting (common nets
between units a. Unit-NACmay
be useful) Combined naval
group/staff
orb. Unitcombined
staff-
NCA
b. Coordinated
ops-benefit from
common nets
between units
Cooperative opsrequire
common
nets between units
Note: CTF - Commander, Task Force = Naval Force.
189

Part III, Section 3, paragraph 9
training time is provided prior to the commencement of any mission
to prepare communication needs, language requirements, compatibility
of rules of engagement, availability of information, and logistics
arrangements.
Once all of these considerations have been adequately addressed, the size, nature,
and form of the required force package can be determined.
b. Deployment Considerations
The size and capabilities of a naval contribution will be influenced by the strength
of alliance forces already in the area and by the profile the contributing nation
wishes to make in the overall response. At an operational level, the nature of a
naval contribution will be influenced by the distance to the destination and the
need for protection en route. Not every mission requires the same amount of
integration in order to be effective. Figure 2 shows how planning factors are
complicated as the desired level of integration increases.
c. Joint Force
Given the varying degrees of integration that may exist in the same force, it may
be necessary to design operations for several levels of integration, and allocate
tasks to various nations’ naval contingents, utilizing a layered approach to match
their political requirements and their capability to interoperate. That is, those
forces whose interoperability is greatest find themselves assigned more missions
and face greater threats. Those with little or no interoperability are assigned
independent operations in areas removed from the greatest threats.
Notes
1
Definitions taken from NATO publication AAP-6 as quoted by Jim Whitman and Ian Bartholomew,
The Chapter VII Committee—A Policy Proposal (Cambridge: Cambridge University Global Security
Programme, 1993): 27.
Further Reading
Naval Forces
Geoffrey Till, Modern Sea Power: An Introduction Brassey’s Sea Power, Volume I
(New York: Brassey’s 1987).
W. T. T. Pakenham, RN, Naval Command and Control Brassey’s Sea Power, Volume
8 (New York: Brassey’s, 1989).
J. J. Blackham, “Maritime Peacekeeping,” The RUSI Journal 138, no. 4 (August
1993), 18-23.
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Part III, Section 3
Juan Carlos Neves, “The Argentine Navy and United Nations Peace-keeping Operation
in the Gulf of Fonseca,” Naval War College Review (Winter 1994), 40-67.
S. L. W. Sim, RN, Men of War for Missions of Peace: Naval Forces in Support of
United Nations Resolutions Occasional Paper of the Center for Naval Warfare Studies.
Strategic Research Department Research Report 8-94. U.S. Naval War College, August
1, 1994.
Robert S. Staley, The Wave of the Future: The United Nations and Naval Peacekeeping
(Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1992).
Massimo A. Annati, “Stand By, We Are Bording,” Proceedings (March 1994), 53-57.
United States. Naval Doctrine Command, Naval Warfare Naval Doctrine Publication
1 (Norfolk, Va.: Naval Doctrine Command, 1994).
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192

