Chapter 4 - Warnings - 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission—Interim Report
4 WARNINGS
It is something that I particularly feel quite passionate about; that all broadcasters should be given
an equal footing and all broadcasters should be given equal access to the information … it would be
impossible to say that everybody was listening to the ABC on February 7. Given the volume of calls that
we received on that night, I would suggest that that’s not the case. Therefore all radio stations … in a
given area should be given equal access to the information. 153
4.114 Efforts should be made to pursue this willingness of commercial radio interests to enter into arrangements
and commitments similar to those with the ABC.
4.115 The State indicated in its submissions that the OESC has already decided to negotiate with commercial
broadcasters who wish to act as emergency broadcasters and thereby ‘extend the reach of warnings
delivered by radio and beyond the audience of the ABC’. 154 This development is welcomed. However, the
Commission notes that success in extending the emergency broadcaster network will require commitment
by the parties on an ongoing basis.
HOW DID THE COMMUNITY RECEIVE AND UNDERSTAND THE WARNINGS
on 7 february?
4.116 Evidence previously described in this chapter confirmed that a large volume of warnings was issued in
various forms and at different times during 7 February. The Commission has also paid careful attention
to the content, accuracy and timelines of the warnings, the detail of their accessibility to the communities
directly affected by the fires, and to the nature of their general dissemination.
Interim report of the Bushfire CRC
4.117 The Bushfire CRC has produced an interim report on its investigation into the fires: Victorian 2009 Bushfire
Research Response Interim Report (June 2009). 155 That report included a detailed study of human behaviour
and community safety. 156 The themes that emerged included the existence of low levels of awareness prior
to 7 February, criticisms of some of the sources of information relied on by the community and concerns
about an absence of timely warnings.
4.118 The report’s findings were based on preliminary analysis of 201 (or approximately one third) of the interviews
conducted by the research team. 157 The researchers’ preliminary analysis of the material indicated that a
minority of those interviewed (about one in five) spoke of some level of awareness of heightened risk of fire
predicted for 7 February, although it was noted that not all interviewees were asked specifically about this. 158
Very few of those interviewed indicated that the forecast and warnings had resulted in them changing their
behaviour prior to 7 February. The report noted that:
The most frequent outcome of the early predictions and warnings was to raise general, non specific
concern about the possibility of fire, and to probably promote a ‘wait and see on the day’ response.
Only a small minority of residents of at risk communities appear to have interpreted the warnings as
having implications for their personal safety and the security of their property resulting in either earlier
action to prepare their property for a defence, or a decision to be elsewhere. 159
136
4.119 Most interviewees reported receiving information via the radio on 7 February. Very few made references
to specific and useful information having being broadcast. 160 The report noted that for many interviewed,
the lack of timely information about developing threats to communities such as St Andrews, Strathewen,
Kinglake, Kinglake West, Narbethong and Marysville, especially late in the day when fire activity was rapidly
increasing, may have contributed to people being surprised by the sudden impact of the fires. Because
those communities were not identified as being under threat, many residents appear to have assumed
they were unlikely to be threatened. 161
4.120 Many interviewees reported seeking information from the CFA and DSE websites and were critical of those
sites. 162 Particularly in Bendigo and Marysville, those interviewed also indicated that direct verbal warnings
from police officers and CFA and SES volunteers were very important in enabling residents to evacuate
safely. 163 The report concluded: