THE RAF AIR POWER REVIEW - Royal Air Force Centre for Air ...

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● It is imperative that future strategists, planners and commanders remember the axiom that military strategy must match
government policy. Once the civilian leaders have determined the policy objectives, planners must then devise a military strategy
to fulfill those objectives. It is surprising how often this simple principle has been violated in war. The Japanese wanted raw
materials and resources in a Southeast Asian empire. In order to achieve that goal, however, they selected a military strategy of
attacking the United States – an enemy they could never defeat. Other less extreme examples are the unhappy American
experiences in Somalia and Haiti. Defeating the dominant warlords and restoring democracy and peace were noble goals, but
they were simply not achievable given the military resources committed and the strategies employed.
Specifically regarding the use of airpower, planners will begin looking at targets to strike or neutralize. They must ensure those
targets do in fact lead them closer to achieving their policy goals. I am told that following the Gulf War a writer was interviewing
a senior airman regarding the targeting strategy of the air campaign. The officer was asked why a certain bridge, seemingly
unconnected with any major military or industrial target and situated in an isolated location, had been struck by coalition aircraft.
The officer was surprised by the question, and answered, half seriously, that “it was hit because it was bridge; we do bridges;
we’re good at bridges.” Targets should not be hit simply because they are hittable, or because they were struck in the last war,
or because there are lots of them, or because they are politically “safe,” or because they are less risky to attack than are other
targets. Rather, targets should be attacked because doing so will help lead to the policy objectives. If a planner cannot draw a
clear connection between the target struck and one of the stated objectives, the targeting strategy needs to be reconsidered.
At a higher level, a more compelling example of this problem was in Kosovo. NATO intervened for humanitarian reasons: the
ethnic cleansing of Albanian Kosovars by the Serbs. Yet, NATO leaders, civilian and military, state repeatedly that the goal of the
air campaign was merely to degrade the military capability of the Serbian forces so as to reduce their ability to conduct that
cleansing. This of course begs the question of how does one define “degrade” – the destruction of a dozen Serbian tanks
could fit the literal meaning of that term. But more importantly, how would such degradation, however defined, meet the political
objectives of saving Kosovar lives? There seemed to be a gap between NATO’s political goals and the military strategy adopted
to achieve them. Fortunately, and almost serendipitously, the air campaign was successful anyway. To reiterate: the military
strategy must fulfill the political objectives desired; if they do not, then those military operations, regardless of how efficient,
accurate, bloodless, and discriminate, are useless.
● The issue of “casualty intolerance” has been discussed during the past decade because coalition casualties have been
astonishingly light. Despite the scale of victory, the Coalition suffered only 240 killed in the Gulf War. This extraordinary
performance has led to the expectation that all wars and military engagements will be similarly bloodless. Hence, the loss of an
American F-16 over Bosnia dominated news coverage for a week in June 1995. The rescue of the pilot, who was then
accorded hero status, illustrates the seriousness with which casualties are now seen by the American public. This experience