Chapter 4 - Warnings - 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

WARNINGS
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2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report
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Timely and accurate warnings may save lives. It is this possibility that has motivated the Commission’s lengthy
examination of bushfire warnings issued in February 2009 and of what constitutes effective warnings. This chapter
first considers definitional matters relating to warnings and the bushfire information and education that has been
available in Victoria. It moves to an overview of the recommendations on warnings from recent inquiries, before
considering what constitutes good warnings. The chapter then considers the warnings and information issued
in Victoria prior to and on 7 February and the way in which the community received and understood this material.
Finally, triggers and signals, sirens, and a telephony-based emergency warning system are considered.
BUSHFIRE INFORMATION, WARNINGS AND TRIGGERS
4.1
4.2
4.3
There is a significant difference between the provision of general information about bushfires and specific
warnings to alert the public of a particular threat. Ongoing information provided to the community about
bushfires prepares the community and educates them on the appropriate steps to take if a warning is
issued. In contrast, a bushfire warning is specific advice about an imminent event. Such a warning should
propel the community into action in response to a specific threat — ideally, armed with the information and
education that has prepared them to respond.
The evidence before the Commission has demonstrated that the community depends on (and has come to
expect) detailed and high-quality information prior to, during and after bushfires. In addition, the community
is entitled to expect to receive timely and accurate bushfire warnings whenever possible, based on the
intelligence available to the control agencies (further discussion in Chapter 10). Though they are distinct
concepts, the successful provision of information and warnings are inextricably linked.
In relation to the provision of information about bushfires, the Emergency Services Commissioner, Mr Bruce
Esplin, made the following comments when asked about the best time for the effective provision of bushfire
information:
In my judgment … it is in the years, the months and the weeks and even the days before the fire season in
this case even starts. This is when the good work is done. That is where people … can do their planning
away from the immediate threat of fire and come to a considered decision about what is the best plan for
them as individuals, as a family ...
I think it is very easy to see a campaign as being something that has effect in one year, but in my judgment,
and certainly in my experience, campaigns such as this have a cumulative effect over time and what you do
in any one year, it is not a very high chance that it will have a profound effect or a profound risk reduction,
it is the impact over time that will make the difference. 1
4.4
4.5
The success of specific bushfire warnings partly depends on the standard of the information and education
provided to the community prior to its issue. In some instances, specific bushfire warnings — and use of
‘triggers’ such as the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS) and sirens — will be less effective in the
absence of high quality information and education campaigns that increase a community’s preparedness
to meet the threat and its understanding of how to respond to a warning.
It is also clear that on receipt of bushfire warnings, people often seek further information and advice.
For example, after receiving a specific bushfire warning, people often want or need further information from
sources like 774 ABC Radio, agency websites or the Victorian Bushfire Information Line (VBIL). It emerged
during the hearings that on 7 February people were sometimes unable to access the information they
needed to respond to the warnings they had received. In other cases, it was clear that in the absence of
timely warnings, the public turned to other sources of information for assistance. This placed pressure on
the agencies providing that information, and was a source of great frustration and stress for those seeking,
but unable to obtain, information and advice. Victoria’s information and warning systems operated under
great stress on 7 February. The systems broke down in a number of respects. The question of information
is addressed in more detail in Chapter 5.
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Warnings
4.6
4.7
The content of warnings is separate from the mode of disseminating warnings. The content of warnings
raises considerations of drafting and construction, while the dissemination of warnings is about the
means and modes by which warnings are communicated to the public. This includes existing modes of
communication, such as radio broadcasts and web pages, and new and emerging technology, including
Twitter and telephony-based warning systems.
SEWS (further described at paragraph 4.188) and sirens are generally not warnings. Rather, they are
triggers, signals alerting the listener to the fact that a warning is to follow. They are a means of attracting
attention and prompting the audience to listen carefully for a warning and/or to search out more information.
Such triggers and alerts are important, and have a role in the suite of responses that should be available to
deal with bushfire threat.
BUSHFIRE INFORMATION AND EDUCATION IN VICTORIA
4.8
4.9
4.10
4.11
4.12
4.13
The publication of information about bushfires and materials designed to educate the Victorian community
about bushfire risk has received considerable attention.
A Fire Communications Taskforce was established in August 2005 by the Department of Justice to
undertake a whole of government approach to community education and communication about fires.
This Taskforce coordinates communication activities and plans. It has overseen the implementation
of a number of flagship projects, and monitors the success of its approaches. 2
The State Government and the Country Fire Authority (CFA) have sponsored a number of high-quality
campaigns to deliver key messages to the community about the risk of fire, including campaigns known
as Fire Ready Victoria and Living with Fire. 3 Those campaigns are explained in publications including:
■■
Fire Ready Victoria Strategy 2004–2007
■■
Living in the Bush: Bushfire Survival Plan Workbook 2nd ed (2008) 5
■■
■■
■■
Fire Safety Victoria 2006
Living with Fire: Victoria’s Bushfire Strategy 2008
6
Living with Fire: A Community Engagement Framework 2008–2012.
4
Information and education programs provided by the State and the work of the Community Fireguard
program have been instrumental in delivering messages about bushfire preparedness. These education
programs are ongoing, and are an important part of the context in which key messages and advice are
delivered in Victoria. It is clear that the CFA and the State have given considerable thought and effort to
ensuring that, as far as possible, the community is well educated and prepared about fire risk before it
receives any particular bushfire warning. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5.
7
Prior to 7 February 2009 the State Government devoted unprecedented efforts and resources to informing
the community about the fire risks Victoria faced (paragraphs 4.81 to 4.92). That campaign clearly had
benefits, but it could not, on its own, translate ‘levels of awareness and preparedness’ into universal
successful risk minimisation on the day of the fires. Indeed, no campaign will have universal success.
All campaigns are dependent for their effectiveness on the quality of information, the modes of dissemination
and the willingness and capacity of people to hear, understand and act on the message. As discussed in
the Introduction, this is a shared responsibility between government and the people.
This chapter takes lessons learned on the content and process of warnings presented to the Commission
so far and makes recommendations for the next fire season. This report does not analyse the effectiveness
of warnings across all the fires. Chapter 1 includes information about initial and critical warnings issued for
each fire and Chapter 9 analyses warnings for the Kilmore East fire. Further evidence on warnings will be
heard by the Commission in future hearings.
8
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BUSHFIRE WARNINGS: THE WELL-TRODDEN PATH
4.14
4.15
The review and analysis of warnings and their mode of delivery is not new. Successive inquiries, reviews
and reports have considered bushfire warnings. Some have focused on warning content and construction,
others on delivery systems.
Some matters highlighted in these reports have received government support and been implemented.
Others, in particular the national adoption of standard bushfire warnings and the development of a
telephony-based warning system, received insufficient attention in the years after their recommendation.
1984 Report on Ash Wednesday
4.16 The 1984 inquiry into the 1983 Ash Wednesday fires produced a report, On Bushfire Disaster Preparedness
and Response in Victoria. 9 That report noted the difference between warnings that simply raise general
awareness and specific warnings about particular fires:
… fire threat indicators which ushered in the 1982/1983 season served as a serious underscoring of the
extreme risk facing authorities and communities alike. Whilst it is difficult to generalise with accuracy, it
would appear that these indicators did help to enhance levels of awareness and preparedness. Whether
this, in turn, had any significant effect on the disastrous circumstances of 16 February, is another matter. 10
4.17
4.18
4.19
4.20
The Ash Wednesday report went on to address warning and information systems generally. It emphasised
the importance of maximum warning lead time, accurate meteorological information, standardisation and
clarity of warnings. It also explored the methods of providing information, such as special messages or
warnings that alert people to switch to a designated system, such as the ABC. It found that greater use
should be made of local TV and radio stations and that ‘Special fire warning sirens should be located at
police and fire stations; also, church bells should be utilised’. 11
The goal that warnings be standardised and their meaning rendered ‘clear and unambiguous’ was not fully
achieved by 7 February. While sirens and church bells received specific attention in the report, the evidence
before this Commission is that use of sirens was contrary to CFA policy on 7 February (further discussion
at paragraph 4.224).
The report emphasised the importance of informing the community about warning systems, and advising
people about how to respond to them. It also recommended that ‘new systems which offer possibilities
of enhancing warning capability should be examined’. 12
These comments appear just as relevant today as when they were published in 1984. While new systems
were indeed examined and kept under review in the years since 1984, the available technology for
a telephony-based warning system was not used or introduced prior to the February 2009 fires.
This represents a missed opportunity, and is addressed in more detail below.
2002 COAG Report
4.21 In 2002, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) commissioned a review of Australia’s approach
to dealing with natural disasters. The review was carried out by a high level group of officials representing
all levels of government. The product of that review was a report titled, Natural Disasters in Australia —
Reforming Mitigation, Relief and Recovery Arrangements .13
4.22
The report concluded that current arrangements ‘could be improved to ensure that Australia has a
world class national framework for disaster management’. 14 Significantly, the report recommended what
it described as ‘a paradigm shift to disaster mitigation’. It recommended the implementation of a Disaster
Mitigation Australia Package, which would include funding for programs such as disaster warning systems
and community awareness and readiness measures. 15
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Warnings
4.23
4.24
The report contained a number of recommendations, three of which are summarised below:
■■ there should be legislative obligations on all broadcasters to broadcast natural disaster warnings
to the public via radio and television (Recommendation 26)
■■ guidelines should be prepared for best practice in the development of local area emergency
warning systems (Recommendation 27)
■■ post disaster assessments should routinely review the effectiveness of warning systems
(Recommendation 28). 16
The Victorian Government has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the ABC,
which appears to reflect part of the aims of Recommendation 26. Otherwise, the above recommendations
were referred to the Australian Emergency Management Committee (AEMC) (a standing committee of the
Ministerial Council for Police and Emergency Management — Emergency Management). An AEMC working
group undertook to identify ‘the requirements for a nationally consistent emergency warning system’.
Other initiatives such as the establishment of the National Forum on Emergency Warnings to the Community
were undertaken. However, work on the development of a national telephony-based warning system did
not come to fruition for a number of years. 17
2004 COAG report
4.25 The question of warnings was again considered by the COAG National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and
Management of 31 March 2004 (the 2004 COAG report). 18 This inquiry recommended that the content of
bushfire threat warnings should be nationally consistent, and that SEWS should be used.
4.26
4.27
4.28
4.29
4.30
The features of a warning system emphasised in the 2004 COAG report are:
a) A warning system should involve use of ‘a consistent warning signal’ at the beginning of the advice
in circumstances where lives are at risk or there is a major threat to property to attract the attention
of those who should be alerted to the warning that follows.
b) A bushfire warning should provide information about the location, size and intensity of a bushfire threat.
c) A warning should inform the listener as to the expected movement of the fire front and should identify
the communities at threat.
19
d) A good warning advises communities on the appropriate action to take.
As discussed further in this chapter, some of the warnings on 7 February were deficient with regard to
matters raised in paragraph 4.26 b, c and d — and SEWS was not used at all.
Recommendation 8.5 of the 2004 COAG report endorsed the recommendations on warning systems from
the 2002 COAG report and further recommended that all fire ban advice and bushfire warnings should be
used consistently (including SEWS) where lives or property are threatened. The 2004 COAG report also
called for the introduction of a nationally uniform bushfire warning system. 20 Finally, it recommended that
the structure of warnings should be based on the findings of the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre’s
(Bushfire CRC) project ‘Communicating Risk to Communities and Others’.
The 2004 COAG report also indicated some logistical concerns about the use of SEWS. In particular, it
noted that due to its infrequent use in southern Australia, television and radio stations ‘have difficulty locating
the signal when they need to play it and the public is largely unaware of its significance. Reluctance to use
the signal when local communities are threatened by bushfire has led to the signal being virtually ineffective
as a national warning measure’. 21 It advocated the regular use of SEWS during periods of bushfire threat.
COAG’s findings and recommendations were sound and have been justified in light of the evidence before
the Commission. It is regrettable that a nationally consistent approach to bushfire warnings has not been
developed, and that SEWS fell into disuse in Victoria prior to 7 February 2009. This is discussed in more
detail at paragraphs 4.189–4.205.
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2005 Catastrophic Disasters Report
4.31 In October 2005 the report, Catastrophic Disasters Emergency Management Capability Working Group —
Review of Australia’s Ability to Respond to and Recover from Catastrophic Disasters was prepared by the
Catastrophic Disasters Emergency Management Capability Working Group, chaired by Mr Tony Pearce,
then Director of Emergency Management and Security of the Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner
(OESC) in Victoria. 22
4.32
4.33
4.34
The 2002 COAG report had recommended the creation of the Working Group that then prepared the
2005 report. It found that ‘whilst existing State/Territory and national emergency management arrangements
are robust … Australia is currently not as prepared as it should be to manage the consequences of a
catastrophic disaster impacting the country’. 23
The Working Group modelled four hypothetical scenarios to assist in identifying the likely impact of
catastrophic events: a cyclone impacting on Cairns, a major earthquake impacting the wheat-belt of
Western Australia and the City of Perth, a tsunami impacting on the mid New South Wales coast and
an influenza pandemic. 24 The report found that ‘there is an overwhelming national need for the development
of appropriate, effective and timely community information and warning systems’. It also emphasised
the desirability of a national approach, and the potentially counter-productive consequences of disparate
systems being developed in isolation. 25
It is disappointing that what was identified in October 2005 as an ‘overwhelming national need’ for a
national warning system, was not the subject of agreement by the states and territories until April 2009.
