Chapter 5 - Information - 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

INFORMATION
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2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report
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The community seeks information about fire risk from a range of sources. Current means of communicating with
and informing the public do not always satisfy the community’s needs and do not always cope with the levels
of demand. This chapter is concerned with information: the content, sources and means of the dissemination
of bushfire information to the public. It deals with three discrete areas in which the provision of information to the
community might be improved: the fire danger index and fire danger ratings; websites; and the Victorian Bushfire
Information Line.
revisiting the fdi and the fire danger rating
5.1
5.2
5.3
5.4
The McArthur Forest Fire Danger Index (FFDI) and the Grassland Fire Danger Index (GFDI) are used by
fire services to assess ‘the difficulty of controlling or suppressing a wildfire’. 1 These indices are calculated
by reference to fuel characteristics and weather in order to generate a numerical index.
The FFDI and the GFDI indicate expected fire danger and are regularly calculated by the Bureau
of Meteorology (BoM) for the use of fire agencies. 2
The FFDI is calculated using the ‘inputs’ of drought, recent precipitation levels, temperature, relative humidity
and wind speed. The FFDI is calculated on the basis of a normative fuel load. 3
The GFDI is calculated using the ‘inputs’ of curing or fuel moisture, temperature, relative humidity and
wind speed. 4
Table 5.1: The FFDI and GFDI fire danger ratings
Ratings FFDI 5 GFDI 6
Low danger rating 0–4 0–2
Moderate danger rating 5–11 3–7
High danger rating 12–23 8–19
Very High danger rating 24–49 20–49
Extreme danger rating 50+ 50+
Source: Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [237.2], [237.5] 7
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5.5
The FFDI and the GFDI are together referred to as the fire danger index (FDI). The FDI was originally
calculated on a scale of 0 to 100. As can be seen from Table 5.1, the fire danger rating of ‘Extreme’
corresponds to an FDI of 50 and above. The scales are effectively ‘capped’ at 100, though higher values
are possible. 8 As Dr Mark Williams, Regional Director, Victorian Regional Office of the BoM explained, the
FDI was originally only designed to ‘go up to’ 100. Computing models now allow the FDI to exceed this. 9
10
5.6 The declaration of a Total Fire Ban (TFB) day is a separate, though related, process. The Country Fire
Authority (CFA) (following consultation with the BoM) generally declares a TFB for a day on which the
forecast FDI exceeds 50. 11 The declaration of a TFB is guided by, but not rigidly tied to, the FDI. 12
The declaration of a TFB triggers statutory controls on activities that use heat and fire. 13
5.7
Witnesses referred to the difficulty that arises because all days on which the FDI exceeds 50 are described
as ‘Extreme’ fire danger days, yet there is a significant difference between a day with an FDI of 50, and a day
on which the FDI is above 100 or even 200. 14 Fire danger ratings do not distinguish between FDI values of
50, 200 or 300. The original work underpinning the development of the FDI has not been validated beyond
the value of 100. 15
16
5.8 The FDI forecast for 7 February 2009 exceeded 100 for most locations in Victoria. Accordingly, the fire
danger rating for the day was ‘Extreme’, but in the view of many lay witnesses, this failed to convey the
especially extreme nature of the fire danger risk for that day. 17

Information
Table 5.2: Fire danger indices forecast for 7 February 2009
Location Forest Fire Danger Index Grass Fire Danger Index
Walpeup 148 190
Swan Hill Airport 159 210
Horsham Airport 137 178
Stawell 133 195
Ballarat Airport 185 330
Hamilton Airport 128 186
Mortlake 102 133
Bendigo Airport 142 186
Shepparton Airport 127 167
Mangalore Airport 131 171
Geelong Airport 129 167
Coldstream 142 186
Tullamarine 164 175
Dunns Hill 136 159
Wonthaggi 79 110
Albury-Wodonga 100 93
Wangaratta Airport 100 95
Hunters Hill 86 102
Latrobe Valley 133 175
East Sale Airport 112 129
Mount Moornapa 125 163
Orbost 84 29
Gelantipy 95 173
Falls Creek 56 126
FFDI/GFDI between 0–50 FFDI/GFDI between 101–150
FFDI/GFDI between 51–100 FFDI/GFDI above 151
Source: Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) at 0069 18
Note: The locations are listed generally from west to east of the state.
5.9
5.10
Expert witnesses expressed interest in reviewing the FDI, the language of the fire danger ratings or developing
some other index to predict the potential for a fire to cause damage. For example, Dr Williams accepted that
it was time to revise the FDI for indices greater than 100. He said that it was ‘clearly a research project that
would have to be done with all the parties involved’. He proposed that the Bushfire Cooperative Research
Centre (Bushfire CRC) might be involved in such work. 19
Professor John Handmer, Innovation Professor in Risk and Sustainability and Director of the Centre
for Risk and Community Safety at RMIT University, suggested that we need to find a way of reflecting a
gradation above 50 or even above 100: ‘Some extreme level. At the moment I think we don’t have a way
of institutionalising responses for a very extreme fire risk’. 20 He said that further research and work was
required by the fire behaviour specialists to devise a scale to deal with very extreme fires. 21
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5.11
5.12
5.13
5.14
5.15
Expert witnesses agreed that current FDI scales provide insufficient information on the severity of fires,
and they highlighted the importance of revisiting the FDI and the related fire danger ratings. 22 The indices
and ratings need to be enhanced to reflect a meaningful set of numbers and language to express fire
danger ratings above the present FDI 50+ (Extreme) category. This would assist in informing and educating
the community about the graduated degree of risk on days when the FDI exceeds 50.
A revised FDI that retains its purpose as an operational tool, indicating the level of fire risk and the difficulty
of suppression, could also provide the community with a more objective indicator of potential fire intensity.
The Commonwealth agreed that research should be undertaken to explore the option of including an
additional fire danger rating beyond ‘Extreme’. 23 The Commonwealth noted, however, that this would
require careful consideration because, presently, FDI values above 100 are not supported by fire
suppression research. This is accepted, and it is assumed that the validity of values over 100 would
be considered in the proposed research.