PART III: MILITARY FORCES AND CIVILIAN POLICE
SECTION 4
AIR FORCE OPERATIONS IN SUPPORT OF PEACEKEEPING
1. Introduction
Air operations, often referred to as “airpower,” include the use of fixed-wing aircraft,
helicopters, or rotary wing aircraft and satellites. Airpower is becoming an essential
factor in peace support operations and plays a vital role in low-, mid-, and high-level
operations. Its unique characteristics can be applied widely. This section explains these
characteristics and how they can be used by an international response group in a peace
support operation.
2. Characteristics of Air
a. Advantages
(1) Height
Being able to gain height above ground level gives the ability to
observe and dominate areas of the earth’s surface (including both
above and below the sea) over long distances. There is security in
height, especially in the case of assets deployed in space; it allows
operations to be carried out with only limited interference. Height also
allows freedom to observe activity and movement in the area under
surveillance, as well as giving the advantage of perspective (i.e. the
ability to “see the other side of the hill”). With such a wide view of the
area of operations (AO), manned (or unmanned) aircraft, helicopters,
or satellites/vehicles in orbit provide a larger, more detailed, and
timely view of events than could otherwise be obtained at ground or
sea level.
(2) Reach
Aircraft can generally travel long distances and at a higher speed than
land and seacraft. Aerial refueling extends range so that aircraft can
quickly reach any part of the globe. Global reach means that airpower
can rapidly project military capabilities over very long distances.
(3) Speed and Responsiveness
Airpower provides unparalleled ability to respond quickly to developing
situations. The speed and range of modern air forces allow far
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Part III, Section 4, paragraph 2
quicker responses compared to movement over water and by land.
This characteristic can be invaluable to PSO commanders in delivering
humanitarian supplies or applying firepower on a hostile target.
(4) Freedom of Maneuver
Operating in the third dimension means that airpower offers considerable
versatility. It can approach from any direction or altitude and in
various configurations in terms of numbers and types of aircraft.
Unlike surface forces, it can combine mass and maneuver rather than
having to choose between the two. This versatility provides much
flexibility as well in taskings for various missions.
(5) Flexibility
The flexibility offered by airpower allows aircraft to be switched
between missions and locations. Movement of aircraft is far less
constrained by the location of their operating bases than any other type
of support asset. Because of their range and speed, aircraft can be
located outside the area of operations. It is possible to use the same air
assets to support more than one peace operation without being entirely
tied to a particular operation. Because airpower is so flexible, it allows
nations with limited airpower commitment to support PSOs.
(6) Security
Airpower assets have the highest level of security of any force
operating in the PSO AO. They can be based outside of the operational
area, and the time spent under threat is short compared to that of
ground forces. Speed, coupled with the ability to operate at high
altitudes with their own defensive countermeasures make airpower
assets very difficult targets. Airlift aircraft (including helicopters) are
vulnerable when on the ground in forward areas, but in most cases,
time spent in such locations is relatively short and should be minimized
by using efficient and rapid combat off-loading methods. Air
delivery techniques, such as an airdrop and underslung loads for
helicopters, can further reduce the threat. The use of space assets
offers valuable reconnaissance and can pinpoint exact positions of
forces. Satellites are less vulnerable than lower flying aircraft and the
least intrusive of all air assets. Unmanned Air Vehicles (UAVs) can
“loiter” over an area for more than a day, gathering information and
relaying it to a control center in a safe area. UAVs have a low radar
signature and are difficult to see from the ground and therefore can
perform vulnerable recce operations while exposing even fewer personnel
to risks.
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Part III, Section 4, paragraph 2
b. Limitations
(1) Environmental Conditions
Air operations may be limited by weather and terrain. Air operations
generally suffer a greater handicap in poor weather conditions than
surface military operations. Some aircraft and satellite systems are
capable of operating in limited visibility and weather; however, poor
weather conditions often restrict their ability to perform primary
tasks. Extreme temperatures or harsh operating conditions such as
blowing dust and sand make operations difficult and increase maintenance
needs. Poor weather and the need to fly by instruments will
reduce air operations in a given area by imposing a greater separation
between aircraft to maintain safety. Mountainous and wooded terrain
can mask ground forces and makes reconnaissance and targeting
difficult, while placing limitations on airlift delivery options; this is
especially true where high mountains are close to resupply sites.
(2) Support Requirements
Airpower assets require the greatest ratio of support to operational
capability. Air operations require more complex support utilities and
greater fuel stocks compared to other PSO operations. Furthermore,
the choice of operating bases for aircraft also is dependent upon the
availability of ground support facilities. For example, during airlift
operations, aircraft require a forward operating location with a standard
of security, loading and unloading facilities, intelligence access,
and air traffic control capability. This factor may restrict use of a
location that is operationally more expedient but that does not have the
required ground support facilities.
(3) Limited Payload
Aircraft payloads are more limited in weight, bulk, and type of freight
than can otherwise be carried by ships or over land. It is essential that
load selection is carefully prioritized, which is crucial to a relief plan
and is decided at the highest level. The disadvantages of small
payloads are offset by the speed and urgency of air delivery in critical
situations, the flexibility of the delivery point, high sortie rates, and
the ability to change rapidly the loads or delivery priorities repeatedly
during an operation.
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Part III, Section 4, paragraphs 2-3
(4) Intelligence and Information
Air reconnaissance and surveillance systems are increasingly capable
of measuring and monitoring physical features, military deployments,
and movement. However, most air operations are mounted and controlled
from bases outside the AO, and the crews and staffs involved
are not as closely in touch with the local situation as ground forces and
civilian agencies working in the crisis zone. Air operations crews and
support staff therefore rely on those on the ground for many aspects of
their intelligence and information. It is important to develop efficient
procedures for the exchange of information between those on the
ground and those responsible for conducting air operations, particularly
where offensive action may be involved.
(5) The Transient Nature of Air Power (i.e., Impermanence)
Aircraft cannot stay airborne indefinitely. Although air-to-air refueling
can greatly extend the range and endurance of aircraft, the need to
rearm, recrew, or service aircraft will limit operations. Large numbers
of aircraft may therefore be needed to sustain support, or maintain a
presence or reactive availability. Air operations may be executed in
cycles as aircraft are replenished, recrewed, and retasked. The impermanence
of air support can be an advantage, for it provides the element
of surprise and it can help to reduce the liabilities arising from an
extended presence in a foreign country. UAVs and satellites both have
longer duration capabilities ranging from hours to days to years.
(6) Fragility
Because aircraft are expensive to purchase and operate, they tend to be
scarce and difficult to replace. On the ground, aircraft are vulnerable
to malicious damage, sabotage, small arms, and artillery fire. It is
important to protect aircraft and their crews. In flight, relatively low
levels of battle damage can have catastrophic effects, which necessitates
careful assessment of how much aircraft are exposed in a combat
zone. However, it is important to distinguish between fragility and
vulnerability; although aircraft are less robust than land vehicles or
ships, speed, height, built-in redundancy, and aircraft warning systems
can reduce exposure to risk.
3. Roles in Peace Support Operations
Airpower can be an important asset in preserving peace and managing a crisis long
before a war begins. The application of airpower ranges from disaster relief, humanitarian
assistance, and providing reassurance to the use of punitive or coercive force. Air
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operations often involve commercial operators for the provision of air transport and
logistic support. However, where civilian or noncombat military aircraft are involved,
risk levels must be monitored constantly to ensure the safety and continued integrity of
the operation.
a. Managing International Crisis
Part III, Section 4, paragraph 3
Airpower has a variety of crisis management applications, most of which are
unarmed and nonviolent. During tension, the ability to generate and project
military power rapidly over long distances makes airpower a vital asset for
conflict containment and international crisis management.
(1) Early Warning: Airpower can be used to detect and give prior warning
of an intended aggression that allows appropriate preventive action to
be taken by PSO commanders.
(2) Profile: In a situation of rising tension between potentially hostile
parties, air operations can be used to send strong political signals to a
potential aggressor. Exercises, training detachments, or high profile
flights can help remove uncertainty over intentions and reduce the
chance of misunderstanding and miscalculation.
(3) Supporting Allies: Airpower can provide timely morale and physical
support for allies in the form of medical air evacuation, combat search
and rescue (CSAR), or by simply its presence in the air above or
delivery of aid and sustenance to groups under threat.
(4) International Rescue: Air operations can include rescue operations
during a crisis, such as the passengers and crew of a hijacked airliner.
Airpower can also be used for emergency withdrawal of personnel
involved in peace support operations (such as mediators, fact-finders,
monitors, interpositional forces).
(5) Stabilizing Measures: The swift deployment of air forces and land
forces by airlift (including helicopters) can improve stability in a
region, or in areas where regional conflict threatens to spill over into
neighboring states.
(6) Practical Deterrence: At the lowest end of the deterrence scale, the
deployment of reconnaissance or surveillance aircraft can, in addition
to providing information, have a significant deterrent effect on a
potential aggressor. Their very presence warns that activities are
being watched and could provoke a response.
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Part III, Section 4, paragraphs 3-4
(7) Specific Deterrence: The proven ability to strike deep into unfriendly
territory denies a potential aggressor the assurance of being safe from
attack. This is a strong and “explicit” deterrent that can be used as a
negotiating tool to gain leverage on an otherwise reluctant party.
(8) Nonlethal Force: As the intensity of the potential crisis increases,
airpower can be used to confront a potential aggressor without resorting
to actual violence. The presence or rapid availability of attack
aircraft, for example, may be instrumental in demonstrating an intent
to inflict retribution on aggressive forces.
(9) Punishment: Nonlethal force can be escalated to actual violence for
the purpose of a limited punishment operation short of war; for
example, in the attack of selected targets to enforce sanctions or in
response to a flagrant violation of a truce agreement.
b. Disaster Relief and Humanitarian Assistance
The speed and range of airpower is a key factor in the relief of natural disasters
(such as flood, famine, typhoon, volcano, or earthquake). Military transport
aircraft are generally rugged in construction; they are able to use rough field strips
and operate with fewer support facilities than civilian aircraft. Military air
transport aircraft are capable of delivering relief during the critical early stages
of natural disasters.
c. Providing Assurance
High resolution airborne surveillance systems can provide assurance to a country
or community of the military posture of a potential antagonist and also can be used
to verify arms control agreements. Such surveillance and monitoring complements
material provided by satellite, and often can be achieved without violating
international boundaries.
4. The Operational Environment
Peace support operations vary in their levels of intensity depending on the nature of
the crisis. The factors influencing the different response levels are determined locally in
the AO, and at a higher level by the international community (see Part I, paragraph 16).
For air operations, these responses can be categorized as low-, mid-, and high-level. In
the guidelines below, it should be stressed that some air operations can be applicable at
all three levels.
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Part III, Section 4, paragraph 4
a. Low-Level of Conflict
In a law-abiding environment, and where organized opposition is unlikely, the
risk to air operations is also low. Some enhancement of routine air movement
protection measures and procedures may be considered locally; however, all
civilian and military air operations should be possible. The most likely requirement
at this stage is for air transport (including transport helicopters) and logistic
support. Success in this low-level environment will depend largely on the ability
of military and NGO personnel to work effectively to ensure loads continue to
move. Success also will be dependent upon the deployed air forces being capable
of providing the delivery methods that the situation demands. When all the
necessary facilities are in place and an airhead is capable of supporting civilian
aircraft operations, military aircraft can then be based in the AO and their more
rugged capabilities used to proceed with the aid program. As a host country’s
transportation infrastructure recovers and the use of military assets becomes less
appropriate, tasks can be progressively transferred to civilian aviation.
b. Mid-Level of Conflict
Where the international mandate is challenged locally and armed opposition is
probable, commercial air operations may have to be suspended and military
transport operations limited. An air combat or air attack presence maybe appropriate,
structured, and supported for demonstrative or punitive action. An air
exclusion zone, with fighters to be held on airborne alert under the control of an
AWACS aircraft, may be required to deny the warring factions from effectively
using airspace and to secure PSO airheads from air attack. Consequently, these
attack aircraft also would require effective and simple rules of engagement that
would allow them to carry out their task.
c. High-Level of Conflict
Where open armed conflict exists between well-organized and equipped forces,
air operations are likely to be limited to surveillance and intelligence gathering,
airspace control, and the application of force. It also may be necessary to mount
rescue (CSAR) and air evacuation operations. Surface attack missions might be
required either to support threatened peacekeeping forces or to punish belligerent
parties for breach of agreements. The preparation for these missions must be
thorough and involve the collection of intelligence to ensure that any force used
is proportional: that is, to ensure weapons chosen for the attack are sufficiently
powerful to achieve a specific political or military aim, yet small enough to avoid
collateral damage. Also, it is necessary to ensure that the immediate reactions of
the party targeted will not put at risk other elements of the international response.
Surface attacks will involve the early use of air reconnaissance operations to build
a complete picture of the theater of operations. Offensive action will also require
extensive battle-damage assessment (BDA) to determine whether the correct
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Part III, Section 4, paragraphs 4-5
target was attacked, whether the desired level of damage was achieved, and to
provide evidence to counter the possibly exaggerated claims by the warring
parties and media. Air forces have little difficulty in matching their combat
capability to a changing situation. As already discussed, the combination of speed
and reach is one of airpower’s greatest strengths. In the event of losing consent
or local support, the impact on peacekeeping forces of a change in the scope of
air operations must be evaluated and appropriate adjustments made to the
peacekeeping force’s military capabilities or operating methods.
5. Monitoring
a. Many of the factors that can cause conflict, for example, rivalry over resources
(e.g., water, oil, minerals, and coastal access), territory, and the migration of
population, can be monitored most effectively from the air. Airborne and satellite
surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities already have been discussed and
have been shown to be critical functions for most PSOs. Airborne observers, air
photography, radar, and optronic and air sampling means can detect abnormalities
in behavior and threatening changes of deployment of parties to conflict.
Most air assets are capable of providing sea as well as land surveillance, thus
making them invaluable in enforcing maritime embargoes and restricting no-fly
and no-transit zones over land masses. Effective monitoring is vital to confidence
building; however, to be a successful factor, the monitoring process will have to
involve the disputing parties to ensure that such air operations are conducted
without favor, openly and fairly.
b. Air and space assets provide the ability to monitor belligerents, ensure truce
compliance, recognize threatening deployments of forces, collect targeting data
for later use, and maintain general surveillance of humanitarian conditions. The
collection and carefully controlled sharing of information is a proven confidencebuilding
activity. However, only nations with sophisticated air assets have the
capability to support PSO surveillance and reconnaissance effectively. Satellites
have excellent capability to survey areas by using photographic infrared or
advanced radar techniques. These assets are the least intrusive and are normally
not vulnerable to aggressive action by parties to a conflict. However, satellite data
is limited by the availability of satellite coverage, particularly if the PSO takes
lower precedence to national and other tasks. Also, national and collaborative
classification and security concerns may limit the dissemination of data gathered
from vehicles in space.
c. Many types of aircraft are designed to provide direct monitoring of land areas as
well as radar coverage of airspace. Airborne radar platforms such as the British
Nimrod, American AWACS and JSTARS, and Russian “Mainstay” Ilyushin IL-
76 (AEW&C) aircraft provide the capability to maintain a long-term monitoring
of the airspace above a PSO. These types of aircraft also can assist in enforcing
established no-fly zones. Aircraft designed for radar ground surveillance can
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monitor ground transportation movement over a wide area. The advantage of
these aircraft is that they are nonobtrusive and able to survey an area from outside
its borders.
d. The air surveillance assets described above also have combat functions; they can
provide battlefield intelligence (including BDA) and early warning of hostile or
potentially hostile air activity and capabilities, which may interfere with ongoing
PSO air, land, and sea operations. Additionally, they can control, direct, and
integrate friendly surveillance and defensive and offensive air operations.
e. Maritime patrol aircraft (MPA) have been used with great success in enforcing
sanctions. Their speed and endurance allow a single MPA to monitor large areas
of ocean surface that would require a much larger number of surface ships. MPA
can identify ships involved in sanctions violations and efficiently coordinate
interception of naval forces to physically carryout the enforcement phase.
f. Most tactical aircraft are capable of switching to a reconnaissance role through
photographic, radar, or infrared detection means (by identifying sources of heat
and other emissions). Direct aerial observation, in addition to providing an almost
instantaneous flow of information, also projects a continuing presence of PSO
forces over a wide area. In addition, UAVs provide a close observation of selected
areas without exposing a human pilot to threats. UAVs have been discussed in the
preceding paragraphs; these can be inexpensive and reusable and have a short
response time. They are particularly useful when a situation calls for minimal
presence as they can be seen as less threatening than direct observation by manned
tactical aircraft. They have a range of several hundred miles, long “loiter” time
(24 hours), and are difficult to detect at altitudes above 3,000 meters (10,000 feet).
6. Airlift (Air Transport and Logistic Support)
a. Tasks
Part III, Section 4, paragraphs 5-6
Airlift is essential for maintaining mobility and sustaining the component
elements of a PSO. Its tasks include deployment, sustainment, recovery, and
aeromedical evacuation of wounded personnel. Air transport also can act as a tool
for building trust and confidence. It has an important role to play in the movement
of the key players in a crisis, whether they are parties to the conflict, mediators,
observers, UN agencies, NGOs, interpositional forces, or the media. It also can
be used to bring medical, engineering, or other expertise and “enabling elements”
to a crisis area where relief or support is urgently needed. Air transport aircraft
(including helicopters) can be provided by contributing air forces, commercial
operators, and by aircraft contracted from military or commercial operators and
tasked directly by the PSO (e.g., the UN). Air transport operations include:
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Part III, Section 4, paragraph 6
(1) Scheduled air transport services involving the programmed movement
of aid and support personnel and supplies;
(2) Air logistic support operations conducted to outload, distribute, and
recover personnel, materiel, and equipment, including the distribution
of food and supplies (by air drops if necessary);
(3) Airborne operations involving the movement of combat forces and
their logistic support to an objective by parachute or heliborne assault
or air landing; and
(4) Aeromedical evacuation involving the swift movement of patients to
and between medical treatment facilities by air.
b. Deployment
Airlift is essential to the initial deployment of PSO forces. Long-range strategic
airlift can transport forces over long distances in a few hours and often can deliver
them directly to the crisis area. Reaction time from decision time to arrival for
PSO forces in-theater can be calculated in hours rather than days. This is
especially important if the operational situation is rapidly deteriorating and a need
exists to quickly evacuate foreign nationals and establish a buffer between
warring factions.
c. Sustainment
Sustainment of both PSO forces and indigenous population is normally accomplished
by airlift operations to established airfields or rough airstrips in forward
operating locations, depending upon the capabilities of the aircraft. When the
tactical situation or threat level precludes airland delivery, an airlift may sustain
operations by aerial delivery techniques (such as airdrop, freefall, low altitude
parachute extracting system [LAPES], or support helicopters [SH]). Food,
medical supplies, and other materiel can be delivered by these means. Airland is
preferred since it can usually deliver a larger load with less risk. Although airland
is more cost effective, air delivery gives commanders a further option where it is
not possible to land aircraft.
d. Strategic and Tactical Transport Characteristics
(1) Jet-powered strategic transport aircraft offer high transit speeds, carry
heavy loads, and operate over an extended range. They can help to
overcome the need for in-theater refueling. However, they generally
require long runways and good base handling facilities.
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(2) Tactical transport aircraft, usually turboprop powered, are slower and
limited to shorter ranges, but can carry large volumes of freight,
operate from short, rudimentary airstrips, and are easier to load and
unload. They may also be used for airborne drops where it is not
possible to land.
(3) Support helicopters are relatively slow and operate over shorter
ranges than fixed wing transport aircraft. However, they do not require
established operating bases, and they can use otherwise inaccessible
positions; their ability to carry a wide variety of loads internally and
externally gives them great flexibility. Moreover, their ability to fly
close to the ground, using natural features for concealment, makes
them less vulnerable in the combat zones and able to navigate visually,
at low level, in weather conditions that would preclude conventional
fixed-wing operations.
(4) Civilian air fleets are engaged routinely in large-scale operations and
have considerable capacity. However, civilian aircraft are vulnerable
to armed action, are not equipped with passive defense equipment
(such as missile warning devices, chaff and flare dispensers), and are
primarily designed to operate from well-equipped and efficiently
operated bases. Their cost also may be a factor, and highly competitive
charter companies do not all maintain universally recognized safety
standards. Military air transport can operate in bases that may not have
the standard of facilities that a civilian operator would need and in
higher degrees of risk. Military air transport’s lack of numbers and
limited payloads can be offset by high sortie rates, particularly over
short ranges, and by the flexibility of load priority that higher sortie
rates confer. A mix of types may be required: strategic military or
civilian aircraft operating in a safe or “sanitized” main base, with
fixed- and rotary-wing tactical transport aircraft, distributing cargo or
personnel from the base to the areas of operations, as in a “hub and
spoke” operation.
e. Advantages
Part III, Section 4, paragraph 6
Airlift has a number of advantages over surface means. It is the most responsive
transport and able to operate over the entire area of operations. It increases
commanders’ options in deploying, sustaining, and employing the PSO force. Its
ability to overfly surface obstacles and circumnavigate danger areas allows airlift
transportation to limit or avoid entirely confrontations with belligerent ground
forces, such as at road blocks.
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Part III, Section 4, paragraphs 6-8
f. Limitations
Airlift requires suitable landing zones (LZs) or drop zones (DZs) near the
objective area, which may have to be defended in certain circumstances. Airlift
mobility, while responsive and flexible, is the least costly method of moving large
amounts of materiel, and will increase the cost of a PSO. Airlift assets are
generally in short supply and adequate capacity may be difficult to obtain.
Insertion by air may raise the risk factor in a PSO if aircraft become targets. The
loss of aircraft or personnel may abruptly end resupply operations by air.
7. Combat Search and Rescue
These operations involve the use of aircraft to locate and rescue personnel in distress
or at risk, or aircrew who have abandoned their aircraft in potentially hostile areas. Their
location may involve the use of air reconnaissance and satellite systems; their recovery,
normally by helicopter, may require airborne early warning support, fighter escort, or, in
extreme cases, air attack against ground defenses. Although rare in comparison to other
tasks, these missions are a necessary and vitally important part of the overall mission.
Both those participating in the operations who are at risk and those governments sending
forces to the operation need to be confident that rescue can be effectively conducted in
peace support operations. When they succeed, they are a demonstration of commitment
and competence and provide a morale boost to PSO troops and aircrew. However, when
they fail, they can change the course of a PSO.
8. Electronic Warfare Operations
“Electronic warfare” generally refers to the ability to locate, listen, and interfere with
the electromagnetic emissions of a hostile force. Military electronic warfare techniques
can be used in confidence building and conflict prevention, and to provide information
about the impending hostilities in a crisis. Related air operations can include: signals
intelligence (SIGINT) gathering to assess military capabilities, deployment, and posture;
jamming or counteracting provocative, threatening, or propagandist broadcasts; replacing
or supplementing local communications facilities; and disseminating safety and
public information messages. A combination of these techniques has been used successfully
to prevent parties using civilian radio frequencies to mislead and intimidate the
population. Aircraft can be used for the dissemination of information to the indigenous
population by broadcasting through the commercial radio and television frequencies of
a particular area’s local media. Multimedia can be very effective at taking the message
of the UN peace operation directly to the local population. In many instances, assets for
these operations are most readily deployed, protected, and employed from the air. They
are an increasingly important part of PSOs.
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9. Airborne Capabilities for Command and Control
Command and control of PSOs can be enhanced by different types of aircraft
designed to supply senior commanders and officials in a crisis with real-time information.
This function becomes increasingly important where hostilities are imminent or in
progress. Aircraft can put a UN commander on the scene and supply current information
to make immediate force employment decisions. This airborne C2 function normally is
fulfilled by larger aircraft with the required communications capability to enable
commanders to control their forces. For example, AWACS aircraft can perform this
function with the air component commander on board controlling air assets and making
on-the-spot decisions. Other aircraft specialize in the C2 of ground forces. AWACS are
useful during large military operations; their involvement in a PSO to control ground
forces assumes a higher threat and peace enforcement type of action. When an operation
approaches this level, the air command and control function can provide commanders
with real-time monitoring and command response as situations develop. This can be
particularly useful during periods of heightened tension or threatening troop movements
by one or more of the belligerents.
10. The Use of Force and Options
If PSO forces are required to use force against a designated party, air forces can
maintain air superiority by performing offensive and defensive counter air operations.
They may be used for ground defense or against artillery. Force application consists of
utilizing aircraft to attack or block air or surface forces. There are two kinds of force
applications for air operations: airspace control and surface attack.
a. Airspace Control
Part III, Section 4, paragraphs 9-10
Control of the air is necessary for the safe and efficient execution of other air and
ground operations, including aid distribution. Airspace control measures can
include air exclusion zones, air policing, and air defense (combat air patrols
[CAPs]), and could be conducted against opposing aircraft and hostile groundbased
air defense. Forces required for control of the air may include command and
control facilities, ground radar, AWACS, fighter aircraft, tanker aircraft for airto-air
refueling, and ground-based air defense units. Generally, “packages” of
some 40 aircraft of several different types are required to establish and maintain
a no-fly zone. This is a complicated and costly type of operation. Often during
PSOs, ground navigation aids and radar control have been destroyed or simply not
developed. Ground missiles and border crossing agreements may require accurate
control of PSO aircraft to avoid violating mandates and incursion into other
sovereign territories.
It is important to note that in previous PSO operations, all aircraft entering and
leaving the AO were required to do so using strict procedures, which were
designed to ensure safe passage and to redirect aircraft to avoid mid-air collisions
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Part III, Section 4, paragraph 10
and keep them clear of risk areas. It is vital that clear and simple airspace
procedures are developed and made available to all aircraft involved with the
PSO. English is the recognized air traffic control language and it is vital that at
least one crew member is a fluent English speaker and has been well-briefed on
the air and ground situation. Also, aircraft must be fitted with accurate on-board
navigation equipment such as a satellite global positioning system (GPS).
Finally, PSO aircraft must be readily identifiable and made distinctive from other
aircraft operated by the warring parties. This is achieved by installing a radio
transmitter device, which is specially coded for all PSO aircraft, known as
identification, friend or foe (IFF).
b. Surface Attack
An attack on surface targets can achieve its purpose without causing death or even
injury. The destruction of a bridge to frustrate military deployment or maneuver,
or the surgical destruction of a ground-based weapon system, following a
warning message, may be sufficient. However, in conjunction with other measures,
including its explanation and justification, lethal force may have to be
applied to demonstrate intent, to punish infringement of an agreement, or to
support friendly troops on the ground in the event of an attack by belligerent
parties.
c. Planning
When air assets are used to apply force, it is imperative that the mission objectives
are clearly planned with sufficient force to achieve the aim. Air operations bring
all of an adversary’s military, political, industrial, and cultural assets within
striking range. Careful target selection is therefore essential, and consideration
must be given both to the desired outcome and the physical effects. Care should
be taken to avoid possible collateral damage, and to avoid the adverse reaction of
opposing, friendly, and neutral forces and observers. It is essential to maintain the
principle of proportionality; that is, the amount of applied force must be in
proportion to the initial infringement. Additionally, the target must be clearly
identified, and, where necessary, positively designated or marked. Aircraft
should be used in sufficient strength to deal effectively with their objectives and
to maintain the credibility of the PSO. Air operations must be planned in great
detail with particular attention to other ongoing activities within the entire PSO.
Care especially should be taken to avoid any action that could result in hostage
taking of PSO personnel, destruction of sensitive assets, or other retaliatory
measures that are detrimental to the overall goals of the PSO. Failure to take these
points into consideration will inevitably attract the attention of the media, which
could sway public opinion and change the outcome of the operation. These
possible considerations may not warrant the use of airpower.
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11. Multinational Cooperation and Coordination
Peace support operations involve multiple nations, their military forces, and nongovernmental
organizations. This requires liaison and coordination, and simple tasks take
longer and require greater sensitivity to the various participants and their individual
needs. The use of multinational forces and differing SOPs is a complicating factor,
despite the use of English as a standard language for air traffic control. Trained personnel,
appropriate communications equipment (to allow ground to air communication), and
SOPs are essential to the success of airpower operations in PSOs. Integration is essential
and must extend to all levels, for example, down to forward air controllers (FACs), who
are trained specialists on the ground and can direct and control air operations on behalf
of ground units in routine or combat circumstances.
a. Interoperability and Standardization
Part III, Section 4, paragraph 11
Combining air assets and supporting functions from a variety of countries can be
both easier and more difficult than for land forces or even naval units. This is made
easier because, as already noted, the English language is the world standard for
air traffic control; also, many of the commercial or military aircraft that could be
used in such operations are in multiple national inventories, and international
exercises have achieved a universal familiarity with many of the procedures and
problems. However, although many countries may have the same aircraft—and
in some cases, similar maintenance systems—running a smooth multinational
operation from a single base can still pose problems. Communications equipment
and capabilities, refueling equipment, modifications standards, and spare parts
inventories must be reviewed to see whether operations can be sustained from a
particular location involving different nationalities’ aircraft, crews, and standard
operating procedures.
b. Culture and Politics
Cultural and political differences in a multinational force may lead to operational
unevenness. Technical manuals, training materials, and support service units may
use different languages; personnel may require different diets, exercise varying
religious demands, different safety standards, reporting procedures, and air
tasking orders. These differences can exacerbate relations between national
contingents and raise differing assumptions about operational effectiveness.
Political and economic constraints also impinge on the harmony and success of
a peace support operation. Often they are beyond the control of the military
services. The loss of an aircraft or a portion of its crew, whether by accident or
hostile fire, will have a different domestic political significance in each nation.
The consequences of sustaining or abandoning air resupply operations for those
directly sustained may be overshadowed by effects on national, domestic,
political, and cultural issues. These reactions may divide operational unity
between contributing contingents.
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Part III, Section 4, paragraphs 11-12
c. Standard Operating Procedures
Each military service has different ways of doing business that are distinct to that
service. How much contingents can be integrated needs to be considered carefully
since the consequences of such action may result in possible friction and
inefficiency. Compromises will need to be considered to maximize the effectiveness
of the personnel and materiel assigned to the PSO. The publication of a force
SOP (such as a force commander’s policy directive) that can be widely agreed
upon is an important unifying factor. It may be possible to adapt existing SOPs
from long-standing pacts, alliances, or coalitions as a basis for wider adaptation.
12. Command and Control of Air Operations
The ability of airpower to respond quickly to a developing situation demands that it
operates under an effective and responsive command and control structure to achieve the
maximum usefulness from limited air assets. PSOs are especially subject to change by
the action or reaction of those countries or parties involved. In this context, the mission
(of a UN peace force, for example) could change drastically in a short time. Such an action
would require a rapid change to the type of support being provided by the air operation.
Once again, the inherent speed, range, and flexibility of airpower allows it to be employed
quickly to respond to these rapidly changing conditions. To ensure that airpower
capabilities are used efficiently to support a PSO’s overall goals requires a well-designed
and efficient command and control system.
a. Centralization
Centralized command and control of air assets promotes an integrated effort and
enables forces to be employed to meet the overall priorities. Centralized C2 also
allows air operations to be refocused quickly to exploit situations as they arrive.
Such an air operations organization will respond to the changing demands of the
operational situation, and concentrate at the critical place and time to achieve
decisive results. It follows that centralize C2 is essential if airpower is to be
employed in a unified, effective action and it should be vested at the highest
practical level that allows complete and ready control over operating forces.
Decentralized execution allows effective spans of control, responsiveness, and
tactical flexibility by placing responsibility for implementing air operations at the
lowest practical level. In a PSO, it is essential to identify the appropriate levels
at which the civilian and military organizations involved should interface to avoid
confusion and allow joint (civilian and military) air operations to be managed as
effectively and safely as possible.
b. C2 Organization
Most nations are cautious about how much control they will allow another
authority to exercise over their aircraft. After specific agreements between
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nations supplying forces to the UN PSO, command of a UN PSO may be vested
in a joint force commander (JFC). The overall commander of air operating assets
is the air component commander. Since these operations nearly always combine
joint as well as multinational elements, this commander can be known as the joint
(sometimes, combined) forces air component commander (JFACC).
(1) Joint/Combined Forces Air Component Commander
The JFACC would be responsible to the JFC for the management,
direction, and operation of all air assets assigned to the military
element of the PSO. Representatives from the national air forces at air
headquarters coordinate operational priorities and arrange for logistics
support of their respective forces.
(2) Combined Air Operations Center
Air operations are planned and executed through a combined air
operations center (CAOC). The CAOC is comprised of specialists in
each air support mission who perform the detailed planning, coordination,
and execution of the air missions. The exact organization of the
CAOC will depend upon the objectives of the PSO and the characteristics
of the participating national forces.
13. Support Elements Required for Airpower in PSOs
a. Basing Options
There are three levels of basing options for airpower: to locate the assets outside
of the AO, to base them within the AO at a central location, or to disperse them
to numerous forward locations within the AO. The choice of basing for air assets
supporting a PSO will depend on the nature of the operation, the type of aircraft
to be deployed, the existence of support infrastructure, and the expected threat
level and risk to those involved. An air operation may use a combination of all
three basing options or base the air assets for different phases, or according to
changes in the operational level of intensity. During planning, consideration must
be given to responsiveness, security, and the effect of airpower presence to
determine the optimum deployment of aircraft required in support of the PSO.
(1) Outside the Area of Operations
Part III, Section 4, paragraphs 12-13
Locating PSO air assets outside the AO provides a greater level of
security and a wider choice of locations and supporting infrastructure.
The more complex support requirements of air assets are normally
better served by larger, modern air terminals that are more likely to
exist outside of the PSO AO. This reduces the number of personnel and
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Part III, Section 4, paragraph 13
equipment within the AO. Airlift missions should normally load
enough fuel to preclude the necessity of refueling operations within
the AO and other types of missions (presence, surveillance, force
application, etc.), and normally will not require to land within the AO.
(2) Within the AO, at a Central Location
This option gives the advantages of shorter response times to taskings,
may give a better perception of a UN or multinational presence in the
AO, and keeps aircrew in closer touch with the operational tempo. The
disadvantages may include a lack of adequate support facilities. The
airbase will require additional security measures as compared with the
out of AO base option. This option normally will entail bringing
supplies to the central base and then distributing them to various
locations throughout the area.
(3) Forward Operating Locations within the AO
Air support assets are located closest to where they are to be used on
a daily basis. This option may be used for smaller, easily maintained
air assets such as helicopters or small transports, but is generally not
suitable for more complex air operations. The issues of responsiveness
and presence are maximized in this method, but the security
problem is far greater. Conditions must be carefully evaluated and
deemed permissive to use this option.
b. Logistics and Maintenance Considerations
The support requirements of airpower must be considered before the decision to
deploy in a PSO is made because they can greatly increase the cost of the operation
in terms of military assets and cash. Air assets that operate continuously in the AO
will require the full range of maintenance and logistics specialists, including
those for hydraulics, avionics, engine, airframe, and fuel systems. The deployment
of even one aircraft will require that all the critical maintenance functions
are covered. As the number of aircraft involved in the operation increase, the
number of support personnel required for each aircraft will decrease as an
economy of scale takes effect. The need for an efficiently functioning supply
system and large amounts of aviation fuel can drive the choice of option for
employment of airpower as well as the basing option.
c. Aerial Refueling
Air refueling aircraft can provide valuable support to the overall PSO air
operation. These aircraft can be used to increase endurance, increase range,
increase payload, and eliminate the necessity for ground refueling in the AO.
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Longer endurance is especially important to aircraft performing surveillance and
reconnaissance, presence, and enforcement of no-fly zones. The presence of
aerial refueling aircraft can reduce the total number of aircraft necessary to
support a PSO by increasing the time each aircraft can spend over the objective.
Aerial refueling is a “force extender” since it increases the time on task (TOT)
without increasing the number of aircraft available.
d. Security
Aircraft are most vulnerable to attack when on the ground. A relatively unsophisticated
attack, such as small arms or mortars, can cause much damage. Aircraft
require a level of security commensurate with the level of threat they are exposed
to. The forward basing option is the most vulnerable to attack and requires
considerable military assets for protection of aircraft. Security for air operations
should be performed by personnel trained in specialized ground defense missions.
e. Intelligence
Part III, Section 4, paragraph 13
A responsive intelligence capability is essential for planning and executing air
operations in support of PSOs. The threat must be assessed and provided to any
aircrew operating in or transiting the AO. In addition, data must be maintained on
airfields and associated support infrastructure offering potential locations (such
as diversions) for air operations. This information should include the expected
level of multinational and host nation support, which is critical to everyday airlift
support mission operating in the AO. In addition to unit level intelligence
elements, national, joint, and service intelligence components of all contributing
nations adds to the overall intelligence picture. Force application missions require
specific target intelligence to include photographic reconnaissance as well as
accurate coordinates of its position. Much of this targeting data may be procured
by airpower assets not assigned to the PSO, such as satellite imagery. In its initial
phase, a PSO is characterized by confusion due to a lack of good information
concerning the existing infrastructure. Establishing a PSO intelligence base on
these facilities should make these deployments function much more effectively
and smoothly.
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212