It is also a matter of concern that the 2005 Catastrophic Disasters report, which revealed significant
areas for improvement in Australia’s capacity to respond to natural disasters, was not made public until
summonsed and tendered in the Commission’s hearings. 26 One of the clear lessons from the fires of
7 February and from the substantial body of material on natural disaster and warning systems generally,
is that the community, governments and emergency services benefit from the free flow of information.
The decision not to release this important report for a number of years did nothing to increase community
preparedness to meet the challenges posed by natural disasters.
2006 Fire agencies’ internal review
4.35 In 2006, the CFA and the Department of Sustainability and Environment (DSE) commissioned Mr John
Schauble to conduct a review of information processes during fire incidents, including the issue of provision
of warnings to the community during fires: Joint CFA/DSE Review of Effectiveness of Information Flow to
Communities and Media During Fire Incidents — Preliminary Findings. 27
4.36
This review involved a series of debriefs and interviews with CFA and DSE personnel engaged in
the information management process. It focused on the work of the Information Units in Information
Management Teams in the fire services. The report noted:
… the bar has been raised’ in terms of both how rapidly information about developing events is released
to the general community and how specific that information should be. It is no longer sufficient to report
that a large fire is burning in a general location. There is now an expectation on the community’s part that
timely and useful information regarding predicted spread into specific locations, including particular streets,
will be made available in time for potential-affected citizens to make decisions. 28
WHAT MAKES A GOOD BUSHFIRE WARNING?
124
4.37
The Commission received expert advice on what constitutes an effective warning in written submissions
and in oral evidence. 29 Other key documents on this topic include:
■■
2005 and 2009 Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council (AFAC) position papers
■■
2008 Australian Government advice Emergency Warnings — Choosing your Words 31
■■
Material relating to the Common Alerting Protocol (CAP).
32
30

Warnings
4.38
4.39
4.40
There is a high level of consistency between these key documents and the expert advice received by
the Commission. The State has committed to implementing improvements in bushfire warnings for the
forthcoming fire season. 33 This guidance highlights that the content of a warning should be driven by its
aim. In this context, Professor Handmer, Innovation Professor in Risk and Sustainability and Director of
the Centre for Risk and Community Safety at RMIT University, set out the features of a good warning. 34
In particular, it should let people know what they should or should not do to protect themselves, empower
them to respond appropriately, be ‘people centred’ and be based on local needs and expectations. 35
In oral evidence, Professor Handmer added that the purpose of a warning is to ‘provide a signal for
some action’. 36 He noted that it is important to ensure that people realise that the warning relates to
their personal situation. 37
Professor Handmer also suggested that messages should set out the expected timing and severity of the
event, say what is likely to happen and when it will occur, indicate how people should act and identify the
source of the message (which should be one that is trusted as credible by those at risk). 38 He noted the
phenomenon of people seeking to confirm and discuss warnings in their personal networks. 39 He said that
language should be vivid, rather than vague or abstract; messages should be positive, rather than negative
(that is, they should advocate what to do); and they should invite sociability (for example, by recommending
that people check on their neighbours) because people like to ‘do something’. 40
41
4.41 Urgent messages should contain locally specific information. Professor Handmer recommended that
messages should include information about the degree of severity of the fire, or the predicted event.
… the severity message is to help people gain an appreciation of what is coming and to help them make
an appropriate decision 42
4.42
4.43
4.44
He made the following further suggestions for improvements to existing materials:
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
consideration should be given to having another level of fire danger for particularly extreme conditions
high-risk areas and vulnerable groups should be targeted for more personalised messages and
bushfire-related education 44
45
commercial media needs to become part of the fire and emergency management system
informal networks could be used more to disseminate warnings, and to add locally specific
information to the message 46
47
to be useful, warnings need to provide those at risk with enough time to take protective action.
Mr Alan Rhodes, Manager Community Safety Research and Evaluation for the CFA, referred to the research
of two American experts, well known in the field, Mr Dennis Mileti and Mr John Sorensen. He set out their
view that for a warning to be effective, it must:
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
describe the precise nature of the threat and how it poses a danger to the public
communicate the exact location of the threat
provide guidance as to the specific actions the public should undertake
specify the time when the hazard is likely to impact
48
state the agency which is giving the warning (multiple sources are preferable).
These statements provide sound guidance as to what constitutes a good warning.
Many of the matters explored in the evidence of Professor Handmer are strikingly similar to the views of
the Emergency Services Commissioner, Mr Bruce Esplin. The OESC has produced a number of significant
reports in relation to warning systems, emergency management and emergency events in Victoria. 49
The Commission commends the work of Mr Esplin’s office and its contribution to the development of the
learning and research in the area, in particular its work on the Community Information and Warning System:
The Report of Trial and Evaluation (2006). 50
43
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4.45
In evidence, when asked what constitutes a ‘good warning’, Mr Esplin said the following:
I have formed a view in that regard and the first thing is that the warning has to be delivered to a
community that has been prepared to receive the warning and to know (a), hopefully where to access
information and what to do when they get that information. A good warning is simple; it is probably
locally relevant information delivered by locally credible sources. 51
4.46 It is also useful to consider the work of the American expert, Mr Sorensen. In his article, Hazard Warning
Systems: Review of 20 Years of Progress, Mr Sorensen referred to six warning myths that ‘all too often
constrain the effectiveness of warning systems when implemented’. 52 He describes the six myths:
4.47
(1) the myth of ‘public panic’: Mr Sorensen says that social scientists have shown this is not the case,
except in situations affected by closed physical space and an immediate and clear source of death
where escape routes are not available to everyone affected.
(2) the second myth Mr Sorensen cites is that ‘officials are usually worried about overwhelming people
with too much information’: in his opinion, the public ‘rarely, if ever’ receives too much information
during an emergency.
(3) Mr Sorensen refers to the concern about raising ‘false alarms’: he notes that the likelihood of people
responding to warnings is not diminished by what has been labelled the ‘cry wolf’ syndrome — so long
as the basis of the false alarm is understood.
(4) the belief on the part of authorities that a single spokesperson is good practice when disseminating
emergency information: indeed, to the contrary, says Mr Sorensen, the public needs information from
a variety of sources.
(5) it is a common belief that people will take action immediately on receipt of a warning: however,
most people ‘simply do not’ do so, says Mr Sorensen.
(6) the sixth myth is that officials often think people will follow all recommendations made in a warning,
but research shows people will not blindly follow instructions, unless the basis for the instruction is
clear and that basis makes ‘common sense’. 53
The myths described by Mr Sorensen appear to have underpinned some of the development of our current
bushfire warning systems. The challenging of these myths assists in assessing the system with fresh eyes.
An improved understanding of the way in which people react to warnings assists in crafting better warnings.
THE WARNING POSITION ADOPTED BY AFAC
54
4.48 In 2005, AFAC prepared a draft position paper on bushfire information and warnings. The paper was last
modified on 24 April 2007, but remained in draft form. 55 The AFAC paper is described as being ‘In Response
to Recommendation 8.5 from the COAG Report on Bushfire Mitigation and Management’. 56
4.49
The 2005 AFAC paper emphasised the importance that messages should use plain language and should
address the following questions:
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
What is the risk?
Where is the threat now?
Where is the threat expected to move to next?
What are the immediate risks faced by people in the threat area?
What are the public advised to do about those risks?
What are the response agencies doing about the situation?
57
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4.50
It indicates that bushfire information and warning messages should also include:
■■
■■
■■
clear information about the area of risk
where a specific location is provided, information about the general location — local place names should
not be used unless supplemented with general location details
the time and date that the message was issued, including the length of time that the message is current.
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Warnings
4.51
Though this 2005 paper has been superseded, it expressed a number of sound principles, drawing on
the work of COAG in 2004, and it constitutes a useful guide to a clear approach to the construction of
bushfire warnings.
4.52 The call for clearer content in warnings was reiterated in a subsequent AFAC draft paper titled A National
Systems Approach to Community Warnings: Discussion Paper Draft Version 2.0 (May 2009). 59 This paper
proposes a systems approach to warnings incorporating four elements:
4.53
4.54
■■
■■
■■
■■
preparing the community
situational awareness
message construction and dissemination
appropriate action taken.
This 2009 AFAC paper advocates a consistent national approach given the transient nature of the
population and the fact that ‘emergencies have no regard for jurisdictional boundaries’. 60 The paper
observes that the ‘most crucial aspect of the warnings system is the continued development of
community survivability strategies that are in place well before any emergency event occurs’. 61
The second element, ‘situational awareness’, refers to the information and awareness that resides in
individuals, communities, industry and the emergency services. The paper notes that individuals and
emergency service organisations all receive information from a range of sources, formal and informal.
Based on that information, organisations decide to warn, and individuals to act — but these actions
may not align (for example, people may act prior to the warning). This is not necessarily a problem, as:
No matter how the information gets to someone, the challenge is to make sure the information is able
to be corroborated through the authoritative source, is meaningful and people are confident they know
what to do when they receive it. 62
4.55
4.56
4.57
The evidence before the Commission tends to confirm that while emergency services are monitoring natural
disasters, gathering intelligence and considering issuing official warnings, many (but not all) in the community
are likely to be responding to the environmental cues and informal sources of information available to them.
On receipt of an official warning, people commonly seek corroboration from other sources, and further
information about the appropriate response.
The 2009 AFAC paper also notes that there is no consistent Australian standard for message construction,
or protocol for triggering a warning and calls on COAG to adopt the use of the CAP as the basis for
messaging in Australia and to set a timeframe for its implementation by emergency agencies. 63
Finally, the AFAC paper notes studies that demonstrated the significant association between community
education and higher levels of household preparedness and the taking of appropriate protective action. 64
This is certainly consistent with the evidence before this Commission.
Best practice IN BUSHFIRE WARNINGS: Choosing Your Words
4.58 In 2008, the Commonwealth Attorney-General’s Department released Emergency Warnings — Choosing
Your Words. 65 This document is a valuable guide to best practice in drafting warnings. Its content is practical
and clear. The paper set out a number of guiding principles. It counselled against making assumptions
about the audience, noting that warnings will need to reach a broad audience and that any message
needs to be appropriate for those at home, at work, in the car or visiting the area. 66
4.59
The paper noted that an emergency warning is a ‘dialogue with the community, not a command situation’.
It promoted seeking cooperation with a suggested action, not compliance with an order: ‘This is best
achieved by giving people information that convinces them that a particular course of action is the best
one to take’. 67
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4.60
In describing the way in which people generally respond to warnings, the paper suggested that this is a
process and not a single step. People generally follow a certain thought process before deciding to respond,
starting with receiving a message, believing its credibility, confirming it, personalising it, determining what
action is required and ending with determining whether the action is feasible. 68
4.61 Professor Handmer agreed that the advice in Choosing Your Words is sound. 69 Ms Jillian Edwards, Manager
Strategy and Knowledge, AFAC, said that it was ‘a very good piece of work that provides a lot of insight into
some of the language that could be used to elicit certain reactions from people’. 70 Mr Pearce, now Director
General of Emergency Management Australia, agreed it was provided to agencies to guide them in best
practice. 71 Mr Rhodes accepted that CFA messages could benefit from some of the paper’s suggestions. 72
4.62 Choosing Your Words provides excellent practical guidance as to the best method of drafting and
constructing a clear and useful bushfire warning. There is general support among the parties for the
proposition that the content of bushfire warnings should be based on the principles set out in Choosing
Your Words. 73 The State indicated in its submissions that it would, before the next fire season, refine fire
messages based upon the Choosing Your Words publication. 74
The Common Alerting Protocol IN BUSHFIRE WARNINGS
4.63 There is evidence before the Commission concerning the development of a protocol and standard digital
format for expressing the content of warnings, known as CAP.
4.64
4.65
4.66
CAP was designed in the United States by emergency managers and technology experts and ultimately
adopted there in April 2004 by the Organisation for the Advancement of Structured Information Standards
(OASIS). Use of CAP is mandated in the United States. 75 It is now being introduced in other countries
including Italy, Canada, Indonesia and Japan. 76
The use of CAP permits a consistent warning message to be disseminated simultaneously over different
media (for example, internet, SMS, landlines, email). 77 Once adopted, CAP can be incorporated into any
number of technology applications. 78 It has been described as a ‘write it once’ tool.
As Ms Edwards explained, CAP is two things:
It is a simple but general template for the consistent construction of messages, using standard
classifications and terminology.