In its written submissions, the State also supported this proposal. It suggested it would, however, await
the outcomes of a reconsideration of the FFDI and GFDI being undertaken by the Australasian Fire and
Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC) before implementing any Commission recommendations
on this issue. 24 The work of AFAC, to which reference was made by Ms Jillian Edwards, pertains to a
new approach to bushfire warnings, dealt with in Chapter 4 of this report. 25
In supporting the proposed recommendation AFAC suggested that it, the Bushfire CRC and the BoM be
included in the parties that could explore the options for revisiting the fire danger ratings. 26 Given that the
Bushfire CRC, the CSIRO and a number of universities are potential recipients of research funds for this work,
the Commission makes no recommendation on which body should be invited to undertake this research.
RECOMMENDATION 5.1
The Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council and the Bureau of Meteorology
collaborate with researchers to explore options for the fire danger indices and fire danger ratings
including:
■■
■■
■■
an additional fire danger rating beyond ‘Extreme’;
adjusting the existing fire danger ratings to correspond to higher Fire Danger Index values; and
developing a revised fire severity scale for use in bushfire warnings based on new fire danger ratings.
Making the FDI Available to the Public
5.16 The BoM issues the FDI every afternoon for a selection of locations in each forecast district. When a rating
of 50 or more is forecast at two or more locations, the BoM issues a Fire Weather Warning for that district
after consulting with the CFA and the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE). 27
5.17
5.18
The BoM makes the FDI available to the public, but only in the fire weather forecasts posted to the BoM
website on the afternoon before the day in question. 28 The FDI is not included in the general weather
forecasts posted on the BoM website or in material distributed to the media. Dr Williams accepted that if
people knew where to look they could have accessed information about the FDI late on Friday, 6 February
2009 on the BoM website, but there was no general broadcast by the BoM of the FDI for 7 February. 29
Dr Williams was asked whether there was any reason why the FFDI and GFDI could not be provided with
future general forecasts issued by the BoM.
158
Well, that’s an interesting question. It could be. I guess my concern is that I don’t know how well they
would be understood. People like numbers and obviously the higher the number, the more extreme the
fire danger index is. It is there for the 24 hour forecast so I suppose they could be made available for
longer periods. We calculate them routinely, we do them every day. 30

Information
5.19
5.20
It does appear to be the case, as Dr Williams puts it, that ‘people like numbers’. The BoM is an extraordinarily
popular site — one of the most popular in Australia. 31 The site received 75 million hits on 7 February, which
compares with a daily average number of approximately 44 million hits. 32 This provides some indication of
the level of public interest in the weather forecasts and fire information the BoM is able to provide.
A number of lay witnesses expressed a desire to have the FDI published more widely and for it to be more
readily available. Typical of these views was Ms Jesse Odgers of Kinglake, who said:
I feel the information is absolutely essential and I would like to educate myself more as to better understand
what those indexes mean because they are going to assist me in making a more informed choice about
when to leave. It assists me in that somebody external to me who is educated and experienced in fire is
going to be able to give me an external assessment as to the danger other than a broad message such
as that it is a total fire ban day or it is a day of extreme fire danger. So the more information that we can
receive the more informed we will be and the more informed choices we can make. 33
5.21
Mr Ken Rogers of St Andrews noted that he was surprised after the fires to learn that a fire severity index
exists and felt that information about such an index would have helped him to decide whether to stay or
go. 34 Mr David Brown of Strathewen also expressed a desire to have had access to the information that
the FDI was forecast to be in excess of 100 in his area. 35 He said that it would be a very graphic way of
demonstrating the level of potential risk:
When you have an index that normally runs from nought to 100 as its top end and it was registering 328,
that is a very graphic illustration of the seriousness of the potential event and I think that would have
been quite easy for people to understand … 36
5.22
5.23
5.24
5.25
Dr Chris Harvey of Kinglake expressed a similar view that the FDI should be more readily available to
the public, and accompanied by education about its meaning. 37
Ms Karen Ward of Mudgegonga also said that had she ‘known how high the fire danger index was for
that day,’ she would have left as soon as she knew of a fire in the area, because she would have known
‘how bad the fire was going to be’. 38
It therefore appears that in times of fire threat, the public has a strong desire for fire knowledge and
information. It appears likely that there are as many in the community who prefer to have access to
FDI figures, as there are those who find language such as high or extreme helpful and it would, therefore,
assist the public to have ready access to the FDI.
When asked whether there was any reason why the FDI is not provided to the community by the CFA
with the other information provided about bushfires, Mr Russell Rees, Chief Officer, CFA, responded:
Only in the sense that to understand those figures ... you need to understand what they mean so there
needs to be an educative process and the language of low, moderate to extreme, high extreme is the
language that is considered best to explain that scenario. If we move to explain those numbers it is
a bit like using the UV index. If I say, ‘the UV index today is 35’ what does that mean to you and I?
But if I said, ‘it is extreme today’, the chances are we would take action and put sunscreen on. 39
40
5.26 But Mr Rees accepted that if one provided the FDI in conjunction with ‘the words as well’ this ‘would be fine’.
5.27
5.28
In relation to Mr Rees’ concerns that some may not understand the index figures, it is expected that the FDI
would be provided in combination with the fire danger rating descriptors. In short, the numbers and words
would be provided together. Of course, it is also desirable that information be available to the public about
the meaning of both these resources.
The FDI should be placed in easily accessible publicly available material, along with the fire danger rating,
to increase the prospect that the message is understood by the widest possible sector of the community,
including those who ‘like numbers’ and those who find language more comprehensible.
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5.29
5.30
5.31
In their submissions, Counsel Assisting proposed that the FDI ought to be published and more readily
available to the community to assist individuals to assess the level of bushfire risk on particular days. 41
The State agreed in principle with this recommendation, but said it did not intend to implement it until it had
had the opportunity to examine the outcome of AFAC’s consideration of this issue. 42 The Commonwealth
supported the proposed recommendation, but indicated it wanted to consult with the fire agencies before
deciding on the best way of providing the FDI to the public. 43 AFAC endorsed the proposed recommendation,
but called for an accompanying national public education campaign. 44
This is a simple matter, but one worthy of immediate action, to ensure that the FDI is readily available to
the public. Drawing on the comments of Mr Rees, it would be desirable for the FDI and the revised fire
danger rating to be as well publicised and as well known as the UV rating. To that end, the FDI should
be included in fire weather warnings and general weather forecasts to promote the visibility of this tool
in predicting fire danger.
