Report of the Investigation Team Bulla Tanker 7 February 2009 ...

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CFA.001.027.0022 4.3.1 Overall Fire Management There did not appear to be a management structure in place at Whittlesea Fire Station to assist with the deployment of ST1402. 4.3.2 Supervision of ST 1402 The strike team was under the control of ST Leader Paul Elso who had briefed and communicated regularly with all crew leaders. His task during the burn over period was extremely difficult and stressful as he was also monitoring a burn-over incident involving another two tankers from his Strike Team at a location 400 metres away. 4.4 Equipment Factors 4.4.1 Bulla Tanker • Bulla Tanker is a 3.4D • The installed crew protection systems performed without fault. • The intercom system between the ROPS and the cabin worked as expected. Bulla members were surprised to hear of criticism of this device on other tankers and so questioned the training and understanding of its operation by other crews. • The short recirculation hose on the pump failed at some stage during the event but did not impact on the pumps operation or the availability of water to the spray nozzles or monitor. However the nozzles and monitor were used very lightly. If the need to use these was of a more urgent nature it is not known if the hose failure would have had an impact. The hose was quickly replaced when the vehicle returned to Whittlesea on its way back home. 4.5 Personal Protective Equipment 4.5.1 Wild Fire Jackets Members on the back of the tanker noticed that some burning embers were able to get within the sleeves of their Wild Fire Jackets. However this could be due to the velcro tabs not being adjusted correctly. Once readjusted the problem seemed to be remedied. 4.5.2 Helmets Some heat was detected by the crew on the rear of the vehicle on their heads indicating it had entered the space between their skulls and the shells of their helmets. 5. FINDINGS 5.1 Vehicle Crewing The crew of Bulla Tanker was a good mix of experienced members and young members keen to pick up from their more senior counterparts. This resulted in six members making up the crew of this vehicle. Bulla Tanker Burnover – 600 Whittlesea-Yea Road – 07/02/2009 Page10 DRAFT – CFA internal working document
CFA.001.027.0023 The sixth member meant that, at the time the fire passed, four members were in the ROPS area on the rear of the vehicle, under the protection of just three blankets. 5.2 Brigade Strike Team History Bulla Brigade are very proud of their Brigade history as a Brigade that has been involved in Region 14 Strike Teams at any large fire over the past number of years. Their pride extends to the understanding that every crew that has represented the Brigade has done so in an exemplary manner showing a high degree of skill, dedication and hard, honest work ethics. 5.3 Earlier Burn-over Experience Some members of the Bulla Crew, including the Crew Leader and the Driver, had previous experience involving a Bulla Tanker caught in a burnout situation. At the Cobaw Fire Bulla Tanker was part of a Strike Team that were overrun by fire in such a traumatic scenario that at least one long term, well respected and experienced firefighter resigned from the Brigade almost immediately afterwards. During this incident it was believed by the Bulla Crew that the vehicle was in this predicament because it was trapped behind another CFA Tanker which made it impossible to relocate to a more protected location. 5.4 Assessment of the fire situation at the property The Crew Leader assessed that the location of the Bulla Tanker when fire was approaching the property at 600 Whittlesea-Yea Road did not offer his crew the best protection due to a number of factors such as: • Trees lined the front of the property • Fires approaching from a number of directions due to spotting and erratic wind conditions • The vehicle was behind another CFA Tanker allowing Bulla Tanker nowhere to move forward if required to do so • A more appropriate anchor point had already been identified by the crew at the rear of the house The Crew Leader directed the Driver to reverse the vehicle to this safer location in an open area at the rear of the house. 5.5 Fire Storm Conditions The conditions at the rear of the house provided better protection than those at the front of the house where Sunbury Tanker 2 and Craigieburn Command Vehicle were located. With the exception of a large tree the area at the rear of the house was open with light vegetation. The crew are quite adamant that their location assisted them getting through this ordeal as well as they did. 5.6 Actions by Crew and Vehicle Protection Systems. When the burn-over occurred the crew took refuge in Bulla Tanker (3.4D) and correctly deployed the crew protection systems which operated without fault. The protection blankets used in the ROPS area provided a very effective barrier to the Bulla Tanker Burnover – 600 Whittlesea-Yea Road – 07/02/2009 Page11 DRAFT – CFA internal working document
Page 1 and 2: CFA.001.027.0013 Report of the Inve
Page 3 and 4: CFA.001.027.0015 5.10 Bulla Tanker
Page 5 and 6: CFA.001.027.0017 • The sustained
Page 7 and 8: CFA.001.027.0019 The Bulla Tanker a
Page 9: CFA.001.027.0021 When the crew left
Page 13 and 14: CFA.001.027.0025 6. SCHEDULES 6.1 S
Page 15 and 16: CFA.001.027.0027 1700 1730 1800 181
Page 17: CFA.001.027.0029 6.5 Photographs Fi

Report of the Investigation Team Bulla Tanker 7 February 2009 ...

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