It stipulates a digital format for making the constructed message readable by any machine. 79
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4.67
4.68
The benefits of the adoption of CAP have been described as including:
■■ efficiency and minimisation of confusion during emergencies
■■ reduction of costs and operational complexity by eliminating the need for multiple custom software
interfaces to the many warning sources and dissemination systems involved in all hazards warning
■■ facilitation of movement towards coordinated warning messages over multiple delivery systems
■■ distribution of authoritative alert messages to those who need them in a timely and effective way,
ultimately reducing damage and loss of life
■■ capability of conversion to and from the ‘native’ formats to all kinds of sensor and alerting technologies,
forming a basis for technology independent of national and international alerts and warnings. 80
In April 2008, AFAC formally adopted the position that its member agencies will use the OASIS Common
Alerting Protocol, V1.1, or its derivative, as the standard alerting protocol for handling the essential content
of alert warning messages. 81
In its 2009 draft paper
4.69 A National Systems Approach to Community Warnings, AFAC suggested that a
‘standards based, all media, all hazards public warning strategic framework makes for a more effective
solution and more efficient use of resources’. 82 The paper went on to note that the OASIS CAP provides
a suitable basis for messaging format, with some adjustments for Australian content and terminology. 83

Warnings
4.70
The introduction of CAP would assist in simplifying bushfire warnings in Victoria, and would contribute to
what should ultimately be a nationally uniform approach. The written submissions of AFAC endorsed the
adoption of CAP. 84 The State undertook in its written submissions to adopt CAP in the next fire season. 85
RECOMMENDATION 4.1
The State ensure that bushfire warnings issued in Victoria:
■■
■■
■■
■■
are founded on the principle of maximising the potential to save human lives;
embody the principles encapsulated in Recommendation 8.5 of the Council of Australian
Governments report the National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management (2004);
embody the principles endorsed in the Australasian Fire and Emergency Service Authorities Council
Draft Discussion Paper, A National Systems Approach to Community Warning (May 2009); and
incorporate the use of the Common Alerting Protocol, as adapted for the Australian context.
BUSHFIRE WARNINGS: THE SYSTEM IN VICTORIA ON 7 FEBRUARY
4.71
Before examining the evidence on bushfire warnings issued on 7 February it is important to understand
the system for disseminating bushfire warnings in Victoria in effect on that day.
The procedure set out in the Emergency Management Manual
4.72 The Emergency Management Manual Victoria (the Manual) states that:
Warnings should be used under specific circumstances where community action is necessary to protect
lives, property or the environment. Upon the request of a control agency to issue a warning, it is the
responsibility of the emergency response co-ordinator to ensure that it is issued both to agencies and
the potentially affected community. The content and format of the warning must be simple, arresting,
brief, suited to the needs of the affected community and be worded in accordance with advice from
the control agency … Warning methods could include loud hailers, telephones, door knocks, radio or
television announcements or local community networks.
For emergencies of major community significance, the warning should be authorised by an emergency
response co-ordinator in consultation with the control agency. 86
4.73
4.74
While some of this text cannot be faulted — such as the first sentence — other parts of it are outdated and
confusing, such as the statement about loud hailers and door knocks. The text does not refer to websites,
yet there is clear evidence that many in the community rely on the fire agencies’ websites to obtain bushfire
warnings. When referring to the issuing of warnings, the two apparently simple statements about who issues
warnings in different circumstances mask the considerable complexity about who is responsible for issuing
warnings in Victoria during fires (Chapter 9). Finally, the evidence before the Commission demonstrates
that many bushfire warnings issued on 7 February were not simple and suited to the needs of the affected
community. The particular shortcomings evident in relation to the content of the CFA’s awareness, alert and
urgent threat messages are discussed in more detail below, and summarised at paragraphs 4.163–4.164.
The degree to which current policies and protocols on warnings are, in many respects, divorced from the
reality of what occurred on 7 February is troubling. If the Manual is to be useful to emergency services it
should contain information that reflects current best practice.
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Dissemination of BUSHFIRE warnings by the fire agencies
4.75
4.76
4.77
4.78
The evidence before the Commission demonstrates that there were generally two types of material made
available to the public in early February 2009 concerning the bushfire threat in Victoria. First, general
information (including weather and fire risk predictions) was disseminated prior to 7 February. This information
(which is dealt with in more detail from paragraph 4.82) focussed principally on the risk of fire and the
conditions facing Victoria throughout the fire season, particularly during the heatwave between late January
and early February.
Secondly, there were the specific bushfire warnings for each of the fires issued in one of three categories —
awareness, alert, urgent threat — prepared by the CFA or DSE using pre-existing templates. The information
units in each Incident Management Team created information releases at the incident level. The information
releases were provided to the Integrated Emergency Coordination Centre (iECC), Regional Emergency
Coordination Centres, the ABC and local media agencies for broadcast, and to the VBIL. When the iECC
information unit received these messages from the IMT, they were generally uploaded onto the CFA or DSE
websites, albeit with some delay. 87
The evidence reveals that the CFA and DSE websites were a key source of information for the community
and that many people relied on the internet as their principal source of information. 88 Broadcasts by the
ABC, in its role as the emergency broadcaster, were also critical in the flow of information to the public. 89
The role of the ABC is addressed in more detail below.
Mr Rees explained that the CFA has developed standard form information releases to describe fire
situations. Three levels or ‘grades’ of message are created. The standard information releases for fire
situations were presented in his witness statement. 90
Table 4.1: Current CFA types of information releases for fire situations
Title of Message Description Review Time
Awareness Message
– Initial Advice
Alert Message
To be issued when a fire first commences, when there is
not currently a threat to life or property but local interest
may be generating.
To be issued when a heightened level of awareness is
required by people and communities in close proximity to
a fire. There is still no direct threat, but there is the potential
for direct impact should conditions change or escalate.
May include a time parameter within message if known.
It is important not to over exaggerate the risk so that people
in the area do not feel unnecessarily threatened.
Within four hours of issue
depending on conditions.
Within two hours of issue,
depending on conditions.
Urgent Threat Message To be issued when direct impact from a bushfire is imminent. Within 30 minutes of issue,
depending on conditions.
Source: Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees (WIT.004.001.0001) [201] 91
RADIO Broadcasts by the ABC — the ‘emergency broadcaster’
4.79 On 4 February 2004, the ABC entered into an MOU with the State of Victoria pursuant to which the ABC
has undertaken to broadcast information and warnings provided to it by relevant emergency services
organisations during an emergency. 92
130

Warnings
4.80
Emergency messages are provided by the emergency services to the ABC via a special hotline number
staffed by the ABC 24 hours a day. Local radio Victoria broadcasts the messages immediately and then
regularly repeats them every 15 minutes until the threat message is downgraded by the emergency
organisation that issued the alert. The messages can be broadcast on 774 ABC Radio Melbourne, the
regional ABC local radio network in Victoria, a specific Victorian local radio station or the whole Victorian
radio network. 93 Ms Samantha Stayner, Acting Program Director 774 ABC Radio, gave evidence about
the process followed by the ABC to meet its obligations under the MOU and in relation to the events of
7 February, during which the ABC devoted significant resources and effort to covering the fires. 94 This is
discussed further below.
BUSHFIRE INFORMATION DISSEMINATED PRIOR TO 7 FEBRUARY
4.81
4.82
4.83
4.84
4.85
A significant body of information about bushfires was made available to the public during the 2008–09
bushfire season. There was also intensive coverage of weather forecasts, fire danger predictions and
information about the risk of bushfire during the period from October 2008 onwards. Dissemination of
this sort of material is vital to maintaining the community’s knowledge about the risk of fire.
During the 2008–09 bushfire season, senior government figures made key announcements about the
high risk faced by Victoria during the season. The approach adopted to these messages was laudable.
Significant resources and time were devoted to ensuring that Victorians were aware of the risk during the
summer months. 95 The campaigns reflected a sound emphasis on improving community preparedness.
For example, on 27 October 2008, the Premier, the Minister for Police and Emergency Services and the Chief
Fire Officers of each of the CFA, DSE and the Metropolitan Fire and Services Board announced the beginning
of the 2008–09 bushfire season. The announcement emphasised the need for preparedness, the significant
investment of State resources in fire response, and the high-risk outlook for the 2008–09 bushfire season. 96
Major announcements, media releases, press conferences and events aimed at alerting the community
to the extreme fire risk took place throughout November and December 2008, and January 2009. There
was intense media coverage of the issue from late January through early February 2009. 97 On 4 February,
Mr Esplin met with the Chair of the Fire Communications Taskforce, Ms Louise Martin, Director Strategic
Communications, Department of Justice, and Ms Amber Brodecky, Manager Media and Community
Relations, OESC. In light of the weather forecast, they agreed on the need to urgently renew the FireReady
advertising campaign. A decision was made to immediately resume and extend that advertising campaign. 98
This was a timely and commendable decision.
Announcements were made by senior members of the government and the emergency services.
For example:
■■
■■
■■
30 January at a press conference the Premier urged Victorians ‘to be vigilant’ and he said:
‘we are right on the edge today’. 99
2 February the Premier said ‘this is not over yet’.
100
4 February: a media release (titled Fire Services Warn of Continuing Fire Threat) was jointly issued by the
CFA, DSE and the Metropolitan Fire and Emergency Services Board, warning of the continuing fire threat
and extreme weather forecast for Friday and Saturday. 101
■ ■ 4 February the Premier was reported in the Herald Sun saying that the State was ‘set to burn’ with or
without the extreme heat. 102 The Premier also said that the CFA warned people to ‘be alert and do not
get caught out when a bushfire strikes’. 103
■■
■■
5 February: a press conference was held at the iECC. A number of media releases were issued by the
CFA and DSE for the event, titled Victoria’s fire agencies and police warn of extreme danger, 104 This is
the weekend to be bushfire alert 105 and High Fire Danger Saturday 7 February. 106
5 February the Premier was quoted in the media saying: ‘Everything is just absolutely tinder dry
and we don’t even need the high temperatures now for high fire alerts’. 107
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4.86
4.87
■■
■■
■■
■■
■■
5 February: the CFA’s Chief Officer and DSE Chief Fire Officer were on ABC statewide radio. They referred
to the ‘unprecedented fire weather’, the fact that, ‘Saturday appears to be worse in terms of weather forecast
terms, than the 16th of February 1983’. In his interview, Mr Rees noted in particular that people might form
the view: ‘given where the situation is, I’m going to make the decision not to be there — that is a very valid
decision’. Mr Ewan Waller, Chief Fire Officer, DSE, noted that people should ‘get mentally prepared as well as
physically prepared for a very, very, very difficult day’. He also stated that fire ‘could be anywhere in Victoria’.
Mr Rees noted the concern that fires in these sort of conditions ‘can pop up really quickly and unless you’re
vigilant, and alert and looking about you may not even get that warning’. 108
6 February: further media releases were issued, for example: Campers urged to stay home during extreme
conditions; 109 Extreme Fire Threat; 110 Extreme Fire Weather Warning; 111 Avoid all unnecessary travel
tomorrow; 112 and High Fire Danger Saturday 7 February. 113
6 February: during the press conference at Ballarat, the Premier said: ‘The worst day ever in the history
of this State’…‘I can’t stress this enough, I mean I know the Chief Fire Officer has been out and he said
it will be as bad as you can get and he is not exaggerating’. 114
6 February: Mr Rees said we would see ‘weather that perhaps we have never had in the State of Victoria
in respect of fire danger’. 115 He also released a podcast which was available online at www.cfa.vic.gov.au
in which he provided a series of statements about the weather, the state of the fuel and the legitimacy of
leaving property. He said ‘we would rather be talking about lost houses than lost lives’. 116
7 February: Mr Esplin was interviewed on ABC Radio at 11:15am, where he said, among other comments:
‘These fires can come and go in the space of an afternoon and do untold damage and that’s what
happened in Ash Wednesday in 1983 — rapid onset, fast moving into built up areas and the human
toll was huge and we don’t want that today’. 117
This narrative indicates that a great deal of information on bushfires and the risk of bushfires was broadcast
in Victoria throughout the 2008–09 bushfire season, and particularly in early February 2009. This material
was generally of a high quality, attracted significant media attention and achieved high media ‘penetration’. 118
Professor Handmer expressed the view that the use of a person such as the Premier to disseminate messages
is very useful and likely to carry high credibility. 119
Mr Esplin remarked:
I haven’t seen a situation where as many warnings were delivered in that period of time, in such
a period of time. Warnings that were stark and clear and unequivocal about the level of risk. 120
4.88
4.89
4.90
4.91
After the fires, the OESC commissioned an independent media analysis of the radio, television and print
coverage for the period 4–7 February. 121 The media analysis confirms that terminology related to fire
predictions and the dire weather forecasts, such as ‘warnings’, ‘heatwave’ and ‘bushfire’ were used
repeatedly in the lead up to 7 February. 122
Professor Handmer stated that the ad hoc high-level ‘warnings’ from people such as the Premier, the Chief
Fire Officers and the Emergency Services Commissioner were ‘very clear not only about the risk in physical
terms, but also the types of people who might be most vulnerable and the sorts of things that perhaps
people could do’. 123
The message delivered in the days leading up to 7 February were direct in their meaning. The words of the
Premier, the Chief Fire Officers and the Emergency Services Commissioner showed foresight. Each of them
was honest, forthright and explicit in the information and advice they gave. There is no doubt that each went
to great lengths to disseminate the message that Victoria was facing an extreme fire risk.
These messages no doubt contributed to many Victorians’ preparedness and, possibly, were responsible
for saving the lives of some who heeded those words and left bushfire prone areas prior to 7 February
and/or undertook additional preparations for the bushfire threat.