RECOMMENDATION 5.2
The Bureau of Meteorology include the Forest Fire Danger Index and the Grass Fire Danger Index in its fire
weather warnings and general weather forecasts on its website and in material distributed to the media.
Building A Single, multi-agency bushfire information website
for Victoria
160
5.32
5.33
5.34
5.35
5.36
5.37
The CFA and DSE maintain separate websites. Mr Rees explained that the State Information Desk at
the Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre (iECC) currently publishes information on the CFA website,
based on information received from Incident Control Centres (ICCs) in the field. 45 Mr Ewan Waller, Chief Fire
Officer, DSE, described the DSE website as providing ‘rapid access to critical incident updates, map based
information, warnings and other related information’. He said the DSE website had evolved to meet ‘rapidly
increasing public demand’. 46
Members of the public rely on fire agency websites for accurate and up-to-date information about fires in
their area. A number of lay witnesses attested to seeking information from websites. 47 On 7 February, ABC
staff also monitored the CFA and DSE websites as one of the sources of information available to them. 48
The Victorian Bushfire Information Line (VBIL) staff also relied on the websites. 49
The public reliance on websites was reflected in the interviews analysed for the purposes of the Bushfire CRC
Victorian 2009 Bushfire Research Response Interim Report (June 2009). The preliminary analysis in that interim
report noted that, ‘many interviewees sought information from the CFA and DSE websites ... There were no
positive references to the websites. There were several negative evaluations of both websites’. Information on
the sites lagged behind fire events. 50
Professor Handmer provided expert opinion on the use of websites to gain information about fire risk and
location. He expressed the view that ‘web based material has become the primary source of information in
our society, both official and unofficial’. 51 He noted, however, that websites are often unreliable under heavy
demand. 52 Professor Handmer stated that the public should have access to one website with the relevant
information but, to reduce overload, there may be more than one site with identical content. 53
Several witnesses agreed with the need for a single website. For example, Mr Alexander Caughey,
Community Education Coordinator for the CFA, agreed there should be one site. 54
Ms Kathryn Venters, Manager of Customer Service at DSE (based at the VBIL Customer Service Centre),
also expressed the view that VBIL staff find it confusing to have to consult two agency websites, and said it
would be a great advantage to have a single website. 55

Information
5.38
Counsel Assisting has proposed the development of a single, multi-agency website to publish bushfire
information in Victoria. This need was identified some time ago in the July 2006 report, Joint CFA/DSE Review
of Effectiveness of Information Flow to Communities and Media During Fire Incidents — Preliminary Findings
(the Joint CFA/DSE Information Review) where the following findings and recommendations were made:
Along with the VBIL, the websites are a powerful tool for the dissemination of accurate and timely
information directly to the community. The growing importance of the website can be measured by
the fact that CFA’s website was recording in excess of 100 new users per minute during peak times in
January 2006. The CFA’s website eventually encountered serious overloading to the point where it could
not be accessed at some times. This created credibility problems; having created an expectation that
information will be available it is imperative that this can be met …
It would appear that there is a degree of duplication in the website presentations of both agencies.
These sites have evolved over time to serve different purposes. They continue to serve a multitude
of purposes and are aimed at multiple audiences.
It also seems clear that there will be increasing demand for web-based information. Given the efficiency
of such distribution and its capacity to deal with routine as well as urgent messages and information,
the further development of web-based information should be treated as a priority … the prospect of
permitting for web updates from IMT [Incident Management Team] or RECC [Regional Emergency
Coordination Centre] level is worthy of consideration.
Recommendation: Ensure websites have sufficient technical capacity to deal with public demand
during peak periods.
Recommendation: That the possibility of web messages being authorised or uploaded from IMT
or RECC level be examined.
Recommendation: That the creation of a single, multi-agency bushfire information website for
Victoria be considered. 56
5.39
The findings and recommendations made above are strikingly similar to those now recommended. In particular,
concerns about website capacity, the speed with which material is posted to the site and the desirability of a
single website all received detailed and careful attention in the Joint CFA/DSE Information Review. When asked
why the recommendation on a single website had not been implemented since July 2006, Mr Rees said:
… I can’t answer you why not except to say that it was a project that was started following a review in
06–07 to create one website. Whether it failed due to a lack of funding, the clear objective we had was
that we in CFA reached a view that ... two changes needed to happen as we moved forward towards
this one website. The first was that the CFA adopted the CAP [Common Alerting Protocol] as part of the
AFAC recommendation ... the other thing we were looking forward to was the standardisation of message
through the electronic telephone type message system. So we were looking to make the change all at
once. I think the one website is a weakness. It is simply a case that we haven’t got there yet. 57
5.40
5.41
5.42
These comments do not fully explain the failure to implement the single website by February 2009.
Mr Rees said in his statement that the CFA and DSE were presently engaged in a project designed to
develop ‘one website for the display of fire emergency information. It is envisaged the website will provide
a simple summary of the information from the CFA and DSE websites on a single map of Victoria using
common terminology to describe the fires’. 58 Mr Waller also referred to a current project to have ‘one
website and I would very much welcome that, and a very quick website’. 59
The State accepted the proposed recommendation for a single website, but in its written submissions
proposed that the CFA would be promoted as the official bushfire website, with the DSE site remaining
available to ‘ease capacity constraints’ and for individuals who wish to continue using that site. To ensure
consistency, the State proposed that behind the scenes there would be a single website with single data
entry and ‘same time’ uploads to both the CFA and DSE websites. 60 This suggestion of a principal and
subsidiary website is arguably a little different from the evidence already given by Mr Rees concerning
the project he attested was underway.
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5.43
5.44
5.45
In any event, the development and promotion of a single multi-agency website is essential. If the DSE
site simply mirrors the CFA site and is provided to ease demand, this appears sensible, assuming identical
information is posted and updated to both sites simultaneously. But the continued maintenance of separate
sites, with the potential for separate information, is unlikely to be as useful.
The creation of a single website would enable information dissemination and receipt to be streamlined,
would eliminate confusion, and would prevent possibly contradictory information being placed on more
than one site. Further, the promotion of a ‘one stop shop’ website is likely to relieve demand on other
services, including the VBIL and even Triple Zero.
