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Report of the Investigation Team Bulla Tanker 7 February 2009 ...

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CFA.001.027.0018<br />

The fire was part <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> large Kilmore East Fire Complex which originated near<br />

Kilmore East and was reported by <strong>the</strong> Mount Hickey Fire Tower at 1149 hours.<br />

The fire destroyed 255,000 hectares <strong>of</strong> private and public land in <strong>the</strong> Kinglake,<br />

Kinglake West, Stra<strong>the</strong>wen and numerous o<strong>the</strong>r communities resulting in 159<br />

fatalities and destroyed 1639 buildings.<br />

3.3 Wea<strong>the</strong>r at <strong>the</strong> Time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Incident<br />

The wea<strong>the</strong>r conditions were generally as expected with extreme temperatures in<br />

<strong>the</strong> mid 40’s and gusty N-NW winds ahead <strong>of</strong> a strong S-SW wind change which<br />

occurred shortly after <strong>the</strong> incident. (Refer to Schedule 6.3)<br />

3.4 Fire Behaviour<br />

Fire behaviour on <strong>the</strong> day was extreme with spotting activity many kilometres<br />

ahead <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> main fire. Rates <strong>of</strong> spread were up to 8 to 12 kilometres per hour<br />

according to post incident analysis conducted by fire behaviour analysts. Despite<br />

<strong>the</strong> large number <strong>of</strong> fire fighting resources deployed, control <strong>of</strong> fires under <strong>the</strong><br />

prevailing conditions was considered impossible. Crews resorted to <strong>the</strong> protection<br />

<strong>of</strong> individual assets and people while undertaking procedures to ensure <strong>the</strong>ir own<br />

safety and survival. At <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> burn over crews described <strong>the</strong> fire<br />

behaviour as “a fire storm” which hit with little warning and from at least two<br />

directions with a very loud roaring noise. The “fire storm” consisted <strong>of</strong> a very loud<br />

roaring noise, strong winds, dark smoke and severe ember attack.<br />

4. ANALYSIS – OBSERVATIONS<br />

Note: For fur<strong>the</strong>r information on ST 1402 Deployment and Background this<br />

<strong>Report</strong> should be read in conjunction with <strong>the</strong> Craigieburn Car <strong>Report</strong>.<br />

4.1 Incident Sequence<br />

4.1.1 Appointment <strong>of</strong> Crew for <strong>Bulla</strong> <strong>Tanker</strong><br />

The crew members for <strong>Bulla</strong> <strong>Tanker</strong> were selected at <strong>the</strong> time <strong>of</strong> deployment<br />

from Brigade members who were at <strong>the</strong> station at <strong>the</strong> time (approx 1500 Hrs).<br />

The selection was based on having a good mix <strong>of</strong> experienced members plus<br />

providing an opportunity for a young member to gain experience. This<br />

resulted in six members being selected as <strong>the</strong> crew. There was also<br />

consideration that enough experience was left to provide protection to <strong>the</strong><br />

township <strong>of</strong> <strong>Bulla</strong> with members experienced and trained in <strong>the</strong> operation <strong>of</strong><br />

<strong>the</strong> Brigades Quick Attack appliance.<br />

4.1.2 Briefing <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> <strong>Tanker</strong> Crew<br />

The <strong>Bulla</strong> <strong>Tanker</strong> Crew did not receive any briefing at any stage though it was<br />

noticed <strong>the</strong> Strike <strong>Team</strong> Leader was having trouble getting any useful<br />

information on <strong>the</strong> requirements <strong>of</strong> <strong>the</strong> Strike <strong>Team</strong> while <strong>the</strong>y were stopped<br />

at Wallan <strong>the</strong>n Whittlesea. Any information received by <strong>the</strong> Crew Leader was<br />

passed on to all members <strong>of</strong> his Crew as required.<br />

4.1.3 Arrival at Whittlesea Fire Station and Briefing<br />

<strong>Bulla</strong> <strong>Tanker</strong> Burnover – 600 Whittlesea-Yea Road – 07/02/<strong>2009</strong><br />

Page6<br />

DRAFT – CFA internal working document

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