The Development of New Industrial Relations in Slovenia - UMAR

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members for available work, and established general rules, which partly substituted protective labour legislation. Centralised CA improve the bargaining power of trade unions and widen protection over more workers. In North America, where CA exist mainly at a company level, a decentralised SIR has been developed. The reasons are anti-monopoly public opinion and strongly rooted ideology of competitiveness and individual initiative, which hindered appropriate organisation and co-operation between employers. European unions opted for the solidarity approach (equal pay for equal work) and centralised CB. Market expansion was followed by the expansion of areas covered by CA. This should prevent such competition among employers that would lead to deterioration of working conditions for all workers. However, the globalisation of economy causing stronger competition is forcing employers to use new competitive technologies, work organisations, wage systems, etc. to adjust more quickly. Therefore, they cannot follow uniform rules. So the focus of CB is being shifted from the level of sectors to the level of companies and factories, which means the decentralisation of SIR (see table). In Sweden the importance of sectoral CA, after the collapse of central intersectoral framework of CA, diminished as well. Through the pressure of employers, company and plant CA gained importance. In the Netherlands the process of decentralisation called "organised decentralisation" was carried through by means of agreements between trade unions and employers. Elsewhere, the changes of SIR are, with centralised social agreements, taking place in both directions. In the EU a new supranational level of IR is developing. The evidence is given by two European agreements concluded by the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederations of Europe (UNICE) and the European Centre of Public Enterprises with Public Participation (CEEP). They concern parental leave and part-time work, and were adopted as directives by the EU. They represent a start of CB on the European level, and the Treaty of Amsterdam will help promote it. In CEE countries IR and SIR are at the beginning of development. The main obstacle is slow development of real employers' organisations. Tripartite consultative bodies and social agreements make the SIR very centralised. Real CB, particularly at a company level, is just at the beginning. In some cases we can even talk about the collapse of IR. In Slovenia, quite centralised CB and the SIR are expected to be partly decentralised with the integration into the EU and a more substantial inflow of foreign capital. Slovenian social partners will have to get prepared for this and take part more actively in the European IR. 6. WORKERS′ PARTICIPATION AT THE ENTERPRISE LEVEL (The part of this chapter, concerning legal issues, is partly based on Vodovnik 1999) The 1989 version of the European Company Statute (the directive part containing the rules concerning the employee participation) operates with three different models of employee participation: 1. At least one - third and not more than one - half of the supervisory board (in a two - tier board structure) or the the administrative board (in a one - tier board structure) are appointed by the employees (Germany, Denmark). 2. Employees are co - opted to the board on the basis of nominations undertaken by 20
the employee representatives (Netherlands). 3. Employees are represented through a “separate body” (Germany, Austria and some other countries). In Slovenia 1993 a model was introduced by the Law on Employee Participation in Management, which is the combination of mentioned three models. Employees participate in decision making through works councils (WC) and through their representatives in company bodies (supervisory board, management board - workers′ director). The structure of this model is similar to the German one, only that in the Slovene model the workers are in some cases given more rights and in some other less. The law from 1993 is the main legal source regulating workers′ participation in the enterprise - level decision making and is based on the constitutional right of workers to participation (Vodovnik, 1999). It determines the basic principles of workers′ participation in different types of organisations, but is more explicit in regulating the details of participation in private companies. Some participatory mechanisms have their legal bases in other laws (for example in legislation regulating the functions and structure of managing bodies in public sector organisations). The the basic individual and collective participatory rights are determined by law of 1993, but the employer and workers′ representatives are free to expand on these rights in a collective agreement, or to agree on specific methods and conditions for the implementation of the right of participation. Within an enterprise the employees are represented by the works′ council, which is elected by the employees in companies with 20 or more employed. If there are fewer than 20 employees workers can elect a single representative to assume the entire function of the works′ council.The number of members of the works′ council varies according to the number of workers employed in the company. The law stipulates precise election procedures for the workers′ representatives. It lists categories of cases in which the employer is obliged to assure access to information for workers′ representatives, cases in which common consultations should be organised before the employer makes a decision, and other cases in which the workers′ consent is required for the decision. The law states that in companies employing up to 1000 persons the works′ council may appoint one third or more of the members of the supervisory board. In larger organisations the works′ council may appoint half of the members. Workers′ representatives have the right to nominate one of the members of the managerial board. The works′ council is entitled to make such a proposal to the shareholders′ assembly. The outlined system was quickly implemented because of the principle that participation is not the duty of the company, but a right of workers. The trade unions did not oppose the system, but welcomed it as an additional tool in achieving their basic goals. According to the research on the implementation of the mentioned law (ITEO, Kavčič 1996) on a sample of enterprises the proportion of organisations in which works′ councils have been established is as follows: insurance companies 40%, public enterprises 23,7%, enterprises owned by the Development Fund (DF) 75%, foreign 21
Page 1 and 2: IMAD Institute of Macroeconomic Ana
Page 3 and 4: SUMMARY In Slovenia a stable, co-op
Page 5 and 6: This paper should also made a contr
Page 7 and 8: egan. So especially Slovenia opened
Page 9 and 10: EU standards it will not be possibl
Page 11 and 12: The Confederation of Trade Unions
Page 13 and 14: agreements. The coverage rate showe
Page 15 and 16: constructive proactive development
Page 17 and 18: independent craftsmen and small - s
Page 19: As in other countries it is expecte
Page 23 and 24: In Slovenia workers have the consti
Page 25 and 26: the term “conciliation” is used
Page 27 and 28: Central bodies for tripartite co-op
Page 29 and 30: Central bodies for tripartite co-op
Page 31 and 32: Practically none of the EU members
Page 33 and 34: structural reforms and changes to a
Page 35 and 36: national policy. Slovenia will, the
Page 37 and 38: Ministry of Labour and Social Insur

The Development of New Industrial Relations in Slovenia - UMAR

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