Report of the Investigation Team Bulla Tanker 7 February 2009 ...

CFA.001.027.0013
Report of the Investigation Team
Bulla Tanker
7 February 2009
Kilmore East Fire Complex
Disclaimer
This is a report to the Chief Officer of CFA. The report has been prepared in accordance with the Terms of
Reference, and the authorisation issued by the Chief Officer. The object of the investigation was to identify in a timely
manner, matters that needed to be considered by the Chief Officer.
The report is the findings of the author(s) based on the information available at the time the report was compiled.
Given the restraints of time and circumstance, the report may not have identified all relevant facts and issues. The
author(s) acknowledge there may be inaccuracies or omissions in the document.
The report is for the use of the intended recipients and may contain information that is confidential or privileged. If you
are not the intended recipient of this report you are hereby notified that any use, dissemination, distribution or
reproduction of this report is prohibited and that you must not take any action in reliance on it.
If you have received this report in error, please notify CFA immediately.
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CFA.001.027.0014
TABLE OF CONTENTS
1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 4
1.1 Date of the Incident 4
1.2 Location of the Incident 4
1.3 Jurisdiction 4
1.4 Summary of Findings 4
2. SCOPE 5
2.1 Investigation 5
2.2 Duration of the Investigation 5
2.3 Authority to Undertake the Investigation / Terms of Reference 5
2.4 Sources of Information 5
2.5 Constraints Affecting the Investigation 5
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT 5
3.1 Vehicle Involved 5
3.2 Area Affected by the Fire 5
3.3 Weather at the Time of the Incident 6
3.4 Fire Behaviour 6
4. ANALYSIS – OBSERVATIONS 6
4.1 Incident Sequence 6
4.1.1 Appointment of Crew for Bulla Tanker 6
4.1.2 Briefing of the Tanker Crew 6
4.1.3 Arrival at Whittlesea Fire Station and Briefing 6
4.1.4 Arrival and Tasking 7
4.1.5 Fire conditions deteriorate 7
4.1.6 Radio Message to make up and move out of the Fire Area. . 7
4.1.7 Entering the Property at 600 Whittlesea-Yea Road 7
4.1.8 Assessment by the Crew Leader 8
4.1.9 Burn Over incident 8
4.1.10 Moving From the Property 8
4.1.11 Regrouping 9
4.1.12 Crew Replacement 9
4.2 Individual Human Factors 9
4.2.1 Crew Experience and Training 9
4.3 Management Factors 9
4.3.1 Overall Fire Management 10
4.3.2 Supervision of ST 1402 10
4.4 Equipment Factors 10
4.4.1 Bulla Tanker 10
4.5 Personal Protective Equipment 10
4.5.1 Wild Fire Jackets 10
4.5.2 Helmets 10
5. FINDINGS 10
5.1 Vehicle Crewing 10
5.2 Brigade Strike Team History 11
5.3 Earlier Burn-over Experience 11
5.4 Assessment of the fire situation at the property 11
5.5 Fire Storm Conditions 11
5.6 Actions by Crew and Vehicle Protection Systems.. 11
5.7 Welfare of Crew and Condition of the Tanker Post Burn-Over 12
5.8 Effectiveness of the Intercom System 12
5.9 Perception of Crew Needs Post Incident 12
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5.10 Bulla Tanker Returned to Active Duties 12
6. SCHEDULES 13
6.1 Sources of Information 13
6.2 Topographical Map of the Area 14
6.3 Weather Conditions 14
6.4 Area of Incident showing Terrain and Vegetation 15
6.5 Photographs 17
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1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This investigation was carried out at the request of the Chief Officer of CFA in
response to a report of a burn over of CFA Bulla Tanker during the Kinglake Fire
Complex on February 7 th 2009. Bulla Tanker 1 is a 2001 Isuzu 3.4D (Reg. No.
MBD880) and was crewed by six Bulla volunteer firefighters at the time of the
incident.
1.1 Date of the Incident
The incident occurred on Saturday 7 February 2009 at approximately 1630 hours.
1.2 Location of the Incident
The incident occurred at 600 Whittlesea – Yea Road., Humevale.
(VicRoads, Map 61 W9)
1.3 Jurisdiction
The fire was part of what was originally known as Kinglake East fire and this part
was burning on private land. The control agency for the fire at the time of the
incident was CFA.