132

Warnings
4.92
However, it is also clear that for many Victorians these general awareness messages and advice were not
sufficient to alert them to the threat caused by any particular bushfire, nor were they translated into a ‘call to
action’ in all cases. Such statements in the media prepare the community only to the extent that individuals
respond, prepare and listen for specific bushfire warnings which may follow. This can in part be explained by
the evidence of Professor Douglas Paton, Chair, School of Psychology, University of Tasmania, who discussed
the various factors (individual, social and structural) that influence a person’s level of bushfire preparedness. 124
BUSHFIRE WARNINGS ON 7 FEBRUARY
4.93
4.94
4.95
An outline of the specific warnings issued on 7 February is provided in Chapter 1. This section provides
a broader discussion about different types of warnings. The Commission will hear further evidence on the
warnings given for each major fire in future hearings.
Mr Rhodes stated that the methods the CFA uses to disseminate information include:
■■
information releases, which are uploaded to the CFA website ( www.cfa.vic.gov.au), read aloud
on ABC Radio, and provided to the VBIL, so that they can be used to respond to public enquiries
■■ a hotline number established with ABC Radio, so that a designated CFA officer can contact the control
room direct to broadcast urgent threat messages
■■ the VBIL, which is a free call number the public can call to obtain information about current fire threats,
preparedness advice and also recovery information
■■ community meetings held during fire threats that provide community-specific warning information
and advice
■■ information releases provided to local radio stations by regional offices and Incident Control Centres
before they have been sent through to the iECC
■■ community fireguard telephone trees, which work by one member contacting two or more other members
when they become aware of a threat, who in turn contact other telephone tree members and so on
■■ local community members with access to scanners that can monitor CFA radio communications to pick
up information direct from the fire ground. 125
There is evidence before the Commission about each of these methods of information dissemination.
It emerged that on 7 February agency websites and ABC broadcasts were the most common sources
of information and warnings about bushfires for most Victorians, though other sources played a
complementary role.
THE CFA and DSE websites
4.96 On 7 February the CFA and DSE issued warnings for a large number of fires. The pressure on the agencies’
staff and volunteers was extreme and all those involved were forced to cope with a rapidly evolving situation
and threats posed by multiple emergencies. At times, there were obvious limitations on their capacity to
supply information on fires. Mr Waller noted the following:
It was extremely difficult to provide accurate information as all fires were moving extremely quickly and
spotting long distances. Fires moved rapidly into difficult terrain where it is difficult to track progress and
is dangerous to access. There was intensive short distance spotting. Surveillance was also restricted as
at times planes could not fly with the strong winds, or could not safely approach the smoke plume and
infra red scanning was not possible. Ground observation was also limited because [sic] the concern for
safety. Incoming reports on fires from the public had to be quickly verified before possible inclusion in
messaging on where a fire front may be. 126
4.97
Mr Rees produced a copy of all bushfire warning messages posted to the CFA website on 7 and
8 February. 127 Mr Waller produced a detailed compilation of all the information and warnings issued
by DSE on 7 February, including the information posted on the DSE website and sent to the ABC. 128
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2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report
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4.98
This demonstrates that a very large number of awareness, alert and urgent threat messages were posted
to the CFA and DSE websites throughout the day. Information contained in the awareness, alert and urgent
threat messages was conveyed to the ABC and to commercial media for broadcast. It was also supplied
to the VBIL to be used by staff providing information to the public. 129
134
Warnings broadcast by the ABC
4.99 Consistent with the MOU, many bushfire warnings were broadcast by the ABC on 7 February. After the
usual midday news bulletin, local radio Victoria began its scheduled grandstand sports broadcast but
interrupted this at about 12:30pm to broadcast fire-related information. As information about the number
of bushfires burning in various parts of Victoria was received, and the growing seriousness of the situation
became apparent, Victorian local radio management decided to cancel scheduled programming and switch
to continuous rolling coverage of the bushfires. 130
4.100 During the day, much of the content broadcast on local radio Victoria was sourced from 774 ABC Radio
Melbourne. In some areas, local ABC radio stations made local broadcasts at some stages of the day. 131
4.101
The information concerning bushfires received by the ABC came from multiple sources:
■■ telephone calls from representatives of emergency services made on the hotline directly to 774 ABC Radio
Melbourne production studio in Southbank and to regional radio stations and directly to ABC local radio staff
■■ emails from the fire agencies and Victoria Police
■■ ABC staff monitoring the DSE and CFA websites: on the afternoon of 7 February a person in the Ballarat
studio was rostered to monitor the messages being posted on the agencies’ websites and as appropriate
to read those messages on air on 774 ABC Radio Melbourne
■■ direct conversations between CFA and DSE staff and ABC personnel located at the iECC
■■ ABC staff speaking directly to Incident Controllers by telephone, and sometimes the Incident Controllers
being interviewed on air
■■ telephone calls with representatives of the Bureau of Meteorology
132
■■ telephone calls, SMS messages and emails from members of the general public.
133
4.102 There are in evidence transcripts of the 774 ABC Radio broadcasts on 7 February. Additional audio files
and transcripts of ABC Central Victoria Radio, ABC Gippsland Radio, ABC Western Victoria Radio, 3AW
and ABC local radio were also tendered. 134 In addition, a chart setting out the first mention of warnings for
the Kilmore East and Murrindindi fires was tendered. 135
4.103 It is clear from this material that bushfire awareness, alert and urgent threat messages were read multiple
times throughout the day. ‘On the spot’ coverage was provided throughout the day. Interviews were
conducted with representatives of the emergency services, callers from the public provided information
and reporters on the ground provided additional coverage.
4.104 An extremely high volume of calls was received by ABC Radio on the afternoon of 7 February.
The Melbourne Southbank studio received just over 6000 calls. In comparison, on an ordinary day
it expects to receive approximately 800 calls. 136
4.105 Ms Stayner said calls to the ABC were being made simultaneously and continuously on multiple lines.
Producers and editorial staff were answering calls for over 10 hours commencing at about midday on
7 February. 137 The events of the afternoon presented a ‘very challenging situation even for experienced staff’. 138
Some members of the public called in a distressed state seeking information, which presented difficulties
for ABC staff. 139 The public increasingly called the studio looking for specific information and reporting
problems with the VBIL. 140 Some callers rang back repeatedly and became increasingly frustrated. 141
4.106
In addition to the information broadcast on ABC Radio:
■■
ABC television broadcasts on 7 February carried ‘crawlers’ which advised viewers that there were fires
burning throughout Victoria and that they should listen to their ABC local radio for further information.
The first crawler went to air at 1:45pm and they continued regularly until nearly 10:00pm on 7 February. 142

Warnings
■■
Information was published on the 774 ABC Radio Melbourne Twitter account from about 12:30pm on
7 February until the early hours of the following morning. 143 The information published on the Twitter
account came from information already broadcast by the ABC, the CFA website and information on
the ABC news site. 144
4.107 The ABC played a vital role on 7 February in informing and warning the community. The efforts of its staff
are commended. The level of public trust in and reliance on the ABC is evident. However, in a number of
key instances the information provided by the ABC was out of date, or inaccurate — or there was simply
no information that particular communities were under threat. The ABC was reliant on accurate and timely
advice from the emergency services, and when this was not available, the quality of information relayed by
the ABC was inevitably compromised. The specific circumstances around warnings for the Kilmore East fire
are discussed in Chapter 9. The Commission will hear further evidence for each major fire in future hearings.
Commercial media
4.108 The commercial media also played a role in alerting the community to bushfire warnings. A compilation
of media clips (including commercial TV news bulletins) was played during the hearing. 145 These clips
graphically illustrated the level of attention that the bushfire risk gained in the commercial media on
7 February.
4.109 There is scope for increasing the involvement and profile of the commercial media in emergency broadcasting.
As Mr Rees noted, the MOU between the ABC and the emergency services agencies acknowledges that
ABC local radio broadcast to a maximum of about 25–30 per cent of Victorians at peak listening times, and
a smaller number outside those hours. 146 Attention needs to be paid to reaching those who are not within the
ABC’s audience.
4.110 Mr Grant Johnstone, General Manager of ACE Radio Traralgon stations TRFM and Gold 1242, gave
evidence. 147 ACE Radio is Victoria’s largest regional commercial radio network. It operates 13 AM and
FM radio stations throughout Victoria. Mr Johnstone noted that ACE Radio and other commercial radio
networks are not recognised officially as emergency broadcasters. 148 However, ACE Radio follows the
procedures contained in the Commercial Radio Australia Limited codes of practice and guidelines for
broadcasts of emergency information. 149 Pursuant to those guidelines, ACE Radio broadcasts emergency
information. ACE Radio broadcast the warning messages it received on 7 February and undertook
substantial efforts to obtain information directly from Incident Controllers to supplement that information.
4.111 ACE Radio’s system for broadcasting emergency service announcements relies heavily on the emergency
services directly contacting ACE Radio by telephone, fax or email and on ACE Radio staff being able to
speak to emergency service personnel directly when the need arises. 150
4.112 Mr Johnstone noted, however, that there are two major consequences of ACE Radio not having the status
of the emergency broadcaster:
(1) Incident Controllers and others charged with dissemination of information do not automatically
and routinely provide emergency information to commercial regional radio networks. As a result,
the information available for broadcast is more limited than it should be.
(2) Commercial broadcasters are not promoted in the mind of the public as ‘emergency broadcasters’. 151
4.113 Mr Johnstone expressed the firm view that all radio networks that are prepared to broadcast emergency
service information during bushfires and other emergencies, and to maintain appropriate standards when
doing so, should enjoy equal access to the emergency service information to maximise public accessibility.
He noted that ACE Radio would be prepared to enter into an undertaking with the relevant authorities to
guarantee the extent and integrity of its emergency information broadcasts in a similar way to the MOU
that presently exists between the ABC and Victorian emergency services organisations. 152 He said:
135

2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report
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It is something that I particularly feel quite passionate about; that all broadcasters should be given
an equal footing and all broadcasters should be given equal access to the information … it would be
impossible to say that everybody was listening to the ABC on February 7. Given the volume of calls that
we received on that night, I would suggest that that’s not the case. Therefore all radio stations … in a
given area should be given equal access to the information. 153
4.114 Efforts should be made to pursue this willingness of commercial radio interests to enter into arrangements
and commitments similar to those with the ABC.
4.115 The State indicated in its submissions that the OESC has already decided to negotiate with commercial
broadcasters who wish to act as emergency broadcasters and thereby ‘extend the reach of warnings
delivered by radio and beyond the audience of the ABC’. 154 This development is welcomed. However, the
Commission notes that success in extending the emergency broadcaster network will require commitment
by the parties on an ongoing basis.
HOW DID THE COMMUNITY RECEIVE AND UNDERSTAND THE WARNINGS
on 7 february?
4.116 Evidence previously described in this chapter confirmed that a large volume of warnings was issued in
various forms and at different times during 7 February. The Commission has also paid careful attention
to the content, accuracy and timelines of the warnings, the detail of their accessibility to the communities
directly affected by the fires, and to the nature of their general dissemination.
Interim report of the Bushfire CRC
4.117 The Bushfire CRC has produced an interim report on its investigation into the fires: Victorian 2009 Bushfire
Research Response Interim Report (June 2009). 155 That report included a detailed study of human behaviour
and community safety. 156 The themes that emerged included the existence of low levels of awareness prior
to 7 February, criticisms of some of the sources of information relied on by the community and concerns
about an absence of timely warnings.
4.118 The report’s findings were based on preliminary analysis of 201 (or approximately one third) of the interviews
conducted by the research team. 157 The researchers’ preliminary analysis of the material indicated that a
minority of those interviewed (about one in five) spoke of some level of awareness of heightened risk of fire
predicted for 7 February, although it was noted that not all interviewees were asked specifically about this. 158
Very few of those interviewed indicated that the forecast and warnings had resulted in them changing their
behaviour prior to 7 February. The report noted that:
The most frequent outcome of the early predictions and warnings was to raise general, non specific
concern about the possibility of fire, and to probably promote a ‘wait and see on the day’ response.
Only a small minority of residents of at risk communities appear to have interpreted the warnings as
having implications for their personal safety and the security of their property resulting in either earlier
action to prepare their property for a defence, or a decision to be elsewhere. 159
136
4.119 Most interviewees reported receiving information via the radio on 7 February. Very few made references
to specific and useful information having being broadcast. 160 The report noted that for many interviewed,
the lack of timely information about developing threats to communities such as St Andrews, Strathewen,
Kinglake, Kinglake West, Narbethong and Marysville, especially late in the day when fire activity was rapidly
increasing, may have contributed to people being surprised by the sudden impact of the fires. Because
those communities were not identified as being under threat, many residents appear to have assumed
they were unlikely to be threatened. 161
4.120 Many interviewees reported seeking information from the CFA and DSE websites and were critical of those
sites. 162 Particularly in Bendigo and Marysville, those interviewed also indicated that direct verbal warnings
from police officers and CFA and SES volunteers were very important in enabling residents to evacuate
safely. 163 The report concluded:

Warnings
In summary, for many of those interviewed, environmental cues as to the risk of fire (smoke, flames,
embers) served a useful function in alerting them to a developing threat, and in many instances
prompting an active search for more information, or a decision to take active steps to evacuate or to
initiate defence. These environmental cues took on special significance in the reported absence of
specific warnings via the media and agency websites about imminent threat to many of the affected
communities. However, environmental cues, especially remote cues such as smoke, are ambiguous and
are likely to add to uncertainty in the absence of accurate, specific, and timely information for residents
about developing fire threats. By way of concluding, vigilance by residents for environmental cues on
Total Fire Ban Days cannot always be relied upon. 164
analysis of a SPECIFIC BUSHFIRE WARNING ISSUED ON 7 FEBRUARY
4.121 Professor Handmer was asked to comment on the effectiveness of the bushfire warning messages issued
during the fires. 165 In particular, he was asked to comment on bushfire warnings placed on the CFA website
on 7 February. One of these warnings is replicated below.
