Embankment Dam Failure Analysis (FEMA 541) - Association of ...

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Dam name: Black Hills Flash Flood (Canyon Lake Dam) Location: Rapid City, South Dakota Dam Characteristics: Dam type: earthfill Dam height: 20+? feet Dam crest length: 500 feet Reservoir volume: about 700 acre-feet of water released Spillway: Capacity of 3,200 cfs History of Dam: Purpose: Recreational lake in city park Dam completed: 1933 Dam failed: June 9, 1972 Reports varied between 10:45 and 11:30 (39-years old when failed) Failure cause: Overtopping Details on Detection of Failure/Deciding to warn: There were no dam failure warnings and virtually no flood warnings in Rapid City. The 10pm TV news wrap-up indicated that the magnitude and seriousness of the flood was not realized at that time. At 10:30 pm, in simultaneous TV and radio broadcast, people in low-lying areas were urged to evacuate. Details on dissemination of warnings and technologies used: The initial warnings did not carry a sense of urgency because of the complete lack of knowledge concerning the incredible amount of rain that was falling. Details on response to the warning: Description of flooding resulting from darn failure: Water started flowing over Canyon Lake Dam at 10 am or earlier. The dam failed at 10:45 pm (or as late as 11:30 pm) Peak inflow was about 43,000 cfs Peak outflow was about 50,000 cfs Flood in Rapid City covered an area up to 0.5 miles wide. The losses included: 236 fatalities with 17,000 at risk. Of the fatalities: 35 occurred in first 3 miles above dam; 165 below dam; 36 elsewhere Incremental fatalities resulting from dam failure: ??? 3,000 injured. Flooding, including that from dam failure, destroyed or caused major damage to over 4,000 permanent residences and mobile homes. Damage total (failure plus non failure): $160 million. Prepared by Wayne Graham
Dam name: Teton Dam Location: near Wilford, Idaho Dam Characteristics: Dam type: earthf ill Dam height: 305 feet (275 depth at failure) Dam crest length: feet Reservoir volume: 250,000 acre-feet released Spillway: water never reached spillway History of Dam: Purpose: irrigation Dam completed: under final construction/first filling Dam failed: Saturday June 5, 1976 at 11:57 a.m.; first filling Failure cause: Piping of dam core in foundation key trench. Details on Detection of Failure/Deciding to warn: 12:30 am and 7am: dam unattended. 7am to 8am: Survey crew discovers turbid leakage 9:30 am: PCE considers alerting residents but decides emergency situation is not imminent and is concerned about causing panic. 10 am: larger leak, flowing turbid water 10:30 to 10:45: PCE notifies sheriff’s offices and advises them to alert citizens. Details on dissemination of warnings and technologies used: police, radio, television, telephone, neighbor word of mouth. (Included live commercial radio broadcasts from reporters in aircraft and at Teton Dam) Details on response to the warning: Why were there 800 injured? Description of flooding resulting from dam failure: Over 3,700 houses destroyed or damaged. 150 to 200 sq. mi. flooded The losses included: 11 fatalities (6 from drowning, 3 heart failure, 1 accidental gun shot and 1 suicide) with about 25,000 people at risk. 800 injuries. Damage total of $400 million from USGS Open File Report 77-765. Photos: Sugar City 12 mi. 1pm 15 ft depth (0 dead) Rexburg 15 mi. 1:40pm 6 to 8 ft. (2 deaths) Prepared by Wayne Graham
Page 1: PROCEEDINGS FEMA WORKSHOP, JUNE 26-
Page 5: TABLE OF CONTENTS Page # OVERVIEW
Page 9 and 10: 2 OUTLINE OF THE WORKSHOP AGENDA __
Page 11 and 12: 3 SUMMARY OF WORKSHOP PRESENTATIONS
Page 13 and 14: He also discussed research needs to
Page 15 and 16: what is reasonable to the engineer
Page 17 and 18: 4 DAM FAILURE ANALYSIS RESEARCH AND
Page 19 and 20: The break down of the individual to
Page 21 and 22: The break down of the individual to
Page 23 and 24: TOPIC NUMBER RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT
Page 25 and 26: TOPIC NUMBER RESEARCH / DEVELOPMENT
Page 27 and 28: TOPICS Research/Development Topics
Page 29: TOPICS increasing VALUE 2 20 12 15
Page 33 and 34: A AGENDA __________________________
Page 35: B PRESENTATIONS ___________________
Page 38 and 39: Dam name: Williamsburg Dam (Mill Ri
Page 40 and 41: Dam name: Walnut Grove Dam Location
Page 42 and 43: Dam name: Saint Francis Dam Locatio
Page 44 and 45: Dam name: Baldwin Hills Dam Locatio
Page 48 and 49: Dam name: Kelly Barnes Dam Location
Page 50 and 51: Dam name: Timber Lake Dam Location:
Page 53 and 54: Will a Dam Failure Occur? Assessing
Page 55 and 56: Reclamation’s Risk Management Res
Page 57 and 58: Roles of Dam Failure Analyses • I
Page 59: B-3
Page 62 and 63: 2/6/02 %DFNJURXQG ✦ 7UDGLWLRQDO &
Page 64 and 65: 2/6/02 (VWDEOLVKLQJ WKH %DVH 6DIHW\
Page 66 and 67: 2/6/02 &XUUHQW 'DP 6DIHW\ 5 ' ✦ 5
Page 68 and 69: 2/6/02 FRAMEWORK FOR RISK ASSESSMEN
Page 70 and 71: 2/6/02 1.6E-02 ([DPSOH /2/ 5LVN 'LV
Page 72 and 73: 2/6/02 5LVN $QDO\VLV 5 ' ✦ 0HWKRG
Page 75 and 76: The Uncertainty of Embankment Dam B
Page 77 and 78: model (Fread 1988). These models si
Page 79 and 80: Predicted Breach Width (meters) 300
Page 81 and 82: Table 1. - Uncertainty estimates of
Page 83 and 84: Summary of Uncertainty Analysis Res
Page 85 and 86: control seepage and uplift pressure
Page 87 and 88: Results — Peak Outflow Estimates
Page 89 and 90: Conclusions This paper has presente
Page 91: B-5
Page 94 and 95: each failure mechanics are not well
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Fread (1971,1977,l988,l993) used a
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3. Analytical Parametric Breach Mod
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Figure 3. Side View of Dam Showing
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Figure 5. Teton Dam: Predicted and
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unsteady flow equations with the se
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Figure 8. Routing Curves for SMPDBK
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K and X are computed as follows: K
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Figure 10. Profile of peak discharg
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Fread,D.L., and Hsu,K.S. (l993) “
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B-6
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-Application of the numerical model
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45 m 3 /s and at low water level di
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Other recommendation deals with the
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The 2-d flood calculations and the
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The breach hydrographs for the loca
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1) Rectangular mesh # 10m without b
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5. DEVELOPMENT OF RESCUE ACTIONS De
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Emergency action plans prepared ear
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The determination of flow hydrograp
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FEMA/USDA WORKSHOP OKLAHOMA CITY JU
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SIGNIFICANT HAZARD POTENTIAL “Dam
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SELECTING HAZARD POTENTIAL CLASSIFI
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GUIDELINE GOALS • Repeatable Clas
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Permanent Structures • Single fam
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Lifeline Disruption Easy to Restore
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ENVIRONMENTAL DAMAGE • Habitat an
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RISK BASED ASSESSMENT 1. Assume fai
