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CHNN 22, Spring 2008 - School of Social Sciences

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epudiated, and you apologise to Tito for things which you call slanders, it inevitably meant that<br />

the trials themselves were false. This then immediately led on to another question. If these trials<br />

were false and they had a great deal in common in the whole nature <strong>of</strong> them with the Moscow<br />

trials, what about the Moscow trials? I was raising this right from June 1955 following the<br />

Khrushchev-Bulganin visit to Yugoslavia; raising it with colleagues in the YCL, the YCL leadership,<br />

more or less anybody, Klugmann and all these people. I got no satisfactory reply <strong>of</strong> course. We had<br />

to fight right through to get the communist party <strong>of</strong>ficially to repudiate the Moscow trials. I fought<br />

for years and years and years, and it wasn’t until 1988, I think, that we actually repudiated the<br />

trials and the support for the Moscow trials.<br />

I hadn’t just accepted the East European trials for their own sake, but I was influenced by what<br />

appeared to me to be relatively plausible indictments; the Rajk thing, how he had been a young<br />

communist activist who was then arrested in the thirties, and he was recruited when he was<br />

arrested and so on – it appeared to be plausible. One’s initial inclination was to try to find a<br />

plausibility in these trials, because the implication, politically, if one found no plausibility in them,<br />

was that you had to then call into question the whole <strong>of</strong> the nature <strong>of</strong> the regimes that shoot their<br />

leaders on framed-up charges. There was a correspondence I remember in the New Statesman<br />

regarding this, in which Dutt and various other people took part. But in general it seemed to me<br />

that things were progressing in these countries from what I understood. Obviously I looked at<br />

things greatly through much too rose-coloured spectacles, because one wanted to see these things<br />

succeed. I’d visited the GDR in 1951, when I worked for three months in Berlin in preparation for<br />

the world youth festival. Before that I was a month in Czechoslovakia at the end <strong>of</strong> 1950, because<br />

Valerie, my wife, was in a sanatorium, and with Pollitt’s help I got a visa to go and stay out there for<br />

a month. I went down the mines with a student brigade; it seemed to be positive. I don’t know<br />

Czech, so it was limited what I could get out <strong>of</strong> it, but as far as Germany was concerned I did know<br />

the language and it was a period <strong>of</strong> positive feelings and objectives and reconstruction and so on.<br />

So I did accept the trials at the time, and even wrote in Challenge justifying the Slansky trial.<br />

Darkness at Noon, which I’d read, was an extremely fascinating psychological study, but it was not<br />

concerned with the factual basis <strong>of</strong> the trials. It was possible to read Darkness at Noon as an<br />

extremely clever psychological study without seeing anything in it, because there wasn’t anything<br />

in it, that could call into question the factual basis <strong>of</strong> the trials.<br />

T<br />

he secret speech was pretty shocking even though it wasn’t entirely out <strong>of</strong> the blue. I found<br />

that the Yugoslav apology raised questions about the Moscow trials, though it didn’t<br />

answer those questions. Khrushchev’s speech answered a lot <strong>of</strong> questions in an extremely<br />

negative way. I regarded these as absolutely shattering revelations, that it was necessary to make a<br />

much deeper analysis <strong>of</strong> our whole attitude to the Soviet Union. This is what I argued in the YCL<br />

leadership and you will see reports <strong>of</strong> discussions in the YCL on this question. John Moss and<br />

Gerry Cohen, the national secretary and the national organiser, basically followed the party line,<br />

which was to try to minimise everything. There is no doubt that there was an attempt to play down<br />

the gravity <strong>of</strong> the revelations and to say, you know, ‘The Russians have now revealed it all, they’ve<br />

shown great courage, and this means that everything’s going to be alright in the future.’ Another<br />

thing I was very critical <strong>of</strong> was the argument that it was all a question <strong>of</strong> the cult <strong>of</strong> personality, and<br />

we haven’t got the cult any more – which they hadn’t <strong>of</strong> course – therefore, nothing to worry about;<br />

which <strong>of</strong> course is nonsense. From thereon in we had the most virulent battles in the YCL<br />

leadership; not only the EC sub-committee but the EC itself, and the national committee. These<br />

struggles went on right through ’56, ’57, right up to the last one which I was involved in, which was<br />

the summer <strong>of</strong> 1958 with the execution <strong>of</strong> Imre Nagy. As far as I was concerned, this was just a<br />

continuation <strong>of</strong> the old stalinist practice <strong>of</strong> killing those political leaders who you disagreed with or<br />

wanted to get out <strong>of</strong> the way. But this was defended by people, not only John Moss, but also Jimmy<br />

Reid who’d been brought down as national organiser – which he doesn’t like being reminded <strong>of</strong>. I<br />

was the main person, I suppose – not by any means the only person – arguing for a much more<br />

critical examination <strong>of</strong> the situation in the Soviet Union and Eastern European countries. After the<br />

1956 YCL congress, I was nominated for the national secretaryship <strong>of</strong> the YCL against John Moss.<br />

There was a big battle in which John Moss was re-elected, I think by seventeen votes to ten, after<br />

the party came in through George Matthews, who attended the meeting in order to argue that they<br />

should put John Moss back as the national secretary. At a meeting <strong>of</strong> the YCL executive committee<br />

about that time, Johnny Gollan said, ‘We’re stronger than you, and if you don’t comply we’ll get rid<br />

<strong>of</strong> you and we’ll start another YCL.’<br />

29

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