Essence and Cause in Plotinus

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4. The identity between objects and their causes revisited Let us begin our analysis with (i) the (revisited) identity between an object and its cause. So far Plotinus claimed that in many cases it has been recognised that in the sensible world there is identity between an object and its cause; he referred to the eclipse as an example of these cases. In what follows, Plotinus restates this identity and widens his claim: the identity between an object and its cause holds also in the other cases. Lines 12-14 are cryptic. Although the syntax is not convoluted, the style is extremely concise and the meaning is difficult to disclose. The sentence has an interrogative form. However, when one reads it carefully in its context, one realizes that it is not a genuinely open question, as a negative answer is expected. In lines 12-14 there are two main problems. The first concerns the expression e)piì tw½n aÃllwn (line 13). The second (related) problem concerns the meaning of the two clauses eÀkaston dia\ ti¿ eiånai and kaiì tou=to eiånai th\n ou)si¿an e(ka/stou. Let us begin with the expression e)piì tw½n aÃllwn that I have rendered as ‘in the others’ in order to maintain the ambiguity of the Greek text. It is not clear what tw½n aÃllwn refers to. There are several candidates. First, as some scholars suggested (e.g., Henry and Schwyzer in apparatu, Harder, and Hadot), tw½n aÃllwn can indicate all the sensible things other than the eclipse (that was already dealt with). This is the most natural reading of the Greek. However, this does not provide a sufficient understanding: for, the set of all the things other than the eclipse is very large and crowded. Moreover, it does not consider the fact that, at line 11 in text (1), Plotinus has already mentioned many cases (such as the eclipse) for which the identity holds. It is a second possibility that tw½n aÃllwn refers to the examples mentioned at the beginning of the chapter (at lines 6-8), where one reads ‘but there (e)keiÍ) there is man and the reason why it is man (…) and eye and the reason why it is eye’. If this is correct, then one needs to understand what the examples of man and eye would add to the argument. They are clearly arbitrary examples of intelligible things that are present in the Intellect together with their causes. 11 Although this option has the advantage that it restricts the set of ‘the other things’ (tw½n aÃllwn) to intelligible beings, it is not a straightforward reading of the Greek; for, the referent of tw½n aÃllwn is far away in the text. Another objection comes from the fact that Plotinus has already said that, in the case of the intelligible realities, the identity holds. A third possibility is that Plotinus has in mind the other cases (apart from the eclipse) mentioned by Aristotle, e.g., the example of thunder. This third option seems less likely: it sounds highly conjectural and the evidence is extremely scanty. Moreover, as I argued above, it is likely that Plotinus referred to the Aristotelian list above, i.e., at line 11 in our text (1), when he mentions that the identity between a thing and its cause holds in many cases (pollaxou=). Let me then suggest that tw½n aÃllwn refers to items in the sensible world. However, tw½n aÃllwn refers to all the cases other than those of the Aristotelian list (because they were already 11 The reading that the expression tw½n aÃllwn refers to intelligible beings has been accepted by Schwyzer and Cilento. Brehier, MacKenna and Armstrong leave the ambiguity that is present in the Greek. Ficino does not translate the expression e)piì tw½n aÃllwn. 9
considered). I shall try to explain better this point. The idea is that there is a collection of things for which the thesis of the identity between essence and cause holds. This collection contains items from the Aristotelian list together with other items in the sensible world. Still, at this stage, it remains difficult to give a full-fledged description of this collection. Let us now focus on the clauses eÀkaston dia\ ti¿ eiånai and kaiì tou=to eiånai th\n ou)si¿an e(ka/stou. Suppose that Plotinus is talking about sensible items, as suggested above. Then he is saying that each (sensible) item is its cause, and this (i.e., its cause) is its essence. It seems that here Plotinus is making two identity statements. He is saying that a (sensible) item is one and the same with its cause. He then adds that the cause is one and the same with its essence. This portion of the text suggests (at least) two interpretations. First, Plotinus is talking about cause in the sense of ontological ground. If this is the case, then Plotinus is saying that a sensible item is one and the same with its ontological ground. However, as I have already said, the claim that there is strict identity between a sensible item and its cause (in the sense of ontological ground) is extremely problematic. For this reason, this interpretation is very difficult to accept. There is a second and more likely interpretation. Plotinus is talking about cause (not in the sense of ontological ground, but) in the sense of ‘sensible cause’. If this is the case, we need to understand what he means when he says that each (sensible) item is one and the same with its cause. As we noted above, the object-cause unity in the sensible world is different from the object-cause unity in the intelligible world. For, in the sensible world, the unity of an object with its cause is based on containment (and not on strict identity as in the intelligible world). Hence, a sensible item is one and the same with its cause only in a certain qualified way. That is to say, the cause of a sensible object is in the object. Accordingly, the cause is the essence of the object in the sense that the cause is in the essence of the object. It is possible to offer a concluding suggestion for the interpretation of the expression kaiì tou=to eiånai th\n ou)si¿an e(ka/stou. It seems to me that the passage will be clearer if we understand the kaiì not as ‘and’ (i.e., as a conjunction) but as ‘or rather’ (i.e., with an epexegetic value). Then, the whole sentence would be constructed as follows: What prevents each thing being its cause, or rather this (i.e., cause) being the essence of each thing? In other words, the claim that each (sensible) thing (contains in some way or other) its cause is more precisely formulated in the claim that the cause is in the essence of each thing. 12 5. Grasping essence and cause: An Aristotelian attempt? Let us move to (ii), namely to the thesis that certain attempts to grasp the essence provide the correct result. It is easy to see that lines 14-15 can be understood in more than one way. The expression peirw/menoi lamba/nein occurs elsewhere in the Enneads: it occurs at VI.2 [43] 1, 5 where it refers to Plotinus and his pupils. It occurs also at V.8 [31] 9, 12 and at VI.4 [22] 16, 6 where it refers to others than Plotinus and his pupils. The expression peirw/menoi lamba/nein is 12 Here Plotinus seems to suggest that there is (a certain kind of) identity between an item and its essence. This position reminds us of another Aristotelian thesis, namely claim that we find in Metaphysics Z 6, according to which there is identity between something and its essence. 10
Page 1 and 2: Essence and Cause in Plotinus’ En
Page 3 and 4: formation of the human body and its
Page 5 and 6: However, for us in the sensible wor
Page 7 and 8: It is possible that Plotinus is her
Page 9: Thus, Plotinus is interested in Ari
Page 13 and 14: and in the Posterior Analytics, Ari
Page 15 and 16: consider the first clause. These li
Page 17 and 18: Aristotelian discussion of a certai
Page 20 and 21: Bibliography Adamson [2002] P. Adam
Page 22: Schrenk [1993] Schrenk [1994a]: Sch

Essence and Cause in Plotinus

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