Ultimately, consideration should also be given to the creation of one ‘brand’ for bushfire information and
warnings. There is potential confusion in the use of both the CFA and the VBIL as sources of bushfire
warnings and information. But for the purposes of the interim report, the recommendation concerns only the
creation of a single multi-agency portal which would permit a single data entry point to be used to upload
the same bushfire information to multiple websites at once, in time for the next bushfire season.
RECOMMENDATION 5.3
The State ensure that a single, multi-agency portal for bushfire information be established that uploads
information simultaneously to both CFA and DSE websites.
EXTREME DEMAND and delays in posting information on Agency WEbsites
5.46 The agencies’ websites experienced difficulties on 7 February. There is evidence of delays in information
being posted to the CFA and DSE websites, particularly for the Kilmore East fire, and of information being
double-handled. The delays associated with the Kilmore East fire are addressed in more detail in Chapter 9.
5.47
5.48
5.49
Ms Samantha Stayner, Acting Program Director, 774 ABC Radio, noted that on 7 February the CFA and
DSE websites often lagged behind information the ABC was receiving from the emergency services. 61
To reduce delays in the posting of information onto websites, there should be capacity for ICCs to upload
bushfire information and bushfire warnings directly to the new single multi-agency website. This would reduce
the need to disseminate material. If this approach is adopted, in combination with sensible protocols, it is likely
to increase the speed with which such material can be publicly displayed. The Joint CFA/DSE Information
Review also suggested this.
In its written submissions, the State indicated that it is exploring the technical capacity required for ICCs
to upload data to the website. 62 This is a very positive development.
It appears that the agencies’ websites also slowed down due to the extreme levels of demand.
5.50
63
Professor
Handmer referred to ways of reducing the risk of the website malfunctioning or ceasing to function on days
of extreme demand. These included using different display modes so more users can access the site quickly
— for example, placing some of the key information on fixed rather than interactive pages, which reduces the
time taken to deal with particular queries. 64 Graphics and logos can also ‘slow down’ web pages, so there is
the option of going to ‘text only’ during periods of high demand. 65 Professor Handmer gave the example of
the British Commonwealth and Home Office websites, which, during extremely high demand following the
tsunami, switched to a ‘text only’ service to reduce the memory being used on the site, enabling the site to
handle more inquiries or ‘hits’. 66 In addition, page design could be altered to speed up access, or information
could be fed to other sites like Twitter to relieve demand. 67 This happened to an extent on 7 February with the
ABC’s use of a Twitter site. 68
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Information
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5.51 The BoM website has been designed to carry extremely high levels of traffic. Though the information
maintained on the BoM website is different from that regularly accessed on the fire agencies’ websites,
it provides a useful model for the way in which a site can be designed to increase its functionality and
accessibility during periods of peak demand. Steps, such as those referred to above, should be taken
to preserve the functionality of a single website during periods of extreme demand.
5.52
The Commission is of the view that the bushfire information website should provide timely, accurate and
up-to-date warnings and information that is posted by the fire agencies. This needs to be consistent with
information being delivered through other means including the VBIL and ABC Radio. The website needs
to be functional during periods of high demand and communicate simply text and visual information.
RECOMMENDATION 5.4
The State ensure that the single multi-agency portal for bushfire information be designed to allow Incident
Control Centres to directly post information and warnings.
The Victorian Bushfire Information Line
Operations and funding of the vbil
70
5.53 The VBIL was established in 2003 by the CFA. It first operated during bushfire season 2003–04. From 2004,
the VBIL operated with the CFA and DSE as joint stakeholders. The Department of Human Services and
the Department of Primary Industries (DPI) are now also stakeholders, predominantly in the areas of health
and recovery following bushfires. 71 The VBIL operates out of a Customer Service Centre (CSC) in Wendouree,
Ballarat. 72 The VBIL service provided by the CSC gives information to the public via telephone, email,
fax and TTY (textphone/telewriter for the speech and hearing impaired). 73
5.54
5.55
5.56
5.57
5.58
The CSC is funded from a contribution from DSE and DPI for core business and a fee per customer contact
during campaigns, funded by the relevant stakeholder. The VBIL service is funded equally by the CFA and
DSE. When one agency generates a particular campaign, that agency pays for the VBIL service. 74
The CSC’s base funding for 2008–09 was approximately $1 million from DSE and $550,000 from DPI.
VBIL stakeholders were charged campaign fees of approximately $1.3 million from 1 November 2008
to 30 March 2009. 75 Campaign fees for 7 February 2009 were $36,350. 76
The VBIL provides information to the public on major bushfires; bushfire safety messages; community
meetings; Emergency Relief Centre locations; bushfire recovery; TFB days and fire restrictions; DSE fuel
reduction burns and other planned burns; annual DSE fire planning; and community consultations. 77
The VBIL is promoted on the CFA and DSE websites and in promotional material distributed by both
fire agencies. 78 The average call handling time for a VBIL call is six to seven minutes. 79
The VBIL does not report fires, liaise with the Emergency Services Telecommunications Authority or Telstra
Triple Zero, or play a role in dispatching emergency services to fires. 80
VBIL staff are recruited by the CSC, with an emphasis on staff with ‘good active listening and question-framing
skills’. 81 Training is delivered onsite by DSE staff. 82 Staff have access to Google maps and VicRoads materials
to locate towns and suburbs. 83
There is a Service Level Agreement between the CSC, DSE and the CFA:
5.59 Victorian Bushfire Information
Line Service Level Agreement 2008/2009. 84 The Service Level Agreement contains requirements on staffing
and reporting. The staffing levels are set in the Agreement by reference to ‘Readiness Levels’. For example,
‘Readiness Level Red’ (referred to as code red) corresponds to FDI forecasts in excess of 50, or when a
major fire (or a number of smaller fires) is burning. On these days, the Agreement requires that the VBIL
operate extended hours, with the potential for 24/7 hours of operation. It also requires that between 11 and
20 call takers be working on shift. 85
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5.60
The VBIL is available all year round, operating during the core hours between 8:00am and 8:00pm
on business days. The CSC is able to activate surge capacity within two hours of notification by a
State Duty Officer or the iECC Information Unit. 86
VBIL ARRANGEMENTS WITH CENTRELINK
5.61 Centrelink has 25 networked call centres around Australia, which deliver information and assistance
about government services and payments. Centrelink call centres answer approximately 100,000 calls
a day. Centrelink maintains a 24 hour a day, seven day a week standby capacity at its Geelong call centre.
