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Delay and Haircuts in Sovereign Debt - University of St Andrews

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creditor is the proposer, his o¤er is ~x L = ( s)<br />

2<br />

. With an equal probability<br />

that each party is the proposer, the expected payo¤s for the Cautious debtor<br />

<br />

<strong>and</strong> the creditor at t = 2 are ;<br />

, respectively.<br />

+s<br />

2<br />

Next, we calculate the cont<strong>in</strong>uation values for each player as we move<br />

to the …rst period. Let E = p L + (1<br />

s<br />

2<br />

p) H denote the expected size <strong>of</strong><br />

. If the debtor is Optimistic, the cont<strong>in</strong>uation values for the Optimistic<br />

<br />

debtor <strong>and</strong> the creditor are<br />

, respectively. However, if the debtor<br />

<br />

(E+s)<br />

2<br />

;<br />

(E s)<br />

2<br />

E<br />

2 ; E<br />

2<br />

is Cautious, the cont<strong>in</strong>uation values for the Cautious debtor <strong>and</strong> the creditor<br />

are<br />

, respectively.<br />

At t = 1, the sovereign debtor is a proposer. Let Eg denote the expected<br />

growth <strong>of</strong> the economy, where Eg = (E L)<br />

L<br />

<strong>and</strong> r = 1 <br />

<br />

. In what follows,<br />

we present the condition for one-period delay when the debtor is Optimistic<br />

<strong>and</strong> Cautious, respectively.<br />

For the Optimistic debtor, the best o¤er that she can make is the excess<br />

<strong>of</strong> the available barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g surplus over his own cont<strong>in</strong>uation value given by<br />

E<br />

E<br />

L 2<br />

. If this o¤er falls below the creditor’s cont<strong>in</strong>uation value,<br />

2 , this<br />

o¤er will not be accepted. Formally, this condition for the …rst-period delay<br />

for the Optimistic debtor is given by<br />

L<br />

E<br />

2<br />

< E<br />

2<br />

, r < Eg:<br />

(E+s)<br />

2<br />

.<br />

For the Cautious debtor, the best o¤er that she can make is L<br />

If this o¤er falls below the creditor’s cont<strong>in</strong>uation value, (E s)<br />

2<br />

, this o¤er<br />

will not be accepted. Formally, the condition for the …rst-period delay for<br />

the Cautious debtor is given by<br />

L<br />

(E + s)<br />

2<br />

<<br />

(E s)<br />

2<br />

, r < Eg:<br />

Therefore, for either type <strong>of</strong> sovereign debtor, with relatively low prospect<br />

<strong>of</strong> economic growth, there will be no delay <strong>in</strong> the …rst period <strong>and</strong> an immediate<br />

agreement occurs. Q.E.D.<br />

Pro<strong>of</strong> <strong>of</strong> Lemma 1<br />

We beg<strong>in</strong> with the case <strong>in</strong> which the debtor is chosen to make an o¤er at<br />

t = 2. Let (x 2 ; <br />

x 2 ) denote the o¤er made by the debtor, where x 2 <strong>and</strong><br />

x 2 are payo¤ for the debtor <strong>and</strong> the creditor’s share <strong>of</strong> the barga<strong>in</strong><strong>in</strong>g<br />

( s)<br />

surplus, respectively. Let ~x 2 be the solution to x 2 =<br />

2<br />

, where<br />

29

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