PART III: MILITARY FORCES AND CIVILIAN POLICE
1. Introduction
SECTION 5
UN CIVILIAN POLICE ELEMENT
United Nations Civilian Police can be deployed as part of the United Nations element
of a peace support operation. Early interpositional UN forces tended to operate in
depopulated war zones where government structures still existed and the requirement for
UN civilian policing was low. In the post-Cold War era, the UN has deployed to many
emergencies where national and local government structures have broken down and the
population itself is involved in the crisis. The need for a multifunctional response is
therefore increasing. Very often it is the police rather than UN soldiers who have the more
useful professional and intuitive social skills. Also in cases where the UN’s activities may
be challenged, the presence of CIVPOL is less confrontational than UN troops. Police
have fundamentally different characteristics to soldiers. In most cases, they rely on
building a close knowledge of local communities for success.
2. CIVPOL’s Role
The deployment of CIVPOL in a UN operation should be determined by requirements
in the area of operation.
a. Where national police services and civilian authorities are still operating effectively
(for example, where the UN is interposed between two states), CIVPOL’s
role usually will be to liaise between a UN operation and the local police, or
between local police belonging to different groups in the conflict, and to observe
and report on local police activities.
b. In more complex emergencies, where local police and/or civilian authorities are
not operating effectively, CIVPOL may be required to monitor human rights and
provide independent policing services. In this case, its foremost role is usually to
monitor, train, and develop the local police as a sustainable national institution
acceptable to a democratic society.
3. CIVPOL’s Authority and Power
A UN mandate will define the legal status and powers of CIVPOL as well as the tasks
that it can perform.
a. In most UN operations, including complex emergencies, CIVPOL does not
require status and powers over and above those conferred on personnel operating
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Part III, Section 5, paragraphs 3-4
under a UN mandate, nor do they require the same policing powers that they
possess at home.
b. If CIVPOL is required to monitor and/or protect human rights, it will require
powers:
• to have unrestricted access on demand to all places of
investigation and detention;
• to remove persons at risk from local jurisdiction to UN
protection; and
• to investigate complaints.
c. Under certain circumstances it may be necessary to empower CIVPOL to enforce
some aspects of law and order. For example, CIVPOL may be tasked with the
arrest and detention of persons suspected of “acts of political violence.” In addition,
powers to prosecute arrested suspects can be given to the UN special prosecutor.
In all circumstances, CIVPOL can operate effectively only if the host nation and the
political parties recognize its status and agree to the tasks delegated to them.
4. Deployment
The deployment of officers will depend on the terms of the mandate and the UN
military deployment. In the initial stage of deployment, three or four police officers may
be appointed as advisers to the SRSG. They will make recommendations on the
deployment and role of the contingent (for example this occurred in UNOSOM II).
a. Low-Level Operations
Where UN military deployment is linear along a demilitarized zone, CIVPOL
will be organized in relation to the terms of disengagement. Relatively few
officers will operate at posts and on patrols with mobile command backup.
b. Mid-Level Operations
Where a mandate requires countrywide coverage, CIVPOL may have to work
alongside the police systems of the host state. In some cases, there may be no
indigenous police when the state government has collapsed; operations may
include the organization of a new force. In each case, the CIVPOL organization
will have to reflect the levels of policing and requirements in the area; for
example, CIVPOL may be required to provide services at the general police
headquarters, at the provincial or subprovincial level, or perform tasks in specific
areas during election monitoring or training local police forces.
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Part III, Section 5, paragraph 5
5. Tasks in Low- and Mid-Level Operations
a. Low-Level Operations
In low-level scenarios, some elements of the local police and criminal justice
system will operate, and CIVPOL’s role may be limited to observing and
reporting, for example, by:
b. Mid-Level Operations
• acting as a neutral channel of communication, on request, if
police from different parties in a conflict need to contact each
other about crime problems;
• advising UN force headquarters on civil policing matters;
• providing information on how opposed parties are carrying
out police tasks.
In mid-level operations elements, may be engaged in a wider range of duties in
conjunction with locally recognized police forces. 1 These activities are usually
aimed at building and supporting national rehabilitation and reconstruction. They
include, for example:
(1) monitoring the work of local police in order to ensure effective and
impartial maintenance of law of order;
(2) the training and supervision of local forces: CIVPOL can make a
major contribution to the success of a UN mission by training,
organizing, and equipping a local police force to operate after they and
other elements of the mission have left. CIVPOL should be equipped
to train the local police officers both in the classroom and on patrol.
Such tasks may require the provision of training areas, materials in the
local language (including legal texts), and equipment and uniforms for
the new force;
(3) exercising an overview of the civil administration (see Part II, Section
4, paragraph 6) and mediating and negotiating to diffuse tension
between different parties of the community;
(4) monitoring electoral campaigns and processes;
(5) observing the voluntary return of refugees and displaced persons and
monitoring the protection of human rights;
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Part III, Section 5, paragraphs 5-6
(6) assisting the efforts of humanitarian operations;
(7) in conjunction with the above reconstruction activities, elements of a
criminal justice system may need to be constituted incorporating:
• prosecution and defense legal services;
• procedures for processing offenders;
• a judicial service for the disposal of offenders; and
• appropriate custodial services.
In special circumstances, CIVPOL may assume some additional policing duties,
normally the responsibility of the local force, such as the power to arrest and
detain suspects. In these circumstances, an independent UN system for prosecution
will need to be established.
c. Policing the United Nations
The policing of UN personnel is normally the responsibility of the UN military
police in heavily populated areas (see Part II, Section 2, paragraph 2g). In less
densely populated areas, CIVPOL can be responsible for policing UN personnel.
In some cases, UN personnel are protected by a “Status of Forces Agreement.”
In the event of UN personnel being charged with a crime, it is therefore unlikely
that they could be successfully prosecuted by local authorities. In most cases, the
accused would be sent back to their home country to be tried under their national
criminal law.
6. Organization and Command
a. Large UN contingents, contributed by one UN member state, may be split into
smaller units and assigned to work with other contingents. Much consideration
and planning is required before breaking up national police contingents and
combining them with other units. If national police units are broken down into
small units spread far and wide within the mission area, there is a strong
possibility that performance may fall. Discipline may be a problem when they are
away from their own hierarchy and command structure. To improve accountability,
small national police units should remain as a unit.
b. CIVPOL is dependent on other elements of the response group for its protection,
transport, and logistic sustainment. In particular, there may be a day-to-day
requirement for the military element to go on patrol with CIVPOL detachments,
particularly where there is a risk of confrontation and where armed personnel are
required to prevent the abduction of unarmed CIVPOL personnel. There also may
be a regular need for helicopter support. The availability of these services in
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support of policing activity relies on a well-organized coordinating system at all
levels and the prioritization of resources at the highest level to ensure that police
needs are not overlooked in the press of operational events.
c. Command should remain with CIVPOL. If police advisers to the SRSG are
appointed, the senior police adviser may take initial command of the contingent
before the appointment of a police commissioner. When CIVPOL is given a
mandate to manage, supervise, and control local police units, a system of
accountability for local officers in the field is required.
7. Training and Equipment
a. Selection of Officers
Part III, Section 5, paragraphs 6-7
UN officers must be competent to carry out most of the routine tasks usually
performed by the national police of a UN member state. Officers must be
experienced in crime investigation and case preparation, and capable of making
full use of supporting services, including forensic, “scenes of crime,” and
fingerprint and photo-fit facilities.
Most police officers contributed by states have these capabilities:
• familiarity with an internationally recognized criminal justice
system;
• national compliance with the UN Code of Conduct for Law
Enforcement Officials (See Annex 7);
• educated to at least secondary level standards;
• minimum of five years post-recruitment training service;
• prior experience of working with other law enforcement
agencies at national, regional, or international level;
• capable of operating effectively in isolation, in various
multicommand and multidisciplined organizations; and
• experience or skills relevant to conditions in UN operations,
for example, antiterrorist, special operations, search and
rescue, first aid, communications, hostage negotiation, fourwheel
driving, bush skills, navigation, and mines/booby trap
awareness.
In addition, officers will require competence in languages of the operational
areas.
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Part III, Section 5, paragraphs 7-8
b. Training Standards
Training should include:
c. Equipment and Resources
• UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officials;
• awareness of the history, powers, and limitations of the
United Nations;
• case studies of UN operations with CIVPOL elements;
• education about the religion, culture, and traditions of the
peoples in the region in which they will operate, and the
SOPs and organizational cultures of the other elements of the
PSO; and
• additional language training.
CIVPOL units involved in operational law enforcement, law enforcement supervision,
or order maintenance among the civilian population will require:
• transport;
• communications systems;
• protective, self-defense, and law enforcement equipment;
• sites for police stations; and
• weapons.
In some missions police require protection. Before deployment a policy decision
is needed as to the role of CIVPOL and whether there should be an armed element
within it. Several nations have paramilitary police forces that have the characteristics
and training for an armed role. However, arming CIVPOL removes their
value as a nonconfrontational presence.
8. Operations
To be credible and effective, civilian policing must be incorporated into a fair and
impartial criminal justice system and supported by democratic institutions. It also must
win the trust and confidence of the people at a personnel and institutional level. The status
of the local police forces of a host state before and during a complex emergency may not
fulfill these criteria. CIVPOL may not achieve complete effectiveness and credibility in
the period of its operation, whatever powers are given to it in its mandate. However,
before the conclusion of its mission, CIVPOL must ensure national police forces have
been trained or retrained in civil policing techniques and in the role and responsibilities
of the civilian police in a democratic society. CIVPOL officers are required to fulfill
functions other than those for which they have been trained and must adapt to new
conditions.
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Part III, Section 5
Notes
1
E. G. Primosch, “The Roles of United Nations Civilian Police (UNCIVPOL) within United Nations
Peace-keeping Operations,” International and Comparative Law Quarterly 43 (April 1994).
Further Reading
F. Gregory, “The United Nations provision of policing services (CIVPOL) within the
framework of peacekeeping operations: an analysis of the issues,” Policing and Security
6 (1996).
M. W. Doyle, UN Peacekeeping in Cambodia—UNTAC’s Civil Mandate (London:
Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995): 47-49.
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220