1.4 Summary of Findings
• On the day of the fire Victoria was experiencing some of the most severe fire
weather conditions ever encountered
• The ferocity of the fire and its rapid rate of spread created hostile conditions
and stretched resources over vast areas
• As part of ST1402 Bulla Tanker was tasked at a fire burning ahead of the
main fire on the south-eastern side of Whittlesea – Yea Road
• Strong wind gusts and localised fire behaviour severely hampered the
conditions around where this strike team was operating
• As conditions deteriorated the Strike Team Leader gave clear instructions to
all crew leaders that they were withdrawing from this area
• A retreat towards Whittlesea commenced with vehicles in convoy being led by
the ST Leader
• During retreat Bulla Tanker was directed on to a private property at 600
Whittlesea-Yea Road, following Sunbury Tanker 2
• Bulla Tanker passed Sunbury Tanker 2 and made its way to the rear of the
house on this property
• At this location the crew observed an open area with light vegetation
• Bulla Tanker was directed to the front of the house where Sunbury Tanker 2
had turned around to face outwards
• A sudden increase in erratic fire behaviour (fire storm conditions) occurred
without warning shortly after the Bulla Tanker pulled up behind Sunbury
Tanker 2
• The Bulla Crew Leader recalled a previous experience some years earlier
where his Tanker was caught behind another CFA Tanker as a burn-over
occurred
• This prompted the Crew Leader to direct the driver to reverse the tanker to
the open area at the rear of the house
• The crew implemented safety and survival procedures including water spray
protection and woollen blankets
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• The sustained impact from fire lasted for approximately 20 minutes
• Bulla Tanker, on hearing Sunbury Tanker 2 radio that they were leaving the
property, then drove back to the front of the house and followed Sunbury
Tanker 2
• Both Tankers travelled back towards Whittlesea until they caught up with
Greenvale and Epping Tankers
• No injuries, apart from minor ember burns, were sustained by Bulla crew
members
• The Bulla Tanker did not sustain any damage
2. SCOPE
2.1 Investigation
The Investigation Team comprised David Nichols and Ken O’Brien representing
CFA.
2.2 Duration of the Investigation
The investigation commenced on 3 rd April 2009 and was completed on 24 th June
2009.
2.3 Authority to Undertake the Investigation / Terms of Reference
The investigation was undertaken at the request of CFA Manager Operations
Performance Improvement - Deputy Chief Officer Greg Esnouf.
2.4 Sources of Information
During the investigation, personnel identified in Schedule 6.1 were interviewed.
2.5 Constraints Affecting the Investigation
As a result of the ST Leaders Vehicle being destroyed, all logs including radio
communications, times and activities for the strike team deployment were also
destroyed.
Due to the high number of investigations and other operational activity following
the conditions of February 7 it was not practical to commence this investigation
until almost seven weeks later.
The driver of Bulla Tanker was also not available for interview.
3. DESCRIPTION OF THE INCIDENT
3.1 Vehicle Involved
Bulla Tanker is a 2001 Isuzu Single Cab, 3.4D fitted with a Roll Over Protection
System. It does not have Crew Protection Sprays fitted but does have Fog Spray
Protection capabilities.
3.2 Area Affected by the Fire
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The fire was part of the large Kilmore East Fire Complex which originated near
Kilmore East and was reported by the Mount Hickey Fire Tower at 1149 hours.
The fire destroyed 255,000 hectares of private and public land in the Kinglake,
Kinglake West, Strathewen and numerous other communities resulting in 159
fatalities and destroyed 1639 buildings.
3.3 Weather at the Time of the Incident
The weather conditions were generally as expected with extreme temperatures in
the mid 40’s and gusty N-NW winds ahead of a strong S-SW wind change which
occurred shortly after the incident. (Refer to Schedule 6.3)
3.4 Fire Behaviour
Fire behaviour on the day was extreme with spotting activity many kilometres
ahead of the main fire. Rates of spread were up to 8 to 12 kilometres per hour
according to post incident analysis conducted by fire behaviour analysts. Despite
the large number of fire fighting resources deployed, control of fires under the
prevailing conditions was considered impossible. Crews resorted to the protection
of individual assets and people while undertaking procedures to ensure their own
safety and survival. At the time of the burn over crews described the fire
behaviour as “a fire storm” which hit with little warning and from at least two
directions with a very loud roaring noise. The “fire storm” consisted of a very loud
roaring noise, strong winds, dark smoke and severe ember attack.
