Icebreaker Replacement - The Columbia Group

3
Introduction
January 6, 2012: On the Bering Sea 250
miles south of Nome, Alaska, the Coast
Guard Cutter Healy breaks the ice near
the tanker vessel Renda after it became
stopped in ice, so the Renda could
resume its voyage. (Photo courtesy of
U.S. Coast Guard.)
n this publication, two years ago, a case was made for the increasing need of new polar
Iicebreakers for the U.S. Coast Guard. The article concluded that “The time has already
passed when the U.S. should have started the long process of acquiring two new vessels to
replace the Polar Class.” This echoed the 2007 conclusion by the National Research Council
that the United States should “immediately” begin the design and construction of two new
polar icebreakers, and the later 2008 statement by then Coast Guard Commandant Admiral
Thad Allen that the Coast Guard was “at a crisis point” on a decision to build new icebreakers.
Since that time, ongoing disagreement between congressional appropriators and the
Obama Administration over the best course to maintain the nation’s icebreaking capability
has led to continuing delays in funding any new acquisition program to begin the replacement
of the polar icebreakers.
Over the last two years, several developments have occurred that reinforce the urgency for
the U.S. Coast Guard to maintain or even expand their capabilities in the Arctic. Most significantly,
the area of the arctic that remains ice-covered has continued to decrease steadily,
with 2012 set to be the smallest percentage of ice coverage since 1979 when records began.
(See Figure 1 on next page.) With increased access to artic waters comes a corresponding
increase in activity for shipping, resource exploration / extraction, and tourism. The most
visible sign of this phenomenon over the past several months has been Shell’s efforts to
develop exploratory wells in areas that were previously largely ice-covered. While technical
challenges and an abundance of caution prevented the completion of these wells this year,
efforts will continue next season to establish these wells and begin tapping the oil and gas
resources beneath the Beaufort and Chukchi seas.
Despite this activity increase, the only two heavy icebreakers in the U. S. inventory, the Polar
Star and the Polar Sea, remain non-operational. Other than a privately-owned medium
icebreaker leased by the National Science Foundation, the USCGC Healy (WAGB – 20) remains
the only operational U.S. Icebreaker. While the Healy possesses significant capability
to support scientific research, unlike the Polar Star and Polar Sea, Healy is not capable of
heavy icebreaking as is required, for example, for break-in and resupply of McMurdo station
in Antarctica. Instead, recent heavy icebreaking requirements have been met by leasing foreign
icebreakers from Sweden or Russia. Some of the limitations of the Healy were demonstrated
during the January 2012 break-in to Nome to deliver fuel oil in conjunction with an
ice-capable Russian oil tanker. While the mission was ultimately successful, the day-by-day
concerns over whether Healy would be able to continue would not have been an issue had a
heavy icebreaker been available.
Capability Gaps
In 2011, the Coast Guard provided to Congress the “High Latitude Study Mission Analysis
Report.” This report presented a broad look not just at icebreaking, but at all Coast Guard
missions in the Polar Regions. The study identified capability gaps (inabilities to fully
perform the mission) in the Coast Guard’s performance of most of its statutory missions in
the Arctic and Antarctic. The most significant shortcomings were in the areas of: Defense
Readiness; Ice Operations; Marine Environmental Protection; and Ports, Waterways
and Coastal Security. The study concluded that to meet its statutory missions, the
Coast Guard needed three heavy and three medium icebreakers. Further, if the Coast