Chapter 4 - Warnings - 2009 Victorian Bushfires Royal Commission

Warnings
4.92
However, it is also clear that for many Victorians these general awareness messages and advice were not
sufficient to alert them to the threat caused by any particular bushfire, nor were they translated into a ‘call to
action’ in all cases. Such statements in the media prepare the community only to the extent that individuals
respond, prepare and listen for specific bushfire warnings which may follow. This can in part be explained by
the evidence of Professor Douglas Paton, Chair, School of Psychology, University of Tasmania, who discussed
the various factors (individual, social and structural) that influence a person’s level of bushfire preparedness. 124
BUSHFIRE WARNINGS ON 7 FEBRUARY
4.93
4.94
4.95
An outline of the specific warnings issued on 7 February is provided in Chapter 1. This section provides
a broader discussion about different types of warnings. The Commission will hear further evidence on the
warnings given for each major fire in future hearings.
Mr Rhodes stated that the methods the CFA uses to disseminate information include:
■■
information releases, which are uploaded to the CFA website ( www.cfa.vic.gov.au), read aloud
on ABC Radio, and provided to the VBIL, so that they can be used to respond to public enquiries
■■ a hotline number established with ABC Radio, so that a designated CFA officer can contact the control
room direct to broadcast urgent threat messages
■■ the VBIL, which is a free call number the public can call to obtain information about current fire threats,
preparedness advice and also recovery information
■■ community meetings held during fire threats that provide community-specific warning information
and advice
■■ information releases provided to local radio stations by regional offices and Incident Control Centres
before they have been sent through to the iECC
■■ community fireguard telephone trees, which work by one member contacting two or more other members
when they become aware of a threat, who in turn contact other telephone tree members and so on
■■ local community members with access to scanners that can monitor CFA radio communications to pick
up information direct from the fire ground. 125
There is evidence before the Commission about each of these methods of information dissemination.
It emerged that on 7 February agency websites and ABC broadcasts were the most common sources
of information and warnings about bushfires for most Victorians, though other sources played a
complementary role.
THE CFA and DSE websites
4.96 On 7 February the CFA and DSE issued warnings for a large number of fires. The pressure on the agencies’
staff and volunteers was extreme and all those involved were forced to cope with a rapidly evolving situation
and threats posed by multiple emergencies. At times, there were obvious limitations on their capacity to
supply information on fires. Mr Waller noted the following:
It was extremely difficult to provide accurate information as all fires were moving extremely quickly and
spotting long distances. Fires moved rapidly into difficult terrain where it is difficult to track progress and
is dangerous to access. There was intensive short distance spotting. Surveillance was also restricted as
at times planes could not fly with the strong winds, or could not safely approach the smoke plume and
infra red scanning was not possible. Ground observation was also limited because [sic] the concern for
safety. Incoming reports on fires from the public had to be quickly verified before possible inclusion in
messaging on where a fire front may be. 126
4.97
Mr Rees produced a copy of all bushfire warning messages posted to the CFA website on 7 and
8 February. 127 Mr Waller produced a detailed compilation of all the information and warnings issued
by DSE on 7 February, including the information posted on the DSE website and sent to the ABC. 128
133