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oth organisations. 22 Air power was used on occasions such as the attack on Ubdina airfield in late 1994; NATO proudly announced that this had been the largest air raid in Europe since World War II – Richard Holbrooke described it in horror as being closer to ‘pinpricks’. 23 General Sir Michael Rose defended similar actions as being ‘textbook examples of the precise use of force in a peacekeeping mission’. 24 From these two viewpoints, it is evident that perceptions are all-important. As the months went by, the situation in Bosnia continued to deteriorate. The UN’s worst fears were realised in May 1995 when the Bosnian Serbs took 370 (largely French) peacekeepers hostage following NATO bombing of ammunition depots at Pale. Srebrenica fell to a brutal assault in mid-July and the clamour within the international community for ‘something to be done’ rose to yet another peak. NATO planning within AFSOUTH had by this time improved to the point whereby suitable Bosnian Serb targets had been identified throughout the theatre – including ‘indirect’ targets such as bridges and command facilities. 25 These indirect targets were specifically chosen to increase the level of coercive pain levered on the Bosnian Serbs. On 28 August 1995, a mortar bomb exploded in a Sarajevo marketplace killing 68 people. The Bosnian government blamed the Serbs. The Bosnian Serbs blamed the Muslims for firing on their own people in an attempt to provoke a NATO response. 26 There then followed a short delay while plans were finalised and, more importantly, UN forces were allowed to take up positions that they could defend. DELIBERATE FORCE started in the early hours of 30 August 1995. Some 220 fighter aircraft and 70 support aircraft from the US, UK, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Greece, Turkey, Spain and France took part, generally flying four or five ‘packages’ of aircraft on each day that weather allowed operations. Some 3515 sorties were flown delivering 1026 weapons against 48 targets. 27 For presentational purposes, the NATO attacks were carried out as part of the campaign to protect the safe areas – directly and indirectly. It is obvious, however, from Holbrooke that any coercion of the Bosnian Serbs towards a peace settlement would be beneficial. 28 Furthermore, the air campaign was materially assisting an ongoing Croatian Army 29 /Muslim ground offensive – much to the discomfort of the Bosnian Serb Army who found that the concentrations of tanks and artillery necessary to counter this assault made excellent targets for air power. Holbrooke suggested to Milosevic that the air campaign was not coordinated with the ground offensive, but later in his account admits to having advised President Tudjman of Croatia as to which towns his troops should occupy to facilitate later negotiations. 30 The marked escalation in external military involvement resulted in a new momentum for the talks’ process. Wright-Paterson Air Force Base in Dayton Ohio was chosen as the venue for substantive talks between the erstwhile warring factions. The delegates arriving from the Balkans by air had to walk past ramps laden with operational aircraft, leaving the Serbs in no doubt as to the scale of air resources available to an American led coalition. For many commentators and participants the use of air power was decisive. Carl Bildt, however, correctly brings the enthusiasts back to earth with the reminder that the key events were political rather than military – not least because the US administration was at last prepared actually to recognise 23
24 DELIBERATE FORCE started in the early hours of 30 August 1995. Some 220 fighter aircraft and 70 support aircraft from the US, UK, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Greece, Turkey, Spain and France took part… politically the Bosnian Serb entity 31 (this had stymied earlier attempts at a settlement). Beyond the implication that DELIBERATE FORCE had galvanised both sides into negotiating a settlement at Dayton, it is always difficult to penetrate the Stygian gloom of Belgrade politics. Milosevic had already been seen to have sold out the Krajina Serbs; he then confounded the ‘Greater Serbia’ theorists by supporting Dayton. Some key factors can, however, be identified. There was a marked improvement in the terms on offer at Dayton with the recognition of the Bosnian Serb entity. What is more, Russia was fully integrated into the political process 32 and would certainly not have supported Belgrade militarily. After months of dithering, which Milosevic would have perceived as endemic weakness, the international community had sanctioned the use of air power on a significant scale and showed no signs of relenting in its use. Again from the Serbian perspective (both in Belgrade and Pale), Western resources must have appeared unlimited. Finally there was the risk, from Milosevic’s perspective, that coalition air power would increasingly be coordinated with Croat/Muslim ground forces and that more Bosnian Serb territory would be lost in action than at the conference table. Even though Milosevic has consistently shown himself to be a master tactician (rather than a strategist), his evil genius almost certainly appreciated the prospect of the ‘keener’ elements of the international community becoming bogged down in policing the settlement for years knowing that the alternative would leave him or his successors a clear field.
Page 1 and 2: THE ROYAL AIR FORCE AIR POWER Revie
Page 3 and 4: Foreword from CAS Air Chief Marshal
Page 5 and 6: taken into account in its formulati
Page 7 and 8: Sir Frederick Tymms Memorial Lectur
Page 9 and 10: 2 I also do welcome this public opp
Page 11 and 12: 4 Control of the air is achieved by
Page 13 and 14: 6 sense of identity and looking aft
Page 15 and 16: 8 …it was the coalition air force
Page 17 and 18: 10 7 NATO air attack packages a day
Page 19 and 20: 12 I should also point out that the
Page 21 and 22: 14 The real issue, then, is not wha
Page 23 and 24: Air Operations for Strategic Effect
Page 25 and 26: 18 It would be neither practical no
Page 27 and 28: 20 leadership of a foe could lead t
Page 29: 22 Bosnian Serb paramilitary units
Page 33 and 34: 26 Milosevic may have doubted the w
Page 35 and 36: 28 Peace talks started to produce r
Page 37 and 38: 30 The full range of strategic targ
Page 39 and 40: DOCTRINE NOT DOGMA: Lessons from th
Page 41 and 42: 34 …the RAF established in 1918 a
Page 43 and 44: 36 In the summer of 1941 Trenchard
Page 45 and 46: 38 and his cattle. 8 The lesson to
Page 47 and 48: 40 force would pursue and destroy t
Page 49 and 50: 42 The new generation of German wea
Page 51 and 52: 44 This example illustrates the imp
Page 53 and 54: 46 5. The ‘eccentricity factor’
Page 55 and 56: THE FUTURE OF AIR POWER Observation
Page 57 and 58: 50 Nonetheless, there is a distress
Page 59 and 60: 52 Events in Kosovo were similarly
Page 61 and 62: 54 ● It is imperative that future
Page 63 and 64: 56 and residential areas, were imme
Page 65 and 66: 58 successful. 11 Spending money on
Page 67 and 68: 60 Precision weapons, especially st
Page 69 and 70: 62 Air and space platforms like JST
Page 71 and 72: 64 In contrast to the unhappy exper
Page 73 and 74: 66 objectives do not need such comm
Page 75 and 76: 68 9 The unseemly spat between the
Page 77 and 78: THE FUTURE OF AIRPOWER?
Page 79 and 80: 72 …powerful though it is, a US v
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74 theoretical possibilities which
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76 …whilst redundancy is a positi
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78 …superior technology is not al
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80 committing ground forces into a
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TO SEA OR NOT TO SEA: That is the Q
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84 INTRODUCTION In recognition of t
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and its carrier are not inconsidera
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88 …Harrier FA2s could be used to
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90 to bring the aircraft’s weight
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92 …one of the most feared modern
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94 are required. These comprise ope
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96 have to withdraw to a safe opera
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98 In economic terms, the STOVL com
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100 the enhanced AEW capability of
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102 BIBLIOGRAPHY Reference Publicat
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104 Sabin, Dr Philip. Lecture on Ai
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106 77 John Lehman, a former US Sec
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TARGET BERLIN USAAF B-17 breaks up
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110 The Escort Plan The plan for es
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112 With the three Bomb Divisions i
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114 airspace than their Luftwaffe c
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116 Following the initial firing pa
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118 Either accidentally or delibera
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120 escorts quickly took charge of
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122 Of the US personnel engaged in
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EW READING NEW READING NEW READING
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UNIONS NOTICES/REUNIONS NOTICES/REU
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