4. ANALYSIS – OBSERVATIONS
Note: For further information on ST 1402 Deployment and Background this
Report should be read in conjunction with the Craigieburn Car Report.
4.1 Incident Sequence
4.1.1 Appointment of Crew for Bulla Tanker
The crew members for Bulla Tanker were selected at the time of deployment
from Brigade members who were at the station at the time (approx 1500 Hrs).
The selection was based on having a good mix of experienced members plus
providing an opportunity for a young member to gain experience. This
resulted in six members being selected as the crew. There was also
consideration that enough experience was left to provide protection to the
township of Bulla with members experienced and trained in the operation of
the Brigades Quick Attack appliance.
4.1.2 Briefing of the Tanker Crew
The Bulla Tanker Crew did not receive any briefing at any stage though it was
noticed the Strike Team Leader was having trouble getting any useful
information on the requirements of the Strike Team while they were stopped
at Wallan then Whittlesea. Any information received by the Crew Leader was
passed on to all members of his Crew as required.
4.1.3 Arrival at Whittlesea Fire Station and Briefing
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The Bulla Tanker arrived with ST1402 at the Whittlesea FS at approximately
1540 hours. After the STL received a short briefing at the Fire Station he
quickly briefed all the crew leaders and advised that they were to go up to a
location on the Whittlesea-Yea Road where the fire was burning on the side
of the road. The Strike Team task was to try and suppress the fire and
provide asset protection from spot fires from the south-east side of the road.
4.1.4 Arrival and Tasking
The Strike Team arrived at a turn around point on the Whittlesea-Yea Road
about 20 minutes later (approximately 1600 hours). While travelling up hill to
the turnaround point the crew noticed the fire down in the gully burning up to
the roadside on the south side with flame heights of 2 to 3 metres.
At the turnaround point the crew leaders were again briefed by the STL and
instructed to spread out about 30 metres apart along the side of the road and
try to stop the fire crossing the road form the southern side into the unburnt
area on the north side. Crews were to work from the vehicles and not run
hose lines. The aim was to keep the road open as there was a lot of traffic in
both directions.
At this point Bulla Tanker was second in the line of Tankers behind Sunbury
Tanker 2 heading down hill towards Whittlesea.
4.1.5 Fire conditions deteriorate
Before long (5-10 minutes) at approximately 1555 hours, the wind started to
strengthen and the fire had now jumped the road. All four tankers were
directed to move in behind one another on the right hand side of the road
away from the heat. Bulla tanker had used about 600 – 700 litres of water
during this time. There were still many cars moving in both directions along
Whittlesea-Yea Road.
4.1.6 Radio Message to make up and move out of the Fire Area.
The Crew Leader copied a radio message on radio CFA channel 64 from
STL that as the situation is deteriorating all ST1402 Tankers were to make up
and move out of the fire and smoke down the road to a safer location towards
Whittlesea. The ST Leaders vehicle then moved to the front of the strike team
and they all moved off down the hill within two minutes of the decision to
move out.
4.1.7 Entering the Property at 600 Whittlesea-Yea Road
The Bulla Crew Leader noticed that Greenvale and Epping Tankers had
stayed well back from the leading two tankers and the Strike Team Leaders
Vehicle. He then heard them advise the STL via radio that they were
assisting residents on a property on the left side of the road.
At 600 Whittlesea-Yea Road both Sunbury Tanker 2 and Bulla Tanker were
directed by the STL to enter the property.
Sunbury Tanker 2 entered first and pulled up near the front of the house.
Bulla Tanker followed and then passed Sunbury Tanker 2 who were
attempting to turn the vehicle around so as to point out towards the roadway.
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Bulla Tanker continued to the rear of the house where they found an open
area with low vegetation and only one large tree that could pose any problem
if the fire front passed. The tanker turned around this tree and, on hearing a
radio call from Sunbury Tanker 2 for assistance, made its way back towards
the front of the house, again pulling up behind Sunbury Tanker 2.
4.1.8 Assessment by the Crew Leader
At this stage the fire was burning up towards the house from a number of
directions because of spotting activity and wind gusts affected by the terrain.
The Crew Leader was very uncomfortable with where his Tanker was located
as he had noticed some large trees along the front of the property.