Table 4.2: Alert Message for the Saunders Rd, Kilmore East fire, 2:20pm
Effective
From
Effective
To
News
Title
Message
Type
Message
Authorised
by
Review
date/
time
7/02/2009
14:25
7/02/2009
14:40
Saunders
Rd,
Kilmore
East fire,
2.20pm
Alert
Message
for fire at
Kilmore
East
Incident Information: A grass fire is burning
3 kilometres east of Kilmore, near Saunders
Road (VicRoads Map reference 417 C4).
It is burning in a south easterly direction.
This fire is not currently posing a threat to
communities, however the communities
of Kilmore East, Wandong and Clonbinane
need to be aware of this fire. This fire has now
jumped the Hume Highway and significant
spotting has occurred. The fire is impacting
on the outskirts of the Wandong township.
Estimated size is over 600 hectares. Core
Advice: People in the area need to remain
alert as there may not be a warning should
conditions change unexpectedly. Continue
to listen to ABC or local radio for updates on
this fire. Be prepared to activate your bushfire
survival plan if necessary. Decide now if you
are going to stay or go. Remember that it is
very dangerous to leave late with a fire in the
area. Road use in the area will be extremely
hazardous due to low visibility from smoke.
Watch out for fallen trees, power lines,
abandoned cars, wildlife and emergency
services vehicles. If you plan to stay,
remember to seek shelter from radiant heat.
Should the fire reach your property, close all
doors and windows and stay inside the house
while the fire passes. Remain alert, extinguish
any small fires and if necessary, move outside
to burnt ground once the fire has passed.
Drink plenty of fluids to avoid dehydration.
For information on fires in Victoria and general
fire safety advice, please contact the Victorian
Bushfire Information Line (VBIL) on freecall
1800 240 667. Callers who are deaf, hard of
hearing, or have a speech/communication
impairment may call textphone/telewriter (TTY)
on 1800 122 969. Information is also available
at www.dse.vic.gov.au/fires
SDO Gregg
Patterson
(null)
137
Source: Exhibit 3 – Statement of Rees, Annexure 31 (WIT.004.001.0509) at 0530–0531 166

2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report
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4.122
In relation to this message, Professor Handmer made the following points:
■■
■■
Layout: subheadings are present but hard to find, people have to read the whole statement carefully
to find what they might want.
Content and wording: This is an alert message, but the timeframe it is relevant for is only 15 minutes.
This appears inconsistent with the message ‘the fire is not currently posing a threat to communities’,
and the statement that the fire ‘is impacting’ on the outskirts of the Wandong township. He concludes
that ‘much of that message is generic in all the alert messages but it is quite confusing, more than
quite confusing’. 167
4.123 The confusion caused by a message which states both that, ‘this fire is not currently posing a threat to
communities’ and that ‘the fire is impacting on the outskirts of the Wandong township’ is particularly
problematic. Mr Rhodes accepted that this rendered the message ‘contradictory’. 168
4.124 The reference to a fire being 600 hectares in size is not, on its own, particularly informative to most members
of the public, unless accompanied by an indication of the severity and speed of the fire. The reference to a
VicRoads map (which appears in this warning, but not all those posted on the CFA website) may be very
useful to those travelling, but other information describing the location and predicted spread of the fire is
likely to be more useful to residents who are in their homes when they receive the warning.
4.125 In the context of an exploration of these mixed messages, Mr Esplin stated that he was aware the CFA
and DSE were already reviewing the language in the messages. 169 The terminology, design and content
of the messages indeed needs urgent review.
4.126 A real problem with this message, and others like it, is the failure to indicate the severity of the approaching fire,
and the failure to refer explicitly to the window of time until the fire reaches Wandong and other communities.
4.127 When asked to comment on urgent threat messages, Mr Esplin said such a message should not be
regarded as a warning to leave. He asserted that it is rather ‘the last bit of information for a community that
has prepared itself to stay and defend its property’. He said ‘If you get an urgent alert message [sic], it is
to help those people who are planning to stay and defend their properties and it should not be seen as a
trigger to flee, which all the research at that stage had highlighted was the most dangerous option to you’. 170
4.128 This suggests that urgent threat warnings carry meaning only for those who have determined to stay and
defend their properties. However, it is clear that many in the community decide to leave when threatened
by fire and that for some, an urgent threat message is the first indication they receive of fire in their area.
Such messages must be crafted with this reality in mind.
LAY WITNESSES VIEWS ON THE WARNINGS
4.129 Lay witnesses provided useful evidence about warnings relevant to their communities. A number of those
who gave evidence did not hear specific bushfire warnings for their community. Some did not receive a
warning because a timely warning was not disseminated for their community. Some were unable to receive
warnings as their homes had lost power by the critical time. Others did not actively seek warnings or
‘missed’ specific warnings, because they were engaged in other activities, or were preparing their homes
or focusing on other communication sources when the warning was disseminated. Some heard warnings,
but found them inadequate in their description of the speed and severity of the fire.
4.130 Many of those who gave evidence before the Commission expressed grief, anger and frustration about
the fact that they or their family members did not receive timely or accurate (or in some cases any) warnings
sufficient to enable them to take steps to protect themselves and their families.
4.131 Witnesses drew on various sources for information and warnings. Dr Lachlan Fraser of Marysville was aware
of the weather forecast. He saw smoke at about 3:30pm on the afternoon of 7 February and then sought
information from the VBIL, which confirmed that there was a fire at the Murrindindi Mill. He listened to
commercial radio rather than the ABC. 171
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Warnings
4.132 Mr John O’Neill of Steels Creek listened to the commercial stations and 774 ABC Radio. He monitored the
CFA website. His family also made use of a telephone tree in their area. 172 Ms Alice Barber of Pheasant Creek
heard on the television and radio about fires in Kilmore East. 173
4.133 Mr Peter Olorenshaw of Calignee was aware of the severe weather and fire risk. In particular, he listened to
the ABC and monitored the Bureau of Meteorology website. Mr Olorenshaw is the leading Senior Constable
attached to the Latrobe Traffic Management Unit. In that capacity he attended Red Hill Road where fire was
already burning, and he and his partner drove to a number of homes and personally advised residents of the
approaching fire. 174
REACTIONS TO THE INFORMATION BROADCAST PRIOR TO 7 FEBRUARY
4.134 Some lay witnesses reported their reactions to the information concerning the weather predictions for the
weekend disseminated in the days before the fire. Ms Jesse Odgers of Kinglake left her home at lunchtime
on Friday 6 February having heard that ‘conditions would be worse than that of Ash Wednesday’. 175
Ms Odgers said:
There are two parts to my decision, that it was a risk on the Saturday and that was the weather forecast.
I have never heard before in my life a weather forecast that stated that conditions would be worse than that
of Ash Wednesday and together with that and the forecast for extreme winds, temperatures in the low
to mid forties and so that is one part of the external information; and the second part of that information
was my physical experience of where I lived ... seeing the leaves drop from the trees, I had never seen
that before in my life and I thought that was another extreme indicator that something was very wrong. 176
4.135
Mr Peter Newman of Buxton said:
All that week the weather forecasts had got progressively worse, and they started dynamite, anyway, and
they said Saturday is going to be the worst on record … You can’t get any plainer than that they said this
is going to be the worse day on record. On that day we got to 48 degrees and 4 per cent humidity I was
told. You can’t get any worse than that. 177
4.136
Mr Brian Patten of Upper Plenty said: ‘I was well aware that Saturday was going to be a big day for fires or
a dangerous day for fires’. 178 Mr Ken Rogers of St Andrews was aware that 7 February had been declared
a day of Total Fire Ban and regarded this as ‘an indication’ and had undertaken various preparations but
was nevertheless expecting to hear a specific warning. 179 Mr Rogers said:
We understood that it was going to be a pretty bloody day and with a high risk of fire and to be ready for
it. Also, it should be remembered, after 4 days, after [sic] 43, the place was tinder dry. It was obviously a
very high risk of fire, but I think, you never really think it’s going to happen to you. They always seem to
happen to other people. They always had in the past anyway. 180
4.137
Dr John Ferguson of Buxton was aware of weather predictions to the effect that it was to be ‘potentially the
worst bushfire day in Victoria’s history’. Dr Ferguson was listening to ABC Radio, but did not hear the warning
message for Marysville and Buxton at 5:34pm, as by then the power had gone off at his home. He noted,
however, that by that time he could see the smoke in the sky and it was obvious the fire was coming. 181
Waiting for a trigger
4.138 A common theme among lay witnesses was that they expected to receive information about whether the
fire had reached certain areas or towns, which they regarded as an indication that the fire was ‘in their area’.
Some of those witnesses were then overtaken by the speed of the fire when it reached their homes.
For example, Mr Denis Spooner of Strathewen and his family were waiting for an indication that the
fire was in or near Whittlesea. 182 Ultimately, the family left their home, but became separated. 183
Sadly, Mr Spooner’s wife and adult son died in the fire.
Ms Jacqueline Hainsworth of Kinglake West, heard the warning from the Premier on the Friday.
4.139
184
But she
anticipated that the trigger for her to leave would be news of a bushfire anywhere in her area including
Whittlesea, Mount Disappointment, Humevale, Strathewen, St Andrews or Kinglake, rather than declaration
of a Total Fire Ban day. 185
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4.140 Mr Illiya Ananiev of St Andrews said his family was relying on a ‘trigger’ from the internet or the CFA
scanner. Mr Ananiev was aware of the high fire danger, but his first awareness of a fire in his area was being
showered by blackened sticks in his family swimming pool. At that time, the only information on the website
was that a Kilmore fire was ‘going’ and Mr Ananiev was not concerned by this information. In the end his
family had to evacuate at the very last minute. 186
4.141 Mr Bevan Gobbett of Clonbinane planned to commence his preparations when he received word that
a fire had started in his shire. Mr Gobbett was first notified by a friend that a fire had started in Kilmore East.
He accepted that due to a family function on that day he had not heard or seen some of the earlier
warnings. Mr Gobbett had access to a CFA scanner, and the CFA and DSE websites, but found that
the substantive web pages were inaccessible. He also listened to ABC Radio. 187
4.142 Mrs Joan Davey was aware that her son and daughter-in-law from Kinglake were making preparations while
monitoring the CFA website and looking for information about fires in their area. The fire consumed the
family home and tragically took the lives of the young family, including Mrs Davey’s two grandchildren. 188
Informal sources AND visual cues
4.143 Some who gave evidence were not aware of a fire until they saw smoke in the area — for example,
Mr Daryl Hull working in Marysville. 189 Others first heard of fire in their area from friends and family. 190
Others heard information on CFA scanners — or later expressed the wish that they had been able to do so. 191
4.144 Mr Christopher Casey of Long Gully heard nothing about the fires as he was listening to a commercial radio
station. His first indication was noticing smoke in the distance. Ultimately Mr Casey went out into his local
area and was advised by a police officer of the need to evacuate. 192
4.145 Ms Sharon McCulloch of Kinglake was aware that the weather conditions leading up to 7 February were
as bad or worse than Ash Wednesday, but the first indication she had that the fire was approaching was
when she saw smoke and was informed by a relative. She did not hear any warnings for Kinglake on
ABC Radio during the brief period she listened to it. 193
4.146 Mr Douglas Walter of Taggerty had been listening to 774 ABC Radio and heard notification of a fire in
Kilmore that was moving quickly. However, the first indication he had of the progress of the fire was his
direct observations of the smoke. 194
4.147 Mr David O’Halloran and his family monitored ABC Radio and the DSE and CFA websites. He did not
hear a warning for his town of Flowerdale, although he accepted that a warning was broadcast on the
ABC shortly after ten past six. He heard from a neighbour that fire was approaching Kinglake. 195
4.148 Ms Anastasia Scott of Marysville was aware of the forecast weather. But her first indication that a fire had
started at the Murrindindi Mill came from a phone call from a friend. She also received advice personally
from a DSE employee who happened to live nearby. 196
4.149 Ms Christine Glassford of Reedy Creek was aware of the weather forecasts and knew it was going to
be very hot. Ms Glassford’s first information concerning the fire was when she noticed smoke; she then
checked that information on the CFA website but it did not appear to match her observations. 197
Lack of timely warnings
4.150 Chapter 1 describes the main fires on 7 February and contains information on the provision of warnings.
For a number of the fires there is a serious time lag from the point of activation of emergency services to
the provision of information, alert and warning messages to the community. The Commission will hear
further evidence on the timeliness and accuracy of the warnings given for each major fire in future hearings.
