Essence and Cause in Plotinus

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type of Aristotelian definition, i.e., that a definition has to indicate the essence of the thing defined, 20 in others he expresses unhappiness with this type of definition. Plotinus’ suggestion that in some cases a definition that indicates the essence is not sufficient may give rise to perplexity. For, when we speak of definitions, we usually distinguish between conceptual definitions (namely conceptual analyses of the things to be defined) and real definitions (namely propositions that give the essences of the things to be defined). It is well known that both Plato and Aristotle seemed to prefer real definitions. Their approach appears to presuppose that real definitions are the ‘strongest’ ones available. The initial perplexity can be (at least partly) eased if we consider that Plotinus’ conception of definitions differs from his predecessors’: it depends on his multi-level ontology and his own understanding of the notion of logos. Some of Plotinus’ remarks on Aristotelian definitions are expressed in a couple of passages that it is helpful to read. The first is in Ennead VI. 7 [38] 4 (that is to say, two chapters below the texts analysed in sections 2-5). The details of Plotinus’ overall argument are too complex to be discussed here, and I shall restrict myself to some points of interest for our present discussion. 21 Plotinus is trying to answer the question ‘who this man here below is’; he says that he is looking for the logos of man. Several possibilities are considered. In particular, he tells us that the composite of soul and body cannot be the logos of man. At 16-18, we read: ‘For, this logos will be indicative (dhlwtiko/j) of what is going to be, not the sort we say manin-itself is, but more like a definition (oÀr%), and the kind of definition which does not indicate the essence. For it is not even a definition of the form in matter, but indicates the composite which already exists’ (Armstrong’s translation revised). 22 The expression ‘definition that indicates the essence’ very closely reminds us of the way in which Aristotle characterizes a definition. For example, in Top. I 101 b 37-8 Aristotle says that a definition is an account that indicates the essence (eÃsti d' oÀroj me\n lo/goj o( to\ ti¿ hÅn eiånai shmai¿nwn). In ancient Greek the verb dhlou=n can have the same meaning as shmai¿nein, namely ‘to indicate’ or ‘to signify’ (LSJ). Thus, in the present passage, it would initially seem that Plotinus accepts a strong type of account (i.e., an account that indicates the essence). However, he later adds that (at least in some cases, e.g., in the case of ‘the man here below’) accounts that indicate the essence will not be adequate: for, in these accounts there is no grasp of ‘the formative principle itself which has made (to\n lo/gon au)to\n to\n pepoihko/ta) for instance man’ (l.25). The notion of logos as formative principle will be illustrated shortly. The second passage is Ennead II. 7 [37] 3, 7-10 (it therefore belongs to the treatise that chronologically precedes Ennead VI. 7). Here Plotinus distinguishes between logos as a definition that indicates the essence of the thing (o(rismo\j dhlwtiko\j tou= ti¿ e)sti to\ pra=gma) and a logos that produces the thing (lo/goj poiw½n pra=gma). It is easy to see that (as in the text quoted above) the expression ‘definition that reveals the essence of the thing’ is reminiscent of the 20 See, e.g., Top. 130 b 26, APo 73 a 38, Metaph. 1003 b 24. 21 A more extensive discussion of this passage and its context can be found in Hadot [1988], pp. 207-223. 22 The Greek text is as follows: ãEstai ga\r o( lo/goj ouÂtoj dhlwtiko\j tou= e)some/nou, ou)x oiâoj oÀn famen au)toa/nqrwpoj, a)lla\ ma=llon e)oikwÜj oÀr%, kaiì toiou/t% oià% mhde\ dhlwtik%½ tou= ti¿ hÅn eiånai. Ou)de\ ga\r eiãdouj e)stiì tou= e)nu/lou, a)lla\ to\ sunamfo/teron dhlw½n, oÀ e)stin hÃdh. 15
Aristotelian discussion of a certain type of definition (in the Aristotelian corpus, o(rismo\j can be used interchangeably with oÀroj). 23 For present purposes, it will be enough to say that in this text Plotinus is arguing against the (seemingly) Peripatetic view that corporeity is simply a universal contained in the definition that indicates the essence of bodies. Rather, it is a logos in the sense of a formative principle that produces bodies. 24 To attain a better understanding of Plotinus’ view, we need to consider that for him it would be difficult to hold that something in the perceptible world is what it is because it is a crude reflection of the content of the intelligible world. That is to say, it would be difficult (if not absurd) to hold that ‘a man here below’ is bestowed with sense perception because in the intelligible world there is the Form of Humanity that has sense perception. It is (partly) to face this difficulty that Plotinus introduces his peculiar notion of logos. In the passages quoted above, when he speaks of ‘logos that produces the thing’, he is referring to the role of the socalled ‘formative principle’. Although the details of how this works are complex, the general idea is that the Intellect gives the logoi to the Soul, and the Soul interprets what there is in the intelligible world: the Soul (in a process involving several stages) uses the logoi to bring order and determination in the sensible world. 25 The notion of logoi as formative principles has certain similarities with the Stoic notion of logoi spermatikoi. But whereas there are strong suggestions that Stoic logoi are corporeal, Plotinus’ formative principles are not so. 26 We could say that according to Plotinus, the Aristotelian doctrine about real definitions is (not wrong but) incomplete. It is likely that Plotinus wants to add that in some cases (namely when we want to explain how things are at the level of the sensible world) we cannot simply refer to something like definitions that indicate the essence. Plotinus thinks that something else must be added, namely formative principles that organize different qualities into an ordered perceptible world. Concluding remarks on Division and Cause Let me to conclude the analysis of Plotinus’ text (presented in sections 2-5 above) with some remarks. It seems to me that the notion of ‘unfolding’ plays an important role in Plotinus’ discussion. However, if one were to provide a full account of the notion of ‘unfolding’, one would easily go far beyond the limits of the present paper. It will suffice to hint at the some suggestions. At this stage of our analysis, one easily wonders what the method could be by virtue of which it is possible to ‘unfold’ what has been grasped. Since our text (2) does not provide an answer, let me make a tentative suggestion. In I.3 [20], Plotinus illustrates the method of dialectic that consists in the (Platonic) method of division (tv= diaire/sei tv= Pla/twnoj). This method was presented as the means by which it is possible ‘to distinguish the Forms, to determine the essence of each thing, and to find the primary kinds’. In other words, 23 Smith [1997] p. 58. 24 Brehier’s introduction to Ennead II. 7 contains a brief but informative note on this chapter with references to Peripatetic texts. 25 A more extensive discussion of the role of logoi in the sensible world can be found in Kalligas [1997]. 26 Witt [1931], p. 106. 16
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Essence and Cause in Plotinus

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