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Chapter 4 - Warnings - 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

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<strong>2009</strong> <strong>Victorian</strong> <strong>Bushfires</strong> <strong>Royal</strong> <strong>Commission</strong>—Interim Report<br />

4 WARNINGS<br />

4.140 Mr Illiya Ananiev of St Andrews said his family was relying on a ‘trigger’ from the internet or the CFA<br />

scanner. Mr Ananiev was aware of the high fire danger, but his first awareness of a fire in his area was being<br />

showered by blackened sticks in his family swimming pool. At that time, the only information on the website<br />

was that a Kilmore fire was ‘going’ and Mr Ananiev was not concerned by this information. In the end his<br />

family had to evacuate at the very last minute. 186<br />

4.141 Mr Bevan Gobbett of Clonbinane planned to commence his preparations when he received word that<br />

a fire had started in his shire. Mr Gobbett was first notified by a friend that a fire had started in Kilmore East.<br />

He accepted that due to a family function on that day he had not heard or seen some of the earlier<br />

warnings. Mr Gobbett had access to a CFA scanner, and the CFA and DSE websites, but found that<br />

the substantive web pages were inaccessible. He also listened to ABC Radio. 187<br />

4.142 Mrs Joan Davey was aware that her son and daughter-in-law from Kinglake were making preparations while<br />

monitoring the CFA website and looking for information about fires in their area. The fire consumed the<br />

family home and tragically took the lives of the young family, including Mrs Davey’s two grandchildren. 188<br />

Informal sources AND visual cues<br />

4.143 Some who gave evidence were not aware of a fire until they saw smoke in the area — for example,<br />

Mr Daryl Hull working in Marysville. 189 Others first heard of fire in their area from friends and family. 190<br />

Others heard information on CFA scanners — or later expressed the wish that they had been able to do so. 191<br />

4.144 Mr Christopher Casey of Long Gully heard nothing about the fires as he was listening to a commercial radio<br />

station. His first indication was noticing smoke in the distance. Ultimately Mr Casey went out into his local<br />

area and was advised by a police officer of the need to evacuate. 192<br />

4.145 Ms Sharon McCulloch of Kinglake was aware that the weather conditions leading up to 7 February were<br />

as bad or worse than Ash Wednesday, but the first indication she had that the fire was approaching was<br />

when she saw smoke and was informed by a relative. She did not hear any warnings for Kinglake on<br />

ABC Radio during the brief period she listened to it. 193<br />

4.146 Mr Douglas Walter of Taggerty had been listening to 774 ABC Radio and heard notification of a fire in<br />

Kilmore that was moving quickly. However, the first indication he had of the progress of the fire was his<br />

direct observations of the smoke. 194<br />

4.147 Mr David O’Halloran and his family monitored ABC Radio and the DSE and CFA websites. He did not<br />

hear a warning for his town of Flowerdale, although he accepted that a warning was broadcast on the<br />

ABC shortly after ten past six. He heard from a neighbour that fire was approaching Kinglake. 195<br />

4.148 Ms Anastasia Scott of Marysville was aware of the forecast weather. But her first indication that a fire had<br />

started at the Murrindindi Mill came from a phone call from a friend. She also received advice personally<br />

from a DSE employee who happened to live nearby. 196<br />

4.149 Ms Christine Glassford of Reedy Creek was aware of the weather forecasts and knew it was going to<br />

be very hot. Ms Glassford’s first information concerning the fire was when she noticed smoke; she then<br />

checked that information on the CFA website but it did not appear to match her observations. 197<br />

Lack of timely warnings<br />

4.150 <strong>Chapter</strong> 1 describes the main fires on 7 February and contains information on the provision of warnings.<br />

For a number of the fires there is a serious time lag from the point of activation of emergency services to<br />

the provision of information, alert and warning messages to the community. The <strong>Commission</strong> will hear<br />

further evidence on the timeliness and accuracy of the warnings given for each major fire in future hearings.<br />

4.151 Mr David Brown of Strathewen was aware of the predictions for fire risk for Saturday 7 February. He said<br />

that they were waiting for a trigger, that is an indication a fire was in their vicinity. The fire that came upon<br />

them had started over four hours before it reached them. 198 Mr D Brown said:<br />

140

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