PART IV: COORDINATION
SECTION 1
NEGOTIATIONS
1. Introduction
a. Negotiations take place when two parties with opposing views meet to resolve
their differences. When a third party assists by acting between the opposed parties
in an effort to bring them together, it is referred to as mediation. In practice, most
mediation takes the form of negotiations between a mediator and one of the
parties at a time, trying to find common ground. This section describes the
characteristics of these activities and the techniques needed to succeed.
b. In the context of a complex emergency, negotiations will be conducted at many
levels and between many parties, and issues will range from strategic level
discussions in the UN Security Council to tactical level negotiations between UN
officials and military commanders and local militia leaders. Negotiations may
concern political, humanitarian, and military activity. The parties in a complex
emergency will want to discuss these questions with anyone representing the
different elements of the international community. It is essential for those
working to resolve the conflict to understand the scope of the negotiations that
may be taking place and how their functions relate to wider efforts to achieve a
negotiated solution.
2. Characteristics
In the intercommunal violence associated with a complex emergency, most negotiations
will be between members of the international community and one of the parties at
a time. These meetings often will concern relations between elements of the international
response group and one of the parties, for example in the interpretation of their mandate
and to gain access to recent incidents, rather than mediation between the parties. Three
broad types of negotiations may be taking place at every level, of which only one is
actually between the parties:
a. Negotiations between elements of the international community on external or
internal theater related problems; for example between troop-contributing nations,
between the civilian and military elements of a UN mission, and at local
level between NGO convoys and their UN military escort.
b. Negotiations between elements of the international community and one or more
of the parties; for example, on the scope and nature of the international community’s
intervention or assistance in the crisis, or with a host government concerning
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Part IV, Section 1, paragraphs 2-3
which military contingents are acceptable, and at a lower level between NGO
officials and the local authorities on the implementation of a program.
c. Negotiations between the parties, assisted by members of the international
community; these also take place at every level and are the most important type
of negotiations for members of the international community to promote. It is
possible that the parties also will meet and negotiate without the assistance of
outsiders.
3. Negotiating Issues
Within each type of negotiation in the context of a complex emergency, there are three
broad areas that may be the subject of negotiations. Although these tend to follow the
division of responsibility adopted by elements of an international response group, these
divisions may not be recognized by the parties to the conflict.
a. Political Issues
In a crisis that results from a conflict between two or more parties, the immediate
priority may be to provide humanitarian assistance or achieve a cease-fire, but the
most important negotiations will be aimed at achieving an overall political
agreement between the parties. Successful political negotiations provide the
framework and direction within which humanitarian and military activities take
place. Once agreement has been reached to take action, the countries or organizations
involved have to negotiate with the host government and other parties to
agree to the terms of deployment and create a viable situation on the ground, for
example by reaching a political accord that could lead to a cease-fire. As
international agencies (military units, humanitarian agencies, or NGOs) arrive in
the conflict area, they will have to negotiate with the parties for access to their
territory and for accommodation and support. For UN agencies, their deployment
should be covered by a SOFA signed with the host government. However, it may
prove difficult or impossible to reach formal agreement if government has broken
down or in territory where the de facto government is not recognized by the
international community.
b. Humanitarian Issues
(1) Representatives of humanitarian agencies may need to negotiate for
access to assess humanitarian needs with a host government, or with
local military or police units. Having made a “needs assessment,” the
humanitarian agency may need to agree with the host government or
the local commanders on the assessment (if the humanitarian aid is
going to a minority, for example) and methods of supply and distribution.
The humanitarian agency will negotiate with donors to provide
the types and quantities of relief that are required. Once the humani-
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tarian agency has the supplies, it may have to negotiate with the parties
on a case-by-case basis for access to supply relief to the target
population. No matter what agreement may have been reached beforehand,
actual distribution can take a great deal of negotiation as
convoys can be halted locally on the whim of a local militia commander.
(2) In addition to supplying humanitarian aid, humanitarian agencies may
need to negotiate with the parties for freedom of movement to monitor
the conditions of a minority at risk. This may be done by human rights
monitors, or almost any other agency operating in the area. Release of
detainees and prisoners of war is another crucial area of humanitarian
negotiations because detainees are often held under poor conditions
and their captivity is a highly emotive subject between parties. These
negotiations are normally conducted by the ICRC, on the basis that all
prisoners should be unilaterally released (see Part II, Section 7,
paragraph 5c). Members of other agencies, humanitarian or military,
should allow the ICRC to take the lead in these negotiations, and
should be very careful if they become involved in them by the parties.
There is a great risk that the parties may seize personnel in order to
exchange them for their own detainees if uncontrolled prisoner exchanges
take place.
c. Military Issues
Part IV, Section 1, paragraph 3
Although the decision to become involved may be political, military commanders
may have to negotiate the terms on which they will deploy in support of political
or humanitarian agreements. It is important for the military to ensure that they are
not committed to an operation that is militarily untenable. Military representatives
may be involved in negotiating cease-fires that can take three stages: first
getting the parties to reach an internal political agreement that they want a ceasefire,
then achieving a military agreement on how to conduct the cease-fire, and
finally negotiating a workable implementation of the agreement on the ground.
Having deployed, military units will negotiate with the parties for freedom of
movement to monitor and enforce political or military agreements, such as ceasefires
or demilitarization. Agreements made at a higher level may need to be
renegotiated on a case-by-case basis at a lower level: for example, to move up to
confrontation lines to monitor activity or establish observation posts; to cross
confrontation lines in order to hold meetings or resupply units; or to monitor troop
deployments once a separation of forces from a confrontation line has been
agreed, following a cease-fire or demilitarization of a zone. Military units
deployed to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance will have to
negotiate on a case-by-case basis for freedom of movement to escort convoys.
This may lead to “linkage” negotiations on other humanitarian issues and political
problems that may be used as bargaining devices by local warlords.
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Part IV, Section 1, paragraph 4
4. Appointing Negotiators
a. Command Involvement
Command and negotiating are both full time functions. Although commanders
will want to be fully involved in all negotiations that are central to the success of
their mission, there may be scope for establishing a negotiating team to deal with
routine matters and allow the commander to step in, either to add weight when
negotiations are in danger of failing, or to finalize agreements. However,
negotiators should have rank, status, and credibility; for example, a senior
military officer should engage the commanders of the parties about a cease-fire,
and a doctor should discuss medical questions with local health authorities.
b. Impartiality
There may be occasions when it is useful to have senior negotiators who are not
commanders, so that if a commander has had to take punitive action against one
of the parties, and as a result, they refuse to talk to the commander (suspension
of relief supplies or use of airpower, for example), an impartial negotiator can
reopen dialogue.
c. Negotiating Teams
Because negotiating can be very time-consuming and operational areas are
spread out, dedicated negotiating teams should cover specific areas; negotiators
who are divided between several different locations while dealing with different
problems may be less successful. Negotiating teams may include several people
with different expertise, but large delegations should be avoided, and a lead
negotiator is best joined by other experts as necessary. In large delegations,
decisionmakers will be constrained by the presence of an audience, and without
constructive dialogue, negotiations may break down. Progress will improve once
the negotiators and decisionmakers, or their direct representatives, work alone or
in very small groups.
d. Coordinated Objectives
Political, humanitarian, and military negotiators from different organizations or
elements of a UN mission may talk to the same leaders of the parties. If they are
going to have any success in their negotiations, individually or collectively, they
need to be coordinated. This can be achieved by providing clear direction from
the highest level on what objectives should be sought from negotiations and
where it is possible to compromise. In addition, there needs to be regular liaison
between the agencies and individuals engaged in negotiations at each level so that
they are aware of progress or problems. The most efficient solution may be to
create a separate negotiating organization that is responsible for generating
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5. Tasks
negotiating strategy, following the directions of the commander, and for conducting
the majority of negotiations at the theater level.
Negotiating objectives should be set at the highest level and implemented by
everyone involved. Although the SRSG may give clear directions about what can be
negotiated—with whom and by whom, to the heads of the military, civilian, and
humanitarian elements working for the UN—it is important to note that many organizations
operating in-theater will not be under UN control, and will conduct their own
negotiations independently. The following negotiating tasks may be carried out at all
levels:
a. Mediate
Negotiators identify common ground on which the parties can discuss and agree.
b. Facilitate
Negotiators provide practical assistance to their opposite numbers in the parties,
for example, by passing messages, providing a hot line, or securing a venue for
a meeting.
c. Communicate
Because negotiations can be affected directly by outside events, negotiators must
stay in touch while negotiating and also pass on the results swiftly. If related
military activity occurs while the negotiations are in progress or an agreement on
a cease-fire is successful, it has to be communicated as rapidly as possible to all
forces on the confrontation line.
d. Educate
Negotiators may have to teach parties how to negotiate and to make genuine
concessions. The parties may be unable to see that there are alternatives open to
them. Negotiators also will have to ensure that the parties understand the meaning
of agreements that they reach, and the resulting obligations of the international
community and the parties in implementing the agreements.
e. Information Policy Development
Part IV, Section 1, paragraphs 4-5
Manipulation of information can have a serious impact on negotiations. This may
be countered by actively seeking international support for negotiations and by
presenting the facts as seen by the negotiators to diplomatic contacts, who will
report to their capitals, and the local and international media. The local media may
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Part IV, Section 1, paragraphs 5-6
be influenced by the parties and need to hear the negotiators’ points of view. The
international media will influence both international decisionmakers and those
elements of the local population who have access to it.
f. Identify Incentives and Disincentives
Mediation and negotiation should be supported by a comprehensive range of
incentives and disincentives to the parties, so that they can be encouraged to take
positive steps and dissuaded from taking action that will be detrimental to the
peace effort. These incentives and disincentives will vary according to circumstances.
Identification of effective incentives and disincentives is vital in the
preparatory stage of the negotiating strategy.
6. Negotiating Venues
The venue for negotiations is usually dictated by the parties, particularly if negotiators
have taken the initiative to go to the parties. In face-to-face negotiations, the selection
of a venue may be very difficult, with each party perceiving advantages and disadvantages
to each proposal and refusing to agree. The following locations are commonly used:
a. In-Theater
UN headquarters have the advantages of being neutral territory if the parties are
to meet with some security and good communications. However, space is often
at a premium, making protracted negotiations difficult. The headquarters of the
parties are where most bilateral negotiations between parties will take place, with
the negotiator visiting their opposite side’s office. Embassies, where parties can
meet for negotiations hosted by a nation acceptable to all concerned, have the
advantages of neutrality and providing status to the negotiations. However,
security of the visiting delegations may be a problem, as can the availability of
space at the embassy. When the parties refuse to meet anywhere else, crossing
points in no-man’s land on confrontation lines or a portacabin at a UN checkpoint
in no-man’s land can be useful.
b. Out-of-Theater
UN headquarters in New York has been used as a neutral venue for parties.
However, it is probably a long way from the theater and secrecy is hard to
maintain. Regional UN headquarters also have been used as neutral locations, and
may be considerably closer to the theater of operations, making it easier to bring
the parties together, but secrecy is also very difficult. Other neutral locations can
be found in external, neighboring, or neutral third countries, if this is acceptable
to the parties. This may be the preferred solution if negotiations are to be kept
secret.
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c. The following factors should be considered when selecting a venue:
7. Operational Techniques
a. Identification of Decisionmakers
• Security: the venue should be physically secure, with protection
provided by the host authorities or the UN if it is on UN
controlled territory;
• Accessibility: time should not be wasted getting to remote
venues unless this promotes either secrecy or a positive
approach to the negotiations;
• Communications: as already mentioned, communications
are vital. If necessary, the negotiating team should provide
communications facilities that also can be used by the parties
to liaise with their authorities;
• Comfort: during protracted negotiations, a basic level of
comfort may be useful to facilitate a successful outcome.
There should be rooms for each delegation, large and small
meeting rooms, facilities for providing food and drinks, and
overnight accommodations if required.
Time and effort can be wasted negotiating with officials without influence and
with no authority to reach agreements. It is important to identify who the real
decisionmakers are—they are not always the people who have the appropriate
titles and offices—and to attempt to deal with them directly.
b. Media
All parties will try to exploit the media for their own aims. Negotiators should not
become victims of this manipulation. Many incidents are “staged” with a view
that they will be almost instantly broadcast as satellite television news. These
incidents often are used to communicate a political position or to elicit the
sympathy and support of the international community to take action on behalf of
the manipulator. Failure to understand the underlying motives for staged media
incidents can endanger the success of negotiations.
c. Security of Delegates
Part IV, Section 1, paragraphs 6-7
Negotiators must be aware of security at all levels. Individually, negotiators may
be at risk if extremists believe that they support an opposing side’s position or fail
to support their own position sufficiently. Delegations from the parties may visit
or travel through hostile territory controlled by or accessible to other parties for
negotiations.
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Part IV, Section 1, paragraph 7
d. Two-Track Negotiations
As much work as possible should be done at the local level, as this creates a more
favorable climate in which negotiations of all types can take place. Progress made
on small issues at the local level can create a degree of trust and confidence that
allows negotiations on more serious issues to make progress at the top level.
Conversely, progress in the top level negotiations will provide impetus to the
local level. Parties at the local level may say that they are unable to reach an
agreement because they are waiting for instructions from a higher authority.
e. Communications and Mobility
During crises, negotiators must be able to contact their interlocutors and superiors
at any time, rapidly, and under all conditions. They need to have voice and data
communications that are portable and function reliably, as well as flexible
transport that is appropriate to the local conditions.
f. Maintaining Secrecy
In public, parties may take extreme negotiating positions to try and influence their
domestic audience, the international community, and the opposition. If progress
is to be made, it is probable that one or more of the parties may have to discuss
matters and reach agreements at odds with their public position. It may be very
difficult for the parties to do this publicly and survive politically. For this reason,
negotiations are best conducted in secret. Successful secret negotiations require
careful and imaginative planning and implementation and strict adherence to the
“need to know” principle. This is best achieved by involving only one or two
people from each delegation. They are not popular with those who are excluded,
both within the international community and the parties. In addition, information
must be protected so that parties are sure that they can discuss their negotiating
positions in confidence with the negotiators, and that there is no risk that the press
will exploit information about the content of negotiations for their own benefit,
either as a news story or to gain intelligence, which would damage the negotiators’
credibility.
g. Political Recognition
The parties may seek international recognition for a region or state, which may
be politically impossible for the international community to confer. Everyone
dealing with the parties must be aware of this, and beware of the informal use of
titles or terms of reference that might appear to give credibility where none is
implied.
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Part IV, Section 1, paragraphs 7-8
h. Joint Commissions
Convening a joint commission can bring parties together at the local level, chaired
by relevant representatives from the international community and attended by
representatives of the parties. Delegations can be political (mayors or politicians,
for example), military (commanders at various levels, for example) or humanitarian
(the local Red Cross or Red Crescent). Problems can be raised and, if
possible, the entire joint commission can travel to examine the facts on the
ground, rapidly correcting false allegations and building confidence.
i. Using Interpreters
First class interpreters are vital. They should not be natives of the conflict area,
as locals are vulnerable to coercion or attack by the parties and may not be
accepted by both sides. Unless they can be trusted for their impartiality and be
protected, interpreters from one party should not be taken onto territory controlled
by another party. It is likely that the parties will bring their own
interpreters.
8. Principles
a. Impartiality
If parties believe a negotiator is no longer impartial, their trust, cooperation, and
openhearted relationship will be lost and negotiations probably will be unsuccessful.
b. Long-Term View
Negotiators should recognize that it takes time to change from opposing positions
to common ground and to establish a culture of negotiations in which the parties
become used to meeting and solving small problems together in preparation for
handling crises and tackling larger problems. A short-term negotiating success,
won by conceding an apparently small point, may be damaging and set a longterm
precedent; for example, paying tolls to get emergency aid through a hostile
checkpoint may solve an immediate crisis, but also could set a precedent that
results in all convoys having to pay increasingly extortionate tolls in future.
Negotiators should plan ahead to exploit the impact of seasonal changes; for
example, seeds and fertilizer for spring planting and fuel in winter as a source of
incentives. They also should anticipate future crises and be prepared to react when
they occur, but also remain aware that long negotiations may be overtaken by
events.
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Part IV, Section 1, paragraph 8
c. Imagination
Imagination and lateral approaches are vital for the identification of common
ground between the parties, development of incentives and disincentives, and
finding ways to overcome the many barriers in conducting successful negotiations.
d. Acting with Determination
The parties will have more at stake and may have fewer constraints on their
actions than negotiators from the international community; for example a militia
gunman at a checkpoint may have no rules of engagement, unlike a convoy
commander. Faced with parties under emotional pressure, the negotiator or
representative must also be prepared to act with determination.
e. Cultural Awareness
Negotiations are often conducted in unfamiliar languages between parties that
follow idiosyncratic customs for greeting and meeting, and hold values that are
peculiar to their culture. When negotiators themselves also have different cultural
backgrounds, the possibilities for misunderstanding are great. It is above all the
responsibility of the negotiators to understand the culture of the people they are
talking to, so that they better understand the messages that they receive.
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PART IV: COORDINATION
SECTION 2
WORKING TOGETHER
1. Introduction
The purpose of this final section is to draw together information contained in earlier
parts of the guide on the problems of coordination, first, to show why coordinating all the
elements of an international response group is extremely difficult, and then to explain
what structures may assist the operator in these problems. It would be misleading to offer
a rosy picture of the international community’s capability to work together. In each of the
preceding sections, the problems of coordination outweigh our collective ability to
overcome them. A federal approach toward the long-term strategic aims of the peace
process might work as cooperation between similarly tasked organizations has in the past.
But so far, the overall orchestration of a peace process has not been possible, and there
will be moments when this ability would make the difference between success and
failure. A successful peace process is the best guarantee of the long-term viability of
individual efforts to restore civil society, just as a collapse of peace and security inevitably
threatens their survival.
2. The Network of Participants
a. Peace Support Operations involve a growing community of participants. At the
highest level these are described as the elements of a response group (see Part I,
paragraph 13). Several distinct interest groups or elements are represented: for
example, multinational military forces, UN agencies, UN civil elements, ICRC,
bilateral donors, and NGOs. However, within each element there are many
subdivisions and individual organizations. This means that an international
response to a particular complex emergency may comprise several hundred
smaller units and organizations. It is possible that at the lowest or tactical level of
operation each of these subunits and suborganizations will have developed an
individual interest and approach to the operation. In most cases, this is because
they bring different capabilities to the crisis zone but also because of their
national, professional, and institutional differences.
b. Collectively these suborganizations or components can be thought of as a
network (see Part II, Section 1, paragraph 3). A complex emergency will therefore
attract a network of responding organizations whose degree of involvement,
location, and influence vary. Cooperation among the constituents of this network
at the operational level is hard to achieve because of the need to establish and
maintain relationships in at least three different levels or working communities:
with each other in the field, with the local parties in the crisis zone, and beyond
the operational area with the international community at large.
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Part IV, Section 2, paragraph 2
(1) Relationships Between Operators in the Field
Cooperating with each other in the field requires a great deal of
organizational energy and time. Assuming that turf rivalries and
professional differences have been overcome and there is both a need
and genuine desire to collaborate, the sheer size of the network and the
diversity of operators in the crisis area often prevents individual
participants from developing either a complete picture of all the
components of the network or a systematic approach to establishing a
cooperative community.
(2) Relationships with Local Parties and Host Country Elements
Cooperating with the host government, the parties, and each civilian
community poses different problems. In most cases, at a representative
level, the number of key organizations and officials from the host
country and factions of the conflict is smaller than the incoming array
of response elements. But in some cases, the effective local leaders
will be in conflict with each other; communicating with one side will
prevent the possibility of dealing with another. Impartiality becomes
impossible to maintain.
Communications will be unreliable and distances between the key
local figures in the crisis zone will dictate that only the largest and best
organized elements of the response group will establish contact on a
regular basis with all parties. Smaller organizations will have to
operate more locally, often within a cooperative network that can be
maintained by visits on foot and by personal contact.
(3) Relationships with International Communities
At a higher level beyond the immediate crisis zone, there also will be
an international community of interested organizations that communicate
and cooperate with each other. Although each suborganization
represented in the field is likely to have contact on a bilateral basis
with its own higher headquarters or controlling element in the international
community, very few have multilateral access from the
operational level.
c. Establishing cooperative relationships throughout this network of participants
can be very hard to achieve if the number of involved parties is large and the
individual components are physically spread out over the crisis zone and beyond.
Where a crisis involves cross-border movement of population or cargoes,
participants may need to develop working contacts with groups that are at varying
operational, regional, and international levels. Although there may be a central
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egister of all foreign and host country relief agencies kept by the host government
or a coordinating office of the UN, establishing a network of functionally related
agencies is usually an ad hoc matter of knowing who is around (see Part II, Section
1, paragraph 3.) For all these reasons, the relief community, including the
international military forces, tend to communicate within small subnetworks of
individuals that are functionally related or geographically distinct.
3. Different Attitudes
The array of interested large and small parties is divided into three broad professional
disciplines: political, civilian, and military. At every level of involvement all leaders
seem to agree that it is highly desirable to work together and that this need should span
all disciplines. However, when local relief officials say this they often mean to work
together on their own terms without conceding much, if any, of their individual
autonomy. Furthermore, each professional group has a different view of what working
together really means. These can be summarized as:
a. Political Elements
Diplomats and officials representing individual nations and international organizations
such as NATO or the EU prefer to think of themselves working together
in a loose consensus of individual interests. A political consensus may mean that
contributor nations agree to take action to resolve a particular crisis. This is
usually an agreement in principle and the details of how to work together will be
left to a lower level of staff to translate into a practical plan.
b. Civil Elements
In the field, individual civil agencies work together by cooperation or light
coordination (see Part II, Section I, paragraph 5). They attend meetings where
they agree to be responsible for a particular aspect of an operation. They do so
voluntarily but usually without conceding much of their individual freedom of
action or even their right to withdraw their services if the nature of the overall
operation begins to move in a direction they do not support.
c. Military Elements
Part IV, Section 2, paragraphs 2-3
Professional military officers, whether they are from units of a multinational
intervention force or otherwise involved in a PSO, tend to come from a different
starting point on the question of working together. They have a greater tolerance
of the need for subordination of interests to achieve success. How far they will
subordinate themselves to the command of another nation varies on a case-bycase
basis. Generically, their view of working together is by coordination rather
than by cooperation, implying a formal subordination of interests that leaves less
freedom for individual initiatives or a spontaneous withdrawal.
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Part IV, Section 2, paragraph 4
4. Different Levels of Concern
a. Although this guide focuses on the operational level, the need for cooperation
extends beyond the limits of the crisis zone. Intervention by an international
response group needs to be underwritten by an extended structure of consensus
and cooperation if it is to affect a violence ridden complex emergency. Cooperation
within this extended structure operates at different levels, and these should
not be confused with the ones described in paragraph 2, which refer to the network
of operators. In this case, the levels reflect all involved groups that are at an
operational level among international response elements and the local parties
involved in the crisis, at regional level among neighboring states, and at a global
level among authorizing and contributing international organizations.
b. Operational Level
Achieving and maintaining cooperation among the innumerable parties, agencies,
and international military forces at the operational and tactical (or lowest)
level is complex and requires a huge effort. At this level there are many more
individual parties and entities involved than at the regional or global level.
Nevertheless, a refusal to work together may have an immediate local effect on
the viability of the operation. In a complex emergency involving an international
response force and a representative array of national and international relief and
development agencies, the cooperative network would have to extend to political,
military, and civil elements.
(1) Political Elements
(2) Military Elements
• Host governments or host authority in that area where the
crisis has developed (see Part I, paragraph 10).
• Political negotiators—the body of international peace brokers
by whose initiative the intervention has taken place—
will be represented at the operational level and have their distinct
interests and influence on the progress and the agreed outcome.
• Contributor nations that maintain a strong influence over the
day-to-day involvement of their military and financial contributions.
For this reason their active support of the overall
process is needed as well as their support for particular
operations.
• Intervening military forces may be part of a UN structure or
an independent coalition of actors. In either case, the inter-
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(3) Civil Elements
vening military at the operational level have to be recognized
as a separate entity for the purposes of cooperation.
• Armed factions or elements that also are actively involved in
the area of the crisis (see Part I, paragraph 11).
• UN agencies (see Part II, Section 3);
• Nongovernmental organizations (see Part II, Section 6);
• UN electoral and administrative organizations (see Part II,
Sections 4 and 5);
• Human rights investigators (see Part II, Section 7).
The entities listed above are very different and it is hard to characterize them as
a group. Yet, for the purposes of operational success, each one may wield a vital
influence over both the immediate and long-term success of a PSO, regardless of
their comparative differences in size and structure. For example, although the
electoral element may number a few dozen international officials and several
hundred locally enlisted staff, the failure of an election may have an irreversible
effect on the support for a peace process. Each of the above will have to be part
of an effective network to develop closer working relations.
c. Regional Level
With the growing interdependence of states, their shared resources, and population
migration (see Part I, paragraph 6), any nascent emergency that develops into
an extended crisis is likely to involve the immediate interests of neighboring
states in the region. The need to have the full support of regional states is an
essential factor of success. Their support is manifested politically as a consensus
supporting the international relief effort and more practically on a day-to-day
basis by their provision of refuge for displaced persons, as staging areas for the
air, land, and sea movement of logistics, in maintaining arms embargoes, and so
forth. Cooperation among regional powers and the individual organizations
directly involved at operational level has to be maintained and on many issues that
are highly interactive.
d. Global Level
Part IV, Section 2, paragraph 4
Although some complex emergencies have been addressed principally by regional
structures, in most cases there is a crucial element of global involvement.
The authorization for a UN or multinational military force to intervene is granted
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Part IV, Section 2, paragraphs 4-5
by the UN Security Council. Relief funding may be organized from groups that
represent global rather than regional concern, and political pressure on the
warring parties to come to an agreement is usually more effective when representing
global interests than regional efforts on their own. Global consensus is vital
to the success of a PSO, but this influence is usually exercised over the longer term
and not on a daily basis.
e. Linkage
Although the powers and organizations that influence the crisis are divided for the
sake of clarity into three levels, in reality there is extensive linkage between each
level, which also is political, civil, and military. For example, between regional
and operational levels linkage may concern the protection and sustainment of
large numbers of displaced persons who have fled from the immediate crisis zone
to a third party country. Between global and operational levels, linkage may be
essential for the application of sanctions by combat aircraft and warships
provided by regional defense structures or from a globally derived coalition of
actors.
5. Defining Success
Collective desire to achieve success dictates the need for a common approach and
close cooperation beyond narrow sectarian interests and short-term solutions. The
problems of achieving this cooperation stem from the different definitions of success that
prevail between the political, civil, and military elements of a response group.
a. Political Success
Political definitions of success tend to vary with the proximity and relationship
of the country concerned in the crisis. However, the public sense of detatchment
can be manipulated by the attention given to the crisis by the media, whose
intensive coverage can bring it into the living room of every family. The political
response to a complex emergency might be idealistically motivated at best, but
more often it is a reactive capitalization of domestic feelings. With few exceptions,
political leaders in the coalition of actors that provide the majority of
resources will only react to complex emergencies under extreme public pressure
“to do something.” Pressed in this manner, politicians may be more concerned
with their longer-term, domestic survival strategy than the real needs of the crisis.
Experience warns them that public enthusiasm is fickle, so interest may quickly
turn to other issues and turn against them when casualties start to mount. For this
reason, the long-term demands of a complex emergency are sometimes referred
to as a quagmire in which continuing national commitments can become unpopular
and ultimately bring down the responsible government. To be fair to politicians,
their short-term approach usually reflects voter and media priorities.
Success in political terms is an instant expedient that may relieve some of the
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symptoms but perhaps not the underlying causes: it is being able to show that
something is being done; it is avoiding military casualties, but above all, avoiding
long-term involvements that could be classified as “quagmires.”
Among neighboring states that are closer to the epicenter of the crisis at regional
level, the political view of success is more likely to recognize the long-term needs
of the situation. This realistic awareness is encouraged by the presence of large
refugee populations and the threat that civilian violence and the disaster conditions
of the crisis may spill over into their own territories. However, even at this
proximity, containment may be the preferred option rather than involvement. The
hands-on involvement if possible will be subcontracted to the civil agencies (see
Part II, Section I, paragraph 3c).
b. Military Success
The military view of success is conditioned by political pressure from above and
practical experience. Veteran officers from the traditional school understand that
a peace process may take decades to run its course, and, in the meantime, the need
to separate warring communities and reassure them of their relative security is a
constant task. As the process of disarmament and rehabilitation begins to gain
impetus, the preeminent role of the military element is reduced. At the same time,
the civil elements of the response group, which provide the means to transform
a victim population that may be bearing arms to a civilian society, become more
significant in the overall operational matrix. Veterans of these operations understand
both the need for civilian-military coordination and the partial subordination
of the military to what is essentially a civil process.
The delicate marriage of civil-military interests is upset by the comparatively
recent involvement of military forces in the response group that represents a
stronger war fighting ethos. This influential and powerful lobby will dominate in
the mid-level and high-level responses because their assets and capabilities
become essential to success. Professionally, the “war-fighting” lobby has less
experience of complex emergencies and may not recognize the significance of the
civil-military linkage in the solution. Success for them involves deployment of
strength, mass, and technical superiority. It is measured by progressive achievement
of visible objectives, is triumphalist by nature, and needs victors and
vanquished. Success should be instantaneous, must avoid “quagmires” and
“mission creep,” and it may be linked to domestic elections and the need to
maintain public support.
c. Civil Success
Part IV, Section 2, paragraph 5
Within the civil response organization there is a wide variety of operational roles
(see Part II, Section 6, paragraph 5 and 6b). It follows that there are many
individual definitions of success because each organization has its own opera-
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Part IV, Section 2, paragraphs 5-6
tional objectives. Some respond only to the short-term needs of the humanitarian
relief phase, but the majority have both a relief and a development interest within
their areas of competence (see Part II, Section 1, paragraph 1). This requires them
to take a long-term view that can be at odds with the military and political
elements. Most civilian organizations need public support for funding purposes
and idealistic objectives that exceed public sympathy. Civilian objectives and the
civilian definition of success differ in important respects to that of the political
and military elements. Civilian organizations, particularly NGOs, generally have
an interest in the crisis area that predates international political concern and the
arrival of the military intervention force. They are therefore more intimately
involved in the host country (see Part II, Section 6, paragraph 9a). Success,
whether short- or long-term, can be a very defined and sectarian matter, for
example, to establish a drinking water supply or rebuild a school. A project may
be successful regardless of the overall state of the peace process. Success is
usually related to concrete operational tasks; failure is absolute and cannot be
skillfully reinterpreted as success for public consumption in the manner of some
short-term political or military gestures made in response to the need to “do
something.”
6. Although the success of the overall peace process in a complex emergency relies on
the cooperation and coordination of the elements of the response group, there are
overwhelming reasons why it is unrealistic to expect this will happen. As explained
earlier, the number of actors is unmanageable because they are physically divided by the
regional and international levels on which they operate and by the spread of their
locations within the crisis zone. They have disparate political, military, and civil interests,
and each element uses different criteria to define success. In some cases, individual
organizations will not accept any attempt to coordinate them (see for example Part II,
Section 6, paragraph 11a) because they feel their objectives are better achieved independently
of the overall response effort. Although the majority of response organizations
accept the overriding need to coordinate their efforts, in real terms, they will not concede
sufficient autonomy to achieve this. So far no effective system has been agreed to
facilitate the direction of the disparate elements toward a common approach. Moreover,
in the short term it is unrealistic to expect that a global authority of any kind will emerge
to coordinate future operations more effectively. Each element nevertheless has integral
coordinating structures. These encourage commanders and senior officials or representatives
to feel that a degree of coordination is taking place, which is usually misleading.
In every case, these structures have been designed for internal coordination and to
improve the cooperation of that element within the rest of the relief community. There
is no overarching structure to coordinate the response community as a whole. The ad hoc
structures that emerged in some emergencies to meet the particular needs of group
security, or disarmament and rehabilitation, for example, have little long-term significance
and have not been translated effectively to other emergencies.
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Part IV, Section 2, paragraph 7
7. Existing Structures for Coordination
With the benefit of the international community’s post-Cold War experiences, there
are now coordinating structures in each element of a response group. All operators should
be aware of these as a source of information on the network of involved components and
in some cases they have a genuinely effective coordination role.
a. UN Civil Coordination
The UN system organizes its cooperative efforts around several different hubs,
for example at strategic level around the IASC and JCGP. In the field, coordination
efforts are focused on appointed officials such as the SRSG, the UN resident
coordinator, and leaders of subgroups that cope with individual aspects of a
disaster. Ostensibly the Department of Humanitarian Affairs has the overall task
to mobilize and coordinate the collective efforts of the international community
(see Part II, Section 3, paragraph 6b). In some cases, the UN secretary-general
may designate a lead agency to act as the focal point for planning and operational
coordination. All the above are described in greater detail in Part II, Section 3,
paragraph 6 and 7.
For different reasons, these arrangements tend to become less effective as
operational pressures increase. Within the UN system, each agency has a high
degree of autonomy. This results in a multiple command system in which each
agency responds to its individual international constituencies. In the field, UN
agencies will accept advisory coordination (see Part II, Section 1, paragraph 5),
especially when the situation runs according to plans, but when operational
tension rises, individual control exercised from distant directorates will override
attempts to coordinate at the operational level. The detailed coordination of assets
and responsibilities for a multifaceted operation such as rehabilitation of warring
factions that involves political, military, and civil elements may be achieved
using a UN system in a best-case scenario. However, under stress of the
unexpected, there is usually no command figure at the operational level who can
hold the effort together.
b. Nongovernmental Organizations
Within their own community, NGOs tend to develop effective cooperating
arrangements. As an emergency develops and more NGOs arrive, a well-defined
cooperative forum may emerge. Each emergency will produce its own structures
and the arrangements for one are seldom translated to another except in principle.
The operating costs of the cooperative organization are shared and additional
subcommittees may form on a functional basis, for example, for food distribution,
health, etc. These arrangements are described in greater detail in Part II, Section
6, paragraph 8a. Representatives from other elements of the response group,
including the military, will usually attend NGO forums.
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Part IV, Section 2, paragraph 7
As the NGO sector’s proportion of international funding increases, this community
becomes a powerful element of a response group. But in terms of achieving
common approaches to the same problems, many NGOs would not even see
themselves as part of a group that includes political negotiators and the intervening
military forces. NGO cooperative structures are much less effective than the
UN civil arrangements described above. NGO umbrella groups may serve as a
useful entry point to a particular section of the NGO community, but they suffer
from having a low common factor of internal agreement and, without a hierarchy,
usually fail to exert an effective coordinating influence. In these circumstances,
the interelement orchestration of a multifaceted phase of the overall peace
process, such as rehabilitation, that would involve every element of the response
group becomes a negotiating nightmare and may fall apart under operational
stress.
c. Military Coordination
The intervening military force usually brings with it the most comprehensive and
reliable communications and also will control the main transport assets in the
crisis area. In a mid- or high-level response involving NATO forces, the military
have access to a variety of intelligence collection systems (see Part III, Section
1, paragraph 2c), which are augmented by daily information collection at the
tactical level. In every case, an intervening military force is likely to organize a
network of its own liaison officers or military observers whose main purpose is
to communicate with the leaders of the warring factions and host government
officials. With the possession of these powerful communications, transport, and
information resources, the military become an irresistible center of gravity for
coordinating activity that tends to attract representatives from all other involved
elements. Information is an important asset that the military can offer.
In some cases, force commanders have organized their entire military staff to
achieve joint civil-military objectives. But where a force is deployed as a shortterm
expedient, military involvement in civil affairs may be less wholehearted.
The operational staff will concentrate on strictly military tasks and civil affairs are
consigned to specialist sections of the staff, usually the G5 branch or to a CMOC.
In both cases, this serves as a coordinating interface between the military force
and civilian organizations that are involved in the peace process.
Despite having the most effective coordination instruments in the crisis area, the
military are seldom able to take full advantage of their strong position. Culturally,
the military are isolated from the rest of the relief community (as explained in Part
II, Section 6, paragraph 11a and Part III, Section 1, paragraph 5b). Within the
hierarchy of response elements, military officers probably have the least knowledge
and experience of the entire network of civilian actors. Usually the last to
arrive in the crisis zone, the military start from a weak position, and G5 branch
or CMOC staff are either reservists or trained in some other role such as military
240

