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Vogtle - AppendixR.com

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.02 Fire Protection of Safe Shutdown Capability<br />

a. Inspection Scope<br />

3<br />

For the selected fire areas/zones, the inspectors evaluated the potential for fires, the<br />

<strong>com</strong>bustible fire load characteristics, potential exposure fire severity, the separation of<br />

systems necessary to achieve safe shutdown, and the separation of electrical<br />

<strong>com</strong>ponents and circuits to ensure that at least one safe shutdown path was free of fire<br />

damage. The inspectors reviewed selected portions of the UFSAR Section 9.5.1, Fire<br />

Protection Program, Appendix 9A, Fire Hazards Analysis, and Appendix 9B,<br />

Comparison of VEGP Units 1 and 2 with Requirements of the BTP CMEB 9.5-1. This<br />

review was conducted to determine if the licensee’s <strong>com</strong>mitments, as established in the<br />

fire protection licensing basis documents, were satisfied.<br />

The inspectors reviewed the licensee’s documents which establish and implement<br />

controls and practices to prevent fires and to control the storage of permanent and<br />

transient <strong>com</strong>bustible materials and ignition sources, to verify that the objectives<br />

established by the NRC-approved fire protection program were satisfied. The<br />

documents reviewed are listed in the attachment.<br />

The inspectors reviewed the basic layout of the plant and raceway system to verify that<br />

it provided good physical separation of redundant circuits, therefore limiting the<br />

possibility that redundant circuits would be routed in the same fire zone. For example,<br />

there were two separate main control room termination cabinet/cable spreading rooms,<br />

one below the control room for Train A cables and one above the control room for Train<br />

B cables. In addition, the team walked down the selected fire zones to look for cases of<br />

redundant cables routed in the same zone.<br />

The inspectors toured the selected plant fire areas/zones to observe: (1) the material<br />

condition of fire protection systems and equipment, (2) the storage of permanent and<br />

transient <strong>com</strong>bustible materials, and (3) the licensee’s implementation of the<br />

programmatic procedures for limiting fire hazards, <strong>com</strong>bustible waste collection,<br />

housekeeping practices, and cleanliness conditions. These reviews were ac<strong>com</strong>plished<br />

to ensure that the licensee was maintaining the fire protection systems, had properly<br />

evaluated in-situ <strong>com</strong>bustible fire loads, controlled hot-work activities, and limited<br />

transient fire hazards in a manner consistent with the UFSAR, administrative procedures<br />

and other fire protection program procedures. In addition, the inspectors reviewed<br />

design control procedures to determine if plant changes were adequately evaluated for<br />

the potential impact on the fire protection program, safe shutdown equipment, and plant<br />

procedures (as required by the fire protection program).<br />

The inspectors reviewed operator and fire brigade staffing, fire brigade response, fire<br />

brigade qualification training and drill program procedures, and fire brigade drill critiques<br />

for brigade shifts from January 2002, to August 2004. The reviews were performed to<br />

determine whether fire brigade drills had been conducted in high fire risk plant areas<br />

and whether fire brigade personnel training, qualifications, manning assignments, drill<br />

response, and performance met the requirements of the fire protection program.

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