The Politics of Gender and Reconstruction in Afghanistan

EVOLVING INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORKS AND WOMEN’S RIGHTS: POTENTIALS AND LIMITATIONS
As a result, women constituted just under a fifth of the Loya Jirga delegates, and assumed some positions of
authority in the CLJ itself. 33 Women delegates were also able to make their voices heard, despite some unfortunate
incidents during the proceedings. 34
Prior to the CLJ, attempts were made to include women throughout Afghanistan in civic education outreach
and public consultations on the constitution. However, the process of consultation drew some criticism. Major
shortcomings that were singled out included the absence of a clear legal framework to guide its drafting, limited
public education and consultation on the draft constitution, inadequate planning for security and a general
lack of clarity about the process itself (International Crisis Group 2003).
There are marked differences in the civic education and participation opportunities available to educated, urban
women and those for their non-literate, rural sisters. Women’s NGOs were deployed to assist with the necessary
outreach to close this gap. For instance, the Afghan Women’s Network (AWN), comprising about 24 NGOs and
over 1,000 individual members, was involved in civil society efforts to ensure that the constitution took women’s
views and interests into account. These new demands stretched the capacity of women’s groups, however. The
experience of involving AWN, along with several other groups, demonstrated that much more support is needed
for groups asked to mobilize wider constituencies of women (ACSF/swisspeace 2003). Expanding their reach
beyond urban centres to represent a more diverse female constituency and reaching out to both women and men
remain significant challenges.
Furthermore, there were substantial delays in all parts of the process, due to the sensitivity of issues such as the
balance of power both within the central government and between the centre and the periphery, the role of
Islam and the rights of women. As a result, the participation of civil society groups, and women’s groups in
particular, was compromised as the process became bogged down in the politics of different political factions.
We get some indication of the type of circle the government was trying to square, given the powerful cross-currents
of internal politics in Afghanistan, in the phrasing of the paragraph titled “gender” in the National Development
Framework. It reads as follows:
… All programs must pay special attention to gender, and not include it as an afterthought. We have to
engage in a societal dialogue to enhance the opportunities of women and improve co-operation between men
and women on the basis of our culture, the experience of other Islamic countries, and the global norms of
human rights
(National Development Framework 2002:96).
33 One of the four deputy chairs of the CLJ was a woman’s rights activist, Ms Safia Sidiqui, two of the three secretaries to the CLJ were women, one of the
10 working committees was chaired by a woman, and 11 women served in the Reconciliation Committee out of a total of 40 members.
34 The most notable of these incidents centres around the furore created by Malalai Juya, a young woman delegate from Farah province, who made a speech
accusing the mujahidin of human rights abuses and inviting them to take their share of responsibility for the destruction of the country. This resulted in a
threat of expulsion from the Loya Jirga by the Chairman and furious outbursts by mujahidin representatives. Some gathered outside the women’s dormitory
at the Kabul Polytechnic Institute chanting “Death to Communists”. Accusations flew in the Mujahid press organs that she was a member of RAWA
and an agent provocateur. There were protests in the liberal press over her treatment and expressions of support. The UN stepped in to offer Malalai Juya
protection and the threat of expulsion was stalled.
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