education or logistics. Consequently, they may not have the same field of personal
contacts and experience as a full-time relief official. Lacking a complete vision
of the entire network, the military staff tend to have a false horizon, seeing only
the civil agencies that touch immediately on their sphere of interest. This limits
cooperation and causes duplication of effort, for example, in the planning of civilmilitary
development projects that have previously been assessed and provided
for at a higher level in the civil response system. Although G5/CMOC structures
are improving with each new experience, there is still an unavoidable feeling that
some force commanders, particularly from NATO nations with a short-term, warfighting
view of their role, tend to use the civil-military staff to sideline rather than
expand civilian-military cooperation. For a military force with short-term objectives,
the separation of civilian activity from and reliance on the military allows
a clean break in the event of a military exit from a crisis zone.
d. UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General
An overall coordinating responsibility is often vested in the SRSG. In the
hierarchy of a UN response group command structure, the SRSG is the senior
official in the operational area. He or she usually will have directing powers over
such subordinated officers as the UN military force commander and elements
such as UN civil administration and the UN electoral assistance element. The
SRSG also may be authorized to act as the overall coordinator of the peace process
and is uniquely placed to pull together the political, civil, and military elements
into a common approach.
However, experience has shown that the SRSG’s position and responsibilities are
not underwritten with the powers needed to impose an effective coordinating
regime. Any coordinating successes usually have been the result of a commanding
personality rather than through real executive power. For reasons already
explained, the UN civil agencies and NGOs are autonomous and cannot be
coordinated unless their higher directing influence can be overridden at an
operational level. This is also increasingly the case with military contingents that
comprise a UN multinational force. In some cases, the SRSG through the force
commander may exercise operational control, but command is in all cases
retained by national defense headquarters and is used to influence or override the
SRSG’s plans.
8. Planning to Succeed
Part IV, Section 2, paragraphs 7-8
In striving to achieve a common operational approach, it is important to remember
that overall success is decided elsewhere. Several factors influence its likelihood, which
can be arranged as an equation (see Figure 3). On one side are the needs of the crisis, and
on the other are the capabilities and willingness of the international community to provide
them. Although it is obvious that the latter must exceed the former, in recent experience,
elements of the international community have responded to situations where this is not
241