It is also able to call on other centres to provide emergency call centre services, subject to limits on access
to relevant information about the emergency. 87
5.62 Centrelink operates an overflow service to the VBIL whereby specially-trained Centrelink operators can
answer VBIL calls at times of peak demand. 88
89
5.63 DSE and Centrelink are parties to a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The MOU includes the
following:
■■ Parties will use best endeavours to provide each other with information (Clause 7.1.3).
■■ Centrelink staff will record information on the calls received (Services Schedule – Clause 3.1.1(g)).
■■ Centrelink is required to provide daily reporting on the numbers of calls received, numbers of calls
abandoned, average speed of answer and average handling time (Services Schedule – Clause 3.2.1(d)).
■■ DSE is required to provide Centrelink with the necessary scripts and information to allow its staff to
properly answer calls (Services Schedule – Clause 3.3.1(d)).
■■ Centrelink is required to ensure its staff provide callers with information in accordance with the scripts
and information supplied by DSE (Services Schedule – Clause 3.3.1(d)).
5.64 Under the MOU, the VBIL provides Centrelink with all necessary scripts and other information required to
answer callers’ questions, including secure remote access tokens that enable Centrelink operators to log
in directly to the VBIL database. 90
91
5.65 The overflow arrangement is activated by a specific request from the VBIL to Centrelink. The MOU’s
timeframes for activating ‘overflow’ are conservative. The MOU’s terms allow six or seven hours between
a request to activate the overflow and the service commencing. 92 But the evidence was that, in reality,
there is usually a reasonably rapid activation of the arrangement. 93
5.66 Centrelink’s capacity to assist by activating the VBIL overflow is clear. However, there were problems
with the outcomes on 7 February. The reasons for these problems are discussed below.
164
VBIL Call taking parameters and resouRces
94
5.67 As at 7 February, there were 90 telephone lines into the VBIL call centre. There was one queue for calls
into the VBIL and no priority was given to different calls — although a VBIL call was answered before general
enquiry line calls for DSE and DPI. The general enquiry line was not open on Saturday 7 February. 95
5.68 The VBIL call-taking system, as it operated on 7 February, had the following characteristics:
■■ When there was no available line (that is when more than 90 callers rang in at the same time), the caller
heard a recorded message informing them that the VBIL was not able to take the call due to high demand,
and referred them to Triple Zero or the CFA and DSE websites. 96
■■ When there were, at any one time, more than 90 callers attempting to get through to the VBIL, there was
no capacity for those callers to be placed ‘on hold’ — as a result, callers who did not ‘get a line’ were not
counted in the VBIL’s count of calls abandoned on 7 February. 97
■■ When the number of callers to the VBIL exceeded 90 at any one time, the system of overflow calls
to Centrelink (see below) could not operate. As a result, those callers could not wait either for a VBIL
or Centrelink operator to take their call and, again, the call was not counted in the statistics on
abandoned calls. 98
■■ When a call overflowed to Centrelink, two of the VBIL’s lines were occupied for the duration of the call —
as one line into the VBIL and one line out to Centrelink. 99

Information
5.69
The technical and physical limitations of the VBIL system on 7 February contributed to the difficulties callers
had getting through to the service. Since the fires, the VBIL has increased the total number of available phone
lines to the centre to 210. Sixty of these lines are outgoing lines only, to enable calls to be transferred to
Centrelink during overflow periods. 100
VBIL WORKSTATIONS AND STAFFING
5.70 On 7 February, there were 20 work stations available at the VBIL for use by call takers. At no stage on the
day were all those work stations in use. 101
5.71
5.72
5.73
These work stations apparently comprise simple desks, with phones, headsets and computers. At present,
there is no funding for additional work stations, although Ms Venters indicated that consideration was being
given to refitting the centre and to new funding arrangements in the next Service Level Agreement. 102
As at 7 February, the VBIL staffing was as follows:
■■
■■
■■
15 ongoing or fixed-term staff employed by DSE — 13 full-time and two part-time
35 DSE casuals, able to take all types of calls received at the CSC
17 DSE casuals trained only to take the VBIL calls received at the CSC.
Ms Venters explained that on a typical weekday at the VBIL, operating normal hours, 70 call taker hours
would be rostered. On a typical Saturday, operating normal hours, between 32 and 40 call taker hours
would be rostered. On a typical summer day, on which high temperatures are forecast, closer to 140 call
taker hours would be rostered. On a code red day, Ms Venters said that the number of staff to be rostered
is determined by the Service Level Agreement. As is noted above, this requires that between 11 and 20
call takers be rostered. 104
PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE VBIL AND CREATION OF FAQS
5.74 The VBIL Call Centre staff are supplied with Frequently Asked Questions (FAQs), which they are required
to use when answering particular categories of questions from callers. 105
5.75
5.76
5.77
The process intended to operate at the VBIL during fires is that awareness, alert and urgent threat
messages are supplied by the CFA and DSE to the VBIL call centre. The Information Officer at the VBIL
monitors email, checking for information received from the fire agencies. The Information Officer processes
authorised information from the fire agencies and turns it into FAQs used by call takers to answer queries. 106
All VBIL calls are answered using the FAQ database. Two main responses are used when callers have
queries relating to fires:
■■
■■
The general FAQs are used when a fire is not known or there is no specific current fire FAQ for a particular
fire — in that instance, for example, if a caller says they can see smoke or flames in their area, the call is
dealt with by the call taker reading out the information in the Smoke and Fire FAQ. 107
Where a fire is already ‘known’ to the VBIL and a specific FAQ has been prepared for that fire, based on
information provided by an ICC or the iECC, the call taker provides the caller with information drawn from
the specific FAQ. 108
If the fire reported by a caller is not known, the VBIL call takers are trained to search the external CFA and
DSE websites for information on the fire. If such information appears on the fire agencies’ websites, this
is read to the caller. Standard safety messages (from the general FAQs) are also conveyed to the caller,
if appropriate. If there is no information about the fire in a FAQ or on the CFA or DSE websites or a caller
is reporting seeing flames, or is concerned about the amount of smoke, they are advised to hang up and
ring Triple Zero. 109 The protocol requires that once the call taker has concluded a call with a caller who has
reported flames or smoke in relation to an unknown fire, the call is escalated via the Duty Officer to the iECC
within 15 minutes.
