Elegantes Telefax - JAV der TUB - TU Berlin

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16 focusing on country strategy and controlling the country budgets with which they hired most of the personnel to perform the evaluation functions in the project cycle. The remaining country personnel and the personnel from the technical departments were moved to regional sector groups with one environmental sector group (Gutner 2002) and they had to rely for their administrative expenses more on the income they gained from being contracted by country managers. The environmental professionals in the various units are linked by an Environment Board consisting of the heads of these units and they are part of a network, called Environmentally and Socially Sustainable Development (ESSD) which contains professionals dealing with rural and social development topics under a sectoral vice-presidency with the same name. In 2006, the Vice Presidency of ESSD, however, was merged with the VP for Infrastructure. The size, the location and resources controlled by the environmental staff is one important factor for the incentives and resources to monitor and control potentially environmentally adverse project designs and to create and pursue environmentally beneficial projects. The other set of factors is the relationship between the environmental staff and the task managers responsible for the design and operation of the projects. If one follows the literature (Wade 1997; Rich 2002; Gutner 2002), three phases of the organization of environmental management, close to those outlined above, can be distinguished which created a specific institutional set up with a different incentive structure and expectations about the environmental quality of the World Bank’s lending. Nielson and Tierney (2003) identify changes in 1994 as an additional cut off point, thus, introducing a fourth phase. These four phases created different incentives for environmental assessment and monitoring and for lending stand-alone environmentally beneficial projects: • The first phase between 1970 and 1987, basically established by President Robert McNamara, led to the creation of the Office of Environmental Affairs which was understaffed for its screening function (3-5 professionals for more than 200 projects per year), was involved late in the planning cycle, lacked veto power and had to rely on relatively unspecific guidelines issued late in 1984. “These were easily ignored, since they left compliance to the discretion of the task managers” (Gutner 2002, 53). The understanding of environmental management was largely restricted to the control of industrial pollution and pesticides use. There was no structure for separate environmental lending. • With the 1987 reorganization, separate environmental units were created, both as a central unit and within the regional divisions and within a year the number of environmental staff increased by 50 within a year. Although it took until 1989 before the specific Environmental Assessment (EA) procedures were in effect,
17 the reorganization in 1987 created better resource conditions for the EA process, the external literature agrees that remaining conflicts between environmental staff and country managers about the adequate procedure for the integration of environmental criteria into the design, implementation and operation of project were not adequately resolved. 8 The main explanations centre on the incentive structure of the project managers. 9 • The 1987 reorganization is considered more successful in creating incentives for separate environmental lending. Environmental professionals in the regional divisions were free and had the resources to identify potential environmentally beneficial projects in borrowing countries and find supporters within the governmental agencies. An additional incentive to identify and promote environmentally beneficial projects is the result of the establishment of the Global Environment Facility (GEF) in 1991 for which the World Bank is one of the implementing agencies and for which it hosts the independent secretariat. The GEF has a completely different principal structure and decision rules about projects, so that the GEF projects cannot simply be added to the portfolio of the Environment Department of the World Bank, but they increase the leverage of the environmental staff of the Bank in promoting environmental projects. • Nielson and Tierney (2003; 2005) see the creation of the Inspection Panel in 1994, which was based on the same influencing mechanism of an NGO demand leveraged by the US Congress who had to agree to an IDA replenishment, as the organizational “reform that sticks” (Nielson and Tierney 2003, 260). But, they add that this change was supported by the Board which reflects changes of the preferences of the major principals around the UNCED process and complemented by changes in the reporting requirements: One was to make project documents publicly available including the environmental assessments and to get the Board involved earlier in the planning cycle of the project and not only for approval. • The 1997 reorganization changed the incentive structure from a supply oriented to a more demand (by the recipient governments) driven approach (Gutner 2002). The country managers controlled the operating and administrative budgets and the Bank wide technical networks which included the environmental staff 8 NGOs claimed that their cases proved the overall picture. But even World Bank internal reports raised a number of weaknesses in the appraisal and monitoring process (World Bank 1992; World Bank 1996b). 9 Rich 1994 focuses on the incentives to get approval for projects, later (Rich 2002) adds staff turnover and lack of institutional continuity; Wade (1997) diagnoses a bargaining situation between task managers and environmental staff; Gutner (2002, 93) sees the restriction in the pursuit of keeping the transaction costs of projects low as a major point.
Page 1 and 2: WORKING PAPER ON MANAGEMENT IN ENVI
Page 3 and 4: SUMMARY Integrated Water Resources
Page 5 and 6: 1 I. INTRODUCTION Integrated Water
Page 7 and 8: 3 formance gap. Considerable attent
Page 9 and 10: 5 ade saw then the application of t
Page 11 and 12: 7 donor countries (and to some exte
Page 13 and 14: 9 ment banks may be seen as overlap
Page 15 and 16: 11 (Kapur 2002). The gentlemen’s
Page 17 and 18: 13 ing and selection seems to be wo
Page 19: 15 presidents who have undertaken t
Page 23 and 24: 19 Figure 1: Percent of World Bank
Page 25 and 26: 21 Figure 2: A comprehensive framew
Page 27 and 28: 23 VI. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE WATER
Page 29 and 30: 25 major problems. The internal ass
Page 31 and 32: 27 breaking the stalemate of dam co
Page 33 and 34: 29 works, the World Water Council a
Page 35 and 36: 31 cation and explanation of the Ba
Page 37 and 38: 33 result of a combination of cause
Page 39 and 40: 35 Hawkins D.G., Lake D.A., Nielson
Page 41: 37 World Bank (1996c) Operations Ev

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