Part IV, Section 2, paragraph 8
Figure 3: Planning to Succeed
Crisis Factors
Planning to Succeed
Political
Humanitarian
Security
Stabilization
Rehabilitation
Reconciliation
Needs
of
Peace
Process
Definition
of
Success
Political
Consensus
Longterm
Funding
Sufficient
Assets
Capability
for
Success
Security Capabilities
Coordination of Assets
Domestic Pressures
Constraints
International Concern
the case. Some organizations would have intervened bravely under any circumstances for
the best humanitarian reasons, but in other respects, the international community’s
expectations were seriously at odds with reality. Below is a summary of the factors that
should be considered when measuring the likelihood of the overall success of a peace
process:
a. Needs of a Crisis
To be contained or resolved, complex emergencies raise political, security, and
civilian needs, and in each crisis these will be different. Their precise nature has
been described in greater detail in Part I, paragraphs 10 and 11 and in Part II,
Section 3 and 4. In the case of civilian needs, the procedures for needs assessments
have been developed by concerned NGOs and UN agencies. However, to
complete the needs side of the equation, political and security needs must be
included and their sum expressed in terms of international military forces, funds,
and assets. The strength and nature of the political consensus needed to underwrite
the process also should be considered as a need. Above all, there must be
a real desire among the warring parties for a sustainable peace process.
242

Part IV, Section 2, paragraph 8
b. The Capability to Succeed
The needs of a crisis equation must be balanced by the international community’s
capability to succeed. Several unrelated factors determine the overall capability
to provide them:
(1) Definitions of Success
The political, military, and civil elements will view success differently
as explained above. How much these approaches are mutually
exclusive must be identified at an early stage of planning, and realistic
operational provisions to diminish them must be agreed before committing
an international response to the crisis area.
(2) Long-Term Funding Strategy
Complex emergencies tend to be funded by reactive public sympathy.
These are short-term expedients to a long-term problem and rely on
media interest and public sympathy, but both are fickle. A reliable way
to raise, concentrate, and account for the international community’s
considerable spending power should be assured and funds committed
before deployment. Unless there is a viable funding strategy, the
success of an intervention is doubtful.
(3) Material Capacity to Succeed
A response to a complex emergency can fail at the operational level,
despite overwhelming international political pressure on warring
parties to accept a process for peaceful solution. No longer a symbolic
process, peace support operations require extensive resources, professional
management, and understanding of political, economic, and
socio-cultural issues, especially in the long-term removal of the
causes of the violence. The material capacity to succeed can be
assessed from the strength of the political consensus, long-term
funding strategy, and the willingness of international actors to provide
support. The sum of the assets raised must equal the international
community’s ambitions for the process.
243

