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Elegantes Telefax - JAV der TUB - TU Berlin

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18<br />

had their administrative budgets lowered so that they had to find country or task<br />

(project) managers who would contract for their services, imitating a market for<br />

consultancy services. Furthermore, the country managers formulated the lending<br />

priorities with the recipient country finance ministries which had lower priorities<br />

for environmental projects. One of the previous sources of environmental<br />

lending, the environmental staff with staff time and own resources, had dried up.<br />

Environmental assessment now relied on an established set of guidelines, but<br />

the incentive structure of environmental staff changed as they became dependent<br />

on task managers for work assignments. In the words of the author of the<br />

2001 Operations Evaluation Department (OED) report on the Bank’s environmental<br />

performance “the quality of the EA process deteriorated” (World Bank<br />

2001a, 21).<br />

The empirical research on the effects of these changes progressed consi<strong>der</strong>ably in<br />

the last five years (Gutner 2002; Nielson, Tierney 2003; 2005), but remained somewhat<br />

inconclusive, mostly for the difficulties of operationalizing the variables: First,<br />

the dependent variable ‘environmental behavior’ and second, ‘environmentally relevant<br />

changes in the institutional structure of the World Bank’ as the independent<br />

variables are subject to an intensive debate. True, for the dependent variable, there<br />

are the cases of damaging projects which were the basis for the criticism and the<br />

NGO-campaigning against the World Bank since 1983 (Rich 1994), the results of internal<br />

evaluations of the World Bank (World Bank 1996b; 2002a), the results of the<br />

evaluations by the Wapenhans Commission and the Morse Commission 1992 and<br />

the Inspection Panel evaluations (World Bank 2003e). This evidence is sufficient to<br />

identify the problem, but for analytical purposes it suffers from the small numbers<br />

problem.<br />

The most comprehensive effort so far to solve this problem has been by categorizing<br />

Board approved project commitments according to their environmental quality in time series<br />

between 1980 and 2000 (Nielson, Tierney 2003). The authors first classified 5300 World<br />

Bank (and Global Environmental Facility) projects (numbers and volume of committed spending)<br />

into free-standing environmental, traditional, agricultural, economic and social. In a later<br />

paper (Nielson, Tierney 2005), they classified the projects on an ordinal five point scale from<br />

strictly dirty to strictly environmental independently from the World Bank classification (see<br />

Figure 1): Here, the major changes are the continuous decline of broadly “dirty” projects over<br />

the whole period, the decline of the strictly ”dirty” project only in the first decade and the increase<br />

of environmentally neutral projects. Environmental projects increased only slightly<br />

until the mid-nineties and then declined (Nielson and Tierney 2005, 795).

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