4.151 Mr David Brown of Strathewen was aware of the predictions for fire risk for Saturday 7 February. He said
that they were waiting for a trigger, that is an indication a fire was in their vicinity. The fire that came upon
them had started over four hours before it reached them. 198 Mr D Brown said:
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Warnings
I cannot understand how if the two senior officers with the command responsibility for the CFA on the
one hand and DSE on the other were prepared to go public a week or so later in the press and make
the statements they did about how certain they were where this fire was going to come out, that a
warning was not given to the community that was in the path of that fire. I cannot understand it. 199
4.152 Mrs Carol Matthews of St Andrews knew that her children were monitoring the CFA website while
undertaking careful preparatory steps for the approach of possible fires. There was no reference in the
material available to her children to fire approaching or reaching the town of St Andrews. Mrs Matthews
listened to 774 ABC Radio herself and could hear no mention of St Andrews being in the path of the fire. 200
The fire approached the family home rapidly, and tragically took the life of her son.
Views about the content of the warnings
4.153 A number of witnesses expressed concerns about the way in which information was conveyed to the public,
and suggested improvements.
201
4.154 For example Dr Christopher Harvey of Kinglake was aware of the weather predictions for 7 February.
But in his view, there were shortcomings in the way in which the extreme fire danger was conveyed to
the community:
We needed more. My dead neighbours, my deceased neighbours, my friends, we needed more
information. An extreme fire danger day to us is a day to be vigilant. That is as far as I would
describe that. 202
4.155 Dr Harvey called, in particular, for more information about the fire danger index, noting that this would
have to be accompanied by an education program. 203
4.156 Mr D Brown explained that his wife listened to the radio all day and monitored the CFA website. They became
aware that there was a fire in Kilmore East early in the afternoon, but were surprised by the speed by which
it came to their property. 204 Mr D Brown also stated that information about the fire danger index would have
helped people understand the severity of the fire. He said:
I think it would have been a very graphic way of demonstrating the level of potential risk. When you have
an index that normally runs from 0-100 as its top end and it was registering 328, that is a very graphic
illustration of the seriousness of the potential event and I think that would have been quite easy for
people to understand and I think … it would have caused us to think a lot harder about the potential risk
the Kilmore East fire, once we learnt about it on the afternoon of the Saturday, represented to us. 205
4.157 Mr Peter Brown of St Andrews became aware of the Kilmore East fire via an ABC Radio broadcast. He said
they only heard ‘snippets of information’ about the Kilmore East fire on the radio and had to ‘wade through
everybody else’s fires before we would get a little snippet about our fire’. A broadcast heard on ABC Radio
at about 4:00pm informed him that there was a fire in the Clonbinane area, which was advancing slowly with
a south-westerly change already coming through. This caused him to believe the fire would be pushed to
the north-east, away from his valley: 206
I had a strong belief that the information that I was receiving was accurate. I put it quite bluntly
that I would rather receive no warning at all than a warning that is patently inaccurate because,
rightly or wrongly, you pace your day to what information you’re hearing. 207
4.158
Mr P Brown also called for use of plain language:
I feel that when language like ‘held within containment lines’… what are they? The euphemisms for ‘held
within containment lines’ is, ‘oh, we’ve got it under control’… what does that mean? ... I think we have to
be absolutely blunt that, once these fires are out of control, they are out of control and unless you have
some form of backup plan on your property for life preservation you should get out. 208
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4.159 Ms Karen Ward of Mudgegonga was aware of the weather forecast and predictions. She heard a message
on ABC Radio in the evening, which was helpful because ‘it let us know that it was going to be us that was
directly affected’. Ms Ward also sought more information about warnings and suggested it would be useful
if fire was rated so it was clear if the approaching fire is going to be extreme. 209
4.160 Mr John Williams of Yarra Glen noted that on Friday ‘the tempo of the warnings certainly increased’ and
recalled seeing the warning given by the Premier. 210 He took this as a trigger to commence preparations to
defend the winery. He said, however, that the warnings he heard on ABC Radio were difficult to understand:
There were warnings issued from time to time in a very sort of performance type language, ‘a warning
is issued to the people of such and such that you may be about to endure an ember attack,’ this sort
of language, and I had to concentrate very carefully on each one of these messages just to see to whom
it did apply. If I missed the beginning of the statement, the rest of it was of no consequence whatsoever.
These messages went on, very lengthy, using up a lot of valuable time and I kept mumbling to myself,
‘get on with it, give a short, pithy messages that are up to date.’ They were out of date. I can see more
going on here than what’s being told over the radio. 211
4.161
He emphasised the need for short messages and suggested the following model:
‘A message for the people of Timbuktu. A message is issued at 1:35pm. You may be enduring an ember
attack within the next hour. This is a message for Timbuktu timed at 1:35pm’, and then move onto the
next one. 212
4.162 Ms Jillian Kane of Bendigo, gave evidence on the death of her disabled brother in Long Gully. She noted
that given his vulnerability he, and those like him, require ‘a more effective warning system’ and advance
notice to be able to arrange to relocate. 213
conclusions on the construction and content of BUSHFIRE warnings
4.163 Changes should be made to the content of bushfire warnings. Many of the warnings used by the fire
agencies on 7 February were deficient in the following respects:
■■
many warnings did not indicate the likely severity of the fire; this is a significant shortcoming
■■ the warnings rarely identified the window of time during which the fire was predicted to reach
certain towns or communities; this information is vital to the community
■■ some warnings were imprecise in their description of the location of a particular fire or the direction in
which the fire was spreading; again, this information is important to those preparing to meet the threat
■■ the advice in many warnings was lengthy and confusing, sometimes even contradictory; it was difficult
to identify the important information
■■ the terminology used in some warnings was vague and euphemistic; it did not serve to grab the
audience’s attention.
4.164 On the particular language to be used in bushfire warnings, as Mr Rees agrees, terms like ‘going’ and
‘out of control’ — though they have meaning to fire specialists — fail to convey sufficient meaning to the
public. 214 In his evidence, Mr Lawson agreed that the use of a term such as ‘extremely dangerous bushfire’
would be in keeping with the desire to use plain language. 215 Mr Pearce agreed that using the term ‘severe’
would improve communication about the severity of fires. 216 Terms which convey clearly the severity and
intensity of bushfires should be used.
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Warnings
RECOMMENDATION 4.2
The State ensure that the content of bushfire warnings issued in Victoria reflects the principles set out
in the Commonwealth policy paper Emergency Warnings — Choosing Your Words (2008). In particular,
all bushfire warnings issued in Victoria must use clear language, avoid euphemisms, and contain explicit
information in relation to:
■■
■■
the severity, location, predicted direction and likely time of impact of bushfires on specific communities
and locations; and
the predicted severity of impact of the bushfire and whether a specific fire poses a threat to human life.
TOWARDS A LONGER TERM APPROACH — A NEW CATEGORISATION SYSTEM
4.165 A number of witnesses who appeared before the Commission said that it may be desirable to develop
a clearer means of communicating the severity of a bushfire to the public. Some witnesses proposed drawing
on the ‘category one, category two’ terminology used in cyclone warnings. For example, Mr P Brown
suggested an improved system of fire danger rating:
… you could have a total fire ban season and you could train people up on the type of equipment that
can be used on any given day, and then what happens is you rate everyday during the fire season from
a 1 through to a 5. You can have it such that, as you move through it, the response from the fire authority
can go from being at a 1, where the fire can be contained within a given time and so the community can
have confidence that it is actually within a scale that the fire authorities can control, right through to a
5, where straightaway we know that, when the fire occurs, unless it is under control within the first ten
minutes to a quarter of an hour, it’s now out of control … the community needs to know that. 217
4.166 Similarly, Mr Ananiev suggested, ‘All we are looking for is a category 1, 2, 3, or 5, and maybe a colour,
red, yellow, green, to mix in with it’. When asked about use of the terminology ‘extremely dangerous’,
he said ‘For me it would be category 1. One red’. 218
4.167 Ms Glassford said she found the information on ABC Radio confusing:
I would have probably personally preferred to have heard that the fire was in a particular location and the
direction it was heading rather than hearing about what towns were under threat. I think that probably
reflects the fact that I’m not really close to a particular town … I know a lot of people who were leaving late
that day. I think also just knowing where it was and the direction it was heading may have aided them in
choosing the direction to escape the fire. 219
4.168
Dr Harvey agreed:
You know you can’t be calling it a very extreme fire day, you can’t use that sort of language,
it just doesn’t mean a thing. Numbers mean things to people. 220
4.169 Professor Handmer drew comparisons with other warning systems used for natural disasters. He explained
that in relation to cyclones, there is a categorisation system ranging, ‘from 1 or 2, very low impact, to 5,
extreme cyclone’. He explained further the benefits of cyclone warnings, while noting that cyclones are
easier than bushfires to ‘detect, track and issue warnings for’. 221
4.170 There are important differences between floods, cyclones and fires, and different challenges are raised in
relation to warning systems for each. However, a more readily understood ‘severity scale’ to be used when
grading bushfires would assist the community in responding to bushfire warnings.
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4.171 The AFAC 2009 draft paper, A National Systems Approach to Community Warnings, recommended that
categorisation levels should be developed for other emergencies, and in particular that the use of the fire
danger index should be reconsidered, incorporating the experiences of dealing with cyclones. 222 Such an
approach has benefits and may be capable of more starkly bringing to the attention of the public the severe
risks attached to some fires.
4.172 In a related context, a number of witnesses spoke of the difficulty of conveying the severity of extreme fires
by reference to the current fire danger index scale. This matter is discussed in more detail below in Chapter 5.
4.173 In relation to the possible introduction of a numerical system of grading severity of fires, Professor Handmer
said that it may require some years of education but people would understand it, so long as it was
accompanied by an appropriate education awareness program. 223
RECOMMENDATION 4.3
The State commission research into the development of a new fire severity scale that denotes the risk
posed by dangerous and extremely dangerous bushfires (similar to the cyclone categories 1 to 5).
LESSONS FROM THE 2005 WANGARY FIRES AND PROJECT PHOENIX
4.174 In January 2005, the Wangary fire on the Eyre Peninsula in South Australia resulted in the deaths of nine
people and the destruction of 93 homes. After the Wangary fire, Mr Andrew Lawson was appointed as the
Country Fire Service of South Australia (CFS) Liaison Officer to the Coronial Investigation Team and to assist
those conducting an independent review into the same fire. 224
4.175 Mr Lawson is currently Deputy Chief Fire Officer of the CFS. He is also a member of the AFAC Operations
Strategy Group and the Urban Strategy Group. Mr Lawson has extensive experience in all areas of the
fire industry, including operational firefighting, fire planning and mapping, administration, management
and policy development. 225
4.176 Mr Lawson gave evidence effectively ‘wearing two hats’. He attested to his experience dealing with the
aftermath of the Wangary fires and the implementation of a new bushfire warning system in South Australia.
He also gave evidence in his capacity as a member of AFAC’s Operations Strategy Group and as principal
author of the 2005 AFAC draft paper discussed at paragraph 4.48.
4.177 Mr Lawson explained that as a result of the Wangary fires, the CFS immediately commenced an extensive
‘lessons learnt’ process known as Project Phoenix. The aims of that project included identifying and
implementing improvements prior to the 2005–06 fire danger season. 226 One such improvement was the
introduction of a new bushfire warning system.
4.178 In January 2005, the CFS was using four levels of bushfire warnings. Part of the learning of Project
Phoenix was that there was widespread confusion about the numbering system and the meaning of
each phase in the system. 227 The CFS has since simplified the warning system to two levels, comprising
bushfire information messages and bushfire warnings. The new system is now known as the CFS Bushfire
Information and Warning System. 228
4.179 Bushfire information messages inform the community about a bushfire that is burning or ‘going’, and may
be threatening, but does not necessarily demand urgent action by the community. Bushfire information
messages may also include information and advice on the state of a more distant bushfire. 229
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Warnings
4.180 The second stage, the bushfire warning message, warns the community that a major bushfire is burning out
of control under high to extreme conditions and is a threat to public safety. A significant threat to life exists,
and the community needs to respond immediately to ensure their safety and survival. In South Australia,
a bushfire warning message is accompanied by use of SEWS. 230
4.181 Compared with the Victorian bushfire warnings, the South Australian regime involves less dense text, and
more explicit reference to a ‘threat to public safety’. Mr Lawson explained that the construction of the South
Australian messages takes into account the COAG recommendation of 2004. He said ‘we believe that it is
most important that the community understand what the risk is in as simple and as plain terms as possible’. 231
4.182 Professor Handmer was asked to consider the South Australian warning examples for comparison. He said
the South Australian examples were clear and straightforward and that the wording was ‘better practice’ in
how it describes the fire and locality. 232
The South Australian one is a bit more punchy. I often think a lot of CFA material is very sound but
perhaps it is directed more for people who like to read a lot of material — it is not a criticism; I like to
read a lot of material — whereas the South Australian one is minimalist and it would be seen, I think,
as good practice in warnings to try to just head in that direction that’s all. 233
4.183 When issued, CFS warning messages are displayed on the CFS website, broadcast on ABC Radio and
5AA (a commercial radio station) and sent to subscribers who opt in to receive CFS messages via email
and fax stream. 234
4.184 Mr Lawson explained that the CFS has an MOU with the ABC and the commercial radio station 5AA.
Those radio stations have undertaken to read on air a bushfire warning message immediately, regardless
of their programming commitments and to repeat it every 15 minutes thereafter. Each bushfire warning
message is preceded by SEWS. 235
4.185 South Australia implemented changes to its warning system very rapidly following the January 2005 fires.
The new system was in place by May 2005. Mr Lawson explained that ‘we had to do something prior to
the 2005–06 fire season’. 236 He indicated that it would be difficult for a new system to be introduced in
Victoria by October or November this year but that this should nonetheless be undertaken. 237
4.186 The State of Victoria’s submissions note that steps are ‘already being taken’ to ensure changes to
warnings will be implemented by next fire season. 238
4.187 Use of a two-part system of warnings, instead of the three used in Victoria, has appeal as a simpler approach
that is likely to be more easily understood by the public. The first level is essentially an information or alert
message of the existence of a fire, which does not necessarily require any action to be taken by the public,
other than to keep it under notice. The second level encourages urgent action, such as to activate a predetermined
fire plan. The level of threat can range from low to high depending upon the language used.