He also recalled an earlier event in his CFA experience where a Tanker he
was on was caught in a burn-over. At that time he and his crew were
convinced their situation was made worse by the fact that they were behind
another CFA Tanker which meant that their movements to any other area of
safety was quite restricted.
Now at this location he again found himself and his crew in a potential burnover
and again their movement restricted by a CFA Tanker in front.
Therefore the Crew Leader advised the Driver to reverse the Bulla Tanker to
the open area at the rear of the house which he felt offered a much better
level of safety plus a better opportunity to move if necessary for further
protection.
4.1.9 Burn Over incident
All members of the Bulla Tanker felt relatively comfortable throughout this
ordeal even though visibility was poor, embers were flying everywhere and
radiant heat levels were very high.
The crew were keen to point out that they at no time considered that they
were in ‘survival mode’ but were taking actions based more on precautionary
measures.
These actions included using two short 38mm hose lines in short bursts of
fog as required, the use of blankets which had been readied prior to entering
the property and having the monitor ready in case the large tree in the middle
of the open area caught fire.
The use of any water for protection was very minimal as the crew members
on the back of the Tanker were all relatively comfortable with the protection
offered by the heat shields and blankets; however some adjustment to the
positioning of the blankets was needed to keep out burning embers. This
could be attributed to having three blankets providing protection for four
members.
4.1.10 Moving From the Property
After most of the fire had passed the CL overheard a radio message that
Sunbury Tanker 2 were leaving and so directed the driver to move forward
towards where Sunbury had been parked. There they caught up with
Sunbury Tanker 2 and followed it off the property back on to Whittlesea-Yea
Road where they turned left.
On leaving the property the driver of the Bulla Tanker was quite startled to
see the Craigieburn Car well alight behind a shed.
Others on the passenger side of the rear of Bulla Tanker also noticed some
burning vehicles along Whittlesea-Yea Road.
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When the crew left the property they felt relieved and happy that they would
be able to regroup and restart their firefighting activities.
After a very short time the vehicles found themselves in an unburnt area with
clean air and bright conditions. Here they pulled over on the side of the road
with Sunbury Tanker 2 and were soon joined by Greenvale and Epping
Tankers.
4.1.11 Regrouping
The Bulla crew noted that the Craigieburn crew were all accounted for and
had travelled from the property on Sunbury Tanker 2. All crew members from
all Tankers were also accounted for and a quick check was carried out on the
condition of each Tanker.
Bulla noticed that there Tanker had escaped unharmed apart from a short
recirculation hose on the pump which had burst.
The Strike Team then headed back to Whittlesea where the Bulla crew felt
they would simply get refreshments, fill up the tanker and, after minor
maintenance to mend the recirculation hose, they would return to firefighting
duties.
4.1.12 Crew Replacement
The Bulla Crew were dismayed to learn when at Whittlesea that they were to
return home. They were advised that, as members of Strike Team 1402 who
had just experienced a traumatic event, they were all to return via
Craigieburn to their home locations.
The Bulla Crew felt that, due to the location they selected to wait out the fire
storm, they had not been impacted to the same degree as other crews and,
as they had not been at the fire ground for very long, there working day was
still just beginning.
Again at Craigieburn the Bulla Crew were advised that they were not to crew
their vehicle though another Bulla Crew was assembled to continue with the
Bulla Tanker which was still in good operational condition.
4.2 Individual Human Factors
4.2.1 Crew Experience and Training
The Crew Leader has 22 years experience and had, previous to this incident,
been away on many campaign fires as a crew leader and crew member. He
is a qualified and endorsed crew leader. He also has previous experience in
a burn-over situation at a fire at Cobaw in the Macedon Ranges.
This incident has had a long lasting effect on members involved from Bulla
with a long established Brigade member leaving the Brigade soon after the
Cobaw event. The Crew Leader recalled this event during this incident and
used this experience to identify a better, safer anchor point for his crew and
vehicle. The driver of the vehicle, who could not be available for the
interview, was also involved in the Cobaw incident.
All Brigade members regularly train in crew safety and practice survival
procedures. Brigade members participated in a Group Exercise about a
month before 7 th February.
4.3 Management Factors
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4.3.1 Overall Fire Management
There did not appear to be a management structure in place at Whittlesea
Fire Station to assist with the deployment of ST1402.
