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16 The Founder | Wednesday 28 May 2008
Special Feature - Cult of Personality
Successful cult of personality
Photograph: Miguel A. Lopes
Putin begins his
speech, intermittently
jabbing his
finger at the crowd:
“Our candidate
Dmitry Medvedev
is victorious… The presidential and
parliamentary elections were held
in accordance with the constitution
of our country, according to the
dates set forth in the law… But such
a victory is also a great responsibility.”
The crowd chants: “Putin! Putin!
Putin! Putin! Putin!” Thousands of
fists punch the air in salute. Putin
does not attempt to conceal his joy.
He continues: “This victory will
ensure that we maintain the course
that we have chosen together
and the course that we have been
implementing together; this course
will continue… Everybody who
loves Russia will join our efforts as
we work for the citizens of our great
Motherland!”
Who are the thousands of young
Putin-supporters who brave the
inclement weather, screaming with
excitement at every word he utters?
They are not wearing the distinctive
bright-red and white uniforms
of the Nashi youth movement;
nevertheless, they almost certainly
are Nashi activists, bussed into
Moscow from every corner of the
Russian Federation. Nationalistic
and fervently loyal to the outgoing
President, these Nashi members
represent the hard-core of Putin’s
support base, but they also reflect
the tremendous popularity enjoyed
by Putin across Russia.
Nashi was founded in 2005 by
politician Vasily Yakemenko. It
was created in response to the immense
street protests that brought
pro-western leaders to power in
countries that have historically
existed within the Russian sphere of
influence. Georgia’s Rose Revolution
in 2003 and Ukraine’s Orange
Revolution in 2004 both involved
a large number of students. Putin
especially felt that Viktor Yushchenko’s
victory in the Ukraine
was enabled through the protests
of youth group PORA. Nashi,
therefore, was created in order to
counter opposition youth groups
seeking revolution in Russia.
Nashi’s purpose was to create
a cult of personality for Putin,
thereby reducing the likelihood of
a popular uprising against authoritarian
rule. The organisation grew
rapidly, and by late 2007 it claimed
a membership of 120,000 Russians
aged 14-25.
Nashi insists that it is funded
by independent businessmen who
wish to gain the Kremlin’s favour.
In reality, Nashi is mainly funded
by grants from the state-owned
energy giant Gazprom (formerly
chaired by Dmitry Medvedev). The
movement also receives money
from Norilsk Nickel, a mining
and smelting company principally
owned by billionaire Putin-loyalist
Vladimir Potanin. Nashi is entirely
dependent on the patronage of
Putin and his cronies, and it exists
to do his bidding.
“
The former head
of the FSB and
an ex-KGB agent,
Putin revealed his
ruthlessness when
he launched the
second Chechen
War in 1999
”
Nashi members are indoctrinated
with nationalist ideology. They call
themselves the ‘Putin Generation’
and are motivated by slogans such
as “Russia Forward!” The name of
the organisation is designed to inspire
nationalist, anti-western (and
therefore pro-Putin) sentiment:
‘Nashi’ can be roughly translated
as ‘Ours’ or ‘Our People’. This title
conveys both a sense of Russian
identity and Russian sovereignty,
and it implicitly suggests an antagonistic
attitude towards foreign
influence in Russia.
Nashi members receive rewards
for their political work: members
often gain internships in government
departments and state-owned
energy companies. In this respect
Nashi operates in much the same
way as its communist-era forerunner,
the Soviet youth movement
Komsomol.
Yet, now that the threat of a
revolution in Russia has passed,
Nashi seems increasingly redundant.
Putin’s cult of personality has
penetrated the popular consciousness,
and he no longer needs his
youthful shock-troops. Before the
presidential election in March there
was talk in the Kremlin of Nashi
being dissolved. It is expected
that regional Nashi organisations
will be assigned new tasks: they
will be subsumed into the voluntary
groups founded by Nashi,
and Nashi members will focus on
community service. Putin is at the
height of his popularity, and he no
longer requires the security provided
by Nashi’s existence.
But why is Putin so popular?
Strongman
Putin presents himself
as a strongman
who has set out to
re-instil pride in
the heart of Russia.
The former head of
the FSB (successor to the KGB) and
an ex-KGB agent, Putin revealed
his ruthlessness before his first
presidential term when, as Prime
Minister under Boris Yeltsin, he
launched the Second Chechen War
in August 1999, brutally suppressing
the Chechen rebel movement.
In the world of Kremlin internal
politics he was equally ruthless
following his rise to the presidency.
Putin turned against the deeply
unpopular business oligarchs who
“
He is especially
adept at using
Russia’s strength
as an energy
superpower to
punish dissident
countries - he cut
off Ukraine’s gas
supply
”
had thrived under Boris Yeltsin.
Boris Berezovsky, the man who had
played kingmaker on Putin’s behalf,
fled fraud and corruption charges
in Russia, settling in the UK (he
now lives near Royal Holloway).
Mikhail Khodorkovsky, former
head of the now bankrupt Yukos
Oil Company, was tried and imprisoned
for fraud and tax-evasion.
There is a great deal of corruption
in Putin’s Russia, yet he has cultivated
the image of a man who is
unable to tolerate crime.
Putin’s aggressive foreign policy
posturing explains a great deal of
his popularity: it recaptures the
spirit of Cold War-era Russian
pride, which evaporated after the
collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991. His approach to relations
with former Soviet satellite states
reflects the Russian desire to overcome
the post-imperial melancholy
that set-in under Boris Yeltsin’s
administration. Putin is especially
adept at using Russia’s strength as
an energy superpower to punish
dissident countries. Most notably
he cut off Ukraine’s gas supplies
shortly after the Orange Revolution
in 2004.
Putin even threatened to place
nuclear warheads near Kaliningrad
if NATO carried out its intention of
installing a missile defence system
in Poland and the Czech Republic;
these warheads would be pointed
at Europe. Putin’s rhetoric became
conciliatory only on 6 April this
year when he signed an agreement
with George Bush declaring the
willingness of both sides to compromise
on missile defence.
Meanwhile, Putin threatened
that he would materially-aid the
independence movements in Georgian
regions Abkhazia and South
Ossetia; this was in retaliation for
international recognition of Kosovo’s
independence from Serbia.
The failure of NATO to earmark
Ukraine and Georgia for membership
in April was a consequence of
Putin’s forceful diplomacy, which
halted NATO encroachment on
territory that Russia traditionally
considers its own.