conference proceedin.. - Facultatea de Drept

Conference Proceedings - Galaţi, 24 th -25 th of April 2009
Year I, Vol. II - 2009
the Directives. As to what the decisions are concerned, the same arguments
remain valid in justifying the applicability of this principle, except for the
fact that there is no need to necessarily adopt internal rules for their
application, either because they are not addressed to the state, or because
they are not addressed to the individuals (a fact pointed out by the nature
and the characteristics of the obligations imposed).
The direct applicability of the Community provisions brings about
some effects on the internal legal order and, of course, on the individuals of
the states in question:
- the individuals have the option of requesting the national courts
to ensure respect for the rights conferred by the Community
rules;
- there emerges the effect of sanctioning the Member States which
have not taken the necessary measures to enforce the
application of Community law.
The direct effect allows individuals to place themselves on the same
position as if it would had actually fulfilled the Community obligations (as
in the case of a person who invokes a Community provision to his own
benefit, although the state has not actually carried it out or has brought it
into being in an improper, deficient manner);
- the concept of direct applicability allows Community law to
develop the above mentioned effects in the absence of any contrary
provisions of national law.
It is only through strengthening the priority that the direct
applicability produces its effects even in the presence of any contrary
national norm, a fact which provides Community law with a maximum
force of penetration in the legal order of the Member States.
The special effectiveness of the legal system within the Community,
comparable to that of the internal law within a state, is based on the rule of
Community law principle, sanctioned by the case-law. Within the
relationship between the Community law and the national legal systems of
the Member States, this principle provides an answer to the question
whether a national law subsequent to the entry into force of a Community
rule may not comply with this rule.
The answer to this problem is very important because, if a Member
State should be free to not comply with the community norm, the
Community juridical order is likely to break up into a series of partial and
discontinuous orders, autonomous and divergent in their content.
In theory it has been often proven, that the very existence of
Community norms, norms that give rise to the unitary Community legal
order, would be jeopardized if, in the event of conflict, the national legal
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