prison privatisation in south africa issues, challenges and ...

Correctional Contracts (BCC) in which both the financing and management services are
contracted for a full 25 years–the maximum allowed by the CSA 1998.
2. Private sector involvement in community corrections
The Correctional Services Act of 1998 forbids private contractors from becoming involved with
community corrections. Prior to the current form of prison privatisation, private sector
involvement has been an established and accepted component of many programs used as
alternatives to incarceration. This is particularly true in the UK, where charities play a critical role
in the juvenile justice system.
The South African criminal justice system should turn to the private sector for assistance. The
resulting benefit would necessarily improve conditions in the prisons and assist with community
corrections.
The easiest and quickest means of increasing private sector involvement in the South African
prison system would be to outsource more services in the existing prisons to the private sector.
The provision of food, for example, could quite easily be turned over to the private sector with
considerably less controversy than the outsourcing of other core functions. The use of NGOs
should be further explored, and both public and private prisons should turn to organisations
such as NICRO to provide reintegration services.
3. Private prison contracts should refer to standards of care for prisoners with HIV and/or TB
The contract should include specific reference to standards of care for prisoners with HIV and/or
TB. Condoms and lubrication should be made discreetly available, and Directly Observed
Therapy programs should be required for the monitoring of prisoners with TB. The contract
should specifically state that HIV tests be made available to prisoners on request, accompanied
with the requisite counselling and education.
4. Private prison monitors should report to an independent regulatory agency
An effective monitoring agent must be independent, not a part of the same department that is
being monitored. Furthermore, monitoring is a separate function from operations; DCS is not a
regulatory agency but a provider of correctional services. Because of these conditions, the DCS
monitor assigned to BCC is at high risk to become co-opted into the management structure. In
order to avoid this, a monitor should be appointed who does not report to DCS but to a separate
regulatory agency within the government. The monitoring of prison conditions and prisoner
complaints is the role of the Judicial Inspectorate, both for public and private prisons. The
additional monitoring required for private prison contracts is that of contract compliance, which
the current position of DCS Controller is not in a position to provide. Contract compliance, for
any government contract, should not be monitored by any of the departments immediately party
to the contract as this compromises independence. The contract compliance officer for private
prison contracts should come from the government’s existing internal audit agency, and those
expected to fulfill this role should be experienced in performing operational audits of various
kinds. Either rotation or sufficient reporting requirements and visits by auditors of varying
seniority would also help ensure that capture does not take place.
5. Strengthen accountability to the public of the privatisation process
Given the importance of accountability in the process of privatising prisons, and in light of the
constitutional rights of South African citizens and the intentions of the recently passed Act, the