4.3.2 Supervision of ST 1402
The strike team was under the control of ST Leader Paul Elso who had
briefed and communicated regularly with all crew leaders. His task during the
burn over period was extremely difficult and stressful as he was also
monitoring a burn-over incident involving another two tankers from his Strike
Team at a location 400 metres away.
4.4 Equipment Factors
4.4.1 Bulla Tanker
• Bulla Tanker is a 3.4D
• The installed crew protection systems performed without fault.
• The intercom system between the ROPS and the cabin worked as
expected. Bulla members were surprised to hear of criticism of this
device on other tankers and so questioned the training and
understanding of its operation by other crews.
• The short recirculation hose on the pump failed at some stage during
the event but did not impact on the pumps operation or the availability
of water to the spray nozzles or monitor. However the nozzles and
monitor were used very lightly. If the need to use these was of a more
urgent nature it is not known if the hose failure would have had an
impact. The hose was quickly replaced when the vehicle returned to
Whittlesea on its way back home.
4.5 Personal Protective Equipment
4.5.1 Wild Fire Jackets
Members on the back of the tanker noticed that some burning embers were
able to get within the sleeves of their Wild Fire Jackets. However this could
be due to the velcro tabs not being adjusted correctly. Once readjusted the
problem seemed to be remedied.
4.5.2 Helmets
Some heat was detected by the crew on the rear of the vehicle on their
heads indicating it had entered the space between their skulls and the shells
of their helmets.
5. FINDINGS
5.1 Vehicle Crewing
The crew of Bulla Tanker was a good mix of experienced members and young
members keen to pick up from their more senior counterparts. This resulted in
six members making up the crew of this vehicle.
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The sixth member meant that, at the time the fire passed, four members were in
the ROPS area on the rear of the vehicle, under the protection of just three
blankets.
5.2 Brigade Strike Team History
Bulla Brigade are very proud of their Brigade history as a Brigade that has been
involved in Region 14 Strike Teams at any large fire over the past number of
years. Their pride extends to the understanding that every crew that has
represented the Brigade has done so in an exemplary manner showing a high
degree of skill, dedication and hard, honest work ethics.
5.3 Earlier Burn-over Experience
Some members of the Bulla Crew, including the Crew Leader and the Driver,
had previous experience involving a Bulla Tanker caught in a burnout situation.
At the Cobaw Fire Bulla Tanker was part of a Strike Team that were overrun by
fire in such a traumatic scenario that at least one long term, well respected and
experienced firefighter resigned from the Brigade almost immediately afterwards.
During this incident it was believed by the Bulla Crew that the vehicle was in this
predicament because it was trapped behind another CFA Tanker which made it
impossible to relocate to a more protected location.
5.4 Assessment of the fire situation at the property
The Crew Leader assessed that the location of the Bulla Tanker when fire was
approaching the property at 600 Whittlesea-Yea Road did not offer his crew the
best protection due to a number of factors such as:
• Trees lined the front of the property
• Fires approaching from a number of directions due to spotting and erratic
wind conditions
• The vehicle was behind another CFA Tanker allowing Bulla Tanker
nowhere to move forward if required to do so
• A more appropriate anchor point had already been identified by the crew
at the rear of the house
The Crew Leader directed the Driver to reverse the vehicle to this safer location
in an open area at the rear of the house.
5.5 Fire Storm Conditions
The conditions at the rear of the house provided better protection than those at
the front of the house where Sunbury Tanker 2 and Craigieburn Command
Vehicle were located.
With the exception of a large tree the area at the rear of the house was open
with light vegetation.
The crew are quite adamant that their location assisted them getting through this
ordeal as well as they did.
5.6 Actions by Crew and Vehicle Protection Systems.
When the burn-over occurred the crew took refuge in Bulla Tanker (3.4D) and
correctly deployed the crew protection systems which operated without fault. The
protection blankets used in the ROPS area provided a very effective barrier to the
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heat and ember attack with the four crew saying they felt quite comfortable and
safe. Two spray nozzles were also prepared for extra protection.
At no stage did the crew feel that their lives were in real danger nor did they
consider that their actions constituted being in survival mode.
Their actions were more to do with providing extra comfort and being prepared in
case the situation deteriorated further.
5.7 Welfare of Crew and Condition of the Tanker Post Burn-Over
• None of the crew sustained any injuries or burns except for some
minor ember burns which entered through the sleeves of their jackets.
Embers stopped entering once the velcro on the jacket sleeves were
readjusted.
