THE RAF AIR POWER REVIEW - Royal Air Force Centre for Air ...

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capabilities dominated. The campaign vividly illustrated that Europe needs to do more, but we should not delude ourselves that the EDI option, however desirable, will be easy or cheap. There is a long and hard road between ‘Something must be done’ and practical capability. There is one further significant result of the difference between the US and UK’s relative sizes which deserves to be highlighted and that is our different approaches to jointery. Phil Meilinger points out the difficulty a potential enemy will face because of the redundancy of US forces, a redundancy that encompasses not only substantial air arms of all 4 Services, but also redundancy Much of the UK’s air power capability will in future be controlled in peace and war by joint formations; for example, battlefield helicopters by JHC, Harrier and Nimrod MR by JF2000, and 38 Gp assets are already tasked by MOD 75 of capabilities within them. At this scale, true jointness is seen as a drawback, because it reduces options by reducing redundancy. The focus is therefore an effective collaboration and advantages accrue from cumulative effect, rather than true synergy. Thinking in the UK could hardly be more different. Much of the UK’s air power capability will in future be controlled in peace and war by joint formations; for example, battlefield helicopters by JHC, Harrier and Nimrod MR by JF2000, and 38 Gp assets are already tasked by MOD. This creates an absolute requirement for a depth of joint understanding, which we are making good progress towards, but have yet to fully achieve. It also creates the possibility for substantial disagreement at Joint Targeting Board (JTB) level and below over how limited assets should be used to best effect. Air staffs will therefore have to be extremely well educated in the effective application of air power doctrine, if they are to contribute effectively to the JTB process. Type knowledge, however deep, will no longer be enough. For today’s airman, the superstructure of joint knowledge cannot be heavier than can be supported
76 …whilst redundancy is a positive benefit for the US, lack of redundancy is an issue for the UK and brings with it a greater training burden, if joint synergies are to be identified and exploited by the foundation of air power knowledge on which it rests, a fact which has been recognised and acted upon. Therefore, whilst redundancy is a positive benefit for the US, lack of redundancy is an issue for the UK and brings with it a greater training burden, if joint synergies are to be identified and exploited. TECHNOLOGY In many ways, improved technology is also an issue of scale and the resources that a nation or organization is prepared to (or simply has available to) devote to development. As Phil Meilinger correctly states, it is the huge increase in computing power which has allowed such rapid advances in capability, allowing, for example, not only the design of aerodynamically unstable aircraft but the on-board computing resources to actually keep them in the air. However, nowhere is the technology gap between the US and UK more evident than in the …nowhere is the technology gap between the US and UK more evident than in the exploitation of space. Even if we consider space only in respect of reconnaissance, intelligence and communications, the range of assets deployed by the US dwarfs that available to any other nation
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THE ROYAL AIR FORCE AIR POWER Revie
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Foreword from CAS Air Chief Marshal
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taken into account in its formulati
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Sir Frederick Tymms Memorial Lectur
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2 I also do welcome this public opp
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4 Control of the air is achieved by
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6 sense of identity and looking aft
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8 …it was the coalition air force
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10 7 NATO air attack packages a day
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12 I should also point out that the
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14 The real issue, then, is not wha
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Air Operations for Strategic Effect
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18 It would be neither practical no
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20 leadership of a foe could lead t
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22 Bosnian Serb paramilitary units
Page 31 and 32: 24 DELIBERATE FORCE started in the
Page 33 and 34: 26 Milosevic may have doubted the w
Page 35 and 36: 28 Peace talks started to produce r
Page 37 and 38: 30 The full range of strategic targ
Page 39 and 40: DOCTRINE NOT DOGMA: Lessons from th
Page 41 and 42: 34 …the RAF established in 1918 a
Page 43 and 44: 36 In the summer of 1941 Trenchard
Page 45 and 46: 38 and his cattle. 8 The lesson to
Page 47 and 48: 40 force would pursue and destroy t
Page 49 and 50: 42 The new generation of German wea
Page 51 and 52: 44 This example illustrates the imp
Page 53 and 54: 46 5. The ‘eccentricity factor’
Page 55 and 56: THE FUTURE OF AIR POWER Observation
Page 57 and 58: 50 Nonetheless, there is a distress
Page 59 and 60: 52 Events in Kosovo were similarly
Page 61 and 62: 54 ● It is imperative that future
Page 63 and 64: 56 and residential areas, were imme
Page 65 and 66: 58 successful. 11 Spending money on
Page 67 and 68: 60 Precision weapons, especially st
Page 69 and 70: 62 Air and space platforms like JST
Page 71 and 72: 64 In contrast to the unhappy exper
Page 73 and 74: 66 objectives do not need such comm
Page 75 and 76: 68 9 The unseemly spat between the
Page 77 and 78: THE FUTURE OF AIRPOWER?
Page 79 and 80: 72 …powerful though it is, a US v
Page 81: 74 theoretical possibilities which
Page 85 and 86: 78 …superior technology is not al
Page 87 and 88: 80 committing ground forces into a
Page 89 and 90: TO SEA OR NOT TO SEA: That is the Q
Page 91 and 92: 84 INTRODUCTION In recognition of t
Page 93 and 94: and its carrier are not inconsidera
Page 95 and 96: 88 …Harrier FA2s could be used to
Page 97 and 98: 90 to bring the aircraft’s weight
Page 99 and 100: 92 …one of the most feared modern
Page 101 and 102: 94 are required. These comprise ope
Page 103 and 104: 96 have to withdraw to a safe opera
Page 105 and 106: 98 In economic terms, the STOVL com
Page 107 and 108: 100 the enhanced AEW capability of
Page 109 and 110: 102 BIBLIOGRAPHY Reference Publicat
Page 111 and 112: 104 Sabin, Dr Philip. Lecture on Ai
Page 113 and 114: 106 77 John Lehman, a former US Sec
Page 115 and 116: TARGET BERLIN USAAF B-17 breaks up
Page 117 and 118: 110 The Escort Plan The plan for es
Page 119 and 120: 112 With the three Bomb Divisions i
Page 121 and 122: 114 airspace than their Luftwaffe c
Page 123 and 124: 116 Following the initial firing pa
Page 125 and 126: 118 Either accidentally or delibera
Page 127 and 128: 120 escorts quickly took charge of
Page 129 and 130: 122 Of the US personnel engaged in
Page 131 and 132: EW READING NEW READING NEW READING
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EW READING NEW READING NEW READING
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UNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REU
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