Chapter 4 - Warnings - 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

More documents

Recommendations

Info

2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report 4 WARNINGS BUSHFIRE WARNINGS: THE WELL-TRODDEN PATH 4.14 4.15 The review and analysis of warnings and their mode of delivery is not new. Successive inquiries, reviews and reports have considered bushfire warnings. Some have focused on warning content and construction, others on delivery systems. Some matters highlighted in these reports have received government support and been implemented. Others, in particular the national adoption of standard bushfire warnings and the development of a telephony-based warning system, received insufficient attention in the years after their recommendation. 1984 Report on Ash Wednesday 4.16 The 1984 inquiry into the 1983 Ash Wednesday fires produced a report, On Bushfire Disaster Preparedness and Response in Victoria. 9 That report noted the difference between warnings that simply raise general awareness and specific warnings about particular fires: … fire threat indicators which ushered in the 1982/1983 season served as a serious underscoring of the extreme risk facing authorities and communities alike. Whilst it is difficult to generalise with accuracy, it would appear that these indicators did help to enhance levels of awareness and preparedness. Whether this, in turn, had any significant effect on the disastrous circumstances of 16 February, is another matter. 10 4.17 4.18 4.19 4.20 The Ash Wednesday report went on to address warning and information systems generally. It emphasised the importance of maximum warning lead time, accurate meteorological information, standardisation and clarity of warnings. It also explored the methods of providing information, such as special messages or warnings that alert people to switch to a designated system, such as the ABC. It found that greater use should be made of local TV and radio stations and that ‘Special fire warning sirens should be located at police and fire stations; also, church bells should be utilised’. 11 The goal that warnings be standardised and their meaning rendered ‘clear and unambiguous’ was not fully achieved by 7 February. While sirens and church bells received specific attention in the report, the evidence before this Commission is that use of sirens was contrary to CFA policy on 7 February (further discussion at paragraph 4.224). The report emphasised the importance of informing the community about warning systems, and advising people about how to respond to them. It also recommended that ‘new systems which offer possibilities of enhancing warning capability should be examined’. 12 These comments appear just as relevant today as when they were published in 1984. While new systems were indeed examined and kept under review in the years since 1984, the available technology for a telephony-based warning system was not used or introduced prior to the February 2009 fires. This represents a missed opportunity, and is addressed in more detail below. 2002 COAG Report 4.21 In 2002, the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) commissioned a review of Australia’s approach to dealing with natural disasters. The review was carried out by a high level group of officials representing all levels of government. The product of that review was a report titled, Natural Disasters in Australia — Reforming Mitigation, Relief and Recovery Arrangements .13 4.22 The report concluded that current arrangements ‘could be improved to ensure that Australia has a world class national framework for disaster management’. 14 Significantly, the report recommended what it described as ‘a paradigm shift to disaster mitigation’. It recommended the implementation of a Disaster Mitigation Australia Package, which would include funding for programs such as disaster warning systems and community awareness and readiness measures. 15 122
Warnings 4.23 4.24 The report contained a number of recommendations, three of which are summarised below: ■■ there should be legislative obligations on all broadcasters to broadcast natural disaster warnings to the public via radio and television (Recommendation 26) ■■ guidelines should be prepared for best practice in the development of local area emergency warning systems (Recommendation 27) ■■ post disaster assessments should routinely review the effectiveness of warning systems (Recommendation 28). 16 The Victorian Government has entered into a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with the ABC, which appears to reflect part of the aims of Recommendation 26. Otherwise, the above recommendations were referred to the Australian Emergency Management Committee (AEMC) (a standing committee of the Ministerial Council for Police and Emergency Management — Emergency Management). An AEMC working group undertook to identify ‘the requirements for a nationally consistent emergency warning system’. Other initiatives such as the establishment of the National Forum on Emergency Warnings to the Community were undertaken. However, work on the development of a national telephony-based warning system did not come to fruition for a number of years. 17 2004 COAG report 4.25 The question of warnings was again considered by the COAG National Inquiry on Bushfire Mitigation and Management of 31 March 2004 (the 2004 COAG report). 18 This inquiry recommended that the content of bushfire threat warnings should be nationally consistent, and that SEWS should be used. 4.26 4.27 4.28 4.29 4.30 The features of a warning system emphasised in the 2004 COAG report are: a) A warning system should involve use of ‘a consistent warning signal’ at the beginning of the advice in circumstances where lives are at risk or there is a major threat to property to attract the attention of those who should be alerted to the warning that follows. b) A bushfire warning should provide information about the location, size and intensity of a bushfire threat. c) A warning should inform the listener as to the expected movement of the fire front and should identify the communities at threat. 19 d) A good warning advises communities on the appropriate action to take. As discussed further in this chapter, some of the warnings on 7 February were deficient with regard to matters raised in paragraph 4.26 b, c and d — and SEWS was not used at all. Recommendation 8.5 of the 2004 COAG report endorsed the recommendations on warning systems from the 2002 COAG report and further recommended that all fire ban advice and bushfire warnings should be used consistently (including SEWS) where lives or property are threatened. The 2004 COAG report also called for the introduction of a nationally uniform bushfire warning system. 20 Finally, it recommended that the structure of warnings should be based on the findings of the Bushfire Cooperative Research Centre’s (Bushfire CRC) project ‘Communicating Risk to Communities and Others’. The 2004 COAG report also indicated some logistical concerns about the use of SEWS. In particular, it noted that due to its infrequent use in southern Australia, television and radio stations ‘have difficulty locating the signal when they need to play it and the public is largely unaware of its significance. Reluctance to use the signal when local communities are threatened by bushfire has led to the signal being virtually ineffective as a national warning measure’. 21 It advocated the regular use of SEWS during periods of bushfire threat. COAG’s findings and recommendations were sound and have been justified in light of the evidence before the Commission. It is regrettable that a nationally consistent approach to bushfire warnings has not been developed, and that SEWS fell into disuse in Victoria prior to 7 February 2009. This is discussed in more detail at paragraphs 4.189–4.205. 123
Page 1 and 2: WARNINGS 4
Page 3: Warnings 4.6 4.7 The content of war
Page 7 and 8: Warnings 4.38 4.39 4.40 There is a
Page 9 and 10: Warnings 4.51 Though this 2005 pape
Page 11 and 12: Warnings 4.70 The introduction of C
Page 13 and 14: Warnings 4.80 Emergency messages ar
Page 15 and 16: Warnings 4.92 However, it is also c
Page 17 and 18: Warnings ■■ Information was pub
Page 19 and 20: Warnings In summary, for many of th
Page 21 and 22: Warnings 4.132 Mr John O’Neill of
Page 23 and 24: Warnings I cannot understand how if
Page 25 and 26: Warnings RECOMMENDATION 4.2 The Sta
Page 27 and 28: Warnings 4.180 The second stage, th
Page 29 and 30: Warnings 4.199 The South Australian
Page 31 and 32: Warnings 274 4.213 The CFA’s oppo
Page 33 and 34: Warnings 4.233 Sirens are one of a
Page 35 and 36: Warnings 4.250 The Commission is en

Chapter 4 - Warnings - 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

You also want an ePaper? Increase the reach of your titles

Delete template?

Save as template?