• The tanker did not sustain any fire or heat damage however a
recirculation hose was found to have burst following the incident.
5.8 Effectiveness of the Intercom System
The Intercom system installed to provide communication between the cabin crew
and the crew in the ROPS on the rear of Bulla Tanker worked as expected.
5.9 Perception of Crew Needs Post Incident
The Bulla crew felt that one of their main obligations when responding to a fire
was to represent their Brigade, and CFA, in an appropriate manner and provide
the highest level of support to communities threatened by fire.
The Strike Team had only been deployed to actual firefighting duties for a short
time before they were directed to a safe point for regrouping but then diverted to
the property on Whittlesea-Yea Road for protection.
Following this incident their priority was to get back to firefighting as soon as
possible as there were many reports still being heard over the radio calling for
Tanker assistance.
Instead they were told that they had undergone an unusual experience and that
they were to return home, taking no further part in firefighting activities.
This caused all members of the Bulla Crew considerable grief as they believed
that they did not experience any stressful situation, did not suffer any injuries and
their vehicle was still fully operational as the burst recirculation hose had been
replaced at Whittlesea Fire Station.
5.10 Bulla Tanker Returned to Active Duties
On returning to station Bulla Tanker was re-crewed with different personnel from
Bulla and returned to the fire ground.
In one way this confirmed the feelings within the original crew members that they
had let the Brigade down however they did feel some comfort in knowing that
their Brigades representation on the fire ground was now continuing.
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6. SCHEDULES
6.1 Sources of Information
The following personnel were interviewed. The table details their roles and the
time and location of interview.
Name
Larry Pelly
Craig Ettwell
Chris Kieselbach
Geoff Schwarz
Emanuel Bonett
Role/Unit
Crew Leader
Crew Member
Crew Member
Crew Member
Crew Member
Location
Bulla FS
Bulla FS
Bulla FS
Bulla FS
Bulla FS
Time
1930
03/04/09
1930
03/04/09
1930
03/04/09
1930
03/04/09
1930
03/04/09
Martin Pelly was the driver of Bulla Tanker but was not available to take part in the
interview.
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6.2 Topographical Map of the Area
The arrow shows the approximate position of 600 Whittlesea - Yea Rd., Humevale.
6.3 Weather Conditions
Kilmore Gap AWS (Elevation 528 metres ASL)
Time Temp RH Wind FDI
1030
1100
1130
1200
1230
1300
1330
1400
1413
1430
1445
1500
1530
1600
1630
32.8
34.1
35.8
36.6
39.4
39.6
40.1
42.0
41.0
41.1
41.7
41.4
41.8
41.6
40.5
22.9
20.0
17.0
15.0
11.9
11.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
9.0
10.0
10.0
8.9
9.0
N 52 G 67
N 56 G 73
N 52 G 69
N 56 G 72
N 48 G 67
N 69 G 81
NNW 57 G 85
NNW 46 G 69
N 72 G 91
NNW 62 G 80
NNW 65 G 82
NNW 63 G 91
NNW 57 G 82
NW 54 G 80
NW 54 G 72
57
72
78
93
96
161
130
107
190
147
169
155
138
130
125
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1700
1730
1800
1810
1813
1819
1830
40.6
40.5
40.1
39.9
33.1
30.3
28.8
10.0
10.0
10.0
10.0
23.9
29.6
34.0
NW 44 G 69
NW 46 G 70
NW 37 G 61
W 17 G 54
SW 26 G 50
SSW 32 G 67
SSW 32 G 59
97
102
81
50
30
26
21
The above table of weather observations were recorded at the AWS at Kilmore
East. This is approximately 30 kilometres north west of the incident area at
Humevale. As indicated by the highlighted area the wind change did not pass
through this area until about 1800 Hrs
6.4 Area of Incident showing Terrain and Vegetation
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The area at front of house where
Sunbury Tanker 2 were
positioned when the fire
approached.
The area at rear of house where
Bulla Tanker were positioned
when the fire approached.
Bulla Tanker Burnover – 600 Whittlesea-Yea Road – 07/02/2009
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DRAFT – CFA internal working document

CFA.001.027.0029
6.5 Photographs
Fire conditions just prior to the incident. Photo taken by Bulla Tanker crew from the rear of their vehicle.
Bulla Tanker Burnover – 600 Whittlesea-Yea Road – 07/02/2009
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DRAFT – CFA internal working document