103
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2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report
5 INFORMATION
5.78
5.79
If, after information from the FAQ on a known fire has been provided to the caller, the caller reports that the
information does not correspond with their experience, or the situation in their area has escalated and they
feel immediately threatened, they are advised to ring Triple Zero. Again, once such a caller has terminated
the call, the call taker escalates the call to the iECC. 110 Alternatively, if the caller does not feel immediately
threatened, but does require more information urgently, their details are taken and their query is escalated
to the iECC within 15 minutes by phone, and a copy of their request is sent by email. When further
information is received from the iECC, it is relayed in a return phone call to the caller, if time permits. 111
The process of escalation was undertaken on a number of occasions on 7 February, but was not always
able to be completed in a timely fashion, or at all, given the extreme demands on call takers and all staff
on the day. 112
VBIL PLANS FOR 7 FEBRUARY 2009
5.80 In preparation for 7 February, the VBIL Duty Officers monitored the information on Fire Web for updates on
weather conditions. Daily iECC briefings were also reviewed to keep up to date on forecast conditions that
might trigger increased calls to the VBIL. Over the course of the week prior to 7 February, it became clear
that the weekend would be one of extremely high fire danger. 113
114
5.81 Plans were put in place to have the VBIL resourced to its highest levels ever for a TFB day. Ms Venters
met with the VBIL Duty Officers on 5 or 6 February to discuss strategies for the weekend, including
contingency plans for resourcing, logistics and IT support, and related issues. 115
5.82
5.83
There is no specific requirement that the VBIL provide Centrelink with advance notice when it is expecting
days of peak demand. 116 Prior to 7 February, Centrelink received a situation report from DHS regarding
the heatwave and an informal email that indicated that Victoria was expecting a high fire danger day
on 7 February. 117 The VBIL did not formally notify Centrelink that its overflow services were likely to be
required. 118
On the morning of 7 February, Ms Christine Millington, Manager Customer Liaison and Education DSE
and Duty Officer at the CSC on 7 February, reviewed and updated the process for activation of overflow
arrangements with Centrelink. 119
VBIL Staffing on 7 February 2009
5.84 During the course of 7 February 45 staff worked at the VBIL call centre in Ballarat, comprising 33 operators
and 12 administrative staff and team leaders. 120
5.85
5.86
5.87
However, perusal of the roster for 7 February demonstrates that at times, including during peak periods
in the afternoon and early evening, the number of call takers who were working dropped below 11.
Between 2:45pm and 3:15pm, for example, the number of staff taking calls dropped to as low as nine.
This is less than the minimum level of 11 call takers required on a code red day under the VBIL’s Service
Level Agreement with DSE. 121
It is difficult to understand why that on a code red day, in light of the information available in the preceding
week about the extreme weather forecast, the VBIL did not roster closer to the top of the 11 to 20 range
for call takers.
Centrelink had shifts in place with up to 26 staff at various times of the day available to take calls from
the VBIL. 122
The events of 7 February 2009 at the VBIL and Centrelink
5.88 Unfortunately, the events of 7 February, despite the best efforts and goodwill of those involved at the VBIL
and Centrelink, unfolded as a sequence of errors.
5.89
The CSC opened at 6:00am. Ms Millington, Duty Officer for the VBIL, recorded a ‘call spike’ in her log book
at 9:00am and increasing activity, including further call spikes, from that time. 123
166

Information
5.90
5.91
5.92
5.93
5.94
5.95
5.96
At approximately 12:47pm, Ms Millington contacted Centrelink Telephony Network Support requesting that
they commence taking the VBIL overflow calls. Initially, Centrelink expressed hesitation about its capacity
to assist, as its staff were already taking increased volumes of calls due to the flooding in Queensland. 124
At approximately 1:05pm, Centrelink advised that it would activate the overflow arrangements, and
contacted its Geelong call centre and directed it to prepare for activation. 125
At 2:10pm, DSE informed Centrelink it needed to activate overflow arrangements immediately, rather than
within the timeframes provided for in the MOU. Ms Tracey Tozer, Business Manager Telephony Network
Support, Centrelink, informed the Team Leader at the Geelong call centre to activate three experienced staff
immediately. 126 Ms Millington manually directed the VBIL overflow to Centrelink at 2:16pm. At 2:18pm the
overflow was halted. Ms Millington said this was done because it was discovered Centrelink was not able
to access the VBIL database and a request came from Centrelink to halt the activation. 127 The evidence from
Centrelink suggested that the request may only have been to alter the parameters for the overflow. In any
event, the function was turned off. 128
It transpired that, as a result of Centrelink conducting a technology systems upgrade a few days prior to
7 February, Centrelink operators were ‘locked out’ of the DSE database. 129 Centrelink’s practice was to
test its remote access capabilities once a week and the access problem caused by the system upgrade
was not detected until the VBIL requested that Centrelink activate its overflow capacity. 130
With the exception of a few calls received between 2:16pm and 2:18pm, Centrelink operators did not begin
answering the VBIL calls until approximately 5:25pm. To overcome the difficulty caused by Centrelink staff
being unable to access the VBIL database, information was provided to Centrelink by fax but not before
5:25pm, at which time the overflow to Centrelink recommenced. 131 Ms Venters did not know why it took
two hours to commence sending information by fax. 132
Shortly thereafter, the fax machine at the Ballarat Centrelink Centre broke down. This necessitated a
manager from the Ballarat Centrelink office visiting the VBIL CSC to physically convey the documents
back to Centrelink. 133
Ms Carolyn Hogg, Deputy Chief Executive Officer, Centrelink, explained that Centrelink now tests its
systems more regularly and accepted that it should have tested its systems after the upgrade. 134
TIMELY PROVISION OF INFORMATION TO THE CALL CENTRE AND TO VBIL STAFF
5.97 Information on current fires is provided to the VBIL by ICCs. The material usually comes directly from ICCs
or the iECC, by email or, less often, by fax or telephone. When received, the information is used to create
a new FAQ, using a template (paragraph 5.74).
