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Deutsche Bank 1 - Historische Gesellschaft der Deutschen Bank e.V.

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"Ad-Hoc Programme". Unfortunately, however, tangible<br />

successes in the sense of an "or<strong>der</strong>ly floating" have not<br />

yet materialised, though one should not forget, of<br />

Course, that the cornbined inflow of oil surpluses has<br />

placed particularly difficult obstacles in the way of cen-<br />

tral bank cooperation. On the other hand, an alternative<br />

to the present exchange rate system is not in sight at the<br />

moment.<br />

By the end of 1974, after fluctuations in the latter Part<br />

of the year, the D-Mark had appreciated by about 8%<br />

against all currencies and by 15% against the US Dollar<br />

since the beginning of the year. This reflected, above all,<br />

the Fe<strong>der</strong>al Republic's strong foreign trade position.<br />

The "mini-snake", i.e. the bloc-floating of five EC-<br />

currencies (including the D-Mark) and two Scandinavian<br />

currencies, has functioned smoothly. France withdrew<br />

frorn this rnonetary association in Spring 1974. While the<br />

base rates of the mernber currencies had to be altered<br />

several times during 1973, no adjustments have been<br />

necessary since then.<br />

Little Progress in European integration<br />

The prospects for an early completion of the European<br />

Economic and Monetary Union did not irnprove in 1974.<br />

The oil price crisis has intensified the structural differ-<br />

ences existing in Europe. The divergencies in the infla-<br />

tion rates within the Cornrnunity and in the balance of<br />

payments positions of individual countries are greater<br />

than ever. ltaly implemented measures to restrict im-<br />

ports ternporarily, in its trade with the EC-partners as<br />

well. National differences are rnaking it rnore difficult to<br />

reach agreernent on a cornrnon energy policy. Further<br />

negative factors proved to be the British desire for a re-<br />

examination of its conditions of membership and the<br />

Referendum planned for the summer.<br />

Nevertheless, un<strong>der</strong> the pressure of the new crisis<br />

situation, it was possible to achieve sorne success in<br />

questions of financial solidarity. Towards the end of the<br />

year, the EC's medium-term rnonetary assistance was<br />

rnobilised in favour of Italy; with these funds, short-term<br />

EC-loans totalling 1.2 bn. units of account (UA) were re-<br />

deemed. The Fe<strong>der</strong>al Republic placed a US-$2 bn. gold-<br />

secured loan at Italy's disposal.<br />

The purpose of the EC-loan planned for 1975 and to be<br />

guaranteed by the member countries, is to raise US-$ 2<br />

bn., primarily in OPEC states, in favour of Partner nations<br />

with a weak balance of payments position. The much-<br />

disputed "European Regional Development Fund" has<br />

been in existence since the beginning of 1975 and was<br />

allocated 1.3 bn. units of account (UA) for a trial period<br />

of three years. It may also be adjudged a positive deve-<br />

lopment that, at the latest round of monetary negotia-<br />

tions within the framework of the Group of Ten and the<br />

IMF in Washington, the EC member-states took up a<br />

common stand.<br />

It is still true that the future fate of European integra-<br />

tion depends on political decisions taken at the highest<br />

level. These are influenced by, amongst other things,<br />

everyday economic and monetary practices in the indi-<br />

vidual EC-countries. To secure what has been achieved<br />

and to create a sound basis for a renewed effort, all the<br />

member-states must work far more energetically than<br />

they have done in the past towards a coordinated stabil-<br />

ity policy. The necessary financial assistance in favour of<br />

the weaker Partners rnust be given selectively with a<br />

view to reinforcing their econornic structures. Only then<br />

can there be hope that the current disequilibria within<br />

the Community can be reduced to a tolerable magnitude<br />

in the foreseeable future.

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