The Choosing Your Words publication provides a hierarchy of terms to match the assessed degree of risk,
urgency and need for action.
RECOMMENDATION 4.4
The State ensure bushfire warnings in Victoria are confined to two categories or stages:
■■
■■
Bushfire Information — a message providing information to the community on a bushfire that is ‘going’
and has the potential to threaten public safety; and
Bushfire Warning — a warning to the community about any dangerous or extremely dangerous bushfire,
particularly one that is burning out of control and poses a threat to human life.
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RETHINKING THE Standard emergency warning signal
4.188 As noted in paragraph 4.7, SEWS is not a warning. It is a distinctive alert tone or signal broadcast prior
to warnings for major emergencies. It is designed to ‘alert listeners or viewers of radio or television that
an official emergency announcement is about to be made concerning an actual or potential emergency
which has the potential to affect them’. 239
4.189 The use of SEWS is not referred to in the Emergency Management Manual Victoria, but a protocol is set
out in a document titled SEWS Guidelines for its Use in Victoria (October 2006). 240 The current protocol
for the use of SEWS requires the control agency to request the police to authorise its use. 241
4.190 SEWS was not used in Victoria on 7 February. There were no discussions with the Chief Commissioner
of Victoria Police about the use of SEWS on the day. 242
4.191 The Commonwealth had been considering a ‘relaunch’ of SEWS; however, it ceased that work in
anticipation of the findings of this Commission. 243
4.192 There is evidence of a clear reticence on the part of the emergency services in Victoria to use SEWS.
The signal has not been regularly used in Victoria, because of concerns about its so called ‘overuse’
and the emergency services’ view that its use may cause confusion. 244 This appeared, in part, to be
derived from reviews of past fires. For example, Mr Rees said:
Although the decision to use SEWS rests with an Incident Controller, the current practice within the CFA
is not to utilise SEWS. This is because whilst SEWS remains available for use, the current process of
graduated warnings is considered more sophisticated. That view has been reached on the basis of both
anecdotal evidence and reviews conducted following fires in 2006–07. 245
246
4.193 In evidence, Mr Rees expressed the view that SEWS does not have a place if there are multiple fires,
and expressed concern that if SEWS had been used on 7 February prior to each urgent threat message
on the ABC, it would have been played 510 times on the day.
4.194 There was criticism about the use of SEWS following the 2005–06 fires in the report Debrief Outcomes
Significant Victorian Fires December 2005 and January 2006, Review by Ross Smith 12 July 2006.
In particular, the report was critical of the risk of ‘SEWS overload’. It also noted that messages were
broadcast late, and that SEWS messages must be initiated well before the anticipated fire impact. 247
4.195 It is obvious that SEWS has little utility if broadcast too late. However, a criticism about the late use of
SEWS does not justify a conclusion that SEWS should not be used at all or that the mere use of SEWS
has the capacity to confuse the listener. Mr Esplin agreed that there were no reports following the 2005–06
fires of dangerous or late evacuations or death that could be traced back to use or misuse of SEWS. 248
4.196 Further consideration was given to use of SEWS in the report Joint CFA/DSE Review of Effectiveness
of Information Flow to Communities and Media During Fire Incidents – Preliminary Findings (July 2006)
(CFA/DSE Review of Information Flows). 249 This review suggested that the use of SEWS during 2006 fires
was inconsistent and sometimes inappropriate. It was overused to the degree that the public were
‘sick of it’. The consensus in the debriefs was that SEWS messages had become counter-productive. 250
4.197 The use of SEWS must be consistent. This could be achieved by adopting appropriate protocols, such as
one that the signal would be used to precede the proposed bushfire warning messages that relate to fires
of a particular severity — namely those which are ‘extremely dangerous’ and those that pose a threat to
human life.
4.198 The CFA/DSE Review of Information Flows report contains a curious comment. It states that, ‘other than
performing the role of an initial notification, SEWS in this context may arguably have become obsolete’. 251
However, the only appropriate role for SEWS is just that — as a signal, or what the review refers to as the
‘initial notification’. When seen in the correct light, SEWS does have an important and useful role to play,
as has been demonstrated in South Australia.
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4.199 The South Australian CFS uses SEWS whenever lives are at threat or when a fire is burning out of control
on a very high to extreme fire danger day. 252 SEWS precedes each bushfire warning message. Mr Lawson
explained that an education program was implemented prior to the re-introduction of SEWS. He was asked
whether, since the changes to the warning system were introduced in May 2005, the CFS had received
feedback about the use of SEWS, including any suggestions of irritation, confusion or panic. Mr Lawson
indicated the following:
We have received feedback from very small numbers of communities saying that it raises their level of
awareness unduly, that we have used the signal when the fire didn’t pose the threat that they believed
it should have as a result of using the warning, but we continued to use the SEWS warning. 253
4.200
When asked why the CFS continues to use the warning in the face of such criticism, Mr Lawson stated
the following:
We take that view that we have made that decision to use the SEWS, and until we have strong evidence
to the contrary that suggests it does in fact provide confusion to the community, then we will continue to
use the SEWS. 254
4.201 Professor Handmer suggests that SEWS can be useful: ‘warnings to me operate in a competitive
environment often with everything else people are doing or listening to, and there is often, not always,
but often needs to be some way of cutting through all the haze and the idea of SEWS is to do that’. 255
Mr Esplin said that he would prefer SEWS to remain available as a tool for the control agencies to use
‘if they believe it will materially assist the delivery of messaging to the community’. 256
4.202 The State and the ABC expressed concerns during the hearing that the introduction of a protocol for the use
of SEWS may lead to irritation or confusion in the community. 257 However, it has been possible to overcome
these issues in South Australia, as Mr Lawson outlined, by disaggregating the broadcasting network and
issuing warning and information messages to specific communities through the regional radio system. 258
4.203 The concerns expressed about the use of SEWS may be addressed by various means, including adopting
a sensible approach to a new protocol for its use. This could include:
■■
■■
grouping bushfire warnings that require the use of SEWS
reducing the length of time SEWS is played when used multiple times
■■ disaggregating ABC broadcasts on occasions when multiple fires are threatening different parts
of the State
■■ arrangements concerning the number of times particular warnings are repeated.
4.204 Professor Handmer indicated that, in his view, SEWS could be introduced to the Victorian community
before the next fire season. 259
4.205 In light of this discussion, it appears likely that a reintroduction of SEWS, accompanied by appropriate
education, could indeed be achieved prior to the next fire season. Of course, its reintroduction must be
accompanied by education on its purpose. 260 Further, any concerns about the effects of overuse of SEWS
could be addressed by the ABC, CFA and DSE implementing a protocol for a streamlined process for the
use of SEWS on ABC Radio and television.
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RECOMMENDATION 4.5
The State ensure that the Standard Emergency Warning Signal (SEWS) be used in Victoria to precede
each bushfire warning or group of warnings for bushfires that are dangerous or extremely dangerous,
particularly for a fire that is burning out of control and poses a threat to human life, subject to appropriate
limits on the maximum frequency of use.
RECOMMENDATION 4.6
The State invite commercial operators to enter into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU), similar to
its MOU with the ABC, on the dissemination of bushfire warning messages and the use of the Standard
Emergency Warning Signal by those operators.
THE USE OF SIRENS AS A BUSHFIRE WARNING
4.206 Sirens are intended as a signal to those in the vicinity to seek further information or take protective action
according to procedures established in the minds of those hearing the siren. 261 When understood correctly
(that is, as a trigger used against the background of an existing procedure for correct response) it is clear
that a siren may have a useful role as part of an overall system of bushfire warnings.
262
4.207 CFA policy is that sirens are not to be used for warning the public. Mr Rhodes expressed the view
that sirens have many limitations. 263 He confirmed that the CFA does not advocate the use of sirens. 264
4.208 The Commission has heard evidence on the use of sirens in some communities in Victoria and South Australia.
Whether the use of a siren is appropriate as a fire danger warning depends on local circumstances, including
a developed community appreciation of its function. There is scope to investigate and develop the use of
sirens in communities that would benefit from such an alert system. In addition, sirens may be useful outdoors,
particularly for travellers and campers. 265
4.209 A small number of lay witnesses who gave evidence before the Commission referred to the use of sirens.
For example, Mr Hull and Dr Fraser spoke of hearing the siren in Marysville sound briefly, but Mr Hull thought
it was a false alarm, given how quickly it stopped. 266 Dr Fraser heard something, but it was not a ‘wail’ and
did not appear to indicate that there was a fire in the area. 267 Ms Barber was waiting to hear the CFA siren
in Kinglake West, but it did not sound. 268
148
Ferny creek — a local solution
4.210 There is compelling evidence before the Commission of the manner in which a siren may be developed
for use by a town to serve its local needs and purposes. In 2001, the OESC facilitated the trial of a siren in
Ferny Creek. That process gave rise to a written report, The Ferny Creek Fire Alert Siren Evaluation Report
— Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner (2001). 269
4.211 The Ferny Creek fire alert siren trial was initiated following the recommendations of the State Coroner’s
inquest into the deaths of three people during the Ferny Creek fire on 21 January 1997. 270 A number of
residents expressed concern that the CFA fire siren could not be heard in their location and, as a result,
they had received little or no warning of the impending fire. This concern prompted a group of residents
to lobby all levels of government for the installation of a CFA-type siren that was audible to all residents
in an identified area in Ferny Creek. 271
4.212 The Ferny Creek trial was conducted by a working group of representatives from the CFA, Victoria Police,
Shire of Yarra Ranges, the OESC and three community resident representatives. 272 The report noted that the
process of reaching consensus about use of a siren involved a ‘shift from antagonism to acceptance’, and
that ‘it is also an example of the emergency services having the courage to move outside their comfort zone
and actively contribute to the trial of a system about which they have strong reservations’. 273

Warnings
274
4.213 The CFA’s opposition to the use of sirens is recorded in the report. In this context, the report noted
that statewide CFA messaging does not always suit local issues: ‘It does not consider people such as
recreational bushwalkers who may not have any warning about an approaching bushfire and those residents
(children and older people) who are not aware of safety procedures or who are not able to leave their homes
on days of total fire ban’. 275
4.214 It appears that the tension referred to above, which may exist between the statewide bushfire preparedness
policy and local interest in early warning systems that suit a particular community, continues to plague the
development of local solutions. One of the lessons from February 2009 is that greater weight ought to be
given to communities’ desires to fashion warning systems appropriate to their location and their needs.
4.215
Mr Esplin described the Ferny Creek siren in the following way:
They are a unique community in the sense of, firstly, their preparedness for fire; secondly in their accepting
that they have chosen to live in a place in the State that is particularly beautiful most of the time but
particularly high risk in a very small percentage of time. They accepted that risk and understood that
they had a responsibility to take steps themselves to protect themselves and their community. They were
prepared to take on responsibility for the siren which they have done and maintained to this time. 276
4.216 The community in Ferny Creek use their siren as a ‘contribution to promoting appropriate bushfire survival
behaviour’. It is not promoted as a trigger to evacuate, but rather it prompts residents to ‘access further
sources of information’ 277 and to activate defensive actions.
4.217 The progress of the Ferny Creek fire alert siren was further considered in a subsequent evaluation report:
Community Alerting For Bushfire — A Local Solution For a Local Need: The Ferny Creek Fire Alert Siren
Follow-up Evaluation 2002 conducted by the OESC. 278 The follow-up evaluation confirmed that the fire alert
siren is now ‘an established element within bushfire preparedness planning and response. The fire alert siren
is one link in a chain of communication being used and accessed by community residents’. 279
4.218 The evaluation noted that a belief remains in the emergency management sector that sirens encourage
residents to unsafely leave their homes if a bushfire threatens. The evaluation has in fact shown that, with
appropriate community education and communication ‘the role of the alert siren can be incorporated into
appropriate and safe planning and decision making’. 280
4.219 This example provides robust evidence that a siren can be part of a successful program for bushfire
preparedness and that, if properly understood and implemented, a protocol for the use of a siren does not
undermine statewide policies such as ‘stay or go’, which is further discussed in Chapter 7. The success of
the project is the result of considerable effort and goodwill on the part of the community, the local CFA and
the OESC.
