Chapter 4 - Warnings - 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report
4 WARNINGS
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5 February: the CFA’s Chief Officer and DSE Chief Fire Officer were on ABC statewide radio. They referred
to the ‘unprecedented fire weather’, the fact that, ‘Saturday appears to be worse in terms of weather forecast
terms, than the 16th of February 1983’. In his interview, Mr Rees noted in particular that people might form
the view: ‘given where the situation is, I’m going to make the decision not to be there — that is a very valid
decision’. Mr Ewan Waller, Chief Fire Officer, DSE, noted that people should ‘get mentally prepared as well as
physically prepared for a very, very, very difficult day’. He also stated that fire ‘could be anywhere in Victoria’.
Mr Rees noted the concern that fires in these sort of conditions ‘can pop up really quickly and unless you’re
vigilant, and alert and looking about you may not even get that warning’. 108
6 February: further media releases were issued, for example: Campers urged to stay home during extreme
conditions; 109 Extreme Fire Threat; 110 Extreme Fire Weather Warning; 111 Avoid all unnecessary travel
tomorrow; 112 and High Fire Danger Saturday 7 February. 113
6 February: during the press conference at Ballarat, the Premier said: ‘The worst day ever in the history
of this State’…‘I can’t stress this enough, I mean I know the Chief Fire Officer has been out and he said
it will be as bad as you can get and he is not exaggerating’. 114
6 February: Mr Rees said we would see ‘weather that perhaps we have never had in the State of Victoria
in respect of fire danger’. 115 He also released a podcast which was available online at www.cfa.vic.gov.au
in which he provided a series of statements about the weather, the state of the fuel and the legitimacy of
leaving property. He said ‘we would rather be talking about lost houses than lost lives’. 116
7 February: Mr Esplin was interviewed on ABC Radio at 11:15am, where he said, among other comments:
‘These fires can come and go in the space of an afternoon and do untold damage and that’s what
happened in Ash Wednesday in 1983 — rapid onset, fast moving into built up areas and the human
toll was huge and we don’t want that today’. 117
This narrative indicates that a great deal of information on bushfires and the risk of bushfires was broadcast
in Victoria throughout the 2008–09 bushfire season, and particularly in early February 2009. This material
was generally of a high quality, attracted significant media attention and achieved high media ‘penetration’. 118
Professor Handmer expressed the view that the use of a person such as the Premier to disseminate messages
is very useful and likely to carry high credibility. 119
Mr Esplin remarked:
I haven’t seen a situation where as many warnings were delivered in that period of time, in such
a period of time. Warnings that were stark and clear and unequivocal about the level of risk. 120
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After the fires, the OESC commissioned an independent media analysis of the radio, television and print
coverage for the period 4–7 February. 121 The media analysis confirms that terminology related to fire
predictions and the dire weather forecasts, such as ‘warnings’, ‘heatwave’ and ‘bushfire’ were used
repeatedly in the lead up to 7 February. 122
Professor Handmer stated that the ad hoc high-level ‘warnings’ from people such as the Premier, the Chief
Fire Officers and the Emergency Services Commissioner were ‘very clear not only about the risk in physical
terms, but also the types of people who might be most vulnerable and the sorts of things that perhaps
people could do’. 123
The message delivered in the days leading up to 7 February were direct in their meaning. The words of the
Premier, the Chief Fire Officers and the Emergency Services Commissioner showed foresight. Each of them
was honest, forthright and explicit in the information and advice they gave. There is no doubt that each went
to great lengths to disseminate the message that Victoria was facing an extreme fire risk.
These messages no doubt contributed to many Victorians’ preparedness and, possibly, were responsible
for saving the lives of some who heeded those words and left bushfire prone areas prior to 7 February
and/or undertook additional preparations for the bushfire threat.
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