5.98
5.99
Once an FAQ is complete, it is published on the FAQ database. Call takers are informed by email or
verbally that a new FAQ is available. FAQs are intended to be created by the CSC Information Unit as soon
as practicable after their receipt. The process usually involves copying the information over without retyping.
It is difficult therefore to understand why there were, on occasions, lengthy delays between the provision
of information to the VBIL and the creation of FAQs. 135
Generally, the time required to circulate new and updated FAQs is between 30 minutes and an hour,
depending on the complexity of the information and the number of other incidents being reported.
There may also be a need to clarify or verify information. 136
5.100 The system did not work perfectly on 7 February. On a number of occasions information was slow to reach
the VBIL or slow to be disseminated within the VBIL, or both. Table 5.3 summarises the evidence on the
timeframes during which information was made available on 7 February.
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2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report
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Table 5.3: Timeframes for making information available through the VBIL
Fire
Ignition time
First warning provided to
the VBIL
FAQ created
for new fire
campaign
distributed
to VBIL staff Findings 137
4:19pm 140 Messages not supplied to the VBIL
Kilmore East 11:49am 138 3:25pm [four messages, one
alert and three urgent threat
attached to one email] 139 until 3.25pm under the title ‘Catch‐up
messages, Kilmore … fire’. This
lagged over three and half hours
behind the time of ignition of this fire.
The FAQ was created nearly one hour
after its receipt at the VBIL, adding to
the delay.
Horsham 12:26pm 141 12:46pm [urgent threat] 142 1:25pm 143 The FAQ was created within
approximately 30 minutes of receipt
of the message.
Coleraine 12:36pm 144 1:15pm [urgent threat] 145 1:46pm 146 The FAQ was created within
approximately 30 minutes of receipt
of the message.
Pomborneit–
Weerite
(known earlier
in day as
Camperdown–
Danedite Rd
fire)
Churchill–
Glendonald
Rd Fire
1:17pm 147 2:03pm [urgent threat] 148 2:47pm 149 The FAQ was created within
approximately 45 minutes of receipt
of the message.
1:33pm 150 2:07pm [urgent threat] 151 3:01pm 152 The FAQ was not prepared for
approximately one hour after receipt
of the message.
4:58pm 156 The FAQ was not prepared for
Murrindindi 3:00pm 153 3:49pm [awareness] 154
4:46pm [urgent threat] 155 approximately one hour after receipt
of the message.
4:45pm 160 The FAQ was not prepared for
Redesdale 3:11pm 157 3:40pm [awareness message] 158
3:57pm [urgent threat] 159 approximately one hour after receipt
of the message.
Narre Warren–
Crawley Rd
8:47pm 164 The FAQ was not prepared for
3:32pm 161 6:44pm [alert] 162
8.28pm [urgent threat] 163 approximately two hours after receipt
of the message.
Bendigo 4:34pm 165 5:02pm [awareness] 166
9:15pm [urgent threat] 167 5:35pm 168 The FAQ was created within
approximately 30 minutes.
Beechworth 6:09pm 169 7:05pm [urgent threat] 170 7:44pm 171 The message was not supplied until
approximately one hour after ignition.
The FAQ was not prepared for
approximately 45 minutes.
Source: Statements of Ms Venters, Mr Rees, Mr Caughey and Mr Waller and tenders and oral evidence of Ms Venters 172
168

Information
5.101 Table 5.3 indicates that on some occasions on 7 February, short periods elapsed between the ignition
of fires, provision of warning messages by the CFA or DSE to the VBIL, and creation of relevant FAQs.
However, on other occasions, there were significant delays. The FAQ for the Kilmore East fire was not
created for the VBIL staff until 4:19pm. This is despite the fact that Ms Millington’s log reveals that at 12:39pm
on 7 February, she contacted Ms Henshaw of the CFA Information Unit to report that the VBIL had received
calls about the Kilmore East fire, which was not yet on the CFA website. Ms Henshaw, who had access to
the Incident Management System live feeds concerning fire information was able to supply Ms Millington
with some information about the fire and indicated that further information would be available. Nevertheless,
messages were not supplied to the VBIL until 3:25pm and the FAQ was not created until 4:19pm. 173
5.102 Ms Venters said the different time frames may be explained by virtue of the fact that the Horsham and
Coleraine fires were earlier in the day, and during a period when less information was being received at the
CSC. 174 She said it was also a case of people having to ‘process an immense amount of information’. 175
VBIL Calls answered and abandoned on 7 february 2009
5.103 The VBIL experienced unprecedented demand — 12,846 calls were presented to the VBIL from 6:00am
to midnight on 7 February. This compares with 2981 calls on 10 January 2009 (during the Delburn fires)
and 2544 calls on 11 January 2007 (during the Great Divide fires). 176
5.104 The statistics for the VBIL’s performance on 7 February reveal that the CSC fell well short of its performance
benchmarks. 177 There were high numbers of calls abandoned. Of the 12,846 calls made to the VBIL on
7 February:
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
731 calls were answered by the Interactive Voice Response (a recorded message service whereby
callers can ‘self help’ by selecting options from a menu without the need to speak to an operator)
27 calls were made to the after-hours Interactive Voice Response service
902 calls were transferred to the overflow queue (Centrelink)
9879 callers entered the operator queue
178
1307 calls were terminated before entering the operator queue.
5.105 Of the 9879 calls that were queued, waiting to speak with an operator, only 1754 were eventually answered
and 8125 were terminated while the caller waited in the operator queue. 179
5.106 Ms Venters said these figures demonstrated an abandonment rate of 82.2 per cent (8125 calls abandoned
from the 9879 calls waiting to speak to an operator). 180 The abandonment rate is even higher if the 1307
calls terminated by callers before they entered the queue are included. Of course, those callers may have
terminated their calls by choice on hearing the recorded messages that the VBIL was experiencing heavy
demand and that callers might instead ring Triple Zero or call back on another occasion. Further, this figure
does not include callers who were unable to get a line because the number of people calling the VBIL
call centre exceeded the 90 lines available.