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B-8
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It is common that dam failure analy
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A similar situation exists in dams
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Edison Pond Dam may have resulted i
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B-9
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However, most of the dams that fail
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The side slopes are sometimes steep
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In Georgia, we use dambreak modelin
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In closing, I wonder if we in the d
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ADJUSTING REALITY TO FIT THE MODEL
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CALIBRATION CORRELATION TO REALITY
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New age modelers Post-modern hydrol
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B-11
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Step 1: Determine Dam Failure Scena
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Table 1 Guidance for Estimating Whe
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The parameter DV may be used to sep
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Table 2 Recommended Fatality Rates
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B-12
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The procedure was intended to provi
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Although this failure occurred seve
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Qmax equation needs to be updated c
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Dam Failure Analyses Workshop Oklah
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Stability Analyses Programs to Dete
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Milner Dam • Control of Seepage F
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•7
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Santee Cooper East Dam • The Emba
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Dayton Dam Canal Embankment Failure
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Canal Embankment - before failure 2
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The Breach • With the reservoir s
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Breach - 7/20/96 2/12/02 FERC-CRO J
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July 22, 1996 Inspection • The ne
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Secondary Breach Location 7/22/96 2
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Horses on dunes 7/22/96 2/12/02 FER
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Breach 9/30/96 2/12/02 FERC-CRO Jun
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Reconstruction of the Canal Embankm
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Filling in Canal Bottom 8/27/97 2/1
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Impervious Core in breach 9/30/97 2
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Canal Embankment 1/15/98 2/12/02 FE
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Presentation for FEMA / USDA Worksh
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• Life Safety Model • Environme
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B-15
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Case Study Setting The Chalk Hill h
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ased on ranges given in the BRAECH
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B-16
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Current Dam Safety Research Efforts
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Overtopping Facility • Near-proto
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Flow Classification Nappe Flow Skim
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Friction Factor 10.00 Darcy Frictio
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Recent Developments in the Research
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ACB Mats Placement 12
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Vegetated Vegetated 14
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Overtopping Testing Threshold Level
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30 Design Curves 28 26 24 Articulat
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Flow Flume Setup Top of flume wall
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10 Analysis D 50 C u -0.25 [1.0805%
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Limited Overtopping, Embankment Bre
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development of concentrated flow, 2
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0.1 k d (m 3 /N-h) 0.01 0.001 τ c
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SUMMARY Research efforts at the ARS
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B-19
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Hydrologic Engineering Center Missi
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Schematic of the Alamo Dam study ar
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Cross-section Data Editor • Optio
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Use of GIS/DEM data RAS cross secti
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RAS Unsteady Flow • Overview •
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Pre-processing Geometry • For uns
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Bridge Hydraulic Properties Plot Hy
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Unsteady Flow Simulation Manager 1.
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Viewing Unsteady Flow Results • A
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Gate Section
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Future Work • Dam & Levee Breachi
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Product Availability • Internal t
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MORRIS 1 CADAM & IMPACT: European R
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MORRIS 3 • To create a database o
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MORRIS 5 • Dam-break wave along a
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MORRIS 7 SELECTED RESEARCH FINDINGS
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MORRIS 9 site. The results varied s
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MORRIS 11 be appropriate for the si
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MORRIS 13 Funding of European resea
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MORRIS 15 Breach Formation Flood Pr
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MORRIS 17 their findings and future
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MORRIS 19 Theme 4 Sediment Movement
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MORRIS 21 (Italy), Politechnika Gda
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Issues, Resolutions, And Research N
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and is presented in detail by Mark
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The most commonly applied approach
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Test no 1,2,3,5,7, and 8 will be us
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• breach tests A local contractin
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5. BUDGET AND TIME SCHEDULE The who
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Catalino Cecilio Catalino B. Cecili
Page 364 and 365:
David Gutierrez California Dept. of
Page 366 and 367:
John Ritchey Dept. of Environmental
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