244

ANNEX 1
THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM
Main
Committees
Standing
Committees
Other Subsidiary
Organs
Trusteeship
Council
Security
Council
UNDOF
UNFICYP
UNIFIL
UNMCGIP
UNTSO
General
Assembly
Military Staff
Committee
International
Court of
Justice
Economic
& Social
Council
Secretariat
IAEA
UNRWA
UNCTAD
UNICEF
UNHCR
WFP
UNITAR
UNDP
UNEP
UNU
UN Special Fund
World Food Council
HABITAT
UNFPA
Regional
Commissions
Functional
Commissions
Other
Committees
Principal organs of the United Nations
ILO
FAO
UNESCO
WHO
IMF
IDA
IBRD
IFC
ICAU
UPU
ITU
WMO
IMO
WIPO
IFAD
UNIDO
GATT
Other United Nations organs
Specialized agencies and other autonomous
organizations within the system
Based on an organogram in Erskine Childers, Time Beyond Warnings—Strengthening the United
Nations System (London: CIIR/Pax Christi, 1993).
245

ANNEX 2
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS
Under-Secretary-General
Executive Office
Assistant Secretary-General
Assistant Secretary-General
Centre for
Disarmament
Affairs
General
Assembly &
Trusteeship
Council
Affairs Division
Americas
Division
Europe
Division
East Asia/Pacific
Division
Africa I
Division
Africa II
Division
West Asia
Division
General
Assembly
Secretariat
Services Branch
Division for
Palestinian
Rights
Trusteeship
Council &
Decolonialization
Secretariat
Services Branch
SECCO
Secretariat
Services Branch
SECCO
Subsidiary
Organs
Secretarial
Services Branch
SECCO
Practices &
Charter
Research Branch
Based on an organigram provided by the Department of Political Affairs, April 1994.
SECCO Affairs
Division
Military Staff
Committee
Secretariat
246

ANNEX 3
ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PEACE-KEEPING OPERATIONS
Military Adviser's Office
Situation Centre*
OFFICE OF THE
UNDER-SECRETARY-GENERAL
Executive Office
Policy and Analysis Unit
OFFICE OF
PLANNING AND SUPPORT
OFFICE OF
OPERATIONS
Assistant Secretary-General
Assistant Secretary-General
Planning
Division
Field Administration and
Logistics Division
Africa
Division
Asia and Middle
East Division
Europe and Latin
America Division
Electoral Assistance
Division
Mission Planning
Service
Finance Management
Support Service
Civilian Police
Unit
Demining
Unit
Training Unit
Logistics and
Communications
Service
Personnel Management
and Support Service
* The designation “Centre” as used here is not derived from official organizational nomenclature standards (see General Assembly Resolution 32/204; see also A/
C.5/33/6).
ST/SGB/Organization, Section: DPKO, Page 15, March 22, 1995.
247

ANNEX 4
DEPARTMENT OF HUMANITARIAN AFFAIRS
Under-Secretary-General
for Humanitarian Affairs
Office of the USG
Inter-Agency
Support Unit
Executive Office
Disaster Management
Training Programme
Director of the
New York Office
Director of the
Geneva Office
Financial
Administrative Unit
Policy Analysis
Division
Complex
Emergency
Division
Distaster
Reduction
Division
Information
Management &
External Relation
Branch
Relief
Coordination
Branch
Analysis &
Planning Unit
Evaluation
Unit
Africa I
Section
NIS &
Middle East
Section
IDNDR
Secretariat
Mitigation
Branch
UNEP/DHA
Unit
Pisa Warehouse
Mine Clearance
& Policy Unit
Africa II
Section
Asia, Europe
& Latin America
Section
Information
System Section
External Relations
& Publications
Section
Information
Dissemination
Unit
Rapid Response
Unit
Complex
Emergency
Support Unit
Based on an organigram by DHA, July 1995.
248

ANNEX 5
UN SECURITY PHASES
There are five UN Security Phases (which may differ within the same country):
Phase 1: PRECAUTIONARY; incoming UN missions need clearance by the Designated
Official (in most cases the UNDP Resident Representative). Stepped-up security arrangements
at the duty station and limited movement of UN staff and dependents.
(Declared and downgraded by DO.)
Phase II: RESTRICTED MOVEMENT; All staff and their families remain at home
unless otherwise instructed by the Designated Official. No official travel either incoming
or within the country unless specifically authorized by the Designated Official. Arrangements
are usually initiated during this phase to prepare for possible evacuation. (Declared
and downgraded by DO.)
Phase III: RELOCATION; under Phase III, some internationally-recruited staff and all
eligible families of UN staff are relocated either inside or outside the country. (Declared
and downgraded by UNSECOORD.)
Phase IV: PROGRAM SUSPENSION; relocation outside the country of all remaining
internationally-recruited staff members except those directly concerned with emergency
or humanitarian relief operations or security matters. (Declared and downgraded by
UNSECOORD.)
Phase V: EVACUATION; evacuation of all internationally-recruited staff. National staff
are evacuated on a case-by-case basis. (Declared and downgraded by UNSECOORD.)
249

ANNEX 6
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND
RED CRESCENT MOVEMENT AND NGOS IN DISASTER RELIEF
1993 Steering Committee for Humanitarian Response, Geneva
(an alliance for voluntary action of Caritas Internationalis, Catholic Relief Services,
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, International Save the
Children Alliance, Lutheran World Federation, OXFAM, and World Council of Churches)
The purpose of the Code is to guard our standards of behaviour. It is not about
operational details. Rather it seeks to maintain the high standards of independence,
effectiveness and impact to which disaster response NGOs aspire. It is a voluntary code,
enforced by the will of each NGO accepting it to maintain the standards laid down in the
Code.
In the event of armed conflict the code will be interpreted and applied in conformity
with international humanitarian law.
The humanitarian imperative comes first: the prime motivation is to relieve human
suffering amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. The right to
receive and to offer assistance is a fundamental principle: hence the need for unimpeded
access to affected populations. Aid is given regardless of race, creed or nationality on the
basis of need alone. It will not be used to further a particular political or religious
standpoint. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.
Assistance should not be driven by the need to dispose of donor commodity surpluses.
We shall respect culture and custom. We shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries
in the management of relief aid. Aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to
disaster as well as meeting basic need, while not creating longterm dependence. We will
hold ourselves accountable both to those we seek to assist and to those from whom we
accept resources. We recognise the obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring of aid
distributions and to carry out regular assessments of the impact of assistance. In our
information activities we shall endeavour to portray disaster victims as dignified humans,
not hopeless objects.
The Code also describes the working environment we would like to see created by
donor governments, host governments and the intergovernmental organisations to
facilitate the effective participation of NGOs in disaster response.
250

RJBR/10/6/93
Purpose
CODE OF CONDUCT FOR THE INTERNATIONAL RED CROSS AND RED
CRESCENT MOVEMENT AND NGOS IN DISASTER RELIEF
This Code of Conduct seeks to guard our standards of behaviour. It is not about
operational details, such as how one should calculate food rations or set up a refugee
camp. Rather, it seeks to maintain the high standards of independence, effectiveness and
impact to which disaster response NGOs and the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement aspire. It is a voluntary code, enforced by the will of the organisation
accepting it to maintain the standards laid down in the Code.
In the event of armed conflict the present Code of Conduct will be interpreted and
applied in conformity with international humanitarian law.
The Code of Conduct is presented first. Attached to it are three annexes, describing
the working environment that we would like to see created by Host Governments, Donor
Governments and Intergovernmental Organisations in order to facilitate the effective
delivery of humanitarian assistance.
Definitions
NGOs: NGOs (Non Governmental Organisations) refers here to organisations, both
national and international, which are constituted separate from the government of the
country in which they are founded.
NGHAs: For the purposes of this text, the term Non-Governmental Humanitarian
Agencies (NGHAs) has been coined to encompass the components of the International
Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement—The International Committee of the Red Cross,
The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies and its member
National Societies—and the NGOs as defined above. This code refers specifically to
those NGHAs who are involved in disaster response.
IGOs: IGOs (Inter-Governmental Organisations) refers to organisations constituted
by two or more governments. It thus includes all United Nations Agencies and regional
organisations such as the Organisation of African Unity, the Commission of the European
Community or the Organisations of American States.
Disasters: A disaster is a calamitous event resulting in loss of life, great human
suffering and distress, and large scale material damage.
251

THE CODE OF CONDUCT
Principles of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red
Crescent Movement and NGOs in Disaster Response Programmes
1. The Humanitarian imperative comes first.
The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental
humanitarian principle which should be enjoyed by all citizens of all countries. As
members of the international community, we recognise our obligation to provide
humanitarian assistance wherever it is needed. Hence the need for unimpeded access to
affected populations, is of fundamental importance in exercising that responsibility.
The prime motivation of our response to disaster is to alleviate human suffering
amongst those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster.
When we give humanitarian aid it is not a partisan or political act and should not be
viewed as such.
2. Aid is given regardless of race, creed or nationality of the recipients and without
adverse distinction of any kind. Aid priorities are calculated on the basis of need
alone.
Wherever possible, we will base the provision of relief aid upon a thorough
assessment of the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in place
to meet those needs.
Within the entirety of our programmes, we will reflect considerations of proportionality.
Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as precious in one
part of a country as another. Thus, our provision of aid will reflect the degree of suffering
it seeks to alleviate.
In implementing this approach, we recognise the crucial role played by women in
disaster prone communities and will ensure that this role is supported, not diminished, by
our aid programmes.
The implementation of such a universal, impartial and independent policy, can only
be effective if we and our partners have access to the necessary resources to provide for
such equitable relief, and have equal access to all disaster victims.
3. Aid will not be used to further a particular political or religious standpoint.
Humanitarian aid will be given according to the need of individuals, families and
communities. Not withstanding the right of NGHAs to espouse particular political or
religious opinions, we affirm that assistance will not be dependent on the adherence of
the recipients to those opinions.
We will not tie the promise, delivery or distribution of assistance to the embracing or
acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.
252

4. We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.
NGHAs are agencies which act independently from governments. We therefore
formulate our own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement
the policy of any government, except in so far as it coincides with our own independent
policy.
We will never knowingly—or through negligence—allow ourselves, or our employees,
to be used to gather information of a political, military or economically sensitive
nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which
are strictly humanitarian, nor will we act as instruments of foreign policy of donor
governments.
We will use the assistance we receive to respond to needs and this assistance should
not be driven by the need to dispose of donor commodity surpluses, nor by the political
interest of any particular donor.
We value and promote the voluntary giving of labour and finances by concerned
individuals to support our work and recognise the independence of action promoted by
such voluntary motivation. In order to protect our independence we will seek to avoid
dependence upon a single funding source.
5. We shall respect culture and custom.
We will endeavour to respect the culture, structures and customs of the communities
and countries we are working in.
6. We will attempt to build disaster response on local capacities.
All people and communities—even in disaster—possess capacities as well as
vulnerabilities. Where possible, we will strengthen these capacities by employing local
staff, purchasing local materials and trading with local companies. Where possible, we
will work through local NGHAs as partners in planning and implementation, and cooperate
with local government structures where appropriate.
We will place a high priority on the proper co-ordination of our emergency responses.
This is best done within the countries concerned by those most directly involved in the
relief operations, and should include representatives of the relevant UN bodies.
7. Ways shall be found to involve programme beneficiaries in the management of
relief aid.
Disaster response assistance should never be imposed upon the beneficiaries.
Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved where the intended
beneficiaries are involved in the design, management and implementation of the
assistance programme. We will strive to achieve full community participation in our
relief and rehabilitation programmes.
253

8. Relief aid must strive to reduce future vulnerabilities to disaster as well as
meeting basic needs.
All relief actions affect the prospects for long term development, either in a positive
or a negative fashion. Recognising this, we will strive to implement relief programmes
which actively reduce the beneficiaries’ vulnerability to future disasters and help create
sustainable lifestyles. We will pay particular attention to environmental concerns in the
design and management of relief programmes. We will also endeavour to minimise the
negative impact of humanitarian assistance, seeking to avoid long term beneficiary
dependence upon external aid.
9. We hold ourselves accountable to both those we seek to assist and those from
whom we accept resources.
We often act as an institutional link in the partnership between those who wish to
assist and those who need assistance during disasters. We therefore hold ourselves
accountable to both constituencies.
All our dealings with donors and beneficiaries shall reflect an attitude of openness and
transparency.
We recognise the need to report on our activities, both from a financial perspective
and the perspective of effectiveness.
We recognise the obligation to ensure appropriate monitoring of aid distributions and
to carry out regular assessments of the impact of disaster assistance.
We will also seek to report, in an open fashion, upon the impact of our work, and the
factors limiting or enhancing that impact.
Our programmes will be based upon high standards of professionalism and expertise
in order to minimise the wasting of valuable resources.
10. In our information, publicity and advertising activities, we shall recognise
disaster victims as dignified humans, not hopeless objects.
Respect for the disaster victim as an equal partner in action should never be lost. In
our public information we shall portray an objective image of the disaster situation where
the capacities and aspirations of disaster victims are highlighted, and not just their
vulnerabilities and fears.
While we will co-operate with the media in order to enhance public response, we will
not allow external or internal demands for publicity to take precedence over the principle
of maximising overall relief assistance.
We will avoid competing with other disaster response agencies for media coverage
in situations where such coverage may be to the detriment of the service provided to the
beneficiaries or to the security of our staff or the beneficiaries.
254

THE WORKING ENVIRONMENT
Having agreed unilaterally to strive to abide by the Code laid out above, we present
below some indicative guidelines which describe the working environment we would
like to see created by donor governments, host governments and the inter-governmental
organisations—principally the agencies of the United Nations—in order to facilitate the
effective participation of NGHAs in disaster response.
These guidelines are presented for guidance. They are not legally binding, nor do we
expect governments and IGOs to indicate their acceptance of the guidelines through the
signature of any document, although this may be a goal to work to in the future. They are
presented in a spirit of openness and co-operation so that our partners will become aware
of the ideal relationship we would seek with them.
ANNEX I
Recommendations to the governments of disaster affected countries
1. Governments should recognise and respect the independent, humanitarian and
impartial actions of NGHAs.
NGHAs are independent, non-political bodies. This independence and impartiality
should be respected by host governments.
2. Host governments should facilitate rapid access to disaster victims for NGHAs.
If NGHAs are to act in full compliance with their humanitarian principles, they should
be granted rapid and impartial access to disaster victims, for the purpose of delivering
humanitarian assistance. It is the duty of the host government, as part of the exercising
of sovereign responsibility, not to block such assistance, and to accept the impartial and
apolitical action of NGHAs.
Host governments should facilitate the rapid entry of relief staff, particularly by the
rapid granting and delivery of visas where necessary.
3. Governments should facilitate the timely flow of relief goods and information
during disasters.
Relief supplies and equipment are brought into a country solely for the purpose of
alleviating human suffering, not for commercial benefit or gain. Such supplies should
normally be allowed free and unrestricted passage and should not be subject to importation
taxation, landing fees or port charges.
The temporary importation of necessary relief equipment, including vehicles, light
aircraft and telecommunications equipment, should be facilitated by the receiving host
government through the temporary waving (sic) of license or registration restrictions.
255

