Essence and Cause in Plotinus

object, which comes to be apprehended in two different ways. When an object is known in the
Intellect (e)keiÍ), there is identity between it and its cause. Strictly speaking, at the level of the
Intellect there is no distinction (not only between an object and its cause, but also) between
knowing and being: for something to be known is the same as for it to be. The distinction
between knowing and being, as it applies to the Intellect, is drawn by our discursive thought.
When an object is apprehended in the sphere of our discursive thought (e)ntau=qa), a separation
between the notion of cause and that of essence is introduced. However, this second reading
faces some difficulties. For example, one would be committed to the view that in the Intellect
we find something like the eclipse. And, to say the least, this is controversial. Moreover, given
that here (e)ntau=qa) too there is identity between an object and its cause, one wonders what the
difference is between here (e)ntau=qa) and there (e)keiÍ). Given these difficulties, we can conclude
that this interpretation is more problematic and should not be endorsed.
Let us consider again Plotinus’ claim that here (in the sensible world) there is (a certain)
identity between an object and its cause. This claim is far from being intuitive and it has to be
argued for. Plotinus finds support for his claim in a piece of Aristotelian doctrine. One wonders
why Plotinus finds the Aristotelian example attractive. For, Plotinus is certainly interested in the
epistemological implication of the Aristotelian doctrine, i.e., the claim that at least in some
cases to know the essence is to know the cause. However, Plotinus cannot introduce an essence
of the Aristotelian kind: he cannot accept some the fundamental tenets of the Aristotelian
essentialism. On the contrary, it is well known how Plotinus strongly criticises some of the basic
aspects of the Aristotelian notion of essence. 9 Hence, one wonders what it is that Plotinus
appeals to in order to explain the relation between something and its cause. I am not sure I can
provide a satisfactory answer to all these difficult problems, but I shall try to see what
suggestions can be offered by our text.
It seems to me that Plotinus’ idea will become clear later in the continuation of our
passage, especially at lines 12-19. Nevertheless, it is important to mention and briefly
characterise this idea in advance. At line 18, Plotinus refers explicitly to the Forms that are
playing an important role in the argument (as well as in the chapter and in the entire treatise).
When Plotinus is talking about Forms and their causes in the intelligible world, he has in mind
something like Platonic Forms. Let me try to clarify this point. Platonic Forms are revisited as
thoughts in the Divine Mind. They are ontologically similar to Platonic Forms, for they are selfsufficient;
they also are (in a certain way) cause of being for the sensible things. But there is
something more: Plotinus’ Forms bear a certain relation with each other, with the primary
genera, and with the totality of the intelligible world. That is to say, Plotinus’ Forms are
interconnected in the order that is present in the intelligible world. For this reason, the whole of
the intelligible world is perfect and complete (VI.7 [38] 3, 21).
It is also true to say that Plotinus’ Forms share a feature with the Aristotelian natural
kinds. For (at a discursive level) Plotinus’ Forms are known in a way that is similar to the one
whereby Aristotelian natural kinds are known, i.e., in a way that shows the identity between
essence and cause.
9 This point is discussed in (e.g.) Chiaradonna who notices that Plotinus criticised in particular the fact that
Aristotle identified the essence with certain predicates of the sensible (i.e. corporeal) being; [1999], 36.
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