Essence and Cause in Plotinus

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ESSENCE AND CAUSE IN PLOTINUS’ ENNEAD VI.7 [38] 2: AN OUTLINE OF SOME PROBLEMS Annamaria Schiaparelli The Queen’s College, Oxford Introduction The notions of essence and cause are widely discussed in philosophy: they are central themes of philosophical speculation in Antiquity as well as nowadays. However, these notions are also highly problematic: although many attempts have been made, it is still difficult to fully capture and understand them. Furthermore, when one tries to analyse the relation between essence and cause, the task becomes even more challenging. In Antiquity, the notion of definition was closely connected to that of essence: at least from Aristotle onwards, it was generally assumed that the definition reveals or expresses the essence. Given the complexity of these philosophical problems, in this paper I shall confine the discussion to some aspects of the notions of essence and cause (and their relation) as they are presented in Plotinus’ Ennead VI.7 [38] 2. In some passages of this treatise, Plotinus’ philosophical speculation has two aspects: there is an important Platonic background (as one would normally expect), but Plotinus seems also to make use of certain Aristotelian theses about knowledge of the essence and knowledge of the cause. Since scholars have already explored the significance of the Platonic background, 1 I shall focus on the influence of Aristotle’s viewpoint on Plotinus’ discussion. For this reason, some Aristotelian texts will also be presented. My aim is to bring evidence in support of the view that Plotinus is interested in applying (at least part of) the Aristotelian conceptual apparatus in his analysis on the causality of Forms. 1. The Platonic background: the causal structure of sensible phenomena Since, as I have said, the Platonic background of Plotinus’ views on causation has been widely explored, I shall restrict myself here to a brief outline of that background. Some of the main themes of Plotinus’ discussion in VI.7 [38] 2 are introduced in the first chapter of the treatise, where Plotinus engages himself in certain exegetical problems arising from Plato’s Timaeus. In VI.7 [38] 1, the starting point of Plotinus’ philosophical speculation is Plato’s description of the activity of the craftsman (and the other gods) when the world’s body (i.e., the sensible universe) was formed. 2 Plotinus is also concerned with the 1 E.g., Hadot [1988], D’Ancona Costa [1992]. 2 A detailed reconstruction of the significance and the role of the demiurgos in the Neoplatonic tradition can be found in O’Meara [1975]. 1
formation of the human body and its sense organs. However, Plotinus does not seem to be interested in the details of how this formation came about. For example, he is not interested in how the gods assembled head and limbs. Rather, he addresses the question of whether the fact that a human body has sense organs depends on some forethought present in the gods’ minds. 3 The answer is clear and straightforward: Plato’s suggestion that there is some planning in the gods’ minds should not be taken literally. For, according to Plotinus, there is forethought in the case of neither living things nor the universe (VI.7 [38] 1.30). The question of what causes the sensible universe to have a certain structure is left open: if Plotinus dismisses the idea of there being any forethought in the case of intelligible world, he needs to provide us with an alternative suggestion. If this is the case, then one of Plotinus’ tasks is to search for an account of how in the sensible world there are certain characteristics. He needs to provide an account of the causal structure of sensible phenomena. His view can be only partially summarised here: his interesting proposal is that the natural phenomena’s causal structure will provide us with a certain image of the intelligible world. This image will not be complete for two reasons: the first is that (given the nature of our soul) we could never reach a complete grasp of the intelligible world; the second is that the sensible world contains a number of contingencies that are foreign to the intelligible world. The issues that arise from Plotinus’ exegetical task in VI.7 [38] 1 and 2 are intertwined with a philosophical reflection on the notion of causality. Since it remains unclear from the outset what type of causality Plotinus has in mind, I shall need to mention some more Platonic background. In particular some passages in the Phaedo will be briefly examined. I shall focus only on the issues that are related to our discussion. In a well known section of this dialogue, Plato says that Socrates was looking for the causes of sensible things and natural phenomena. However, he was not looking for their material or mechanical causes. As a result of his investigations, Plato offers two accounts of the notion of aitia. Both accounts are said to present a safe (a)sfalh=) aitia. However, the first is a safe but trivial (a)maqh=) aitia whereas the second is a safe and cleverer (komyote/ra) aitia. In his description of the safe but trivial aitia, Plato claims ‘the one thing that makes the other things beautiful is the presence of or the association (…) with absolute beauty’. That is to say, it is only by referring to the Form and to the relation between the Form and a particular that we can have a better grip on what causes the particular to have a certain characteristic (Phaedo 100c6-7, 101c4-5). 4 The case of the safe and cleverer aitia is different. For example, if one were to ask in virtue of what a body becomes hot, the answer would no longer be (that it becomes hot) in virtue of its association with heat. This answer would be true but trivial. The appropriate answer is that a body becomes warm in virtue of a certain relation with the fire (Phaedo 105b8-c1). It is clear that the difference between the two accounts of aitia can be expressed along the following 3 The Timaeus’ passage that Plotinus seems to have in mind is the following: ‘Our present subject must be treated in more details and its preliminaries, concerning the generation of bodies, part by part, and concerning soul, and the reason and the forethought of gods producing them-of all this we must go on to tell on the principle of holding fast to the most likely account.’ (Ti. 44c 4- d1, Cornford translation). 4 The role of the Forms in Plato’s Pheado has been the subject of much discussion: see (e.g.) Vlastos [1968], Bostock [1986], Fine [1987], Matthews/Blackson [1989], Irwin [1995]. 2
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Essence and Cause in Plotinus

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