Equally, governments should not restrict the re-exportation of relief equipment at the end
of a relief operation.
To facilitate disaster communications, host governments are encouraged to designate
certain radio frequencies, which relief organisations may use in-country and for international
communications for the purpose of disaster communications, and to make such
frequencies known to the disaster response community prior to the disaster.
4. Governments should seek to provide a co-ordinated disaster information and
planning service.
The over all planning and co-ordination of relief efforts is ultimately the responsibility
of the host government. Planning and co-ordination can be greatly enhanced if
NGHAs are provided with information on relief needs, and government systems for
planning and implementing relief efforts as well as information on potential security risks
they may encounter. Governments are urged to provide such information to NGHAs.
To facilitate effective co-ordination and efficient utilisation of relief efforts, host
governments are urged to designate, prior to disaster, a single point-of-contact for
incoming NGHAs to liaise with the national authorities.
5. Disaster relief in the event of armed conflict.
In the event of armed conflict, relief actions are governed by the relevant provisions
of international humanitarian law.
ANNEX II
Recommendations to donor governments
1. Donor governments should recognise and respect the independent, humanitarian
and impartial actions of NGHAs.
NGHAs are independent non-political bodies whose independence and impartiality
should be respected by donor governments. Donor governments should not use NGHAs
to further any political or ideological aim.
2. Donor governments should provide funding with a guarantee of operational
independence.
NGHAs accept funding and material assistance from donor governments in the same
spirit as they render it to disaster victims; one of humanity and independence of action.
The implementation of relief actions is ultimately the responsibility of the NGHA and
will be carried out according to the policies of that NGHA.
256

3. Donor governments should use their good offices to assist NGHAs in obtaining
access to disaster victims.
Donor governments should recognise the importance of accepting a level of responsibility
for the security and freedom of access of NGHA staff to disaster sites. They should
be prepared to exercise diplomacy with host governments on such issues if necessary.
ANNEX III
Recommendations to international organisations
1. IGOs should recognise NGHAs, local and foreign, as valuable partners.
NGHAs are willing to work with UN and other intergovernmental agencies to effect
better disaster response. They do so in a spirit of partnership which respects the integrity
and independence of all partners. Intergovernmental agencies must respect the independence
and impartiality of the NGHAs. NGHAs should be consulted by UN agencies in
the preparation of relief plans.
2. IGOs should assist host governments in proving an overall co-ordinating
framework for international and local disaster relief.
NGHAs do not usually have the mandate to provide the overall co-ordinating
framework for disasters which require an international response. This responsibility falls
to the host government and the relevant United Nations authorities. They are urged to
provide this service in a timely and effective manner to serve the affected state and the
national and international disaster response community. In any case, NGHAs should
make all efforts to ensure the effective co-ordination of their own services.
In the event of armed conflict, relief actions are governed by the relevant provisions
of international humanitarian law.
3. IGOs should extend security protection provided for UN organisations, to
NGHAs.
Where security services are provided for intergovernmental organisations, this
service should be extended to their operational NGHA partners where it is so requested.
4. IGOs should provide NGHAs with the same access to relevant information as is
granted to UN organisations.
IGOs are urged to share all information, pertinent to the implementation of effective
disaster response, with their operation NGHA partners.
257

ANNEX 7
Article 1
UNITED NATIONS CODE OF CONDUCT FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICIALS
Law enforcement officials shall at all times fulfill the duty imposed upon them by law,
by serving the community and by protecting all persons against illegal acts consistent
with the high degree of responsibility required by their profession.
Commentary
a. The “law enforcement officials” includes all officers of the law, whether
appointed or elected, who exercise police powers, especially the powers of arrest
or detention.
b. In countries where police powers are exercised by military authorities, whether
uniformed or not, or by states security forces, the definition of law enforcement
officials shall be regarded as including officers of such services.
c. Service to the community is intended to include particularly the rendition of
services of assistance to those members of the community who by reason of
personal, economic, social or other emergencies are in need of immediate aid.
d. This provision is intended to cover not only all violent, predatory and harmful
acts, but extends to the full range of prohibitions under penal statutes. It extends
to conduct by persons not capable of incurring criminal liability.
Article 2
In the performance of their duty, law enforcement officials shall response and protect
human dignity and maintain and uphold the human rights of all persons.
Commentary
a. The human rights in question are identified and protected by national and
international law. Among the relevant international instruments are the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and political
Rights, the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons from being Subjected to
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, the
United Nations Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination,
the international Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the
Crime of Apartheid, the Convention on the Prevention and punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners
and the Vienna Convention on consular Relations.
258

. National commentaries to those provision should indicate regional or national
provisions identifying and protecting these rights.
Article 3
Law enforcement officials may use force only when strictly necessary and to the
extent required for the performance of their duty.
Commentary
a. This provision emphasises that the use of force by law enforcement officials
should be exceptional, while it implies that law enforcement officials may be
authorised to use force as is reasonably necessary under the circumstances for the
prevention of crime or in effecting or assisting in the lawful arrest of offenders or
suspected offenders, no force going beyond that may be used.
b. National law ordinarily restricts the use of force by law enforcement officials in
accordance with a principle of proportionality. It is to be understood that such
national principles of proportionality are to be respected in the interpretation of
this provision. In no case should this provision be interpreted to authorise the use
of force which is disproportionate to the legitimate objective to be achieved.
c. The use of firearms is considered an extreme measure. Every effort should be
made to exclude the use of firearms, especially against children. In general,
firearms should not be used except when a suspected offender offers armed
resistance or otherwise jeopardises the lives of others and less extreme measures
are not sufficient to restrain or apprehend the suspected offender. In every
instance in which a firearm is discharged, a report should be made promptly to the
competent authorities.
Article 4
Matters of a confidential nature in the possession of law enforcement officials shall
be kept confidential, unless the performance of duty or the needs of justice strictly require
otherwise.
Commentary
By the nature of their duties, law enforcement officials obtain information which may
relate to private livers or be potentially harmful to the interests, and especially the
reputation, or others. Great care should be exercised in safeguarding and using such
information, which should be disclosed only in the performance of duty or to serve the
needs of justice. Any disclosure of such information for other purposes is wholly
improper.
259

Article 5 1
No law enforcement may inflict, instigate or tolerate any act of torture or other cruel,
inhuman or degrading treatment of punishment, nor may any law enforcement official
invoke superior orders or exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of
war, a threat to national security, internal political instability or any other public emergency
as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.
Commentary
a. This prohibition derives from the Declaration on the Protection of All Persons
from Being Subjected to Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment of Punishment, adopted by the General Assembly, according to which:
“(Such an act is) an offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial
of the purposes of the Charter of the united Nations and as a violation of human
rights and fundamental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (and other international human rights instruments).” 2
b. The Declaration defines torture as follows:
“.... torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or
confession, punishing him for an act he has committed or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating him or other persons. It does not included pain or
suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful sanctions to the
extent consistent with the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of
Prisoners.” 3
c. The term “cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment” has not been
defined by the General Assembly but should be interpreted so as to extend the
widest possible protection against abuses, whether physical or mental.
Articles 6
Law enforcement officials shall ensure the full protection of the health of persons in
their custody and, in particular, shall take immediate action to secure medical attention
whenever required.
Commentary
a. “Medical attention,” which refers to services rendered by medical personnel,
including certified medical practitioners and paramedics, shall be secured when
needed or requested.
260

. While the medical personnel are likely to be attached to the law enforcement
operation, law enforcement officials must take into account the judgment of such
personnel when they recommend providing the person in custody with appropriate
treatment through, or in consultation with, medical personnel from outside the
law enforcement operation.
c. It is understood that law enforcement officials shall also secure medical attention
for victims of violations of law or of accidents occurring in the course of violation
of law.
Article 7
Law enforcement officials shall not commit any act of corruption. They shall also
rigourously oppose and combat all such acts.
Commentary
a. Any act of corruption, in the same way as any other abuse of authority, is
incompatible with the profession of law enforcement officials. The law must be
enforced fully with respect to any law enforcement official who commits an act
of corruption, as Governments cannot expect to enforce the law among their
citizens if they cannot, or will not, enforce the law against their own agents and
within their own agencies.
b. While the definition of corruption must be subject to national law, it should be
understood to encompass the commission or omission of an act in the performance
of or in connection with one’s duties, in response to gifts, promises or
incentives demanded or accepted, or the wrongful receipt of these once the act has
been committed or omitted.
c. The expression “act of corruption” referred to above should be understood to
encompass attempted corruption.
Article 8
Law enforcement officials shall respect the law and the present Code. They shall also,
to the best of their capability, prevent and rigorously oppose any violations of them.
Law enforcement officials who have reason to believe that violation of the present
Code has occurred or is about to occur shall report the matter to their superior authorities
and, where necessary, to other appropriate authorities or organs vested with reviewing or
remedial power.
261

Commentary
a. This Code shall be observed whenever it has been incorporated into national
legislation or practice. If legislation or practice contains stricter provisions than
those of the present Code, those stricter provisions shall be observed.
b. The article seeks to preserve the balance between the need for international
discipline of the agency on which public safety is largely dependent, on the one
hand, and the need for dealing with violations of basic human rights, on the other.
Law enforcement officials shall report violations within the chain of command
and take over lawful action outside the chain of command only when non other
remedies are available or effective. It is understood that law enforcement officials
shall not suffer administrative or other penalties because they have reported that
a violation of this Code has occurred or is about to occur.
c. The term “appropriate authorities or organs vested with reviewing or remedial
power” refers to any authority or organ existing under national law, whether
internal to the law enforcement agency or independent thereof, with statutory,
customary or other power to review grievances and complaints arising out of
violations within the purview of this Code.
d. In some countries, the mass media may be regarded as performing complaint
review functions similar to those described in sub-paragraph c above. Law
enforcement officials may, therefore, be justified if, as a last resort and in
accordance with the laws and customs of their own countries and with the
provisions of Article 4 of the present Code, they bring violations to the attention
of public opinion through the mass media.
e. Law enforcement officials who comply with the provisions of this Code deserve
the respect, the full support and the co-operation of the community and of the law
enforcement agency in which they serve, as well as the law enforcement
profession.
Footnotes
1
From Human Rights and the Police by J. Alderson. Appendix VII Pages 181-195 -
Council of Europe Publication, Strasbourg 1984
2
First United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of
Offenders: report by the Secretariat (United Nations publication, Sales No.1956.IV.4),
annex 1.A.
3
Ibid.
262

ANNEX 8
ACRONYMS
ACBAR
AEPU
AGCD
AO
ATC
AWACS
BDA
C2
C3I
CAO
CAOC
CAP
CAPs
CBO
CERF
CIDA
CIVPOL
CMOC
CRDA
CRS
CS
CSAR
CSS
CTS
DAC
DAM
DANIDA
DARTS
DEHA
DHA
DMT
DO
DPA
DPKO
DRI
DZ
ECHO
EEZ
EMAD
EOD
Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief
Advance Election Planning Unit
Belgian Administration for Development Cooperation
area of operations
air traffic control
airborne warning and control aircraft
battle-damage assessment
command and control
command, control, communications, and intelligence
chief administrative officer
combined air operations center
Consolidated Appeals Process
combat air patrols
community-based organization
Central Emergency Revolving Fund
Canadian International Development Agency
United Nations Civilian Police
Civil-Military Operations Center
Christian Relief and Development Agency
Catholic Relief Services
combat support
combat search and rescue
combat service support
Commodities Tracking System
Development Assistance Committee
Department of Administration and Management
Danish International Development Agency
Disaster Assistance Response Teams
division of emergency and humanitarian action
Department of Humanitarian Affairs
disaster management team
designated official
Department of Political Affairs
Department of Peace-keeping Operations
Direct Response Initiative
drop zone
European Community Humanitarian Office
exclusive economic zones
Emergency Aid Department
explosive ordnance disposal
263

ERC
EU
FACs
FALD
FAO
FINNIDA
FSO
GIEWS
GNP
GPS
GRO
IASC
IASU
IASWG
ICRC
ICVA
IDP
IEFR
IFF
IFRC
IGO
IHAP
IHL
ILO
INGO
INTERFAIS
IOM
IPF
IRC
ISCA
ITSH
JCGP
JFACC
JFC
LAPES
LWF
LZ
MCDA
MCM
MFA
MFO
MICIVIH
MOU
MPA
MSF
emergency relief coordinator
European Union
forward air controllers
Field Administration and Logistics Division
Food and Agriculture Organization
Finnish International Development Agency
field security officer
Global Information and Early Warning System on Food and Agriculture
Gross National Product
global positioning system
grassroots organization
Inter-Agency Standing Committee
Inter-Agency Support Unit
Inter-Agency Working Group
International Committee of the Red Cross
International Council for Voluntary Agencies
internally displaced persons
International Emergency Food Reserve
identification, friend or foe
International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
intergovernmental organization
International Humanitarian Assistance Programme
International Humanitarian Law
International Labour Organisation
international nongovernmental organization
International Food Aid Information System
International Organization for Migration
indicative planning figure
International Rescue Committee
International Save the Children Alliance
internal transport, storage, and handling
Joint Consultative Group on Policy
joint forces air component commander
joint forces commander
low altitude parachute extracting system
Lutheran World Federation
landing zone
Military and Civil Defense Assets
mine countermeasures
Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Multinational Force and Observers
International Civilian Mission to Haiti
Memoranda of Understanding
maritime patrol aircraft
Médiçins Sans Frontières
264

NATO
NGO
OAS
OAU
ODA
OECD
OFDA
OGS
OSSOC
PAHO
PO
POL
PSO
PVO
ROE
SAR
SCG
SDC
SECOORD
SH
SIDA
SIGINT
SITREPS
SMT
SOFA
SOPs
SRSG
TOR
TOT
UAV
UNDAC
UNDP
UNEP
UNESCO
UNFALD
UNFOD
UNFPA
UNHCR
UNICEF
UNOSOM
UNSCR
UNTAC
UNV
USAID
VOLAG
North Atlantic Treaty Organization
nongovernmental organization
Organization of American States
Organization for African Unity
Overseas Development Administration
Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development
Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance
Office of General Services
On-Site Operations Coordination Centers
Panamerican Health Organization
people’s organization
petroleum, oil, lubricants
Peace Support Operations
private voluntary agency
rules of engagement
search-and-rescue
Standing Coordination Group
Swiss Disaster Relief
United Nations Security Coordinator
support helicopters
Swedish International Development Agency
signals intelligence
periodic situation reports
Security Management Team
Status of Forces Agreement
Standing Operational Procedures
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
terms of reference
time on task
unmanned air vehicle
United Nations Disaster Assessment and Coordination Teams
United Nations Development Programme
United Nations Environmental Programme
United Nations Educational and Scientific Organization
United Nations Field Administration and Logistics
United Nations Field Operations Division
United Nations Fund for Population Activities
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
United Nations Children’s Fund
United Nations Operation in Somalia
United Nations Security Council Resolution
United Nations Transitional Authority in Cambodia
United Nations Volunteers
United States Agency for International Development
voluntary agency
265

VSTOL
WEU
WFP
WFPA
WHO
WMO
WVI
vertical/short takeoff and landing
Western European Union
World Food Programme
World Fund for Population Activities
World Health Organization
World Meteorological Organization
World Vision International
266