5.107 There were also long delay times before calls were answered. The average wait time was 11 minutes
25 seconds. The longest recorded waiting time was 16 minutes and 22 seconds. 181
5.108 Due to the technical difficulties on the day, the data on calls overflowed to Centrelink on 7 February is
incomplete. Centrelink staff answering the VBIL calls would ordinarily log calls in a DSE database in the
same way as the VBIL operators. Due to the failure of the remote access facility, Centrelink staff were
unable to do so on 7 February. 182
5.109 Other sources of data are also incomplete or inconsistent. Information on call levels for 7 February first
supplied by Centrelink to the VBIL in April 2009 was incorrect. 183 In June 2009, Centrelink obtained data
from Telstra indicating that Centrelink received 117 overflow calls from the VBIL and answered 62 of these,
but these figures are also incomplete as there were no statistics available after 9:00pm on 7 February. 184
The VBIL has alternative data indicating that 902 calls were overflowed to Centrelink, but it was suggested
in evidence that this could not be relied on either. 185
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2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report
5 INFORMATION
5.110 Data from Centrelink’s national emergency database (which Centrelink staff filled out on 7 February,
albeit not uniformly) shows that at least 124 calls were answered. 186
5.111 Further, it has also come to light that Centrelink sought information from Telstra that might have enabled
it to capture or recreate the relevant phone records. However, Telstra were unable to recreate the data,
as it was not sought by Centrelink within 20 days, the normal period before records are destroyed. 187
5.112 The data available on calls answered by Centrelink does not appear to match the recollections of staff as
to the level of activity. The Team Leader on shift at the Geelong Centrelink call centre recalls that the calls
were constant and staff were fully occupied. 188
5.113 It is also not possible to determine accurately the abandonment rate of calls to Centrelink because of
the doubts about the core statistics. However, taking one version of the Centrelink figures at face value
(117 calls received and 62 answered), while noting the significant doubts about the accuracy of this
material, the abandonment rate for calls overflowed to Centrelink on 7 February could have been as high
as 47 per cent. 189 The MOU requires at least 80 per cent of calls to be answered within 60 seconds. 190
191
5.114 Staff at the VBIL call centre maintained logs of calls taken in the Centre. The call logs for 7 February reveal
that the VBIL staff were placed under considerable pressure. 192 The log reveals distressing examples of calls
received from people in circumstances of significant danger and stress. Callers included people seeking
advice about evacuation for themselves and relatives; young people at home without their parents; people
desperately seeking information about the fate of loved ones; callers whose home was under ember attack;
and people reporting fires very close to their homes anxiously seeking assistance or advice. Some callers
were angry and frustrated about the lack of information. 193 The VBIL staff were offered counselling in the
aftermath of this difficult day. 194
5.115 Witnesses attested to difficulties in reaching the VBIL and deficiencies in the information supplied by the
service. Dr John Ferguson of Buxton called the VBIL five times, and when he got through eventually was
placed on hold. He said the operator did not know where Buxton was and told him that there was a small
grass fire in Murrindindi. He said this did not match his own observations about the threat at that time. 195
Mrs Joan Davey attempted to call the VBIL, desperately seeking information about her son’s family and
the fires at Kinglake. None of her calls were answered and she was placed on hold for up to two hours. 196
Dr Lachlan Fraser of Marysville called the VBIL about the fire threat to Marysville. He was on hold for about
20 minutes, and when his call was answered, the operator had to look up where Marysville was. 197
5.116 There appears to have been no way for VBIL staff to isolate the urgent from the non-urgent calls on the
night, with the result that call takers were occupied with trivial requests at a time when they were also
fielding calls from members of the public in life-threatening situations. 198
VBIL Debriefs — past and present
5.117 The Joint CFA/DSE Information Review referred to in paragraph 5.38 also considered the VBIL’s
performance. It made the following recommendations to address concerns about the speed of information
flow, consistency of formatting, the demand on the system and the desirability of capturing valuable
information from callers in fire affected areas:
That the protocols covering the forwarding of authorised information and the formats in which that
information is presented be reviewed.
The use of recorded appropriate, updated messages by VBIL be examined as a method of dealing
with caller demands.
The possibility for formal processing and use of intelligence gathered by VBIL as part of the information
flow system be examined. 199
170

Information
5.118 Some aspects of the recommendations made in 2006 have been implemented, but it is clear that speed
of information flow remains a problem. Debriefs have been conducted with VBIL staff since the January–
February 2009 fires. The report of the debriefs reveals that some of the same issues have been raised again.
Call takers on 7 February reported the following concerns:
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
FAQs were too large and difficult for operators to use
operators were not provided with sufficient up-to-date information and the information
that they did receive was sometimes unclear
inconsistent naming of fires created confusion for operators
there was a lack of well-trained, experienced call operators
200
high stress levels due to the failure of the Centrelink overflow capability.
5.119 The ability of the VBIL to offer a surge in capacity to meet extreme demand was severely hampered on
7 February due to physical constraints (numbers of phone lines and workstations) and staffing levels.
5.120 The State accepted Counsel Assisting’s proposed recommendation that more staff should be rostered
on to answer calls during extreme events and that all endeavours should be made to produce FAQs
and disseminate them to call takers as quickly as possible. 201
5.121 The State indicated that it is considering expanding the VBIL to an ‘all hazards’ Victorian Emergency
Information Line. In this context, it intends to examine the operations and procedures of the VBIL,
including information technology, telephony and service standards, and protocols on receipt of
information. 202 Further information on these matters will be adduced in the subsequent hearings
of the Commission.
5.122 The time frames for providing information to the VBIL and creating FAQs within the VBIL should be improved.
Counsel Assisting proposed recommendations to improve the protocols for handling those links in the
information chain. The State agreed improvements are necessary, but suggested that the focus ought to
be on staff levels and the currency of information provided to the VBIL. 203
5.123 To improve the activation of overflow arrangements with Centrelink, the Commonwealth proposed that
DSE be obliged to provide formal advance warning of the potential activation of Centrelink overflow demand
as soon as practicable, and that Centrelink and DSE share information about total call demand, overflow
parameters to be employed, and the staffing capacity of both agencies. 204
RECOMMENDATION 5.5
The State ensure the Victorian Bushfire Information Line is funded to enable it to provide greater surge
capacity during extreme events and to improve the efficiency of its internal information function.
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172
Source: Simon Schulter, courtesy of The Age