Essence and Cause in Plotinus

dialectic through the method of division reveals what the Forms are, i.e., it reveals their
definition. The method of division is therefore a suitable candidate for the activity of unfolding
the Forms, for it can reveal the way in which each Form is related to the others (and hence to the
whole of the intelligible world).
Let us focus now our attention to the notion of cause. For, it would be natural to ask
what kind of causal role is to be ascribed to the Forms. Given the complexity of this problem, it
is only possible to draw a map of the suggestions presented in some of the texts analysed in this
paper. 27 In particular, according to our text (2), it is possible to find the following
characterisation of the Forms’ causality. The general idea is that there are (at least) two ways in
which one can say that Forms are causes. The first is that Forms are causes for sensible items. It
is a possibility that Plotinus is here referring to something like the Platonic view that sensible
items partake of Forms: Forms provide the ontological grounds of particulars that partake of
them. But it is more plausible to suspect that Plotinus could offer his personal elaboration about
the relationship between Forms and sensible items: the essence of a sensible object could be
determined by reflection of an intelligible Form. 28 If this is correct, then it is in this latter sense
that, according to Plotinus, Forms are the ontological grounds of the particulars. However, given
that it is not Plotinus’ primary concern to go into the details of the relationship between Forms
and sensible items in the last lines of our text (2), we can turn to the second way in which Forms
are causes.
This second way in which Forms are causes is still difficult to define. We are dealing
with a different kind of causality, as sensible items are not involved: this is the kind of causality
that one finds when one unfolds a Form.
When we focus on this second way in which Forms are causes, a complex picture
presents itself. For our present purposes, it suffices to delineate only some of its traits. A
characteristic feature of Plotinus’ Forms is that they do not depend on other things that are not
intelligible beings. Still, at the same time, Forms should not be taken in isolation: they are to be
taken in their mutual relations (in particular in their relations with the primary genera) and
hence in their interconnection with the whole of the intelligible world. Hence, there is a certain
kind of dependence of the Forms on the intelligible world. Accordingly, when one comes to
grasp the essence and the cause in the unfolding of the Form, one understands what the Form is
by grasping how it is related to (and dependent on) other Forms (in particular, the primary
genera). One thereby grasps the connections and the interrelations between different elements
of the intelligible world. If one were to push this view even further, one would be tempted to see
in Plotinus a holistic view of universals. 29 However, this thesis needs to be more extensively
argued for, and it constitutes an interesting and fruitful starting point for a new research. 30
27 The topic of the Forms’ causality is discussed (among others) in Wagner [1982] and in D’Ancona Costa
[1992].
28 This point is discussed in Kalligas [1997], 399-400.
29 Plotinus’ holism has been recently discussed in Emillson [2007], 199-207.
30 I would like to thank the many colleagues and friends who read previous drafts of this paper and made
extremely helpful suggestions. I am particularly grateful to David Charles, Paolo Crivelli, Michel Frede,
Pavlos Kalligas, and the anonymous referee.
17