THE RAF AIR POWER REVIEW - Royal Air Force Centre for Air ...

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From a purely national perspective, 100 air defence sorties were flown by RN Sea Harriers and over 1,000 bombing sorties by RAF Harrier GR7 and Tornado GR1s But to return to Kosovo, throughout the course of operation Allied Force, NATO air operations were subject to continual critical analysis from a number of media and military ‘experts’, whose reports gave the impression that NATO aircraft had operated from a safe haven above 15,000 feet raining down bombs on a largely defenceless Serbia. Furthermore, they suggested that many of these bombs missed their targets and no real damage was done to the Serbian military machine, apart from the destruction of dummy tanks, because NATO air crew would not come down to low level to close with the enemy. Then, when the cease-fire was secured and offensive operations at an end, these critics implied that the 78 days of the air campaign was largely nugatory effort, and that it was the growing threat of a land invasion which had caused Milosevic to bend to NATO’s will. Let me give you an airman’s view on these points. First it is absolutely true that the NATO chain of command placed a high premium on the safety of its aircraft and aircrew – and as the professional head of my service I say a good thing too because I would not want the men and women entrusted to my care ever to feel that I or my senior commanders would be tempted to be profligate with their lives. That said, had we given the Serbs greater opportunity to shoot down our aircraft by consistently flying within the range of their man portable SAM systems and light AAA, and had they succeeded in knocking down some NATO aircraft every time they flew over, I can think of nothing which would have given a greater boost to their morale. 11
12 I should also point out that the airspace above 15,000 feet was not a safe haven. While the Serb air force quickly threw in the towel – and incidentally lost 115 combat aircraft, including helicopters, in the course of the war – their GBAD fired over 700 SAMs at coalition aircraft… Moreover we have to ask whether the cohesion of NATO, the centre of gravity of the alliance, would have been sufficiently strong to accommodate a steady flow of aircraft losses. I think a lot of otherwise well informed and intelligent people, albeit totally lacking in military experience, cannot get to grips with the fact that war is not an exercise in chivalry in which honour demands an even handed and fair contest. War is and will remain a nasty and brutal business in which the aim is to achieve political objectives with the least possible loss to one’s own side. This requires you to concentrate your strengths and advantages on the enemy’s weaknesses and no prizes are awarded for manufacturing an evenly balanced fight let alone for sustaining unnecessary casualties. I should also point out that the airspace above 15,000 feet was not a safe haven. While the Serb air force quickly threw in the towel – and incidentally lost 115 combat aircraft, including helicopters, in the course of the war – their GBAD fired over 700 SAMs at coalition aircraft and engaged with heavy AAA on numerous occasions. We did not lose aircraft because we first won the battle for control of the airspace. Thereafter, the effectiveness of our counter measures, the skills of our aircrew and a large slice of luck brought home all but 2 of the 829 airplanes from 14 countries that were chopped to NATO control. RAF aircrew flew 10% of the offensive missions and on numerous occasions when the weather was against us, they penetrated Serb air defences to get to their targets. But because they were unable to identify positively their aiming point or because conditions would not Serb SA3 GOA missile battery
Page 1 and 2: THE ROYAL AIR FORCE AIR POWER Revie
Page 3 and 4: Foreword from CAS Air Chief Marshal
Page 5 and 6: taken into account in its formulati
Page 7 and 8: Sir Frederick Tymms Memorial Lectur
Page 9 and 10: 2 I also do welcome this public opp
Page 11 and 12: 4 Control of the air is achieved by
Page 13 and 14: 6 sense of identity and looking aft
Page 15 and 16: 8 …it was the coalition air force
Page 17: 10 7 NATO air attack packages a day
Page 21 and 22: 14 The real issue, then, is not wha
Page 23 and 24: Air Operations for Strategic Effect
Page 25 and 26: 18 It would be neither practical no
Page 27 and 28: 20 leadership of a foe could lead t
Page 29 and 30: 22 Bosnian Serb paramilitary units
Page 31 and 32: 24 DELIBERATE FORCE started in the
Page 33 and 34: 26 Milosevic may have doubted the w
Page 35 and 36: 28 Peace talks started to produce r
Page 37 and 38: 30 The full range of strategic targ
Page 39 and 40: DOCTRINE NOT DOGMA: Lessons from th
Page 41 and 42: 34 …the RAF established in 1918 a
Page 43 and 44: 36 In the summer of 1941 Trenchard
Page 45 and 46: 38 and his cattle. 8 The lesson to
Page 47 and 48: 40 force would pursue and destroy t
Page 49 and 50: 42 The new generation of German wea
Page 51 and 52: 44 This example illustrates the imp
Page 53 and 54: 46 5. The ‘eccentricity factor’
Page 55 and 56: THE FUTURE OF AIR POWER Observation
Page 57 and 58: 50 Nonetheless, there is a distress
Page 59 and 60: 52 Events in Kosovo were similarly
Page 61 and 62: 54 ● It is imperative that future
Page 63 and 64: 56 and residential areas, were imme
Page 65 and 66: 58 successful. 11 Spending money on
Page 67 and 68: 60 Precision weapons, especially st
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62 Air and space platforms like JST
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64 In contrast to the unhappy exper
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66 objectives do not need such comm
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68 9 The unseemly spat between the
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THE FUTURE OF AIRPOWER?
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72 …powerful though it is, a US v
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74 theoretical possibilities which
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76 …whilst redundancy is a positi
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78 …superior technology is not al
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80 committing ground forces into a
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TO SEA OR NOT TO SEA: That is the Q
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84 INTRODUCTION In recognition of t
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and its carrier are not inconsidera
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88 …Harrier FA2s could be used to
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90 to bring the aircraft’s weight
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92 …one of the most feared modern
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94 are required. These comprise ope
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96 have to withdraw to a safe opera
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98 In economic terms, the STOVL com
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100 the enhanced AEW capability of
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102 BIBLIOGRAPHY Reference Publicat
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104 Sabin, Dr Philip. Lecture on Ai
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106 77 John Lehman, a former US Sec
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TARGET BERLIN USAAF B-17 breaks up
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110 The Escort Plan The plan for es
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112 With the three Bomb Divisions i
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114 airspace than their Luftwaffe c
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116 Following the initial firing pa
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118 Either accidentally or delibera
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120 escorts quickly took charge of
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122 Of the US personnel engaged in
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EW READING NEW READING NEW READING
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UNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REU
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