THE USE OF SIRENS IN Boolarra
4.220 The Commission heard evidence from Mr Lou Sigmund on the use of a CFA siren in the town of Boolarra
on 30 January 2009, when the town was impacted by the Delburn fires. This evidence provides a vivid
example of how a siren might be used in a particular community and its capacity to save lives.
4.221 Mr Sigmund, who lives in Boolarra, has been a CFA Group Officer responsible for eight brigades in the
Morwell Group. He has been a volunteer fire fighter for the CFA since 1998. He has fire-fighting qualifications
and fought in a number of major fires. He was Operations Officer for the Ashfords Road fire (part of the
Delburn fires) between 28 and 30 January 2009. 281
4.222 Mr Sigmund gave a detailed account of his efforts while fighting the fires near Boolarra and about his role
in deciding to sound the siren. 282 The idea of sounding the siren came about at a community meeting on
30 January 2009, at which Mr Sigmund had expressed his strong view (contrary to advice from a CFA
representative) that the town was in imminent danger of being overrun by the fire. 283 Mr Sigmund then
told the meeting that once the ember attacks started ‘we will set the sirens’. 284
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4.223 The CFA siren was activated in Boolarra shortly after 1:00pm that day. A large number of people evacuated
the town. The main street was described as filled with caravans, boats and horse floats hooked up to cars
heading for Churchill. 285
4.224 Mr Sigmund’s direction to use the siren was contrary to CFA policy. Mr Sigmund was aware of the policy
against use of the brigade siren and he was chastised for its use. 286 He attested that he had received
‘nothing but positive feedback from townspeople. They have written letters; rung me and given me nothing
but support for the actions I took’. 287
288
4.225 Mr Sigmund, by his own account, acted on the spur of the moment. He accepted that his decision carried
risks and that if the fire had come from another direction, he might have been sending people into danger. 289
In this context, Mr Sigmund expressed the view that the ‘stay or go’ policy is impossible for ordinary people
to apply, because there are no trigger points to allow the average resident to make a judgement as to their
safety. 290 He said: ‘that is why at the meeting we decided to give them a trigger in the form of a siren’. 291
292
4.226 Twenty nine houses were lost in the fires at Boolarra but no-one died. Despite the siren being used in a
manner that is contrary to CFA policy, it appears to have served a useful purpose in warning townsfolk to
leave. Many appear to have acted on that trigger.
4.227 Mr Rhodes expressed serious reservations about the use of sirens, but he did note that the siren worked
in Boolarra on that occasion because its use was defined at the community meeting and the residents
understood its use. 293
4.228 In addition, Mr Lawson gave evidence that sirens are used in South Australia to alert the community
to the activity of the fire service. The South Australian CFS encourages local brigades to engage with
their communities and to use sirens for purposes determined by the community in consultation with
the brigade. 294 Some brigades use sirens to alert the community to fire, others do not. Mr Lawson said:
‘We leave it to the brigade to make that decision with the community’. 295
USE OF SIRENS AND REFUGES
4.229 There is also evidence before the Commission concerning the use of sirens in a number of communities
in conjunction with the use of refuges. One such community is Walhalla. The town of Walhalla uses the
Long Tunnel Mine as a refuge. 296 The use of this refuge is described in more detail in Chapter 8.
Woods Point also has an established procedure for the use of a siren in conjunction with its refuge. 297
4.230 The Commission also heard evidence about the use of a police car siren as a means of getting people’s
attention in Marysville. 298
Support for a new approach TO THE USE OF SIRENS
4.231 Mr Esplin accepted in evidence that individual communities who support the use of sirens as a means of
taking action to preserve lives and property should be supported by agencies in doing so. 299 Mr Rees also
accepted that the use of sirens should be reconsidered. 300
4.232 There is potential for more communities to attempt a comparable approach as that in use in Ferny Creek,
Walhalla or Woods Point. Not all communities will want to institute a local alert siren. Some communities
will determine to use their siren in different ways for different purposes. The option to pursue local solutions,
including sirens, should be part of Municipal Emergency Response Plans and should also be given more
prominence and assistance in the education campaigns and advice concerning bushfire preparedness.
As Mr Esplin notes in relation to the Ferny Creek fire alert siren:
The community should not be just a passive recipient of services; it should be an active participant
in developing safety strategies that it knows how to apply and is willing to apply, and applies, and
it is involved in a partnership with the emergency services and with local government … and it is
my philosophy that where such a tripartite partnership can be recreated, the safety outcomes are
maximised, but risk is mitigated to the greatest extent. 301
150

Warnings
4.233 Sirens are one of a number of options that might be deployed in some areas to ensure the community is
alerted to the need to be ready to receive warnings, search out further information, take defensive actions
or prepare to implement a protocol for a local refuge.
RECOMMENDATION 4.7
The Office of the Emergency Services Commissioner and the CFA develop guidelines for the use of sirens
in communities that decide to use a siren as part of their response to bushfires.
A TELEPHONY-BASED EMERGENCY WARNING SYSTEM
4.234 The evidence before the Commission establishes that the principal modes of warning the community about
the threat of fire on 7 February were broadcasts on ABC Radio and messages displayed on the CFA and
DSE websites.
4.235 However, the evidence also shows that members of the community often sought out more than one source
of information. Sources such as the VBIL, commercial media, CFA scanners, Twitter sites, phone calls and text
messages from friends or family were also important sources of information and warnings. Others formed their
own views based on their own observations of events as they unfolded.
4.236 Employing multiple modes to disseminate warnings is desirable to ensure the widest possible audience is
reached and to guard against the risk of failure of any one mode. Technology in particular has a role to play
but should not be solely relied upon.
4.237 This section considers the new technology, in particular a telephony-based warning system, that is available
to disseminate warnings.
TRIALlING A nATIONAL EMERGENCY WARNING SYSTEM
4.238 In 2005, the OESC — in partnership with Telstra, ABC Radio, DSE, Victoria’s emergency services, the Shires
of Yarra Ranges and Northern Grampians and the communities of Mt Evelyn, Stawell and Halls Gap — ran
a successful trial of an opt-in landline telephony-based community warning system known as CIWS: see the
report Community Information and Warning System — The Report of the Trial and Evaluation Office of the
Emergency Services Commissioner Report 2006. 302 The report stated that:
The purpose of a public warning system is to help minimise the impact or perceive threat of emergencies
on affected communities by providing timely and accurate information to assist people and organisations
to make decisions about their own safety. 303
4.239 At the time of the trial there were restrictions on Telstra’s use of the Integrated Public Number Database
(IPND). The IPND is an industry-wide database of all listed and unlisted public telephone numbers. It was
established in 1998 and is managed by Telstra under the terms of its carrier licence condition. As a result,
it was necessary to seek participating residents’ permission to use their telephone numbers and property
addresses to develop the CIWS trial database. 304 The report indicated that the CIWS Trial and Evaluation
was informed by key national and international research.
4.240
The report concluded:
The evaluation findings strongly demonstrated that the majority of the participating residents understood
the link between receiving the telephone message and immediately accessing ABC Radio as the secondary
information source. There was also a strong response to continue using the telephone to access other
sources of information (such as a telephone hotline). 305
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4.241 The Victorian trial of CIWS was a clear success. There were high hopes that the success could be built on
and a national telephony-based warning system could be implemented. Regrettably, these hopes did not
bear fruit until 2009.
4.242 Since the 2005 trial, Victoria’s position has been that a national community information and warning system
should be implemented. Victoria has advocated this position repeatedly and forcefully at the highest level. 306
4.243
For a national warning system to be implemented, a number of matters had to be resolved:
■■
Amendments to the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) to enable access to the IPND for the purpose
of issuing warnings were required. 307 There was considerable debate about the need for legislative
amendments. For example, Telstra argued initially that they were not required. The Commonwealth
disagreed and in the end amendments were made. 308
■■ Agreement reached among the states and territories as to the model of warning system to be
implemented (for example, whether it be opt-in or compulsory).
■■ Funding for the establishment of the warning system needed to be secured.
4.244 The chronology of events that unfolded after 2005 indicates that although steps were taken by
governments, sufficient priority and urgency was not given to implementing a national warning system.
4.245 It is not possible to set out every meeting, item of correspondence, event, review and paper that occurred
or was produced between 2005 and 2009 on this issue. Suffice to say that despite political will from the
Victorian Government and a lot of bureaucratic activity, progress was slow and debate was protracted. 309
4.246
The end result was that:
■■
■■
■■
■■
On 23 February, legislative amendments were introduced to permit disclosure of data in the IPND
in certain circumstances. The amendment now permits IPND information to be disclosed in the event
of an emergency or when an emergency is considered likely. The Telecommunications Amendment
(Integrated Public Number Database) Bill 2009, which was hastened as a result of the Victorian bushfires,
received Royal Assent on 26 March 2009. 310
On 23 February, a press release was issued announcing $11.3 million of Commonwealth funding to
contribute to the development of the warning system. 311
On 20 March, a tender was released for the construction of a database known as the Location Based
Number Store, to provide a warning delivery mechanism to the states and territories. Funding for the
development of the Location Based Number Store database and the first four years of operation is to
be drawn from the $11.3 million Commonwealth contribution announced in February 2009. 312
On 30 April, it was announced that COAG had agreed to develop a national telephone emergency warning
system. Further, the Prime Minister and the Attorney-General announced the Commonwealth investment
of up to $15 million to assist the states and territories in establishing the national system. 313
4.247 The new national telephone emergency warning system will be operated by the states and territories,
and will be developed following an open tender process. The system will send emergency warning alerts
by recorded voice and text to landline and mobile phones based on an owner’s billing address. A proposed
second stage, sending warnings based on the location of a mobile (rather than its billing address) will be
the subject of further research. 314
4.248 It now appears that the first stage of the warning system is capable of being implemented by
October 2009. 315
4.249 Victoria is managing the call for tenders for the proposed national Emergency Warning System.
On Tuesday 14 July 2009, the Victorian Premier issued a media release Brumby releases national
emergency warning system tender ahead of bushfire season. 316 The selective tender apparently involves
two major telecommunication providers, Optus and Telstra. Mr Brumby is quoted in the release as saying:
152
With the first milestone in the procurement process complete, we are on track to ensure this critical
system is in place in October. 317

Warnings
4.250 The Commission is encouraged by reports that this project is currently ‘on track’ but, the Commission
remains cautious given the projects history. The Commission will hear further evidence on the progress
of this project during future hearings.
THE USE OF SMS ON 2 MARCH 2009
4.251 Another ‘post fire’ event is worth mentioning in this context. On 2 March, Victoria Police and the OESC
decided to issue a mass warning message via SMS to warn of predicted severe weather. 318 The message
was in the following terms:
Msg from Vic Police: Extreme weather in Vic expected Mon night & Tues. High wind & fire risk.
Listen to local ABC radio for emergency updates. Do not reply to this message.
4.252 The message did not rely on the amendments to the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth), as it was sent
before they came into force. Approximately 2.07 million SMS messages were sent out over a number of
hours to Telstra mobile phone customers. 319
4.253 Due to time constraints, it was not possible to geo-code Victorian mobiles, that is, to allow warning
messages to be sent to all mobiles located in a defined area at the time of the transmission. As a result,
some Tasmanian customers received the SMS message. This was known prior to the message being sent,
and efforts were made to minimise any confusion that might have resulted. 320
321
4.254 A review of this event revealed a high rate of recall by recipients and ‘success’ in the message delivery.
The apparent success of the 2 March SMS message (and the fact that the capacity to send such messages
has existed for some time) underscores the utility of a telephony-based warning system.
Source: AAP Image
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A MULTI-MODE APPROACH TO EMERGENCY WARNINGS
4.255 The implementation of the first phase of the new telephony-based warning system appears to be
proceeding in a timely fashion, and, as noted, the State Government has announced it believes it will
be in place by October 2009. The Commission commends the leadership role adopted by Victoria in
the implementation of the system and the considerable work undertaken by Telstra in the development
of the technology.
4.256 If, by September 2009, it appears unlikely that the first phase of the system will be operational throughout
Australia, steps should be taken to ensure that the system is, nevertheless, operational in bushfire prone
parts of Victoria as soon as practicable thereafter, and ideally in time for the 2009–10 bushfire season.
4.257 The introduction of the second stage of the system should be investigated and implemented as a matter
of urgency. This stage will offer improvements, including the capacity to issue a warning of an emergency
to visitors to an area who have access to mobile telephones.
4.258 The introduction of a new national telephone emergency warning system should not replace, but rather
supplement, other modes of disseminating warnings, including unofficial messages. Multiple message
dissemination modes are essential, as any single mode is unlikely to reach everyone, and in a crisis
some dissemination modes can fail. 322 Mr Esplin said:
Well, firstly I would say that no one warning system will or is likely to capture all the community that needs
to be in receipt of that particular warning, but warning messages go from as simple as a megaphone to
a doorknocking, to use of the mass electronic media or, if time permits, it could be the print media, SMS
messaging, emails. The new technology is providing more and more opportunities to get that message,
that crucial message to more and more people. 323
RECOMMENDATION 4.8
The Australian Government, Council of Australian Governments and the State determine whether it is
technically possible to implement the second phase of the national telephony-based warning system
(that is, the delivery of warning messages to mobile phones based on the physical location of a handset
at the time of the emergency) with a view to implementation for the 2009–10 bushfire season.
154