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a guide to peace support operations - The Watson Institute for ...

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Part II, Section 1, paragraphs 3-4<br />

assistance during conflict: when there is no host government, when<br />

several competing authorities claim the right <strong>to</strong> govern, or when a<br />

vic<strong>to</strong>rious guerrilla <strong>for</strong>ce seeks revenge against those who opposed it.<br />

Previous experience provides few insights in<strong>to</strong> the complexities of the<br />

next crisis. <strong>The</strong>re is a sense that the humanitarian network is always<br />

one step behind a crisis or fighting the new war with the strategy and<br />

tactics of the previous one, exacerbated by the unpredictable and<br />

rapidly changing nature of emergencies.<br />

(3) Resourcing New Roles<br />

Complex emergencies introduce issues beyond the mandates or capacities<br />

of most agencies. Demining and demobilization activities are<br />

two examples. <strong>The</strong> list of new activities has grown and expanded the<br />

concept of “humanitarian aid.” More and more humanitarian aid is<br />

seen as an instrument <strong>to</strong> provide “relief” <strong>for</strong> fragile societies that, if<br />

not assisted quickly, may slide back in<strong>to</strong> conflict. Humanitarian aid<br />

there<strong>for</strong>e may encompass such post-conflict recovery activities as<br />

constructing military barracks, establishing police <strong>for</strong>ces, and even<br />

building prisons. None of these activities has ever been seen as<br />

conventionally “humanitarian,” but without them, there may be only<br />

the prospect of more violence. <strong>The</strong> need <strong>to</strong> deal with a growing number<br />

of different activities has not led <strong>to</strong> a clarification of UN agency<br />

mandates and capabilities. This lack of clarity encourages confusion<br />

and competition <strong>for</strong> “turf” or institutional terri<strong>to</strong>ry. When mandates<br />

are not clear, the fight <strong>for</strong> turf is inevitable.<br />

A critical fac<strong>to</strong>r of the growing competition concerns resources. An<br />

agency’s capacity <strong>to</strong> fulfill its intended program is dependent upon the<br />

funds and material it can attract from donor governments and other<br />

sources. Agencies spend a great deal of time and ef<strong>for</strong>t in raising<br />

resources, and perhaps the worst turf battles occur in those situations<br />

where mandated responsibilities are ambiguous and resource stakes<br />

are potentially high.<br />

4. <strong>The</strong> Peacekeepers and the Humanitarians<br />

Stereotyped mutual images flourish when <strong>peace</strong>keepers and humanitarian agencies<br />

work <strong>to</strong>gether in the same operational area. Peacekeepers look with dismay at the looseknit<br />

and apparently “shambolic” civilian structures that are intended <strong>to</strong> provide humanitarian<br />

assistance, while the civilians view the <strong>peace</strong>keepers as inflexible and culturally<br />

insensitive. <strong>The</strong> relationship is fragile. <strong>The</strong> humanitarian community does not wish <strong>to</strong> be<br />

seen as the instrument of the <strong>peace</strong>keepers, and <strong>peace</strong>keepers often bring with them a<br />

significant capacity <strong>to</strong> become engaged in humanitarian assistance and resent the fact that<br />

this capability is rejected by humanitarian agencies. Yet, the <strong>peace</strong>keepers and the<br />

36

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