Asian-Arab philosophical dialogues on globalization, democracy ...

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Asia-<strong>Arab</strong> Philosophical Dialogues on Globalization, Democracy and Human Rights
after World War I. 18 As in the case of Gandhian swaraj, leading a responsible life in society involves selfrestraint
and the abandonment of domineering impulses. In Confucius’s own words, humaneness or
to be properly human (jen) means “to conquer oneself (k’e-chi) and to return to propriety (fu-li)”. As Tu
Weiming comments, however, the notion of “conquering oneself” should not be misconstrued in the
sense of self-erasure in favor of heteronomous forces. The Confucian idea, he writes, does not mean
“that one should engage in a bitter struggle” of conquest; rather the concept of k’e-chi is “closely linked
to the concept of self-cultivation (hsiu-shen)” or self-transformation and hence to the task of responsible
and responsive social agency. 19
More difficult to assess is the relation of Confucian thought to modern democracy seen as popular
self-rule and self-government. In large measure, the difficulty arises from the fact that, in contrast to
the Gandhian legacy, traditional Confucianism is silent on democracy and the political implications of
human agency. This silence is often taken as evidence of the utter incompatibility of Confucian teachings
and democratic regimes. In the words of the China-scholar Ni Peinim: “The dominant view today still
holds that Confucianism and democracy are like water and fire, totally incompatible and antagonistic to
each other”. According to this view, the former is “authoritarian, repressive, and typically associated with
totalitarian policies, uniformity of ideology, social hierarchy, and discrimination against women”—while
democracy is “the very opposite”. 20 In a similar vein, William Theodore de Bary has pointed out that,
during much of the twentieth century, Confucianism “was made to stand for all that was backward and
benighted in China: it bore all the burden of the past, charged with innumerable sins of the old order”.
When in 1999—he adds—the “Goddess of Democracy” was publicly displayed in Tian-anmen Square,
the display was a revolt not only against Communist repression but also against the older Confucian
tradition. 21 In this context, traditional Confucian sayings like “The common people are the root or
foundation of society” (from the Shujing) are widely regarded as pious placebos devoid of concrete
political connotations.
At this point, it becomes important to ask what precisely is at issue. Does the claimed incompatibility
prevail between Confucianism and democracy tout court, or between the former and a certain kind
of liberalism or liberal democracy? In the latter case, the meaning of “liberal” and “liberalism” becomes
decisive. Do these terms refer to the ethical kind of liberalism which can be traced from Montesquieu
and Hegel all the way to Dewey’s definition of democracy as an ethical community? Or do we mean the
self-seeking, laissez-faire liberalism which ultimately reduces social life to an atomistic state of nature?
In the former case—making room for creative adjustments—it seems quite possible to envisage a
harmony between Confucianism and modern democracy. In the latter case, harmony or compatibility
is clearly excluded—but only because self-centered liberalism is at variance with democracy as such (or
only allows for minimalist democracy). The need for a creative adjustment or rethinking of traditional
teachings is today acknowledged by many Confucian scholars, especially by such “New Confucians”
as Tu Weiming and Liu Shu-hsien. As the latter has aptly stated: “We have to reject the tradition in
order to reaffirm the ideal of the tradition”. 22 However, such a rethinking of Confucian teachings also
requires, as a complementary move, a rethinking of prevalent modern Western ideas—away from the
egocentric preferences of democratic minimalism in the direction of a responsible democratic ethos.
18 Confucian Thought, p. 175.
19 See Tu Weiming. 1979. The Creative Tension Between Jen and Li, in his Humanity and Self-Cultivation: Essays in
Confucian Thought. Berkeley, <strong>Asian</strong> Humanities Press, p. 6; also Confucius, The Analects, 12:1. Regarding the relation
between Confucianism and pragmatism compare Hall, David L. and Ames, Roger T. 1987. Thinking Through Confucius.
Albany, NY, State University of New York Press, p. 15: “If contemporary comparative philosophic activity is any
indication, it might be the pragmatic philosophies associated with Pierce, James, Dewey, and Mead, and extended
toward process philosophy such as that of A. N. Whitehead, that can serve as the best resource for <strong>philosophical</strong>
concepts and doctrines permitting responsible access to Confucius’ thought”.
20 Ni Peinim. 2008. Confucianism and Democracy: Water and Fire? Water and Oil? Or Water and Fish? In Defense of
Henry Rosemont’s View. Marthe Chandler and Ronnie Littlejohn, (eds), Polishing the Chinese Mirror: Essays in Honor of
Henry Rosemont, Jr. New York, Global Scholarly Publications, p. 90.
21 de Bary, Wm. Theodore. 1991. The Trouble with Confucianism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, p. 103-108.
22 Liu Shu-hsien, “From the People-as-the-Root to Democracy” (in Chinese); quoted from Ni Peinim, Confucianism and
Democracy, p. 99.